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ABSTRACT
This research analyses an area of public housing construction .policy in 
Britain, the building of high riee flats (defined as those in blocks of five 
or more storeys).
The national political process on the issue involved central government 
subsidy policy (which encouraged local authorities to build high until 19^7) f 
and the influence of the design professions, the construction industry and the 
national local government system on trends in high flat construction* The policy 
was largely confined to inner urban areas, where the operation of the 19^7 
planning system within an anachronistic local government structure forced local 
authorities to try to meet their housing needs in situ. High rise became 
characterized as a 'technological shortcut to social change* by production 
interests, and pursued despite its relative unpopularity and considerably greater 
costs. A weak structure of Ministry cost controls combined with the provision 
of strong subsidy incentives (both premiesed upon inaccurate expectations of 
local authorities'1 response), resulted in considerable over-building of high 
rise and a major change in the balance of public housing construction policy. 
Contractual pressure on local authorities and central government by large 
national construction firms can be seen as the basic dynamic of the high rise 
housing boom.
The local level political process on high rise is examined in case studies 
of three widely differing areas - Newham, Birmingham and Bristol. Ths develop- 
ment of housing construction policies in these areas was essentially similar, ana 
largely explicable in terms of non-local, structural influences, Ebcplanations of 
policy change in terms of the system of actors in each locality proved inadequate, 
despite the importance of some distinctive local factors.
Theoretically the study offers little support to pluralist or elite 
approaches. 'Mew Pluralist' thsory emerges as descriptively accurate but 
normatively optimistic, and the neo-K&rrdst critique is found to have relevance 
at points.
«  T   
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This is a study of a single political issue in contemporary Britain. It 
is first and foremost a piece of empirical research, seeking to analyse and 
understand the complex influences and processes which lay behind a particular 
series of policy outcomes. Policy studies of this kind are relatively rare in 
British political science, largely because of the extent of governmental 
secrecy in this country. That 1 was able to carry out this research at all is 
due primarily to the help and co-operation of those people in central and 
local government who provided information, granted rne access to statistics 
and documentary evidence, or gave up some of their time to be interviewede To 
all of them I am very grateful, particularly to a small number cf current and 
former civil servants interviewed who, at their request, are not thanked by
*
name in the relevant Chapters below.
The debts accumulated to people in academic life who have advised or 
helped me are also numerous. Peter Malpass, Chris Pickvancej architectural 
staff at Oxford Polytechnic (especially Roland Newman), Bill Connolly, and 
Betty Gittus provided invaluable guidance in strange territory. I was particu- 
larly lucky to be able to undertake this research at Nuffield College, and 
without the help of a number of colleagues in other disciplines, including 
Aubrey Silberston, Steve Nyman, Clyde Mitchell, Arthur Francis, Clive Payne> 
and others, this study would have been a good deal poorer and less accurate. 
In political science David Butler and Neville Johnson advised me on aspects of 
Briticui politics and the Nuffield politics group provided a wide variety of 
intellectual stimuli. Jim Sharpe and Ken Newton especially helped me define 
my ideas on urban politics, and Jim Sharpe during and after his spell as IP;Y 
college supervisor commented extensively on several drafts of the thesis. Sir 
Nonian Chester h-As boen iv.y university s'.ipdrvisor throughout and to him I owe 
irr/ greatest debt, for keeping i.he research on the rails by his tolerance and
- 11 -
criticism, for helping me gain access and for pushing me on where otherwise 
I might have faltered.
Lastly I would like to thank my wife Sheila, who has lived with this 
project for four years and been a constant source of encouragement and 
guidance at every stage.
- Ill -
Chapter .
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of tables and figures ... ... ... ... ... v±
List of abbreviations used ... ... ... ... ... xii
In t ro due t i on 
  . . ... ... ... ... ... ... 1
PART ONE : THE POLITICS OF HIGH RISE HOUSING IN BRITAIN 9
Political Power and Control in House Construction Policy
1.1 : The public housing apparatus ... ... ... 10
1.2 : National policy - the apparatus in action ... 19
1.3   Client influence on public housing construction
The High Rise Housing Boom
2.1 *. The basic outlines of policy ... ... ... ,42
2.2 : The high rise housing boom ...  .  ... 47
Dimensions of the High Rise Housing Issue
3«1 • Architectural ideology and high rise ... ... 67
3.2 : Technology, innovation and industrial
concentration ... ... ... ... ... 73
3.3 : Planning aspects ... ... ... ... ... 84
3.4 : The fragmentation of the public housing drive 93
3.5 : The cost of high rise housing ... ... ... 98
3.6 : Living in high rise ... ... ... ... 108
3.7 • High rise housing as a technological shortcut to
social change ... ... ... .., ... 114
The National Politi cal Process on the Issue
 4.1 : The national issue system ... ... ... 132
4.2 : The influence of the construction industry ... 136
4.3 i High rise housing and the national local govern- 
ment system ... ... ... .,. ... ... ",53
4.4 : The professions ... ... . t . ... ... 163
4.5 : Media coverage of the high rise housing issue 174
4.6 : Pressure group activity . .  ... ... ... 177
4.7 '  Parliamentary consideration . « a ... ... 182
4.8 : The formulation of central government policy 190
- IV -
Chapter
5 Theoretical Approaches to the Study of National Policy
.       »    c.c.<
PART TWO : LOCAL COMMUNITIES TACKLE MASS HOUSING ...   239
6 Urban Politics in* a Nationalized Society
6.1 : The definition of 'urban 1 research ... ... 2^C
6.2 : Part II as urban political research ... ... 2^2
6.3 i The use of case studies .«,. ... ... ... 2*1-3
6.4 : Research methodology ... ... ... ... 2^5
7 Newham
7.1 • The urban background ... ... ... .«. 252
7.2 : Housing policy in West Ham ... ... ... 262
7.3 • East Ham's housing policy ... ... ...   280
7.4 : Housing policy in Newham, 1965-68 ... ... 286
7.5 • Ronan Point - crisis of legitimation ... ... 294
8 Birmingham
8. 1 : The urban background ... ... ,.. ... 321
8.2 : The development of high rise policy ... ... 333
8.3 : The reorientation of policy, 1958-63 ... .,. 34 1
8.4 i The boom years for high rise ... ... ... 350
8.5 i The boom collapses ... . , e ... ... 362
) Bristol
9.1 t The urban and political background ... ... 381
9-2 : The early development of high rise policy ... 386
9.3 ' The 1960 housing crisis and the citizen inter-
vention ... ... ... ... ... ... 390
9.^ : The policy runs down ,.. .,. ... ...
10 Structures, Actors and the Explanation of Local Politics
10.1 : The local issue system ... ... ... ...
10.2 : The system of actors and local policy .. e
10.3 i Structural determination and community autonomy
4 : Mass housing and the local community
Afterword : Two Concluding Comment
Page lo t
Appendix I: Housing authorities, construction firms and 
industrialized high rise, 19&3-73 •••
Appendix II: Media coverage of the high rise housing issue, 
1950-70 ...
Appendix III:Influences on the use of high rise housing in 
Newharn ... ... ... . e . ... ...
BIBLIOGRAPHY • • •«• ••• . • • • c • ••• •
- VI -
List of Tables and Figures
TABLES
Number
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
Title
Housing authorities employing a Chief Architect
^
Architects employed on local authority housing, 1964-73
Architects employed on industrialized and traditional 
housing by local authorities, 1966-73
Structure of the construction industry, 1935-68
Structure of the construction industry: type of firm, 
1968
Top five construction companies: size indices, 1968
Composition of the main consultative committees, sample 
dates
Local authority housing by type of tender, 1964-72
Industrialized and traditional public housing by type
Pacv-!•*• "-"-Q 
«• • • i i>f™ —
14
15
15
17
18
18
19
26
•
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
Ti
of tender, 1966-73 28
Type of contract and technical advice; average number of 
dwellings per scheme, local authority housing, 1968 28
Type of area and type of scheme; average number of dwellings
per scheme, local authority housing, 1968 29
Value range of new construction orders, 1969 29 
Resources and constraints in rehousing conflicts 3'l
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
Local authority approvals in various building forms, 1953-75 
(England and Wales) 49
Local authority housing, Scotland, 1960-73 50
Regional distribution of high rise building, 1966-71 53 
High rise housing stocks held by local authorities, 1972
Conurbation and freestanding County Boroughs 56
High rise in County Boroughs by population size, 1972 56
Distribution of aggregate high rise stocks ; 1972 57
Distribution of change in high flats s\,ock t 1966-72 58
Fearscn correlation coefficients for influences on hi^h flat 
distribution, London and County Boroughs, 1 C<?2 60
- Vll -
Number Title Page No,
3.1 Construction times in public housing, 1957-70 75
3.2 Estimated breakdown of traditional house costs 76
3.3 High and low rise industrialised building, 1963-73 77
3.4 Industrialized building systems, 1965-73 ' 80
3.5 Contractual background of industrialized high rise, 1963-73 82
3.6 Contractual relations on high rise contracts of London
local authorities, 1967-72 83
3.7 Land needed for housing 1,000 people at various densities 88
3.8 The relation of building form to housing densities in the
County of London Plan, 1943 88
3.9 Building forms and the total urban land required for
10,000 people 90
3.10 Space about buildings at various densities and storey
heights 92
3.11 Distribution of public housing approvals by density, 1964-73 * 92
3.12 Distribution of persons in public housing schemes by densities
of persons per acre and per dwelling, 1967 93
3.13 Changes in the population of some major British cities, 1951-71 98
3.14 The aggregate costs of high rise construction, 1960-73 102
3.15 High rise housing costs as a proportion of house costs, 1964 104
3.16 Total cost of development per dwelling by building form 105
3.17 Government subsidy calculation: a hypothetical example 106
3.18 The cost of high rise subsidies, 1957-66 107
3.19 Distribution of unpopular local authority accommodation by
building form 112
4.1 Dwellings approved by housing authorities in industrialized
high rise, by authority type, 1963-73 159
4.2 Contractual relations of housing authorities by authority
type, on industrialized high rise, 1963-73 161
4.3 Contractual relations on industrialized high rise by
authority type and number and type of fir?n, 1963-73 162
4.4 Parliamentary consideration of the high rise housing issue 183
4.5 Involvement in decisions on high rise policy of actors in v.MI/:r 1^1
- Vlll -
Number Title
'+.6 Subsidies on high rise dwellings, 19^6-65
^.7 Cost limits in the Housing Cost Yardsticks, 1967 207
6.1 Selected characteristics of the case study authorities 2k6
7.1 'Quality of life' indices for Newham, 1971
7.2 Population trends in Newham, 1801-1971 255
7.3 Newham 's high rise housing stock 259
7.^ The housing situation in West Ham, 19^6-6;4: annual 265 
construction and demolition
7.5 The housing situation in East Ham, 19^6-64: annual con­
struction and demolition 28*f
7.6 The West Ham and East Ham programmes, 196^-71 28?
7.7 The housing situation in Newham, 1965-72: annual construc­
tion and demolition 296
8.1 High rise flats in Birmingham, 197^ 332
8.2 High rise approvals in Birmingham, 1951-70 338
8.3 Birmingham's annual housing programme, 1953-60 339
8.^ Birmingham high rise approvals by storey height, 1951-70
8.5 The housing situation in Birmingham, 19^6-73 ' annual 
construction and demolition
8.6 Planning options at Castle Bromwich, April 196*t
8.7. Location of Birmingham's high rise flat approvals, 1951-70 351
8.8 Contractual trends in Birmingham's high rise housing, 1951-70 352
8.9 High rise contracts and contract sizes, 1951-69 359
8. 10 Large high rise contracts, 196*t~68 360
9.1 Bristol's population and area, 1 801-1971 383
9.2 High rise flats in Bristol, 197^ -' 385
9.3 High flat approvals in Bristol, 1953-69 390
«
9.A Contractual aspects of Bristol's high rise programme,
1953-69 * 395
9.5 The housing situation in Bristol, 19^6-73: annual construct: en
and demolition 599
9.6 Location of high rise approvals in Bristol, 1953-69 'KH
Number Title Page
10.1 Actualization of possible political acts* Newhara 
authorities, 19^9-72
10.2 Involvement in high rise policy decisions, Newham 
authorities, 19^9-72
I 0 1 Housing authorities experienced in the use of industrialized 
high rise, 1963-73
I. 2 Housing authorities awarding contracts in industrialized 
high rise, 1963-73
I. 3 Contract sizes by housing authority type, industrialized 
high rise approvals, 1963-73
I. *f Contractual relations of seven large firms by authority type, 
industrialized high rise, 1963-73
II. 1 Newspaper high flat coverage, 1950-70: attitudes V?7 
II. 2 Local government press high flat coverage, 1950-70: attitudes
II. 3 Newspaper and local government press coverage of the high rise 
housing issue, 1950-70: focus
II. k Newspaper coverage of the high rise housing issue, 1950-70: 
origins
II. 5 Local government press coverage of the high rise housing 
issue, 1950-70: origins
III. 1 Pearson correlation coefficients for a ward level ana3.ysis 
of variation in local authority housing mix, Newham, 1971
FIGURES
1.1 Consultative bodies and organizational memberships in housing
construction, late 1960s 20
1.2 Loca3. authority dwellings approved in various contract size
categories, 1960-73 27
2.1 Local authority dwellings approved by building form. 1953-75
2.2 Local authority dwellings in high rise blocks as a proportion
of total approvals, by storey height categories, 1953-73 5'1
3.1 Trends in Industrialized housing construction by type of
systerr, 1965-75 81
3.2 High flat construction costs as a proportion of house cOb­ 
struction costs (costs per square foot of dwelling t>pactO» 
1960-73 . . 1.00
•• X •*
Number Title , Page _No.
3.3 Industrialized and traditional building costs (construction
costs per square foot of dwelling space), 1964-73 . . 101
4.1 The national issue system on high rise housing 133 
Coverage of the high rise housing issue in The Times and
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
7.8
7.9
7.10
the Municipal Journal, 1950-70
Newham in Greater London
Ward names and boundaries, London Borough of Newhain
Election results in the Newham local poll, 1968.
Class character of the Newham wards, 1966
Newham housing in unfit and poor condition, 1970
Housing tenure, Newham wards, 1971
Distribution of high flats in Newham, 1971
High rise as a proportion of West Ham tender approvals, 
1946-63
The location of Barnwood Court
High rise as a proportion of East Ham tender approvals,
175 
253
257
257
258
258
260
260
268
270
1946-63 283
7.11 High rise as a proportion of Newham tender approvals,
1964-70 291
8.1 Birmingham County Borough in the West Midlands Conurbation,
1966 322
8.2 Ward organization in Birmingham, 1949-74 323
8.3 Housing tenure in Birmingham wards, 1971 325
8.4 Housholds lacking basic amenities in Birmingham, 195% 1961
and "1971 325-6
8.5 Increases and decreases in ward housing stocks, Birmingham,
1951-61 and 1961-71 327
8.6 Areas of council housing construction in Birmingham before
1949, 1950-62 and 1963-73 329-30
8.7 Distribution cf people with Nev; Coromonwealth parentc,
Birmingham, 1971 330
- XI -
Number Title Page No
8.8 Proportion of completions in flats of three or more storeys 
195^-73i and proportion cf approvals in flats of five or 
more storeys, 1951-70, Birmingham 337
8.9 Bryant advertisement, 1963 355
•
9.'I Land use in Bristol in the early 1950s 3^2
10.1 The local issue system
10.2 Influence flows determining urban practices
A. 1 The structure of governmental relations on high rise housing
11.1 Coverage of the high rise housing issue in the Newham Recorder 
1965-70
11.2 Coverage of the high rise housing issue in the Housing and 
Planning Review, 1950-71 "
- Xll -
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED
(Where .an abbreviation .is used only in particular circumstances the location 
is given)
BEP Bristol Evening Post (Chapter 9» references only)
EG Birmingham Gazette (Chapter 8, references only)
JBKCM Bristol Housing Committee, Minutes (Chapter 9 references only)
BM Birmingham Mail (Chapter 8, references only)
BP Birmingham Post (Chapter 8, references only)
Building Research Station/Building Research Establishment
bed-spaces per acre
Centre for Environmental Studies (references)
Central Housing Advisory Committee
Chartered Institute of Public Finance.
Construction Research Advisory Committee
Department of the Environment
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research
Department of Trade and Industry (references)
Evening Despatch (Chapter 8, references only)
Economic Development Committee
East Ham Council, Minutes (Chapter 7i references only)
House Building Committee (Chapter 8)
House Building Committee, Minutes (Chapter 8, references only)
Housing Committee (Chapters 7, 8 and 9)
Housing Committee meeting (Chapter 7 references only)
Housing Committee, Minutes (Chapter 8, references only)
Housing Management Committee (Chapter 8)
Housing Management Committee, Minutes (Chapter 8, reference only)
Housing and Planning Review (references)
habitable rooms per acre
Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants (references)
London Borough of Newham, Minutes (Chapter 7$ references only)
Ministry of Housing and Local Government
Ministry of Technology
Municipal Journal (references)
Ministry of Public Buildings and Works
National Building Agency
National Consultative Council for the Building and Civil Engineer­ 
ing Industries
National Economic Development Council
National Federation of Building Trades Zhiployers
Newham Recorder (Chapter -7, references only)
HMC
NEDC
NFBTE
NR
NRD 
p.p.a.
ELBA 
RIGS
TCPA
TPHC
TPI
WHM
_WDP
Addendum:
A ti'ii* \j
CCA
C.P.O 
PWC 
QJJ/.GO 
QPANGO
net residential density
persons per acre
Royal Institute of British Architects
Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors
Town and Country Planning Association
Town Planning and Housing Committee (Chapter 7)
Town Planning Institute
V/est Ham Council, r-linutes (Chapter 7» references only)
Western Ds.J 1vJPres/; (Chapter 9? references only)
Association of Municipal Corporations
Cement and Concrete Association
compulsory purchase order
Public Works Committee (Chapter 8)
quasi governmental body
quasi non-government?! body
INTRODUCTION
In 'the last twenty-five years the inner residential areas of British cities 
have been transformed by the public housing drive. Largely due to slum
clearance and redevelopment levels of housing unfitness have fallen sharply and
1access to basic housing facilities has improved out of all recognition.
But this process has not just been one of an equalization in housing stan­ 
dards. State intervention has also created some new forms of differentiation
and inequality in housing. In particular it has in many areas destroyed 'a
2 landscape of small houses' and the community life which went along with it s
and replaced it with 'mass housing' - large flatted estates of uniform housing 
quite distinct in form from the kinds of housing provided by market mechanisms. 
The scale of this kind of change is often underestimated. Contrary to the 
implicit assumptions of most of the sociological literature on sluia clearance, 
probably a majority of the three million people displaced by redevelopment
between 1955 and 1975 did not move out to houses in the suburbs but were re-
k housed on mass housing estates in inner and core city areas. Over this period
nearly VfO,000 high rise flats were built, with around nine-tenths of this
total in inner urban areas. The DOE observes that 'many if not most residents'
5in high rise flats moved there from slum accommodation. The high flat popula­ 
tion must account for a large proportion of the families rehoused by clearance, 
and of course thousands more have been rehoused in low rise developments on 
high density estates.
For the vhousehoids involved mass housing has provided a major imnrcvernent 
in their levels of housing amenity. But it has nonetheless represented a 
decline in the standard of provision made by public authorities. Council houc-- 
ing betv/een the wars and in the 19^0s concentrated on building suburban estate.1? 
of cottage houses with, gardens, some of v/liich were located in pleasant settings 
and were built at generous internal and external space standards. Flat building 
started in the 19!50s but was quite widely opposed particularly by the .Labour
.. 2 -
7 Party in Parliament and on some Councils. Yet after 1950 accommodation which
would previously have been rejected ae offering unacceptable improvements in 
housing amenity came to be seen instead as inevitable and unexceptional. In 
the period before 1970 densities persistently increased; storey heights rose 
very fast, even for family accommodation; design, construction and ultimately 
safety standards were pared down (despite the raising of standards for internal 
dwelling facilities in the 1960s); community facilities and open space provi­ 
sion were sacrificed to demands for economy in state programmes; and 
considerable and growing evidence of tenant resistance to mass housing was 
ignored.
Overall families rehoused by urban authorities in the 1950s and '60s prob­ 
ably received worse forms of accommodation than those rehoused in some earlier 
periods, despite improvements in design standards, heating and domestic equip­ 
ment. The sharp alteration in the type of housing provided by public 
authorities coincided with a more gradual decline in the amenity of private 
housing developments at the lower end of the suburban market, But as Hall 
points out, both these trends took place in a period of rising standards of
Q
living in most other areas of social life.
The post-war predominance of mass housing in the conurbations' and major 
cities 1 public housing drive has occasioned much of the criticism of state 
intervention, physical planning and local authority activity of the past decade,.
At best many commentators have seen the redevelopment of inner urban areas as
q producing only limited and partial gains, at worst as a disastrous failure.'
The popularity of public housing programmes has been increasingly called into 
question as disillusionment with the bureaucratized and austere forms of hous­ 
ing provided hac set in. Since 1969 both major political parties have shown 
decreasing enthusiasm for new council building, and have turned to rehabilita­ 
tion programmes to find a way out of the unpopular and costly solutions of
^o 
mass housing policies.
This reoe-?.rch so':kc to analyse the political process involved in the
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changing character of public housing construction policy up to the 1970s; to 
understand vrhy public authorities have produced distinctive forms of housing 
apparently at odds with majority preferences; and to explain the reasons for 
the widening gap between ideal and reality in post-war Council housing,. These 
questions fall outside some conventional approaches to the'study of politics. 
Although our focus is very firmly on changes in government and local authority 
policies, the decision and influence processes with which we are concerned are 
quite diffuse and 'unpolitical' in character. They produced no great clash of 
political leaders or parties, little overt interest or pressure group activity 
and at the time relatively little public debate or controversy. Yet the 
questions we have posed relate directly to Lasswell's famous formulation of 
the concerns of political science: 'Who gets what, when and how?' And our 
analysis pushes beyond this to ask 'What, if anything, determines who gets what, 
when and how?'
Clearly a single empirical study cannot adequately encompass all the 
changes in public housing construction policy in post-war Britain. Nor is there 
any existing political science literature on this or most related areas. 
Accordingly this research has focused on only a part of these changes, but one 
which has considerable strategic importance in the inner urban public housing 
drive over the years 1955 to 1970. This is the policy of building high rise 
housing, which may be defined as that provided in blocks of five or more storeys. 
We have already noted the importance of high rise in relation to the scale of 
rehousing in this period, and in terms of other indices the policy is an
important one,- involving the expenditure of £1,000 to £1,500 million and affect-
11 ing the lives of perhaps one and a half million people. High flat braiding
was the most extreme and conspicuous form of mass housing provision in this
period, and has since become one of the most widely proclaimed (if unstudied)
12 'failures' of public policy in this field. The post hoc debate has helped to
clarify the cost:: and benefits involved in hi^h rise housing policy to a greater 
extent than for mass housing as a whole, and to produce much more ir-foj-nu
about the pressures and options which may have been involved in it. But in 
our view the logic and resolution of these arguments - about densities, design 
philosophies, costs, tenants' reactions, professional roles, public authority 
decision making, etc. - are much the same for other forms of mass housing 
provision.
Because of the strategic qualities of the high rise housing issue, there­ 
fore, the implications of our findings should spread quite widely across the
whole range of mass housing policies. And because of the issue's Objective
13 importance 1 in Dahl and Polsby'c terms, it may constitute a useful basis
from which to assess some broader theoretical arguments about the operation of 
the British state in the field of social policies. (A full explanation of 
these points is given in Chapters Three and Five below.)
THE STRUCTURE OF THE ANALYSIS
The analysis of housing construction policies poses some problems for the 
political scientist because of the need for a dual focus on both national and 
local policymaking. Despite the extent of 'non-executive* central government 
in Britain, relatively few studies have successfully spanned these different 
institutional levels because the methodologies appropriate to each and the kind 
of evidence they produce vary quite markedly. Accordingly most research has 
tended to focus on the distinctive aspect of decision-making at each level and 
to leave the interactions between them unanalysed or covered by only the 
briefest of sketches. We have chosen instead to attempt an integrated analysis 
in which full attention is given to the role of local authorities in national 
policy formation, and to the role of national pressures and central government 
policy in influencing local decision making. Our analysis is, however, divided 
into two Parts, reflecting the different methodological approaches used. Part 
1 looks at the national political" process on high rise, using some fairly 
extensive statistical analysis to characterise the overall trends in local 
authority decision making. Part II analyses this directly by means of case 
studies of particular areas.
Part I begins with a brief chapter establishing the general context of 
control and influence on public housing construction policies at the national 
level, ah area which is almost uncharted in the existing housing literature 
but which is essential to our later analysis. The organizations and actors 
involved in national policy and some areas of their interaction are described 
in the first two sections! and the third provides a summary of the existing 
literature on the role of public housing 'clients 1 in decisions affecting them.
Chapter Two then presents a statistical picture of the development of high 
rise building and the influence of changes in central government subsidies on 
local authorities. An analysis of the distribution of high rise stocks shows 
that the policy was largely confined to inner urban areas.
Chapter Three is concerned with the dimensions of the high rise issue s its 
benefit and costs, the arguments used to advocate or criticize it, its distribu­ 
tive implications for the organizations and social groups with a stake in the 
issue, and its inter-connections with other issues and policies.
Within this framework, Chapter Four examines the influences actually brought 
to bear in shaping central government policy and national trends in high rise
building. The activity of the design professions, the construction industry and
• 
a number of pressure groups is analysed. Media and Parliamentary consideration
of the issue is reviewed. Trends and influences in the national local govern­ 
ment system are discussed. And finally an attempt is made to penetrate at least 
some way into the decision process within central government.
To conclude Part I, Chapter Five compares some general conclusions about 
the national political process on the high rise issue with the accounts of 
policy making in advanced industrial societies suggested by four major theoretical 
approaches in contemporary political science*
Part II begins with a very brief chapter discussing some of the theoretical 
and methodological problems of urban political research, and the solutions 
adopted in our analysis.
Three detailed case studies are then presented in Chapters Seven (Hewhan;),
- 6 -
Eight (Birmingham) and Nine (Bristol). In each of these a preliminary sketch 
is given of the urban and political backgrounds of the local authority. This 
is followed by a narrative account of the development of local policy on high 
rise over the post-war period.
Chapter Ten brings together and reviews the findings of the case studies 
in relation to some of the major theoretical approaches to urban politicsj 
most of which are variants of those discussed in Chapter Five. The analysis 
focuses particularly on the comparative performance of actor orientated and 
structural accounts of local decision making.
- 7 -
: INTBODUCTION
1, See the progress charted in Department of the Environment, Housing Policy; 
a Consultative Document (London, EMSO, 1977), Cmnd. 6851, Ch. 3.
2 e I take this phrase from S.M. Gaskell, 'A Landscape of Small Houses: the 
failure of workers' flats in Lancashire and Yorkshire in the nineteenth 
century 1 , Ch. 4 in A. Sutcliffe (ed. ), Multi Storey Living: the British 
Working Class Experience (London, Groom Helm, 197*0 .
3. The concept of mass housing employed here is that defined by N. Habrakan
Supports: An Alternative to Mass Housing (London, Architectural Press, 1971). 
See also N. Dennis, 'Mass Housing and the Reformer's Myth', Planning Outlook t 
6 [New Series! (19&9). For a different usage see M. Pawley, Architecture 
versus Housing (New York, Praeger, 1971).
k. The strength of this assumption can best be gleaned from B.J. Parker, 
'Sociological Implications of Slum Clearance' in D.Y. Donnison and D. 
Eversley, (eds. ) London: Urban Patterns, Problems and Policies (London, 
Heinemann, 1973).
5. B. Adams and J B Conway, The Social Effects of Living Off the Ground (London, 
Department of the Environment, 1975) D.O.E. Information Paper No. 9? p. 2.
6. The only extensive discussion of low rise flats as a component of urban
authorities' housing stocks is by E. Gittus, Flats, Families and the Under 
Fives (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), Ch. 8 and Appendices 3 and 
C.
7. See Pawley, Architecture versus Housing, Ch. 2 ; and A. Ravetz, 'From Working 
Class Tenement to Modern Flat: local authorities and multi-storey housing 
between the wars', in Sutcliffe (ed. ), Multi Storey Living.. Acceptance of flat 
building did increase in the inter-war period, particularly in the
8. P. Hall, 'Policy Alternatives - Past and Future' in P. Hall, H. Gracey,
R. Drewett and R. Thomas, The Containment of Urban England (London, Political 
and Economic Planning/Alien and Unwin, 1973) » pp. ^26-33. For improvements 
in internal dwelling amenity see V.A. Kahn, Housing Standards and Costs 
(Birmingham, Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, 1973 )» Occasional Pacc-r 
No. 25* Chs. 1, 2.
9. See for the former view, L. Hellmann, 'Housing and Participation' , Built
Environment, 2 (1976), 328-32; and for the latter view C. Booker, 'Physicaj 
Planning! Another Illusion Shattered', National Westminster Bank Quarterly 
Review, February 1977. *~
10. See D.O.E. , Housing; Policy; a Consultative Document, for the present Labour 
government's minimalist conception of the role of public housing.
11. See below, sections 3.6 and 3«7 respectively.
12. There are two previous studier, of high rise housing in Britain: E.W. Cooney, 
'High Flats in Local Authority Housing in England and Wales since 19V- 1 , in" 
Sutcliffe (ed. ), Multi jStcre ;; Living ; and H.McCutcheon, 'Technical Change 
and Social Need: The Case cu' H-;.gh Flats', Research Policy, k (1')75;, 2o2- 
89* Both these are short articles.
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13. See R.A. Dahl, f A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model 1 , American Political 
Science Review, 52 (1958), ^66-9; and N. Polsby, Community Power and 
Political Theory (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 112-15, on 
the selection of key issues, and R.A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 19&1), pp. 6^-5. 'Objective importance 1 can on 'this 
view be measured in terms of the costs of a policy, or the number of people 
affected. But 'issues' are predefined as locii of political controversy» 
a usage which is not appropriate to high rise: see the discussion of 
pluralist analysis in Chapter 5 below.
On which see L.J. Sharpe, 'Whitehall, Structure and People', Ch. 9 in 
D. Kavanagh and R. Rose (eds 0 )> New Trends in British Politics (London, 
Sage, 1977).
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PART ONE
THE POLITICS OF HIGH RISE HOUSING IN BRITAIN
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CHAPTER ONE
Political Power and Control in Housing Constraction Policy
There is an extensive literature covering most aspects of the politics 
and administration of public housing, with one major exception: the 
production of public housing outputs and the setting of housing construction 
policy. It is this gap which this brief chapter tries to cover, firstly by 
surveying the organizations and groups constituting the 'public housing 
apparatus', which determine national housing construction policy; secondly 
by charting the interaction of these groups in some key areas; and thirdly 
by looking briefly at the obverse side of this pattern of political control, 
the non-involvement of 'clients 1 in the setting of housing construction policy.
1 1.1 ; The Public Housing Apparatus
Essentially the public housing apparatus consists of three sets of 
organizations, central government, the design professions and the construction 
industry. 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.
The organisation of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, the
central department concerned with housing policy for most of the post-war
2 period has been well described elsewhere. The Ministry's extensive influence
over public housing construction policy derived from housing legislation, 
the setting of subsidy scales, the programing of local authority building via 
a system of •annual allocations, the exercise of cost controls over schemes
in the course of granting or denying loan sanction approval, and the specifics-
3 tion of design standards or desiderata. The degree of involvement of
Ministers decreased rapidly from the first to the latter means of influence; 
similarly decision-making by administrative class civil servants gave w*y to
A
the influence of professional staffs. Cost controls provided a means by 
which the Ministry architects were able to exert considerable influence on
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local authority architects departments, particularly during the periods when 
controls were operated by regional staffs before 1954 and after 1962-4* This
influence was concentrated on high rise contracts, since loan sanction approval
rise 
for ordinary low/schemes could be dealt with by executive officers using
5 routine cost yardstick procedures. Design advice, crystallized in a numoer
of influential circulars and manuals, was also almost entirely & professional 
function. Under the normal pre-Pulton arrangements, the professional staffs
were organized in separate hierarchies under a Chief Architect and Chief
7 Planner, each of whom had direct access to the Minister if need be.
The organization of the Housing Division was not good for much of the 
post-war period. Between 1954 and 1964, a crucial period for high rise 
policy, the MHLG Permanent Secretary, Dame Evelyn Sharp, f ran the whole thing
o
on a shoestring'. Staffing levels were static throughout the decade and 
housing was run by a single division comprising an Under Secretary, five- 
Assistant Secretaries and assorted Principals. They worked directly under 
the Minister a lot of the time, since Dame Sharp's main interest was in
planning. In 1961 a Deputy Secretary was appointed with responsibility for
g housing amongst other things, but he apparently 'never did a damn thing'.
The Housing Division was very much understaffed. Between 1956 and 196:5,. a 
period of eight years, there were six major pieces of housing legislation.
Each of the five Assistant Secretaries had two kinds of workload, 
functional and territorial. The territorial workload consisted of looking 
efter the regional loan sanction work allocated to him. The functional work­ 
load consisted of responsibility for a particular aspect of policy. Thus one
«
Assistant Secretary was needed to look after rents policy, one for subsidies, 
one for the public housing program, one for private housebuilding etc* Soze 
work was completely devolved to separate sections of executive officers, ^jnly
the approval of slum, clearance orders, which were dealt with on an intensivelyf *'
10 routinized basis. When leijislation had to be drawn up an enormous te^rorary
pressure built up en the Assistant Secretary concerned. Some of hi? 
territorial workload would be transferred to his colleagues and the rc-it-inder
thrust onto his principal while he worked en the legislation, often for a 
period of up to six months until it was safely through Parliament* The burden 
of consulting with interested bodies, deciding on a policy, clearing it 
through the departmental hierarchy, briefing Parliamentary Council and carrying 
it through Parliament fell completely on two men, the Under Secretary and the 
Assistant Secretary concerned. This was the situation on some of the most
controversial legislation of this period, notably the 1957 Rent Act and
11 the anti-Rachman legislation. On top of this political intervention by
Ministers was at times heavy handed, particularly on the 1957 Act which was 
initially drafted to include derequisitioning of property within six months 
against the strong opposition of the Housing Division and later altered to 
eighteen months after massive protests from local authorities. Under Macmillan 
interventions by 10 Downing Street were common. On the 196/ Act, one informant 
recalled that the Division was told in June that legislation would be needed by 
November.
Attempts to alter this situation were made. In 1956 the Under-Secretary 
in charge asked for a second Housing Division, but it was not until 1964 (wlion
this official became head of the Establishments Division) that this change
13 was made. Until 1963 there were no statisticians employed on housing
figures, and no housing economists were employed until the late 1960s. The 
defects of this system were exaggerated by the regular movement of administrators 
(but not profession?JL staff) from job to job and to other Ministries.
The weakness of administrative control of housing generally, and the 
bifurcation cf administrative and professional responsibilities, meant that 
very considerable influence over housing construction policy rested with the 
professional staffs, especially architects.
For most of tns post-war period, the department with responsibilities in
relation to the construction industry was the Ministry of Public Buildings and
1 f>
Works. During the 1950s the department played a background role, confined
to influencing central government contracts ar>d operating an extensive 
consultative machinery. - In the 1960s it adopted a markedly promotion:;.! role,
17 particularly over industrialized building. The most important officials
1R 
were probably the Chief Architect and Director of Contracts.
THE DESIGN PROFESSIONS
Architects and planners are both organized as professions and display
most of the characteristics on which trait theories of professionalism
19 focus. This is particularly the case with architecture, which has a long
history as a gentlemanly profession and private practice, neither of which is
20 true of planning. Private architects have dominated the Council of the
Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) throughout the post-war period
21 
despite the rapid growth of state mediation of professional services. The
problems of architectural practice in public offices have received surprisingly 
little attention, although Malpass : work has brought out the importance of
public architects' dual professional/bureaucratic orientation for the kind of
22 housing produced by local authorities. Private architects have generally
had higher status within the profession and higher salaries than public 
authority architects, and even in planning this configuration of rewards has
been increasingly important, despite the much smaller scale of the private
23 sector.
Until the 1974 reorganization of local government, planning for much of
the post-war period in many urban areas of the country was not organized in a
24 separate department in local authorities. Instead it was often carried out
under the Chief Architect or Engineer, and the interpenetration of architecture 
and planning was thus considerable. The influence of planning departments 
or the planning function on public housing varied sharply, from the dominant
position described by Malpass in Newcastle to the subordinate role discovered
25 by Kuchmch in Liverpool. Overall architects had the major influence on
i
detailed planning and layouts in most areas.
ARCHITECTS AND PUBLIC HOUSING
It is not commonly appreciated that the professional control of public
housing outputs has by no means been confined to public authority architects 
for most of the post-war period. Housing authorities were quite slow to 
recruit their own architectural staffs, or to organize them under a Chief 
Architect, (Table 1.1). As Layton observed in 1961:
Many authorities considered the use of architects 
for dwellings for the working class a quite 
unnecessary expense and have continued to do so 
until very recently. 27
Table 1.1: Housing Authorities employing a Chief Architect.
1937 1957 1968
Authority Type
County Boroughs
Municipal Boroughs
Urban Districts
Rural Districts
Metropolitan Boroughs
London Boroughs
All Housing; Authorities
%
16.9
0.3
0.2
0.2
-
N.A
4.0
%
56.6
4.4
0.7
0.4
17.9
N.A
3.6
%
73.5
13*1
5.2
7.9
N.A
96.9
17.4
Although large staffs were built up earlier in major urban areas, the 
construction boom of the early 1960s strained their resources to full stretch.
Over the period 1964-73 less than 60$ of public housing was in fact 
designed by local authority architects, despite the increase after 1969 when
PQ
demand pressure eased off, (Table 1.2). In 1966-7 barely half of all 
public housing was designed by public authority architects, while private
architects designed Jtfo and architects employed by contractors the remaining 
fifth. 50
Table 1.2; Architects employed on Local Authority Housing, 1964-73*
SCHEMES DWELLINGS
(1966-73) (1964-73)
Number Number
Architect for 
Layout
« 
Local Authority 10,393 60.6 756,265 64.7
Private 5,458 31 .8 298,506 25.6 
Contractor's 1,292 7.6 113,234 9.8
Architect for 
Building
Local Authority 9.406 54.8 675,513 57.7
Private 5,458 31.8 286,492 24.5
Contractor's 2,285 .13.3 208,943 17.8
TOTAL 17,141 1.170.939
The major reason for the prominence of contractors' architects was 
the growth of industrialized housing systems in the early '60s. Although 
the RIBA was a firm supporter of industrialized building, the evidence 
suggests that the major consequence of these systems was to transfer work
•Z A
away from private architects to corporate architects, (Table 1»3).
Table 1.3; Architects employed on Industrialized and Traditional 
Housing by Local Authorities, 1 966-7^ •
Local Private Contractors 
% of Schemes Authority
Layout
Industrialized 65.2 11.7 23.1 
Traditional 60.0 35.3 4.7
Building
Industrialized 33.6 11.4 55.0 
Traditional 58.4 35.2 6.4
$ of Dwellings
Layout
Industrialized 68.7 15.6 15.7 
Traditional 62.8 38.4 5.8
Building
Industrialised . 51 »0 13.4 35.6 
Traditional 60.4 30.7 8»
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At the height of the industrialized housing boom, private architects designed 
barely one in ten of industrialized housing schemes while contractors' 
architects designed nearly lofo. But the schemes given to private architects
were nearly twice as large on average as those designed by corporate
32 architects, so that industrialized building seems to have favoured the
larger architectural practices, (whose principals dominated the RIBA), at the 
expense of small private offices.
Since all sections of the profession were involved in public housing; 
and the unity of the profession under the leadership of private architects 
has been maintained; and the profession interpenetrated both national and 
local government and the construction industry, the scope for professional 
influence on housing construction policy was clearly extensive.
TEE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
The construction industry is very large. It accounts for 12$ of GDP,
half of gross domestic fixed capital formation, and in periods like the early
•^•z 
1960s some7^ of the country's workforce, (about 1,5 million workers). There
were 80,000 firms in the industry in 1968, a year which we take as our base
year since it is most relevant to the high rise housing boom. But most of
•*;/ 
these firms were unimportant in terms of employment and output , (Table 1.4).^ v
The &fo of firms employing more than 25 people accounted for four fifths of 
total output and employment, and the very small number of large firms accounted 
for nearly two fifths of all employment. Apart from a long war-time and 
post-war break the trend towards increasing concentration in the industry has
proceeded steadily, although the level of concentration in relation to other
35 industries is still low.
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Table 1,4; Structure of the Construction Industry, 1935~t
% of firms in each size category.
SMALL (under 100 employees)
MEDIUM (100-500 employees)
LARGE (over 500 employees)
All firms
/b of gross output by size of firm.
Small
Medium
Large
All firms
% of employment by size of firm.
Small
Medium
Large
All firms
1955
98o7
1.1
0.2
100.0
60.2
24.4
15.4
100.0
67.1
21.5
11.4
100.0
1954
98o2
1.6
0.2
100.0
43-9
24.9
31.2
100.0
53.5
23.1
23.4
100.0
1968
97.8
1.9
0.4
100.1
35.7
25.0
39.3
100.0
40.6
24.9
34.5
100.0
Part of the explanation for this lies in the many different types of firm 
in the industry, particularly the distinction between main and sub contractors. 
In public housing construction, most of the output is probably concentrated in 
the hands of building contractors - general builders concentrate on private 
housing and repair and maintenance, and while specialist firms are employee!.
they are confined to particular tasks. Sub-contracting has certainly
37 increased in public housing over the post-war period. Looking at the
distribution of work by these types of firm reveals a surprising concentration
/ \ 38 in the larger building and civil engineering firms (Table 1*5). The very
largest of these firms accounted for 21# of employment and over 2&fo of gross 
output in this category in 1968, and for 6fo of employment and 9-3$ of gross 
output for the industry as a whole, (Table 1.6). All five companies were 
ranked in the top 200 companies in Britain, although only Wimpey was in the 
top 50. 4°
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Table 1.5; Structure of the Construction Industry; type of firm,
Under 25 
employees
Over 25 
employees
Number of firms
Specialist firms
General builders
Building & civil engineering firms
( Civil engineering only)
All firms
/o of gross output
Specialist firms
General builders
Building & civil engineering firms
(Civil engineering only)
All firms
36,415
31,960
754
(608)
69,745
7.6
11.3
0,7
(0.6)
20.2
1,991
2,268
936
(347)
5,542
18.6
17«0
37.9
(6.3)
79.8
Table 1.6; Top Five construction companies; size indices, 1968,
£ million
Turnover Capital 
Employed
Firm
George Wimpey & Co
John Laing & Sons
Richard Cos tain
Taylor Woodrow
Bo vis Holdings
TOTAL
Employees
Rank in terms of
UK firms 
( turnover)
200.0
99.0
86.0
71.0
51.6
507.6
WIMPEY
34,000
45
39.70
23.63
30.02
31.30
18.16
132.18
LAING
17,000
102
Net Market 
Profits Capitalization
8.17
1.55
3.53
4.31
1.69
19.15
COSTAIN
9,343
114
84.0
18.0
5.3
20.7
13.7
U1.7
TAYLOR 30YIS
WOODHOW
10,225 9,158
126 175
CONSTRUCTION ORGANIZATIONS
The central body which represents the interests of the construction 
industry is the National Federation of Building Trade Employers, which h?s a 
large and powerful central office, ten region::! organisations (plus the poverf-,?! 
London federation), and 240 local branches. ' IT- tl:e 3.-jrly post *'?r -ce^loi 
NFBTE local associations were primarily involved in price-fixin-r but since tV
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introduction of restrictive practices legislation their role has declined.
42
The NFBTE is a main contractors organization, drawing on uniform support from 
the large firms and much less involvement from smaller firms and general 
builders, (21,000 of whom are organized in the rival Federation of Master 
Builders). 45 About 17,000 firms (23$ of the industry total) are NFBTE
members, but its power is such that it coiunands 87/£ of the employer seats on
44the industry's wage negotiating body. Special contractors are organized
separately but affiliated, as are the private liousebuilders*. The large 
national firms play a central role in the NFBTE and their personnel, including
their top directors, have played a prominent role in its affairs for many years
45 both at a national and a regional level.
1*2: Nationr-.l Policy - the Apparatus in Action
GOVERNMENT CONSULTATIVE MACHINERY
The public housing apparatus is unified at a national level by an 
extensive network of advisory bodies which influence central government 
policy (Figure 1.1 and Table 1.7).
Table 1 o7: Composition of the Main Consultative Committees, Sample Dates,
(Number of members)
Organizations
represented;
Design professions
Contractors
Building Societies
Civil servants: D.O.E.
Civil servants: Others
Local authorities
Universities
QUANGOS
Construction Unions
Total Membership
Professional background
of members:
Planners
Architects
Engineers
Surveyors
Housing Managers
Committee:
CHAC
2
2
2
MB
•**
5
3
7
1
22
23 '
.
1
3
CHRAC
3
6
-
5
2
2
2
—
1
21
3
6
5
2
—
SCGH
2
9
5
»
_.
5
_
_
~
21
_ i
1
-.
2
«
NGG
7
12
1
5
_
4
_=
„
4
33
mat
2
6
2
„
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l.«-LjL_Conr>ultat.i vc Bodies and .Qrgaai zatAonrl Iieinber.shi pa in 
Housin;; C_Q_n?tractiorj t _late 1960s 
Groups
Government Departments, etc.
For^.al orgc.ni national ropresentr tion
o
(All nenbersliips run fro::; non-:;cver^'''OT1 ^ r -l £,Toups to consultative 
bodies).
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Over the post-war period there has been a marked change in the nature of 
the organizations concerned with housing construction issues. At the start 
of the post-war period, the main body involved was the Central Housing 
Advisory Committee (CHAC), which was dominated by people with local author! ty
and housing trust backgrounds and was a statutory advisory committee of non-
47government people rather than representing specific interests. CMC's
output of reports etc. declined steadily, until by the 1960s the Housing 
Management Sub-Committee was the only really influential part of the apparatus,
(notwithstanding the nominal CHAC involvement in the extremely influential
» 48 Parker-Morriss report). Full committee meetings became rare and by
1973 over a quarter of the places on the committee were vacant. In 1975 it 
was abolished altogether.
In place of CMC, the National Consultative Council for Building and
Civil Engineering (NCC), the * parliament 1 of the industry run by MPBW since
49 1950, became steadily more involved with housing. " A formal interest group
body, the NCC set up a Standing Consultative Committee on Housing to advise 
on the implementation of the November 1965 White Paper pledge of 500 f 000 hones 
a year. The SCCH operated only until 1971 when the NCC was enlarged to 
include local authority and building society representatives srd resumed 
direct control of housing. On all the NCC bodies, as one civil servant 
explained:
if you 1 re thinking about who represents building 
employers then certainly in the pre-1968 situation 
it was the NFBTE plus the predecessors of the 
National House Builders Federation. That situation 
has not really changed. ^0
On the NCC regional committees the NFBTE, RIBA and other professional bodies
31 also dominated.
A second increasingly important body in housing construction has been 
the Building Economic Development Committee, an active promotional body, 
mainly staffed by industrialists and related professionals, which since 1965 
has campaigned vigorously for the implementation of ths Banwell Report o.i
«. pp —t_c_
tendering procedures in public housing, and later for the Wood Report
52recommendations on 'design and build 1 firms.
Finally a further important area of government-industry interaction has 
been in research. The Building Research Station (operated first by DSIR 
and later by Mintech) was the main body here, and its Board and various 
Advisory Committees were staffed mainly by local authorities, civil servants
and personnel from large contractors, who also seem to have been among the
53primary beneficiaries of the research effort. In 1963 MPBW set up the
Construction Research Advisory Committee to advise its newly established 
Development Directorate and this had a more balanced government - industry
representation ~ some of the six industry seats go to directors of the large
c/ 
firms. In 1971 the Committee's ambit was enlarged by the addition of one
social administration lecturer to form the Construction and Housing Research 
Advisory Committee (CHRAC in Table 1.7).
The overall role of these bodies was described by one civil servant 
involved in these terms:
•
It's important, especially in an industry which is so 
diverse, that you have a formal means of bringing together- 
people on a regular basis. This means that they can see 
Ministers and senior officials without their having to 
have cause for complaint before they see them. 56
In practice the consolidation of industry influence on housing construction 
issues and the progressive displacement of old style 'housing influentials 1 
has been charted remarkably accurately in the evolution of government 
consultative bodies. In general, the representation of 'consumer 1 interests 
in housing .typical of CHAC in its early days seems to have been squeezed out 
by bodies representing only producer interests.
INFORMAL CONTACTS.
Of course the formal machinery of consultation represents only the tip
•
of the iceberg as far as contacts are concerned* Informal contacts betvreen
politicians, top Ministry officials and industrialists wsre common, as
57 Crossman's diaries make clear. Conservative Ministers Keith Joseph. (heJr
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to the Bovis fortunes), and Geoffrey Rippon, (director of Cubbitts) were
closely involved in the industry, and construction interests were well
58 represented in Parliament and elsewhere. In politics firms like McAlpine
•
and Taylor Woodrow have been major donors to Conservative party funds, and
supplied a Party Treasurer^ and support for right wing bodies such as the
59National Association for Freedom. In the civil service Dame Evelyn Sharp
was a close friend of the London contractor Neil ¥ates, and on retirement 
was given a Bovis directorship by her former Minister Keith Joseph. During 
the industrialized building campaign, MHLG drafted in a. succession of high 
powered executives as advisers, including Kenneth Wood, Chairman of
Concrete Ltd* In 1974 a Bovis executive was appointed on a similar basis to
fil 
D.O.E. to mastermind a more vigorous public housing drive.
Contact between architects and planners within and outside central 
government was maintained by the movement of professionals between the - 
different organizations. Certainly MHLG Chief Architects, drafted in mainly
/
from the L.C.C., had considerable influence within the RIBA Council, and
architects and planners did move from government into private practice,
6? 
(although rarely the other way round).
Relations between the professions and the construction industry showed 
a marked change over the period as technological and industrial developments 
accentuated the contractors' role. By the mid ! 50s, as Bowley observes, 
contractors were no longer ready 'to go cap in hand 1 to the architect and 
were increasingly vocal in their demands to be involved in building design. 
By 1965 surveys showed that participants in the construction process were 
already rating the main contractor's role as the most important one, and 
during the industrialized building campaign this position was massively 
strengthened, often by the elimination of the independent professional from 
the design process -altogether. At the industry-professional interface 
architects were, of course, constrained from becoming directors of property 
or construction companies by their professional coc-o of conduct, but v>v
* " u
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1964 the breaches of this requirement were so common that one commentator 
argued:
It is inevitable that the RIBA will soon waive the 
restrictions on its members. The sooner it does so 
the better. The managerial revolution in 11 have to 
come to the building industry before all the potential 
benefits are realized, but the deprofessionalization 
of architecture could help to bring it about. 65
In the aftermath of the ftulson affair this kind of commonplace observation of 
the previous decade began to be seen in a different light, and the RIBA was 
criticized for not being professional enough in its attitude. McEwan 
observes:
Self interest and group or class interest are the 
generators of the disease of professionalism; the 
obsession with money, status, privilege and secrecy. 
The function of protecting the public, upholding 
standards, advancing knowledge of the art and ensuring 
that architects serve genuine social needs are given 
verbal recognition but few resources. The first priority 
at RIBA today is to secure more work for the building 
industry under the leadership of architects. ""
CONTRACT POLICY IN PUBLIC HOUSING
Contract policy is a key area of public housing construction policy on 
which to assess the influence of the various organizations involved.
Relations in construction are crystallized in the contract itself and 
it is interesting to note that the form used on 90-95/£ of non-package deal 
.public housing work is the so-called ! RIBA contract 1 , issued by the Joint 
Contracts Tribunal of RIBA, the NPBTE and the Royal Institute of Chartered 
Surveyors. It is not used in central government, however, and has been 
criticized by Turpin:
*
it is remarkable that the RIBA form has been adopted 
for public sector work, for this form of contract is 
in some respects seriously deficient in the protection 
given to the interests of the client. 67
And a leading manual on contract law concluded that 'no adviser of any
private employer should allow the forms to be used without substantial
68amendment. '
The main area of controversy in this area is however, the rr.vrouo^ ol
69 tendering to be used. * Local authority standing orders and MHLG model
s'tanding orders usually require open competition in which any firm can tender 
and the contract goes to the firm with the lowest bid. The 1944 Simon 
Committee recommended the adoption of selective tendering in the public sector,
in which only certain firms are asked by the client to submit tenders for a
70 competition and again the lowest tender wins. The Ministry of Works followed
this policy after the war and it became universal on central government contracts, 
but MELGr refused to alter its model standing orders throughout the 1950s, 
despite an influential call for a revision of local authority procedures by the 
Joint Contracts Tribunal in 1954» But by the late '50s housing authorities 
were regular3.y suspending their standing orders and one 1961 survey showed only 
10 out of 45 county boroughs still adhering to open competition on larger 
contracts*
In 1962 a second MEBW report recommended the revision of tendering
72 procedures, and during the industrialized building campaign intense industrial
pressure was exerted for large contracts negotiated with a single firm or for 
the adoption of a package contract, in which the contractor both designed and 
built a standard dwelling at a negotiated price.
By 1964 this pressure had gone so far that the Banwell Committee report 
insisted on the need to return to selective tendering on a streamlined basis -
with only two or three tenders invited, serial contracts and an emphasis on
73achieving close working relationships with one or a few firms. This re­ 
defined selective tendering was at last backed by 1IHLG as a procedure that
would 'not only provide value for money but also have a beneficial effect on
74the industry as a whole' f and was very actively promoted to local authorities
by the Building E.D.C.
In fact much of the supposed failings of housing authority contracting 
were misconceptions. • The proportion of noi:sing schemes let by open completion 
was high (5QJo in 1964 for example), but the proportion of dwellings involved 
va^ much less ("52?/j i*1 1964;» because average contract sizes hero were low,
(only 28 dwellings in 1964)o By 1968 the proportion of dwellings involved 
had fallen by more than half. And in 1966 55$ of public housing was actually 
in negotiated or package deal contracts, (Table 1»8). The shift to • 
selective tendering after Banwell took place much more through the decline of 
these contracts than it did,via a move away from open competition, partly 
because of the reduction in demand pressure from housing authorities and the 
redefinition of what constituted selective tendering,
Table K8; Local authority housing by type of tender, 1964-72. 
Dwellings in contracts
by
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
Open 
Competition
Number $
40,575
30,474
18,995
11,879
9,734
32.3
20.9
13o9
13o6
I4o6
Selective 
Competition
Number
27,639
34,556
55,073
51,272
42,110
%
22oO
23 o7
40.3
58.7
63o1
Negotiated
Number
39,068
58,469
45,234
15,373
8,475
%
31.1
40.1
33.1
17.6
12.7
Package 
Deal
Number
18,340
22,308
17,355
8,821
6,406
%
14.6
15,3
12.7
10.1
9e6
Rather more important than either of these, however, was the collapse of 
the industrialized and high rise housing markets after 1967. Negotiated and
package deals were most frequently used on industrialized (particularly high
76 rise) contracts, (Table 1.9). The switch back to traditional building from
the peak industrialized year of 1967 thus produced a fall in their importance. 
In 1966 over 84$ of industrialized, compared with 34$ of traditional, dwellings 
were let in non-competitive contracts.
The other main issue in this area has been the size of housing contracts. 
The frequent complaints of small scale contracts in the building industry dc 
not bear close examination. By 1968 at the peak of the industrialized/high 
rise/comprehensive redevelopment focus of p\iblic housing over 4C$ of all
t
dwellings let by housing authorities were in contracts of over 250 dwellings,
77 (Figure 1»2), although it is true that there had apparently been a rapid rise
in their share throughout the 1960s. Industrialized schemes were nro.ch larger 
than traditional contracts, and the very largest schemes tended to be .1 :/t by
- 2? -
1.2: Local Authority Dv/ellinfrs Approved in Various Contract 
Size Categories, 1960-75.
(England and Wales)
EL 40
p-
rcT
20c
CO
10
o
Year
Kuiaber of dwellings per scheme: over 250 
101 - 250 
26 - 100 
under 26
- 28 -
Table 1,9; Industrialized and traditional public housing by type of 
t ender, 1966-73*
Dwellings in contracts by
Open Selective 
Competition Competition
Negotiated Package 
Deal
Number of
dwellings
% % % . %
INDUSTRIALIZED
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
TRADITIONAL
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1.9
4.5
2.1
9c3
1.6
9.3
11.2
7o2
34.2
30o6
22.9
18,9
16.9
20.3
15.5
21.3
13.8
17.3
30.8
24.0
36o2
57.2
49.5
33.2
30.6
36.0
47.5
58.8
64.8
64.1
67oO
6U2
58*1
56.4
46.3
43.2
35.6
17.8
16o3
35.8
27.4
25.1
23.0
14.1
12.7
8.8
11.7
12.9
26*2
21.8
20 08
23.5
26.6
15.7
23.0
23.8
7.8
8,3
6.6
8.2
5.6
6.8
5*8
4.6
60,041
66,573
59,128
30 , 472
18,802
15,713
14,751
20,529
85,768
81 ,243'
77,529
67,839
68,544
61,456
51,985
53,201
*7ft
selective competition and designed by private architects, (Table 1.10). It
is safe to assume that up to 1968 these schemes were virtually all flats or
7Q 
mixed development in urban areas,(Table 1 0 11)»
T able 1o 10; Type of contract and technical advice; average,, number of
dwellings per scheme, local authority housing,
Industrialized 
Traditional
Industrialized 
Traditional
Open 
Competition
61 
28
Architect
Local Pr 
Authority
176 
49
Selective 
Competition
200 
50
for Layout
ivate Contractors
183 74 
36 45
Negotiated
181 
50
Architect
1968.
Package 
Deal
100 
51
for Buildir..-
Local Private Contractors
Authority
223 
49
178 93
34 ?£
Table 1o11; Type of area and type of scheme; average number of dwellin 
per scheme, local authority housing 1968.
Houses only Flats only Mixed houses
and flats
All schemes
Urban areas 
Rural areas
46' 
14
74 
15
155
44
89 
19
By the peak years of the boom then, it is very difficult to see any respect
in which housing contracts were too small. Indeed quite the reverse,
The concentration of work in public housing into larger(Table 1o12).8°
contracts had proceeded further than in any other construction market by 1969* 
(the first year for which these figures are available, and one below the peak 
year). Some 54$ of the total value of public housing work was in contracts 
worth more than £500,000 - compared with figures of 51$ for all other state 
contracts, 34$ for industrial contracts, 26$ for commercial work and exactly 
3.2$ in the private housing market. Over a fifth of all public housing by 
value was in contracts over £2 million, a level exceeding anything in the 
private sector. The extreme contrast between public and private housing work. 
is dramatically indicative of the extent to which public housing was a favourable 
market for large contractors.
Table 1.12: Value range of new construction orders, 1969*
$ of new work by
value in range
Under £100,000.
£100,001-£250,000.
£250,001-£500,000.
*
£500,001-£1 million.
£1 m-£2 million.
Over £2 million
Value of new work
Public sector
Non housing Housing
22.2
10.2
16.5
10.5
8.3
32..?
£1,1 11m.
15.4
I2o0
19.0
20.3
14.2
19-1
£523m.
Private sector
Housing Industrial Cocnerci
79.7
11«9
5.2
1.6
1.6
-
£5 13m.
33,7
14.3
17.6
9.6
12.9
11.9
£489m.
45.4
11.7
16.5
12.8
8,0
5.6
£3S9m,
2.3: Client Influence on Public Housing Construction
The obverse of the influence exerted by the public housing apparatus can 
be considered as the exclusion of 'client' influence. Since much of this 
research is concerned with the relationship between national policy and particular 
local authorities' decision making, this brief section focuses directly on the 
overall level of involvement of people affected by the public housing process 
in the decisions about the kind of accommodation in which they would be rehoused.
SLUM CLEARANCE
Since 1955 over three million people in England and Wales have been 
rehoused under slum clearance procedures, and particularly in the major urban
areas the clearance and redevelopment process has dominated public housing
81programs.
The procedures and modes of operation of slum clearance have been well 
documented, partly because the coercive character of the process has proved a 
magnet for academic attention since the mid-'60s, when evidence of opposition 
to clearance first became prominent. The nature of local authority procedures
creates a fundamental and massive imbalance of power resources and constraints
82 on their use between Councils and clearance area residents, (Table 1.13).
Of course the operation of procedures varies from place to place, but this 
imbalance has never been found to be less than acute. Local authorities were 
never required to prove unfitness, to operate effectively standardized methods 
of classifying property or to prove that rehabilitation or other action was 
not feasible. Large numbers of people in clearance areas were only fitfully 
consulted (because they were not property owners), many residents are not 
eligible for rehousing, and virtually everyone lived in a state of ignorance 
and anxiety about their future. Whore 'participation' exercises took place 
their relevance was often questionable:
Table 1*13; Resources and Constraints in Rehousing Conflicts.
Power Resources 
Lpcal_ Authorities^
Monopoly of Information, Decision
and Timing
Minimization or withdrawal of
services
Blight creation: neglect of repairs
Withholding of payments related to
C.P.O.
Creation of neighbourhood conflicts
Control of jobs (of employees of 
Council and businesses displaced by
clearance)
Unfavourable typing of residents 
Unfavourable Housing Allocations 
Withdrawal of housing rights 
Eviction
Constraints
Reference public opinion
Political control (of 
party organizations and 
councillors)
Area^Residents^ 
Access to councillors (individually) 
Access to local media
Group forming strategies 
(per laps)
—>Access to reference
publics
•—^Direct action
Uncertainty, lack of information
Poor conditions ( .". high 
costs of delay)
Dispersion (in many cases)
Virtually complete housing 
vulnerability
Job vulnerability (of L.A. 
employees and employees of 
businesses displaced by 
clearance)
Plans are unfurled and councillors explain -what a 
magnificent scheme it is. But unfortunately for 
the councillors, the people have generally come not to 
learn what the area will be like when they have left 
it but how the scheme will affect them personally. 83
Or as one Newham councillor interviewed for this study complained:
All they're concerned with if you try and consult them 
is "When's the van coming to the door?" You don't 
get involved in the basics, the environment and the 
area and that. All that's important to them is their 
personal, once-in-a-lifetime move out of private 
tenancy into the mystic Council tenancy. 84
In practice this is probably a rational position to adopt since, until the 
1970s at least, residents in an area usually were not consulted on whether it 
should be cleared or not, and would not be rehoused in the redevelopment that 
would take place anyway. In the early post-war period, local authorities 
often adopted dismissive attitudes towards clearance area residents 1 views. 
For example, the Newcastle Chief Planner, later Chief Planner at the D.ChE,, 
wrote in 1963s
In a huge city it is a fairly common observation that the 
dwellers in a slum area are almost a separate race of people 
with different values, aspirations and ways of living,.» 
One result of slum clearance is that a considerable movement 
of people takes place over long distances, with devastating 
effect on the social groups built up over the years. But, 
one might argue, this is a good thing when we are dealing 
with people who have no initiative or civic pride. The task 
surely is to break up such groupings, even though the people 
seem to be satisfied with their miserable environment and g^ 
seem to enjoy an extrovert social life in their own locality.
Where this kind of attitude prevailed ; the chance of a sympathetic hearing for 
residents' views was obviously not great. But because clearance usually affects 
relatively small and compact areas in which most people will have substantially 
congruent interests, residents are in quite a good position to form groups to 
try and influence the local authority via protest and demonstrations, which niay 
in turn secure local media coverage and influence 'reference publics'. But 
these efforts will be continuously weakened by their uncertainty about their 
futures and lack of information, by pocr housing conditions and the consequently 
high costs of delay which their action may cause ; and by their virtually complete 
housing vulnerability.
Of course, the blanket justification of clearance activity used by local 
authorities was that although involvement in the process could be disturbing, 
the gains in terms of improved housing amenity were large. Other factors 
intrinsic to clearance, such as the break up of existing communities and the 
remoulding of huge urban areas in an image conjured up by'the local authority 
in isolation, tended to be discounted. For example, Parker in a 1974 review 
of the social effects of slum clearance concluded:
For many years now families have been migrating away from the 
decaying residential areas of our inner cities and seeking more 
congenial surroundings in the suburbs and beyond. Without 
doubt as far as the majority are concerned, this is a voluntary 
and desired change, which has been participated in by working 
class as well as middle class people. In a sense therefore we 
can say that local authorities are reacting to rather than 
precipitating social change. Many slum dwellers share the 
general aspiration for better housing and suburban living, and 
most of those forced to join the outward movement because of 
clearance settle very quickly into their now way of life, and 
the difficulties encountered by the minority are for the most 
part temporary. 87
But many of the people affected by clearance were rehoused in exactly the 
same 'decaying residential areas' of the inner city, except that they were 
living in flats or tower blocks instead of houses, the diametrical opposite 
of the 'congenial surroundings' in search of which people migrated to the 
suburbs. Simultaneously with the rehousing of three million people via 
clearance, one and a half million were rehoused in high flats and many hundreds 
of thousands more in mass housing of some kind by the large urban authorities 
and with relatively little suburban or new towns migration. Little wonder
then that the D.O.E. should cautiously admit: 'many if not most residents in
88 
high rise dwellings in Britain have been rehoused there from slums. 1
REHOUSING
The final and key stage in rehousing for people caught up in clearance is
89 
the receipt of 3. housing allocation. By this stage in the process, trie
residents in a clearance area cannot hope to influence their overall rehousing 
chances, for their new accommodation will already be constructed and. other 
options foreclosed. But the process of matching available Lousing to
individual needs might be expected to introduce a greater element of choice.
In fact it does not. Rehousing was largely determined by the new 
housing under construction and in many cities by the mid-1960s this was 
dominated by high rise. Frequently also it would be concentrated in a 
particular area so that locations! choice would be limited. Finally most 
large urban authorities imposed stringent limits on the number of offers of 
accommodation made to clearance area residents. Although their homes might 
be falling down around them, the refusal of all but the most blatant 'cod 
offers 1 could seriously delay rehousing, lead only to worsening offers or 
produce offers which had to be accepted under threat of eviction. The Kewham 
Director of Housing, for example, explained why his Council made only one offei 
of rehousing in these terms:
when (people) are offered accommodation we endeavour to make 
the offer as reasonable as we can in accordance with requirements. 
We endeavour to spell out to people that if they think they're 
going to get a house they're going to be jolly unlucky, so they'd 
better say they're prepared to take something else... Having made 
the offer we don't have a formal method of three offers or something 
like that and then struck off the housing list. Because that's a 
lot of nonsense! I mean, three silly offers, it would be very 
unfair to strike someone off the housing list. Whereas, one very 
fair offer, thought about in the best way we could do, generally 
speaking people ought really to accept. Because we can't afford 
too much picking and choosing.. 90
(his emphases)
HOUSING WAITING LIST CLIENTS
If the influence of clearance area residents on housing construction
policy was insubstantial during the 1950s and '60s, the situation of families
91 
on local authority housing waiting lists was clearly even more ineffective."
Unlike clearance area residents, waiting list applicants are dispersed in poor 
accommodation throughout the local authority area. They are thus effectively 
debarred from organizing collectively and must deal with councillors and the 
housing department on a completely individual basis. Their influence on the 
general housing construction policy pursued by the local authority is thus nor. 
existent, since they have no idea which accommodation they -will end up in and 
unlike clearance area residents, no stake in any particul;:?.- area or
neighbourhood. The question of their needs or preferences for housing then 
becomes one of individual allocations. Here again their position is extremely 
weak. The clearance area resident being displaced by a coercive process froia 
his own house or from a long standing home, can legitimately hold out for 
accommodation of a form most suitable to his needs, and in the process inconveni­ 
ence the local authority to some extent by holding up the demolition of his house. 
The waiting list applicant has no similar basis for disagreement with local 
authority decisions. In getting on the waiting list, he has, in the eyes of 
some councillors and officials, 'failed to provide 1 for himself and his family. 
The long months or years which families spend in inadequate accommodation while 
accumulating the requisite number of housing points to be eligible for Council 
accommodation, and the additional time which may elapse before this eligibility 
results in a concrete offer of rehousing, count for little in comparison v;lth 
the claims of clearance area residents. The refusal of an offer of accommoda­ 
tion by a housing list family merely puts in jeopardy their position on the 
waiting list, without any cost to the local authority, and the number of offers 
made to waiting list applicants is often much less than those allowed to 
clearance area residents. Not surprisingly then, the 'potential tenants' on 
housing waiting lists have remained completely passive and invisible politically.
Conclusion
V/e have shown that it is possible to talk meaningfully of a 'public 
housing apparatus' which at a national level exerts a considerable influence over 
the setting of housing construction policy. The two main production interests, 
the design professions and the construction industry, operate in close contact 
with each other and central government in shaping production policy on public 
housing. Partly as a corollary of this (although the full proof of this r-\;st 
rest with our subsequent analysis), public housing 'clients' have had litile or 
no direct say in the decisions concerning their rehousing during the post-war
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CHAPTER TWO
The High Rise Housing Boom . • .
The aim of this chapter is to present as full a statistical summary of 
the high rise housing boom as is possible within the limits of the available 
evidence. In order for this account to be comprehensible it is first of all 
necessary to sketch in the outlines of those policies which affected the mix 
of building forms used in public housing programs, particularly to indicate the 
timing of changes in subsidy structures to favour high flat building. The 
close connection between the evolution of policy and the kinds of housing being 
provided by local authorities is evident in section 2.2. A brief discussion 
of the distribution of high rise between different regions and different types 
of housing authority concludes the chapter.
•
2e1; The Basic Outlines of Policy.
PUBLIC HOUSING SINCE 1945
When public housing development restarted in Britain in 1946, the Labour 
government decided to retain the subsidy system which had evolved from the 
policy fluctuations of the inter-war period. The essential elements in this 
system were a flat rate central government subsidy paid over the sixty year life 
of each council dwelling to offset the interest and repayment burden on local 
authorities, plus various additional subsidies of which the contribution in both 
the basic and expensive sites subsidy was fixed at around three quarters of t/ie
deficiency between construction costs plus maintenance and an acceptable level
pof rents, (determined by average incomes)* The remaining quarter of the
rent deficiency was made up by a statutory subsidy met from local authority 
rates, although, this requirement was abolished in 1956 when the Conservative 
government was keen to raise council rents to 'realistic 1 levels.
In the immediate post-war years the need for new housing was desperate rjnd
- f3 -
both main parties treated the level of housing completions as a major political 
issue. Initially all new housing was built by local authorities and private
•z
building was rigorously controlled.. In the 1940s virtually all council
housing was built on large, suburban estates in cottage houses on the inter-
4 war model. Very little slum clearance was undertaken although a few blocks
of flats were built on bomb sites. In 1951 the Conservatives were returned 
to power pledged to complete 300,000 houses a year by their Minister of Housing, 
Harold Macmillan. To boost the housing effort the government increased the 
level of Exchequer subsidy for council housing and encouraged the re-emergence 
of private sector house-building. The effect was to put considerable strain on 
construction industry resources and government finances, which was alleviated
mainly by drastic reductions in the space standards and amenity of public
/ N 5 housing, (the so-called 'People's House'). Following drastic relaxations of
controls on private building in 1954 the government announced in late 1955 that 
the bulk of new housing needs could now be met by the private sector. The 
general housing subsidy which had been paid since 1945 was phased out by the 
end of 1956 and government help to local authorities reserved for slum clearance- 
rehousing and overspill developments, a strategy which was justified in terns of 
concentrating government help on areas where it was most needed. For a brief
period the government even relaxed its programming controls on council building
7 but these were soon reimposed* These changes had a dramatic impact. Public
housing completions fell by nearly a third between 1957 and 1959 and housing
o
standards fell even further* Public housing was certainly redirected into the 
redevelopment of inner urban areas but an acceptable level of slum clearance 
activity was not achieved. Many of the authorities with the most acute 
problems could not afford to go ahead with programs on the scale needed and 
were reluctant to be forced into raising rent levels by government policy. 
By the 1960s it was apparent that a new initiative was necessary.
One stimulus to change was the Parker Morris report, 'Homes for Today and 
Tomorrow' which reviewing the standard of housing provision concluded:
The country already possesses a large stock of houses 
and flats that are becoming out of date and cannot 
afford to build more of them. 9
The report particularly criticized inadequate amenity standards in public 
housing.
Rather surprisingly the report was endorsed by the government although no 
additional help was provided to help local authorities to implement it. The
1961 Housing Act established a new subsidy system which the government claimed
1 1 would help the poorer local authorities to build effectively. The tasks of
public housing were still seen as slum clearance, the relief of overcrowding
and overspill housing, but the subsidy payable on all housing approved by the
12
Ministry was at two rates, related to the financial position of the authority.
Those in financial need were paid three times the rate per dwelling payable to 
those not in need. The test of need was based on the potential rent resources 
of the local authority, however, and had the effect of forcing local authorities 
to apply 'realistic' rents policies in order to carry on housing construction. 
Over the next three years public housing approvals increased by about 15$ 
and housing policies became key electoral issues. The Labour government 
elected in 1964 was committed to a major expansion of the public housing 
program and a new subsidy system. The government guaranteed to pay as 
subsidy any amount of loan charges due to the margin that interest rates exceeded 
» Since the amount of subsidy obviously varies with the capital costs of
the housing the government introduced mandatory Parker Morriss standards and
15 housing cost yardsticks. If the costs of a housing scheme exceeded the
yardsticks the local authority would have to finance the excess from its own 
resources.
The Labour Bill, finally enacted only in 1967 because of the 1966 election 
represented a substantial increase in subsidy levels and housing standards, 
It was combined with" encouragement to industrialized building and a licensing 
system designed to give housing and education building priority of access to 
construction industry resources. The expansion of the public housing effort
- *f5 -
was brief, however. Post-devaluation public expenditure cuts reduced the 
amount of public housing approvals by nearly half between 1967 and 1970.
HIGH FLATS IN POST-WAR POLICY
Central government policy on public housing has always been marked by a 
concern to attack the legacy of bad housing in the inner areas of Britain's 
cities left by the Industrial. Revolution. In the early years of the 1920s it
was assumed that this would largely be effected by building new housing for slum
17 residents on virgin land at the urban periphery. As a result relatively
• 
little was done by way of slum clearance and in 1930 the Greenwood Act
introduced a special subsidy for local authorities building flats on expensive 
sites in an effort to secure a more direct attack on slum conditions. The 
higher the cost of the land used for building, the greater the subsidy paid per 
dwelling. A requirement that redevelopment be in flats of at least four 
storeys was inserted to make sure that sufficiently intensive use was made of 
the land, but since local authorities had a strong financial incentive to
T
maximize the number of dwellings provided in any scheme the effect was to
18 produce rather crammed flatted estates.
In 1946 the basic framework of the expensive sites subsidy was left 
unchanged although subsidy scales were increased and a significant increment
per flat added for flats in blocks of at least four storeys with lifts. In
19 1952 the subsidy scales were again increased. The major policy reorientation
of 1956 greatly increased the centrality of subsidies for inner city redevelop­ 
ment, but did not prevent them from being markedly reduced. The old expensive 
site subsidy paid per dwelling was replaced by a much smaller one paid per acre 
and the primary encouragement to redevelop inner city areas shifted onto a new 
progressive storey height subsidy. Under this flats of four, five and six 
storeys qualified for very large increments to the basic house subsidy, wherever
they were built. Above six storeys the subsidy rose by a fixed increment for
20 each additional storey in the block. A flat in a six storey block received
2,3 times the basic subsidy paid on a house, and this ratio rose to 3.0 at 
fifteen storeys and 3-4 at twenty storeys. This encouragement to high building 
was justified primarily by reference to the increasing costs of high rise 
construction associated with the need to include lifts and to shift from brick 
construction to more expensive building materials. Even with the new subsidy, 
flat developments of clearance areas were less well subsidized than
under the 1952 scale, but flat developments on non-expensive sites were greatly
* 21 encouraged.
This subsidy structure was maintained largely unchanged until 1956, except 
that the 1961 Act slightly increased the amount paid on houses in needy 
authorities while leaving the flat increments unchanged. (in authorities 
judged not to be in financial need, however, the incentives to build high flats 
were strengthened by the reduction in the basic subsidy to a third of that in 
needy authorities).
The Labour government's 1965 subsidy change lead to a major change in the 
high flat subsidy since the higher costs of high rise were now reflected in the 
variable basic subsidy. The increments to the progressive storey height
subsidy above six storeys were abolished but a substantial flat rate addition
23at the 1956 rate was retained. The new subsidy created a strong central
government incentive to keep public housing costs down and led to a radical re­ 
appraisal of the methods of control previously used. Since high rise was a 
particularly expensive building form the introduction of mandatory housing 
cost yardsticks in 1967 bore especia3.1y heavily on high flats. Over and above 
this the government had clearly decided to discourage high rise building. l»ev,T j
«
restrictive density ceilings for public housing schemes were imposed and the 
yardsticks were calculated on the assumption that the most economical mix of 
building forms would be used at each density level, a mix which implied En.niir.c_L
*"* A
high rise use even at the density ceiliii-?;. In fact the ceilings at 155
f
persons per acre in conurbations and 120 persons per acre (ppa) elsewhere ware 
well below the level at which high building on its o\m would be feasible, (which.
was around 200 ppa). Of course very small amounts of high building were still 
possible under the yardsticks but since the cost limits failed to rise in line
with the escalation of building costs even this became more difficult,' even in
25 high density areas in London. After a time high rise schemes began to be
disqualified for subsidy and later to be disqualified for loan sanction approval 
at all as their costs fell outside even the 10$ tolerance limit allowed over 
the yardstick.
These changes in central government subsidies and cost control methods had 
a direct impact on the housing construction policies of local authorities, as 
the next section shows in presenting a statistical summary of the evolution of 
the high rise housing boom.
2o2s The High Rise Housing Boom,
NATIONAL TRENDS IN HIGH FLAT BUILDING
In 1946 the vast majority of local authority dwellings were houses. Flat 
building had begun to increase by 1950, however, mostly in low rise blocks. By
1953 77^ of public housing approvals were houses, 20^ were low rise flats and
?fi "5% were high flats. This situation changed markedly over the next few years,
largely as a result of the freeing of private building from licensing controls 
in 1954- The numbers of houses in local authority approvals fell by 61^ 
between 1953 and 1958 mainly because of the shift of construction industry
resources into the private sector, which consisted almost entirely of
27speculatively built houses. Public housing activity in suburban areas where
private housing was concentrated also declined in favour of redevelopment in
inner city areas.
This was reflected in the increasing importance of flat building and high
pO
rise by 1956, (Figure 2.l)c The proportion of house.?- in public housing 
approvals continued 'to fall until 1964, --'hen it reached a post-war low of -\ r^ . 
The proportion built as low rise flats rose to .just under a third by 1958 where
2.1; Local Authority Dwellings Approved by Building Form,
1955-75.
(England and Y/ales)
Percentage 
of total 
tender 
approvals
low rise £lats
Year
it remained static until 1966, High rise housing by contrast steadily increased 
in importance to 15$ of public housing approvals in 1960 and 26c/o in 1966. The 
numbers of high rise dwellings approved rose from 6,000 in 1956 to 17,000 in 
1961, 35,000 in 1964 and 44,000 in 1966, (Table 2.1). 29 The increasing 
importance of high flats was all the more remarkable since it coincided with a 
two thirds increase in public housing approvals, from 104,000 in 1961 to 
172,000 five years later.
Table 2,1; Local Authority Approvals in Various Building Forms, 1953-75. 
(Tender Approvals, England and Wales)
Year
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Houses
149,904
133,004
97,365
82,031
72,964
58,591
66,099
58,256
53,213
54,535
58,835
65,861
78,520
81,959
85,211
76,133
56,731
50,461
46,460
37,458
48,141
63,184
70,173
Plats
Low Rise
38,749
39,797
31,606
31,677
31,992
32,113
37,583
36,372
33,428
35,502
39,109
45,675
49,067
46,292
46,025
47,559
40,253
37,879
38,419
34,062
36,531
47,021
42,336
High Rise
6,730
8,932
8,044
8,011
10,009
11,369
15,109
15,685
17,107
18,871
27,500
35,454
34,953
44,306
39,309
30,616
15,217
9,740
8,004
5,692
2,970
2,794
1,484
Total
195,382
181,733
137,015
121,719
114,965
102,073
118,791
110,313
103,748
108,908
125,444
146,990
162,540
172,557
170,545
154,308
112,201
98,080
92,883
77,212
87,642
112,999
113,993
Between 1966 and 1968 the public housing expansion faltered and in 1969 when 
public expenditure cuts began to take effect total housing approvals fell by over
»
f
in a single year. Thereafter overall approvals drifted down more gently 
-l 1975 when they began to pick up again. But for high flats the bubble had 
burst irretrievably. Approvals of high rise fell by 3l£ between 1966 and i9 r'8,
by more than half in the following year and by 38$ in 1970. Fewer than
10,000 high flats were approved in 1970 and 2,750 in 1973.
"30 
In Scotland the data available on high rise is less complete. ' The
peak year of the '60s public housing expansion was again 1967, when total 
approvals neared 40,000 and high flats made up 29$ of all public housing,
•2 4
(Table 2 0 2). High rise approvals fell sharply in 1968 but then re-expanded
again until 1970 before falling again.
Table 2.2: Local Authority Housing, Scotland, 1960-73.
Proportion of Approvals %
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
Houses
46o7
52.5
38.2
41.1
38.5
35o2
4U9
4606
59.1
57.2
52.8
64.6
67.2
81.0
Low Rise
34.4
31.4
30.8
30.0
21.0
21.0
25.1
24.8
28.2
25c6
25.4
23-3
24o9
12.9
High Flats
12o1
7-3
13.2
22.2
24.6
28.7
25.2
28.6
12,7
17.2
21.8
Ho8
7.9
6.1
Total Approvals
22,706
19,248
27,517
29,958
27,517
33,260
31,630
39,438
33,749
33,756
20,824
23,122
28,567
11,677
Within the high rise category there was a marked trend towards increasingly 
tall blocks.. From 1955 to 1965 blocks of five to nine storeys, often termed 
'medium rise', made up between 4c3^ and 5o6^> of all public housing, varying 
without any apparent pattern from year to year. Taller blocks on the other 
hand, were an increasing proportion of public housing during the period. 
Blocks of 10-14 storeys expanded from Oo7>£ of public housing in 1955 to 8 0 4$ in 
1963o Blocks of 15-19 storeys expanded from 0.1;' of public housing in 155-5 to
8o3^ in 1964. The tallest blocks, of twenty storeys and. over expanded from
"•5 ? 
0.3>o of public housing in 1959 to 4-5;'1 in 1967, (Figure 2.2),
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2.2: Local Authority 3>r;ellinr;s inJLiph Rise Blocks as .a 
Proportion of Total Approvals, by Storey Height Categories, 
1953-75.
Percentage of 
total approvals
20 storeys 
15-19 storeys 
10-14 storeys
5- 9 storeys
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In 1966 when the progressive storey height element was eliminated from 
the flats subsidy, the trend towards increasing height ceased. Instead 
approvals of blocks under ten storeys more than doubled and grew until 1968 
when they accounted for 10.5$ of all public housing. In 1968 the taller 
blocks absorbed the whole of* the decline in high rise building, and although 
medium rise building fell sharply thereafter its decline was still more gradual 
than that of the taller blocks.
This pattern, of a phased expansion of the taller blocks up to 1965, with 
a pronounced burst of 'medium rise 1 building from 1966 to 1970, seems to reflect 
very accurately changes in government subsidy policy. We shall see later that 
it also mirrored shifts in architectural fashion and construction technology,
THE REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF HIGH RISE
Analysis of the regional distribution of high flats is possible only-for 
the period 1966-71, before which figures are not available and after which high 
rise approvals are so small that regional analysis becomes misleading. Although 
high flat building was declining in the period, over 187,000 high rise dwellings 
were approved, amounting to 18$ of all approvals in these six years, and about 
42$ of all high rise built in Britain since 1953^
Over 90$ of these approvals were in the six regions with conurbations 
recognized in the 1974 local government structure, Greater London, the Eort la- 
West, Scotland, West Midlands, Yorkshire and Humberside, and the North,
•z-z
(Table 2.3). Over a third were in Greater London alone, which accounted for 
over 46$ of high flats approved in England and Wales. The proportion of 
English and Welsh high rise built in Greater London increased as high flat 
building declined, from 44$ in 1966 to over 67$ in 1971. Most regions except 
London, Yorkshire and the North West h^d virtually ceased high building by 
1969. The propensity for local authorities to opt for high rise in London is 
best measured by the disparity between the region's share of national hi^h rise 
and overall approvals. Only three other regions had a positive disparity.
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The mix of housing forms adopted also varies markedly across the regions 
with a fairly clear inverse relationship between the building of houses and 
high rise. The level of aggregation of these figures does not allow us to 
speculate about the lack of apparent relation between the use of low and high
•
rise flats.
The wide disparity between regions in their use of high rise and the 
concentration of high flat approvals in the most heavily urbanized areas 
implies that high rise was a much more important element in public housing in 
urban areas than the national figures suggest. For example at the peak of 
the high rise boom in 1967 over 6Cffo of approvals in Greater London were for 
high flats.
THE URBAN LOCATION OF HIGH RISE HOUSING STOCKS
The official view of the urban location of high rise housing has been 
summed up in a Central Office of Information pamphlet which claims:
High blocks of flats are generally built in the central 
areas of large towns to replace old, overcrowded dwellings 
where land is scarce. They may also be used to provide 
focal points in new housing areas. 34
That high rise building in the late 1960s was concentrated in the most highly 
urbanized regions of the country offers some prima facie evidence for this 
interpretation. But it is not possible to determine from government published 
figures the urban location of high rise flats. In the course of this research 
an approach was made to the Department of the Environment statistics section tc 
obtain data which they might have collected but not published. Unfortunately 
it appears that until 1966 the old Ministry failed to keep adequate records of 
the location of high flat building at all, and that since this date only the 
regional location of such housing has been recorded. At no time in the post­ 
war period then can there have been any statistics of the urban location of hit-' 
flats being used in policy mailing.
This extraordinary gap in official statistics means that this section is 
compelled to use other less adequate and partial statistics in order to speciT;
~ 55 ~
more precisely the distribution of high rise housing across urban areas. 
Our main source is a publication of the Chartered Institute of Public Finance, 
Housing Maintenance and Management-Statistics which includes figures for the 
size of individual local authorities housing stocks by storey height. Since 
these statistics are compiled from voluntary replies made to the Institute 
their coverage is by no means complete, and the authorities which do send
•zs-
replies differ in systematic ways from those which do not. But a total of 
443 English and Welsh housing authorities sent replies in 1972, which we have 
chosen as a base year since it illustrates the importance of high flats in 
public housing stocks by the end of the high rise housing boom. About three 
fifths of all the high rise housing in England and Wales seems to have been 
included by this date, despite the omission of data for the G.L.C. and for some 
other large authorities including Birmingham and ten of the London Boroughs. 
A total of 22 London Boroughs, 58 County Boroughs, 105 Municipal Boroughs, 
144 Urban Districts and 115 Rural Districts provided the necessary information,
however, so that we would argue that these statistics can add appreciably to
37our knowledge providing their limitations are kept in mind.
Over two thirds of the authorities replying to the C.I.P,F. in 1972 had 
no high rise dwellings in their public housing stock, (Table 2.4)« 
Table 2.4: High Rise Housing Stocks, held by Local Authorities 1972. 
Number of Authorities.
Percentage of Public Housing in High Rise 
Authority type Q 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-50 Over 50 Total
London Boroughs
County Boroughs
Municipal Boroughs
Urban Districts
Rural Districts
1
12
60
123
•109
1
13
30
9
2
3
17
7
9
2
5
7
6
' 2
1
3
9
1
1
-
6 3 22
58
1 - 105
144
114
All Authorities 305 55 38 21 14 7 3 443
The importance of high rise clearly declines the smaller the authority. 
Only in the London Boroughs and County Boroughs was high rise an important 
element'in local authority's housing stocks. If we distinguish between 
county boroughs which were part of officially recognized conurbations and those 
which were not, it becomes clear that the former were more likely to have 
sizeable high rise housing stocks, (Table 2.5).
Table 2«,5s Conurbation and Freestanding County Boroughs *
Percentage of public housing in high rise 
0 Q-5 5-10 10,15 13-20______ Total
Conurbation C.B 3 3 9 4 7 26 
Freestanding C.B 9 9 9 3 2 ?3. 
Some of the freestanding county boroughs with sizeable amounts of high rise had 
considerable housing problems, such as Blackburn and Hull. Others, such as 
the two seaside resorts of Southend and Brighton, are more surprising.
There appears to be no very clear relation between the population size of 
county boroughs and their propensity to hold sizeable high rise stocks, 
(Table 2.6). The county boroughs without any high rise all have populations 
under 200,000, however. 
Table 2 0 6: High Rise in County Boroughs by Population Size ? 1972.
Number of C.Bs
Population
Under 100,000
100,001-200,000
200,001-500,000
Over 300,000
Percentage of 
0 0-5
9 5
3 3
3
1
public housing in 
5-10 10-15
8
6
4
—
1
1
2
5
High Rise 
15-20
2
4
1
2
Total
25
17
10
6
The overall distribution of the high rise housing stock in the C.I,P»:-\ 
data set emphasizes the concentration of high rise in large urban areas, and 
small numbers of high flats in the smaller authorities. (Table 2.?). Four 
fifths of the high rise covered was in London ard the conurbation county ocr 
with a further 18/j in the free standing county boroughs and iion-ccarnty Lorou.
Table 2.7: Distribution of Aggregate High Rise Stocks, 1972.
London Boroughs
Conurbation C.Bs
Freestanding C.Bs
Municipal Boroughs
Urban Districts
Rural Districts
High Flats
75,170
82,279
25,071
10,312
3,038
769
% of total 
stocks
38.2
41 -8
12.8
5.2
1.5
0.5
Average 
stock
3,580
3,577
1,<*o
229
145
154
Number of
Authorities
21
25
23
45
21
5
All Authorities 196,639 100.0 1,425 138
A quarter of the 13,350 high flats in the municipal boroughs and urban districts
39 were in or directly adjacent to conurbation areas.
The conurbation county borough total mainly consists of the high flats in 
a few large cities, including Liverpool (19,270), Leeds (11,930), Manchester 
(9530), Sheffield (8,360), Newcastle upon Tyne (6,170), Warley (4,650), 
Wolverhampton (3,770), and Bradford (3,080). In the free-standing county 
boroughs the largest numbers of high flats are in Bristol (5.450), and Hull 
(3,710). These ten authorities with over 3,000 high rise dwellings, together 
with two important authorities not in the data set, Birmingham (24,013) and 
Nottingham (4,300), between them account for over 100,000 high rise dwellings
or about of all the high rise in England and Wales. 40
In London many boroughs have high rise stocks on the same scale as these 
cities, particularly inner London authorities such as Southwark (9,460), 
Westminster (8,610), Lambeth (8,130), Islington (8,300) and some intermediate 
areas like Newham (6,740), Enfield (4,650), Brent (3,240) and Barking (2,990). 
Other London boroughs with large high rise housing stocks but which are not 
included in the data set are Tower Hamlets, Wandsworth, Greenwich, Carnden and
Hammersmith. In addition, of course, the G.L.C. has a high rise housing stool
41 running into many thousands.
No strictly comparable figures for the proportion of change in the data 
set high flats stock between 1967 and 1972 are available since the data set is 
smaller than for 1972 alone. But it seems clear that virtually all the'change 
in high rise stocks was concentrated in the conurbations and large towns 
elsewhere, (Table 2.8). Again much of the building by smaller authorities took 
place in or near conurbation areas. 
•Table...2.8; Distribution of Change in High Flats Stock, 1967-72 *
Change in 
high flats stock
London Boroughs
Conurbation C.Bs
Freestanding C.Bs
Municipal Boroughs
Urban Districts
Rural Districts
21,816
28,140
11,169
3,065
1,239
427
% of total
change
33.1
42*7
17.0
4*7
1.9
0.6
Average 
increase
1,454
1,563
620
93
89
107
Number of 
Authorities
15
18
18
33
14
4
All Authorities 65,856 100*0 646 102
Of course, these figures do not give an accurate picture of the changes in 
high rise housing stocks over this period. In particular they probably under­ 
estimate the concentration of high flat building in the largest housing 
authorities, and in London. Data published in the G.L.C.'s Annual Abstract of 
Statistics for example, show that in the four years 1970-73 a total of 37,562
high flats were completed in the metropolis, of which the G.L.Ce builr 8,227
42of them and the London Boroughs 29,335. Over three quarters of the G.L.C's
completions were in the Group A Boroughs, (the G.L.C's officially defined housing 
stress area which includes most of Inner London plus Newham and Hackney), 
About two thirds of the London Boroughs,1 total was in the same area, where high 
flats formed over 6O/a of all approvals until 1973«
The data that we have examined here strongly suggests that a very large 
proportion of all hi^li flat stocks is concentrated in the conurbation ?,re r:.s of
Britain. In a data set strongly biased against London and conurbation areas 
in general we found that 80$ of all high rise stocks were in conurbation e^eas, 
and 92?i were in the conurbations or in freestanding county boroughs. The 
true figures are certainly greater than this. We have noted also some data 
suggestive of the extent to vhich high rise, in London at least, is concentrated 
in the inner city.
INFLUENCES ON HIGH RISE BUILDING
i 
A proper statistical description of influences on high rise building would
require a better data base and a larger analysis of possible variables than is 
feasible here. This section accordingly presents only some simple correlation 
coefficients for local authorities' propensity to have one form of housing 
rather than another in their housing stocks, correlated with some variables 
which it was guessed might be influential. There may therefore be other 
variables involved and no inferences can be made from these correlations in the
data set to influences in authorities not in the data set.
43 The London C.i.P.F. data provides some strong correlations. The
proportion of the local authority housing stock in high flats correlates very
closely with net residential densities and the proportion of the housing stock
44 which is privately rented, (Table 2.9). The very high correlation between
the importance of high flats in the local authority housing stock and net 
residential densities reflects the two-way relation between these variables; 
i.e. high densities cause local authorities to build high flats which in turn 
increases residential densities. The importance of high flats correlates 
negatively with the proportion of the local housing stock which is owner 
occupied and the extent of the area which is open spacs. Rather surprisingly 
there appeared to be no relation with the importance of slum clearance but a
•
moderately strong relation with the continuing incidence of poor housing, 
measured by the proportion of the local housing stock without a bath. Interest 
ingly enough, the greater the proportion of the local authority's high rise
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which was completed between 1967 and 1971 the less the importance of high flats
45 in the authority housing stock. This suggests that high flats were more
important elements of the public housing stock in areas where the policy was 
a longstanding one.
Table 2.9: Pearson Correlation coefficients for Influences on High Flats 
Distribution, London and the County Boroughs, 1971*
(Correlations of less
London Boroughs County Boroughs
of Local Authority Housing in:
than 0.20 or -0.20 
omitted)
°/o of Local 
Housing stock;
Owner Occupied 
Council Rented 
Private Rental
High Low 
Flats Flats
Houses
-0.82 -0*22
Oo84
0.88
-0.83
High Low Houses 
Flats Flats
-0.20 -
- -0.30 0.22 
0.30 0.35 -0.42
% of Authority area:
Residential
Industrial uses -
Open Space -0.61
% of Local Housing:
Without bath 0«52
Cleared 1966-71
Net Residential Density 0<>95
Gross Population Density *
Population Size *
0.57 0.37
-0.21
^0.40 0.76
0.37 -0.66
Oo25 -Oo22
-Oo89
* *
* *
na na na
na na na
^. _ -
0.35 -
na na na
0.34 - -0.25
0.27 - -0.22
* : Correlation inappropriate na : Data not available
A very different pattern of influences appears to apply to the county 
boroughs. Unfortunately land use and net residential density figures are 
unobtainable for these authorities. But the data on gross population densitie: 
again suggest that local authorities build high rise and do not build houses ir. 
higher density areas. Significantly perhaps, the importance of high flats is 
related most closely to the importance cf slu^ clearance between 1967-71,
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followed by gross population densities, private rental houses and population 
size. A weak negative correlation with the local importance of owner 
occupation also exists,
•
The significance of the high rise figures needs to be set against.the 
figures for the other elements of local authority housing stocks. There is a 
clear inverse relationship between the influences on the building of high flats 
and houses.
In summary, the county boroughs with sizeable proportions of their local 
authority housing in high flats have higher gross populations densities, did a 
lot of slum clearance in the late '60s, have fairly large populations, still 
have higher than average proportions of privately rented dwellings and fewer 
owner occupiers. In London these relationships are much stronger except that 
high flats importance is related to the continuing incidence of poor housing 
and not slum clearance. High rise in London is concentrated in boroughs'with 
high net residential densities, little open space and few owner occupiers.
The London data thus show a very pronounced tendency for high flats to be 
important in inner city and housing stress areas and to be absent in suburban 
areas. This picture is well supported by the county borough data. The more 
muted relationships in the provincial cities may be due to the greater level 
of aggregation in the data - the county boroughs are 'whole city 1 authorities 
rather than small parts of a very large metropolis* Or it may reflect a real 
difference indicating that county boroughs unlike the London authorities were 
able to pursue fairly similar housing policies in inner city and suburban areas. 
An equalization of housing policies within city areas would reduce the variation 
between cities.
Conclusion
•
The period of high rise building in Britain during the fifties and sixties 
bears the cnaracteristic hallmarks of a 'boom', a swiftly escalating increase 
followed by a dramatic downturn. The existence of strong national trends
- 62
brings out the potential importance of an analysis of national policy making 
on the issue, and the prima facie evidence of direct influence from central 
governme'nt subsidy changes is impressive. In terms of geographical location, 
high rise housing seems to have been confined very largely to conurbation areas - 
mainly to 'core 1 or inner city authorities - and a few large free-standing 
cities and towns. The co-variation of high building with high urban population 
densities seems to be the main finding of our partial analysis of influences on 
local authorities' use of different building forms.
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CHAPTER THREE 
Dimensions of the High Rise Housing Issue
No discussion of ideologies, controversies and arguments can be abstracted
« 
from the consideration of the social functions they may serve or the interests
they may advance. But it is possible to separate out the treatment of such fac­ 
tors from the detailed consideration of political processes and to examine them 
in a systemmatic way. The advantages of this procedure are that a much wider 
range of arguments can be covered in greater depth, and that a clear iuea of the 
overall character of the issues and policies in question can be brought to bear 
on the direct analysis of the political process. This chapter then tries to 
give a reasonably comprehensive picture of the issues involved and the ideas 
associated with high rise as an essential preliminary to the detailed analysis 
of policy formation and debate contained in the next chapter,,
We shall discuss ®ix main aspects of the high rise hcu^lng issue, four of them 
associated with advocacy of greater high flat building, and two with opposition- 
to the policy. The 'pro* arguments reviewed relate to the place of high rise in 
modern architectural ideology; technological and industrial aspects of the "high 
rise boom; the planning dimension; and the relation between high flat building 
and the organization of the public housing effort. The 'con 1 arguments surveyed 
concern the costs of the policy and the effect of living in high flat accommoda­ 
tion on residents. Finally, section 3.7 draws together these different threads 
in characterizing the promotion of high rise building as that of a 'technological 
shortcut to social change 1 , which, like many shortcuts, proved to be illusory.
^.1; Architectural Ideology and High Pise 
ORIGINS OF HIGH RISE
The cultural origans of high rise housing in architectural ideology owed
nothing at all to the tenement building tradition evident in British and othor
'i 
countries 1 public housing in the nineteenth century. Indeed high riue housing
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was associated with the emergence of the "modern movement 1 in architecture
2 which was directly opposed to this tradition. Proposals for high rise
building came from many sources - the futurist city planning of Sant'Elia and 
Chiattonei Qropius and Maxwell Fry, the Constructivists and architects in 
Holland and Czechoslovakia. But Le Co'rbusier's contribution made by far the 
greatest impact on the profession. In a series of plans, exhibitions and 
books in the 1920s Corbusier argued for the adoption of high rise as the funda­ 
mental building form of the modern city. His views made high rise a central 
image in modernist architecture and exerted a direct influence on virtually all 
contemporary architects.
Corbusier's basic conception of the structure of a city was nuclear and 
architectonic to an extreme. At the centre of his ideal city would be giant 60 
storey towers spaced far apart with wide open areas between and used for busi­ 
ness and professional offices, and perhaps housing. Next would be a ring "of 
twelve storey apartment houses built in long winding lines. Then there would 
be a green belt beyond which small suburbs of individual houses would be built.
He called this 'the prototype of a classless city 1 but did not explain how
If 
these different types of housing would be allocated or paid for. As they
developed, Corbusier's formulations of his housing ideas became more techno­ 
cratic and he tried to depoliticize his views.
He was hampered in this effort by an extraordinary degree of architectural 
determinism and by his enthusiastic espousal of mass housing ideas. In Towards 
a New Architecture he claimed:
The problem of the house is the problem of the epoch. The equilibrium
of society of today depends upon it.
Architecture has for its first duty that of bringing about a revision
of values.
We must create the mass production spirit.
•The spirit of constructing mass production houses./-
The spirit of living in mass production houses.
Corbusier barely mentioned the social and political pre-requisites or consequences 
of the implementation of hie ideas. Discussing the practicalities of mass 
housing he distinguished as 'collaborators already consecrated to the task; big- 
industry and the specialized factories'. The 'collaborators which must be hrc-u^h!;
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in' included transport industries, banks and the architecture schools. The 
coalition thus formed would be 'one between architects and men of taste 1 while
n
'the executive* would be 'business concerns and architects'. As for the 
people for whom mass housing would be built, Corbusier recognized that they 
were likely to accept the changes he envisaged 'only when the world has been 
radically upset':
The dwelling changes only at the last moment, almost without the 
consent of the inhabitants, against the will of the passive forces 
of preservation.
In later versions of his ideal city proposals the technological commitment was 
softened by the description of his skyscraper town as a 'vertical garden city 1 
in which open space, greenery, fresh air and sunlight set off the machine-made 
environment.
But Le Corbusier never modified his notion of architecture as abstract
*
elite planning making reference primarily to the physical environment. In 1929 
he wrote:
Plans are not politics.
Plans are the rational and lyrical monuments erected in the midst of 
contingencies ... the environment, regions, races, cultures, typo­ 
graphies and climate ... the resources brought by modern technology. 
These are universal.'10
To Corbusier and architects educated on his ideas the building of housing in 
forms recognized to be unpopular but desirable in terms of elite aesthetics or 
technological sophistication seemed uncontroversial, a legitimate exercise of 
professional power.
I have been very careful not to depart from the technical side of my 
problem. I am an architect; no one is going to make a politician 
of me." Everyone in his own domain, where he is an expert can apply 
his specialized knowledge and carry his solutions to their logical 
conclusion. ^"'
POST-WAR' DEVELOPMENTS
The sudden success of the modern movement in capturing the commanding 
heights of the architectural profession after 19^5 cannot be detailed here. It 
is important to note, however, that the conditions of the inter-war period 'rl
inhibited the development of the modern movement, and as a consequence, its 
ability to learn from experience. When the floodgates were eventually released,
the leaders of the movement were hopelessly unprepared, professionally, politi-
12 cally and morally*. Le Corbusier made one further contribution to the idea
of mass housing by building a heavily subsidized French government reconstruc­ 
tion project, the Unite d 1 Habitation at Marseilles, a massive seventeen storey
1 "*?
block housing 1,600 people. In many ways the Unite broke away from the 
abstract megastructures of Corbusier 's early ideas and formed one of the seminal
works in the post-war 'International' style, which stressed slab blocks built in
1*f 
concrete rather than curtain walled tov/ers. The same kind of practical
application occurred elsewhere, narrowing down the circle of influences on and 
influences from housing.
Most architects expressed a willingness to come to terms with the social 
context within which they worked. In the particular_ly restrictive situation 
of low cost public housing they found high rise a useful and respectable solu­ 
tion to problems whose definition they felt incapable of altering. Thus 
Yaraasaki, a respected American architect who designed the now notorious Pruitt- 
Igoe scheme in St. Louis, wrote:
As an architect if I had no economic or social limitations I'd solve 
all my problems with one storey buildings. Imagine how pleasant it 
would be to always work in spaces overlooking lovely gardens filled 
with flowers.
Yet we know that within the framework of our present cities this is 
impossible to achieve... We must recognize social and economic 
limitations. A solution without such a recognition would be meaning 
less.
Those architects who rejected fatalism in the face of post-war realities
were predominantly attracted to the hard technology, 'logical' solutions of
l£ Buckminster-Fuller and Faolo Soleri. These architects' frankly technocratic
approach produced such repressive proposals as Buckininster-Fuller's Harlem 
redevelopment and Soleri f s 'New City 1 megastructure.
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ARCHITECTURE AND HIGH FLATS IN BRITAIN
After 19^5 there was a marked change in the balance of public and private 
architecture in Britain, and a flood of young architects into the larger public
offices produced the distinctive social responsibility element in architectural
17 ideology, which focused primarily on housing and school building. Innovation
in architecture was no longer associated with theory and planning, as it had 
been in the 1930s: 'success for the young post-war graduate was actually build-
"8 
ing what his teachers had envisioned'. As part of this movement, the debate
amongst architects about high rise shifted away from whether to build high 
flats - this was taken for granted - and towards detailed design and technical 
issues. The debate changed also from a literary to an ostensive one, marked by 
the extended and repetitive discussion of a small number of individual schemes. 
In these circumstances British architects tended to justify the use of high rise 
in terms of a 'weak determinism 1 , a non-decisive but important necessity to build
multistorey accommodation in terms of social, economic or technological changes.
19 These explanations were highly selective,.
The other strand of architectural ideology most often related to high rise 
was a vaguely defined appeal to 'social responsibility*. Paradoxically this 
did not denote deference to the 'untutored 1 preferences of public housing 
clients but was interpreted in elitist terms and combined with a strong deter- 
minist view of the influence of architectural design. Although the vulgar fora 
of this view was not usually deployed, the basic message of this element in
architectural ideology was that designs for buildings could have a direct and
20important influence on social relations. Social responsibility thus came to
mean incorporating in high flat designs features which it was supposed would
produce desired forms of social behaviour. The leading instance of this was
to improve contact 
the adoption of Le Corbusier's 'streets in the air' idea at Sheffielc]/between
21 neighbours (an effort in which they failed dismally).
On a smaller scale and in a more diffuse way the architecture of public 
housing in Britain displays both the fatalistic end the strong minded responses
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to a limiting reality. The fatalistic response was typified by the production 
of hundreds of schemes for high rise which made no pretension to any signifi­ 
cant architectural qualities., This strand of design reached its zenith during
*
the industrialized building campaign, when architects in many cities
relinquished any real control over the building design and concentrated only*
22on layouts and landscaping.
The strong minded architects' response to public housing provision was 
spearheaded by the Smithson's f new Brutalist 1 manifesto, which led directly 
to the growth of a recognized design approach whose trademark was the produc­ 
tion of avowedly 'hard 1 designs using dramatic building forms and a great deal
23 of exposed concrete. Very high blocks unrelieved by detailing were also
favoured and in a 1968 article headlined 'High Rise is Inevitable 1 Norman 
Wilson argued:
It is important to avoid the rigidity of present day high rise and,,, 
move further beyond the 30 or kO storeys into the hundred storeys.
The Smithson's ideas also lead directly to the long, deck access blocks of
Park Hill and Hyde Park in Sheffield, 'two of the largest and most uncompro-
2k raising public sector housing developments ever built in Britain'.
But towards the middle of the 1960s the architectural culture established 
before 1939 began to disintegrate from a variety of attacks. The first of 
these was that of the 'pop' architects and artists who stressed a deliberate 
embracing of the artefacts of business civilization and a new science fiction 
technological fixation, which centred on the use of plastics and steel in pre­ 
ference to concrete, and on the development of flexible and temporary building
forms in preference to the monumentality and permanence of established archi-
?6 
tecture. Later a variety of new inputs into architectural theory created
temporary vogues. Studies of 'personalization 1 and 'architecture without 
architects' broadened the range of acceptable images to include the previously 
condentned inter-war suburbs and the self-build housing of Third World cities, 
leading in time to the so-called 'post-modern' architecture cf the 1970s. 
Notions ol territoriality were used to criticize the unstructured pv.blic s-oa
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of local authority housing. Architects close to the vernacular tradition, 
such as Eric Lyons, began to be recognized, and an increasing use was made of 
traditional materials such as wood, brick and stone,, Overall architectural 
culture moved from a relatively homogenous modernism towards a new eclecticism, 
a general background shift which probably did more to reduce the use of high 
rise than any developed debate in the profession, and certainly was vastly
pQ
more influential than the participatory ideas. There is some evidence that
dissatisfaction with high rise was in part a cause of the general shift, as in
29 the critique of functionalism put forward by Rapoport and Cowburn. But it
was only when the transition had begun that criticism of high rise developments 
came to be voiced. The movement of opinion away from high rise was thus a 
product of the aging and partial decay of the inter-war architectural culture, 
and in many ways a by-product of this process* High rise housing's failure 
became a stick to beat the old guard with almost by chance; the perception of
this failure had no deep roots in and no very central effects on architectural
•A -, 30 ideology.
3.2: Technology, Innovation and Industrial Concentration
The aim of this section is to explore the connection between high rise
and 'an ethos of optimism about technology - a leitmotif linking high flats
31 with technological advance 1 . In particular, we shall try to show that there
was no very direct input from new technology underlying the adoption of high 
flats; and that many arguments phrased in terms of technology were actually 
more relevant to industrial concentration issues.
«
THE TECHNOLOGY OF HIGH BUILDING
There is nothing particularly modern about tall building £er__sjs. The 
first skyscrapers were built in Chicago after the fire of 1871 where 'by the
l890s office blocks, hotels and warehouses were being built ... which would
* 32 have been regarded as modern in England in 1930« The transatlantic cultural
lag produced by the conservatism of the British building industry made itself
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33 felt in many areas. But the basic technological skills for high building
existed well before 1939 » as the Highpoint blocks demonstrated. Steel .frame
construction developed by the 1920s. Reinforced and pre-cast concrete were in
35 production before 191*+. and pre-stressed concrete by 1938. Some of the non-
traditional building techniques later used in high flat construction, notably 
Wimpey f s f no-fines' and Laing's Easiform were in production in the 1920s for 
houses. Other precasting technique used by Concrete Ltd,, Wates and Reema 
originated in the 1939-^5 period. Even the heavy pre fabrication system? such 
as Camus and Larsen-Nielson adopted during the 1960s industrialised building
-in
campaign, were being widely used on the Continent by 19^9. The equipment
for high rise building was scarce initially - the first tower crane was imported
38 only in 1951 for example. But equipment advances generally followed after
the adoption of new techniques rather than constraining them.
All this suggests that the technology for building high rise existed so 
long before the high flat boom actually got under way that advances in this
technology can in no sense be seen as determining or even influencing in a major
7>9 
way the adoption of high rise." What was needed was a market and until it
existed in the early 1950s, the plant and expertise necessary for high building 
were in short supply.
A sophisticated variant of the argument from technology posits a major 
restrictive influence exerted by the building regulations as a reason for lack 
of experience with high rise. It is true that the 1939 Act on building in 
London enforced an 80 foot building limit for fire safety reasons. But in 
the 19^+Os and early 1950s this and other regulations were v.'idely breached, and 
by 1957 were completely changed. Over the period of the high rise boom, building 
regulations were relaxed:
... in the national interest on account of the housing shortage 
and in order to stay apace of the needs of modern industry. As 
one critic, has written - "the spread of high building proves that 
public controls afford far less protection than would appear from 
the wording of many a bye-law",^
The report of the Griffith Tribunal provides a graphic illuct:.acicn ox how far
this non-regulation process had gone by the peak year of the industrialized
42 building campaign.
Finally it is worth considering whether the technology embodied in high
•
rise acquired a particular significance in the post-war period. The only
argument advanced here is that high rise cut completion times, an idea which«
originated in the period when non-traditional building firms claimed to be
43 able to avoid building materials shortages. The argument continued to be
bandied around long after this situation had eased. In fact, completion times 
for public authority flats have always been greater than for houses (Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1 • Construction times in public housing 1937-70
44
Completion time in months
Public authority houses 
Public authority flats
1937
10.7
16.1
1962
11.8
18.0
1966
13.1
18.7
1970
20.8
A recent research paper concluded:
Flats take approximately 1.33 times the length of time that houses 
take to complete. The probable reason for this is that a whole 
block of flats has to be completed before a single flat can be 
occupied, but on a low rise development as soon as the first dwell­ 
ing is finished occupation is possible. Whatever the reason, the 
implication to the local authority of this extra time taken to
completion is that of an extra burden on cost. 4:
INDUSTRIALIZED HIGH RISE
Did the industrialized building of high rise introduce a more direct connec­ 
tion between the building form and technical change? The non-traditional system 
used for flats probably did not. The improvements on traditional techniques
made by these -systems were relatively small, and owed more to the standardization
of 
of design components and the detailed development/plant and expertise than they
did to the precasting of components or the mechanization of site processes, 
although progress in these areas was still quite notable. The heavy prefabrica- 
tion systems introduce'd during the industrialized building campaign were a 
different matter, however. Even though they had been in use for over a decade 
in other countries, the technical advance which they represented was an
undeniably important and recent one, and there was an integral relation between
47 industrialization and high rise.
- ?6
All the industrialized systems claimed to make major improvements in
labour productivity in the structural construction process, an important step
48 since house building productivity has remained at a chronically low level.
The industrialized systems could not easily be competitive with traditional 
construction on the typical, low cost British house, however. Stone estimates
that structural labour costs (in 1964) accounted for only about 9 per cent of
4-9 
the total (Table 3.2), Since industrialized building systems basically
operate by substituting more expensive structural materials with a low labour 
erection content (such as large pre-cast panels) for less expensive materials
with a high labour erection content (such as bricks), and by increasing the use
50of (expensive) plant, they faced a very difficult task. Even if labour costs
could be saved elsewhere very large savings in man-hours (50-60$ ) would be
needed to achieve final cost savings of J>-k% via the mechanization of labour
processes.
Table 3«2 *. Estimated breakdown of traditional house costs
Non-house costs: kO% of which:Land 25%
Garage 5
Road, site works 10
Direct house costs: 60% of which: Materials 33
Labour 18 
Foundations, 
equipment , 
fittings 15
Total 100$
Material cost (33$ ) components: Structural Materials
Non- structural Materials 18$
Labour cost 18») components: Structural labour above
ground 
Other labour 9%
These acute difficulties of cost competitiveness on low cost house schemes 
were drastically reduced on high cost high rise schemes, where the proportion of 
total costs accounted for by structural materials and associated labour was around
40 % (instead of 25$), and where the initial co^t differential between traditional
51and industrialized structural materials was much less.
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The technical change involved in pre fabrication, although impressive and 
directly associated with high rise, was nonetheless much less dramatic than 
its exponents commonly claimed. The advance in constructional technology never
•
approached that suggested by such analogies as Le Corbusier's call for a mass
production house, for reasons discussed by Stone:«
At first sight it often appears surprising that the use of industrialized 
factory methods does not result in substantial economies in building con­ 
struction, but the scale of the differences between the normal manufac­ 
tured article and a building can be overlooked. As compared with most 
manufactured goods buildings are large, heavy, bulky and cheap in rela­ 
tion to their size. Because of their size, weight and comparatively low 
price they are difficult and costly to transport even sectionally. Hence, 
and because of the need to tailor them to their sites and attach them to 
services, the advantages of building on site are considerable. Moreover 
building is an assembly industry and less easy to mechanize than manu­ 
facturing industries. Because of the size of a unit of building, the 
variety of purposes and client needs, and because of site limitations, 
a large variety of buildings is required. The construction industry ca 
thus be more sensibly compared with shipbuilding than with manufacturing"/
Finally, labour productivity increases were also supposed to be useful for 
local authorities in reducing labour shortages or by cutting completion times. 
In practice, a relatively stable labour supply on traditional building could be 
obtained by employing larger regional firms which maintained relatively large 
and continuously employed labour forces. The largest national contractors 
most involved in industrialized building tended to employ men erratically and tc 
draw on the * reserve army of labour 1 as needed to compensate for their generally 
higher overheads. On completion times, claims about speed became the common 
currency of the '60s industrial building campaign. For example Concrete Ltd,, 
claimed in 196? '•
Much of Cumbernauld is being built with Bison Wall Frame. In con­ 
structing the first of eight 12 storey blocks of flats in only 
fifteen weeks Bison broke all Scottish building records. Bison was 
chosen for Cumbernauld because its smooth working, industrialized 
system ensured that this imaginative project would be completed on 
time... For Concrete Limited the greatest prize is the sight of 
contented families finding homes of their own - sooner rather than
later.
In the very short term speedier construction could offer some hope of easing
acute housing problems, but within, the time scale of planning, programming and
\ 
redeveloping sites for public housing the difference which one construction
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system rather than another could make wae very small. In fact completion 
times for public authority houses and flats consistently increased throughout 
the industrialized building drive (Table 3*1),
THE MARKETS IN HIGH RISE AND INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION
« 
Analysis of the claims made for high rise (and industrialized high rise in
particular) in terms of technological or industrial progress, strongly suggests 
that many of the supposed benefits were premissed upon arguments for industrial 
concentration. If the construction of public housing could be regularized and 
improved in the hands of a smaller number of larger firms then a variety of 
technological/industrial benefits would follow. It was widely argued that public
authorities had an incentive to build high in order to create these benfits; it
55 was very seldom argued that these benefits were already available.
To examine the implications of high rise for industrial concentration we 
shall first lock at the industrialized high rise boom, and then at some more 
fragmentary evidence relating to the high rise market as a whole, 
(i) Industrialized high rise. The 1960s industrialized boom which began in mid- 
1962 focused initially only on high rise, and although it was subsequently 
diversified high flats remained a very important element in the overall indus­ 
trialized market (Table 3.3). 
Table 3.3 ' High and Low Rise Industrialized Building, 1963-73
Year
1963
196*f
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
Industrialized high
Numbers
11,072
1^,787
16.613 '
2^,3^2
26,298
19,192
11,907
1,983
2,757
1,9to
67<+
#of all
high rise
to. 3
VI. 7
^7.5
52. ^
66.9
62.7
78.2
20.^
3M
26.2
27.0
rise
% of all indus­
trialized building
n.a.
n.a.
36.7
37.5
37-0
32.8
3^.2
10.2 ,
15.6
13.1
3.0
Industrialized low rise
Numbers
n.a.
n.a
28,715
^0, 553
Mf,86Q
39 , 393
22,859
17,399
1^,877
12,922
21,7^*8
% of all
low rise
n.a
n.a
22.5
31.6
3^.2
31.8
23.6
19.7
17.5
18.1
27.3
The stable importance of high flats was maintained by the much more extensive
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and rapid industrialization of high rise building, amounting to two-thirds of 
all high flats by 196?, around twice the figure achieved for low rise. The 
importance of high rise to the overall industrialized market is indicated by 
the more general decline produced by the collapse of the industrialized high 
rise market after 1968-9. By 1970 fewer low rise flats were industrialized 
than in
In practice high rise was more important than these figures suggest to 
industrialised builders, particularly those using concrete and heavy prefabri- 
cation systems who generally won low rise contracts because of their ability 
to handle mixed development estates. Concrete Ltd's Bison system became 
the market leader in high rise in 1966, but from 196*f the firm's fastest grow­ 
ing market was on low rise. In practice systems with a high rise capacity
accounted for over 70% of all industrialised housing until 1968, and their
59 share of the market over the whole period 1965-73 was 69% (Table 3. 10.
Systems with a high rise capacity were far more successful in securing orders 
until 1968 than exclusively low rise systems, which only seriously began to 
erode their predominance once the high rise market collapsed. For pre-cast 
concrete systems as a whole the effect of the high rise market disappearing 
was to produce a startling decline in their success. From being far and away 
the most successful of all system types in 1967 their share of the market 
dwindled to very little by 1970 (Figure 3.1). °
Because of the centrality of high rise in the industrialized building 
campaign, the concentration of output in the high flat market is especially 
significant. Seven national companies dominated the market:
(1) G. Wimpey - Britain's largest building contractor.
(2) Concrete Ltd., - one of the largest building materials firms.
(3) J. Laing - the second largest firm,
(k) Wates - sixth largest firm overall but specialising in housing construction,
(5) Taylor Woodrow - third largest firm overall.
(6) Camus (Great Britain) - subsidiary of the giantFrench firm which held the 
. licence for the Camus system.
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Table 3*4; Industrialized building systems, 1965-73*
Number of systems on the
Low Rise 
systems
market
Systems 
low and
suitable for
high rise.
High Rise Total 
systems
Predominantly Predominantly 
low rise high rise
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
Number of
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
Total
% of all
1965-
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
15
56
65
71
72
64
&
48
JO
14
14
15
15
14
14
12
12
7
15
18
16
17
15
14
13
13
11
12
•12
11
10
9
9
7
7
6
56
100
107
113
110
101
15
80
^
dwellings by system type
9,632
16,792
20 9 173
17,413
12,554
9,226
7,482
4.504
9,455
107 , 231
industrialized
21.2
25-9
28.3
29.7
36*1
47.6
42.4
30.3
42.2
24,430
22,150
24,430
24,588
7,946
7,190
7,172
8,183
12,376
138,463 
building by
53.9
34.1
34.1
42.0
22.9
37.1
40.1
55-1
55.2
9,019
21,144
22,754
13*478
12,079
2,688
1,988
2,175
153
85,478
system type
19.9
32.6
32.1
23.0
34.9
13.9
11.3
14.6
0.7
2,247
4,809
3,933
3*106
2,187
278
992
ma
438
17,990 
5oO
7.4
5o5
5.3
6.3
1.4
5.6
-
1.9
45,328
64,895
71,158
58,585
34,766
19,382
17,634
14,862
22,422
349,032
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Figure 3.1 ; Trends in Industrialized Housing Construction by Type of Sygte-^
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(7) Crudens Ltd. - one of Scotland's most successful building firms which 
penetrated the English market with the Skarne system.
Between 1963 and 1973 these firms accounted for three-quarters of all industria­ 
lized high flat approvals in England and V/ales, Wimpey alone building nearly a
*
61quarter of the total (Table 3.5). The total construction output of the firr^s 
is impressive - Wimpey built 31,200 flats, Concrete 23,000, Laing 12,050, 
Wates 15,500 - and overall in these eleven years they built over a quarter of
all the high flat stock in England and Wales.
The table shows the marked decline of Wimpey T B share of the market under
« m
competition from the heavy prefabrication systems, a decline which also accounts
for Laing' s shaky performance until 19&7 when their Jepersen system (redesigned
63 jointly with KJILG) came on stream. Between 19&3 anc* 19&9 » average contract
sizes in the market increased from 168 to over 350 flats, and all seven fi
except Y/impey were consistently above this average.
In contrast, the top seven firms in the industrialized low rise rir.rket ever
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Table 3.5 ; Contractual Background of Industrialized High RS.se, 1963-73
Percentage of tender approvals going to:
Year Numbers of __^____ Firm_______^^___^^_ T°P 7 Firms (2)
___ High Rise (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (77 Firms to (7)
*
1963 11,072 63.3 8.3 1.7 8.9 2.5 - -- 84.7 21.4
1964 14,787 43.4 16.1 6.7 10.3 4.6 1.2 - 82.3 38.9
1965 16.613 31.9 12.4 12.3 12.2 5.9 5.2 0.3 80.2 48.3
1966 24,342 14.1 23.3 4.8 20.3 6.3 10.6 4.6 83.9 69.8
1967 26,298 12.0 14.1 18.0 12.8 3.8 2.5 8.4 71.6 59.6
1968 19,192 20.1 20.1 5.1 4.4 - 6.2 3.4 59.0 38.9
1969 11,907 8.6 18.5 15.4 12.2 13.5 5.2 4.7 78.1 69.5
1970 1,983 17.5 23.3 12.5 14.8 15.7 - - 83.8 66.3
1971 2,757 19.0 21.7 - 4.8 - - 45.5 26.5
1972 1,940 2.6 53.1 - - - - - 55.7 53.1
1973 674 15.6 19.4 - - - - - 35.0 19.4
Total 131,565 23.7 17.5 9.2 11.8 5.0 4.6 3.5 75.3 51.6
the 1965-73 period (which consisted of Wirapey, Concrete, Laing and four low rise
only firms), accounted for just under half of all approvals, the vast bulk (2%)
64 being in Wimpey's ! no-fii\es' technique. (The seven firms included in Table 3.5
accounted for less than two-fifths of all approvals.) The high rise market was 
thus much more concentrated than with any other form of industrial housing.
(ii) The High Rise Market as a. Whole. Not all high rise was industrialized even 
in the mid-1960s so that overall levels of industrial concentration in high flat 
markets were lower than the previous analysis suggests. How much lower can be 
gleaned from an analysis of completions in Greater London between 1967 and 1972 
(which would be contracts approved lj to 3 years earlier). Our data cover nearly 
85,000 dwellings in contracts with some high rise content (henceforward called
'high rise estate contracts 1 ), of which 65»600 were high rise (around 15/c of the
65 British highflat stock). ^ Three-quarters of these were built by the London
boroughs and the remainder by the G.L.C.
Some 30,000 dwellings (34% of identified approvals) were built by five 
national firms - Wates (9i330), Concrete (7,170), Laing (6,8l4), Wimpey (4,390) 
and Taylor Voodrow (2,600). Overall national firms built 46% of the total, some
17 regional firms built 25% , 39 local firms built 1?fJ and direct labour
,66 
organisations 13/-»
There v/ere marked differences between the London Boroughs and the G.LC. 
in their contractual relations (Table 3.6). The Boroughs relied heavily on 
national firms who built over half of their high rise estate dwellings (a 
proportion which rose consistently to 60% in 1972), in large contracts (the 
average size of which rose consistently from 1?8 dwellings in 196? to 565 
dwellings in 1972 completions). In contrast the G.L.C. relied more on regional 
and local firms since the authority had a greater technical and financial 
capacity and had little need to offer concessions to the largest firms. (The 
G.L.C. large firms total is, however, depressed by the cloud over their main 
industrialized system, Taylor Woodrow-Anglian's Larsen-Nielson system, which 
was the technique involved in the Roman Point disaster.)
These figures suggest that, whatever the peculiarities of the London
67 market, high rise markets overall were dominated by large national contractors
Table 3.6; Contractual Relations, London Local Authorities 1967-72
High Rise Estate Contracts, Completions
London Boroughs Greater London Council
National Companies
Regional Companies
Local Companies
All firms
Direct Labour
Unclassified
Total
High rise dwellings
Dwellings
29,344
10,304
9,345
48,993
&»4i5
5,836
63,244
50,291
Contracts
100
66
84
250
51
33
334
% of classified
National Companies
Regional Companies
Local Companies
Direct Labour
Total
National Companies
Regional Companies
Local Companies
Direct Labour
51.1
17.9
16.3
14.7
100.0
•
33.3
22.0
28.0
16.7
100.0
Average Cont
293'
156
111
168
Dwellings
5,584
9*135
3,505
18, 224
1,330
1,679
21,210
15,309
% of
28.6
46.7
17.9
6.8
100.0
v*£) pi* 55 "i *? P
,*. V4. \S \f 9*r ,-~ *. C
Contracts
21
40
23
84
19
14
107
classified
20.4
38,8
22.3
18.5
100.0
(Dwellings)
266
228
152
70
and displayed a markedly higher degree of industrial concentration than other 
public housing markets. In view of the high degree of concentration in public 
housing as a whole viz a viz other new construction (noted in Chapter 1) this 
finding suggests a quite remarkable process of concentration associated with
the high rise boom. In our view it is this, rather than any major or modern
«
technological change, which constituted the fundamental industrial innovation 
of high rise.
3.3* Planning Aspects 
PLANNING AS URBAN CONTAINMENT
The origin and purposes of the 19^7 planning system, and its orientation
so
towards 'urban containment 1 have been exhaustively described elsewhere.
Here we need only note its success in reducing the average annual expansion of
the urban land area from the 193^-39 level of 60,000 acres to a post-war
69 figure of only about 36,000 acres.
Within urban areas the basic post-war planning innovation was the decanting
70of overspill population into carefully planned new towns. But despite its
prominence in the planning literature, the new towns programme directly
71 affected only a relatively small proportion of the urban population. Far
more important was the tradition of 'tr«$U planning 1 on urban density zoning
Op
initiated by the County of London and Greater London Plans of 19^3 and 19''+^.' 
The Forshaw-Abercrombie Plan, in particular, marked a regression in planning 
practice, largely because, in attempting to deal with the problems of an
arbitrary urban area in situ, it closely reflected the views of the L.C.C's
73 architect's department. The two London plans defined concentric rings of
density zones ranging from 200 persons per acre (ppa) in the centre of the 
L.C.C. area, through large intermediate areas at 136ppa and 100ppa, to a ring
4
outside the County at 75ppa and a suburban zone at 5Qppa. Abercrombie prepared 
very similar advisory plans in many other British cities and conurbations,''
and these sort of proposals were adopted with remarkable uniformity in the
75 Development Plans for urban areas up and down the country.'- Most plans failed
to take into account the post-war fall in inner and core city populations and 
thus throughout the 1950s optimum population targets came to imply more of an 
emphasis on redevelopment, and less on decentralization, a trend strengthened 
of course by the moratorium on new town designations. In 1960 the L.C.C's
first Development Plan Beview extended the higli density central area and intro
77 duced a new intermediate density of 175PP&. The conception of nuclear
cities as pyramids of density levels was thus strengthened at the same time as 
the focus of the planning system on residential densities as a central measure 
of housing amenity was maintained.
Whatever the initial configuration of social groups in relation to the
78 planning legislation, the operations of the system created and modified over
the next few years clearly distributed benefits unequally and even perversely.
79 'Trend planning' in the context of high density inner cities and low density
suburbs reinforced an unequal status quo, accepting that those living at low
levels of amenity would be rehoused in a sanitized environment at reduced but
Ro 
still comparatively high densities, while those living at higher levels of
amenity in suburban areas would continue to do. Policies such as the equaliza­ 
tion of housing standards (particularly public housing standards) across 
metropolitan areas were explicitly debarred,even had there been a structure of
housing authorities capable of achieving such a result. A strong conservative
ft*i 
allocation of values was thus maintained.
Essentially the defence of high density inner city redevelopment as a
planning goal rested on two pillars, the notion of the nuclear city as a pyramid
82 of market values, and the structure of existing social locations. It is
difficult to show an explicit connection between notions about market values
o? 
and denzity zoning, but a moment's thought will suggest that it underlay
virtually every aspect of the planning system's operations.
For example, .in city-centre business and financial districts most 
planning authorities would not consider any other sort of development 
than offices. In other words, certain types of land use are «een ac 
"logical", "sensible" and "financially sound". In city centres it is 
seen as "illogical" to zone land for uses which are not the most 
profitable and which do not bring in the highest income.
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The public housing programme might have developed away from a reliance on 
market values to indicate densities had the 19^7 planning legislation remained 
intact. But the abolition of the betterment levy by the Conservative government
•
in 1953 and the twenty-year property boom which followed it made the spiralling
85 costs of land a fundamental influence towards higher densities. Of course,«
the public housing programme could partially escape from this spiral by creating
its own building land at site value prices through clearance (at least until
o/- 
1969). But this focus, while it could not insulate public housing from the
inflation of land prices, powerfully strengthened the incentives towards 
densification and reduced amenity provision. The devalarization of some inner 
city land which was accomplished seems to have served principally to distort
the profile of development costs as between clearance areas and land at market
8? prices.
The structure of social locations was used in defence of high density city 
planning in a rather diffuse way. The relationship between particular occupa­ 
tions and inner city residence was often put forward as a justification of high
QO
density redevelopment. Crossman, for example, told the Commons:
In the Central London area, Liverpool or Manchester there is a 
case for having housing there for working class people because 
their need is there. The great metropolis needs people who 
areelectricians, needs charladies who will do the cleaning work 
in the office ... and-we have to build housing for them.°9
In"part this argument only brought out more clearly the commitment of the planning 
system to the reproduction of a sanitized status quo. But it was also linked to
the espousal of general urbanist values and some evidence of locational
90 preferences of inner city residents. These arguments were principally at
fault in leaving out of account the fragmented structure of the public housing
programmes, the coercive nature of the clearance programme and the evidence which
91 exited about trade-offs between locational and housing type preferences.
PLANNING TECHNOLOGY AND HIGH DENSITIES
High density inner city redevelopment was not primarily defended in terms 
of its positive planning values, however. It was overwhelmingly justified in
-87
terms of other planning goals which it was seen as maintaining. In particular 
values associated with urban containment - the avoidance of urban sprawl, the 
protection of farming land, the preservation of rural areas close to cities,
particularly green belts - were seen as intimately related to the density
92 zoning policies of inner and core city areas. Since the planning system was
also directed to providing more open space, better schools, decongested indus­ 
trial zones and improved transport systems in these areas, all of which
93 required increasing space allocations, the onus of land saving in inner
city redevelopment fell entirely on housing. And at the same time as this 
pressure was brought to bear, architects independently began to argue that 
high density residential development, as a result of advances in constructional 
technology, was for the first time compatible with acceptable improvements in 
housing amenity. As a result, inner city housing bore a large part of the 
burden of urban containment. Although incremental density increases occurred
throughout the conurbations, the pressure on central urban areas produced
94 particularly drastic changes in housing. This was in practice an
irrational distribution of pressures for urban containment because of the 
diminishing returns in terms of land saved by densification at higher densities. 
Since housing related uses are a fixed component of overall housing land needs,
an increase in densities from 2k to *K) ppa saves almost ten times as much hous-
95 ing land as the much larger increase from 160 to 220 ppa (Table 3.7). If
housing land is to be saved anywhere it can be saved most easily by increasing 
the density of low density developments.
The effects of pressure for increasing already high densities on inner city 
housing developments was determined most basically by the assumption about the 
relation of building forms to density built into planning technology at this 
time. The Forshaw-Abercrombie plan defined the post-war orthodoxy in terms which 
assumed that above 100 ppa most accommodation would be in high rise (Table J.S)' 0, 
Because of difficulties in translating theoretically attainable densities into 
buildings on the ground, it was anticipated that completely high rise
Table 3.7 : Land needed for housing 1,000 people at various densities 
(assuming a requirement of 8 acres for housing related uses)
Gross
population
density (ppa)
20
30
to
50
60
70
80
Net
Residential
density (ppa)
24
40
59
83
115
159
222
Housing
Land
(acres)
42
25
17
12
8.6
6.3
4.5
Overall Land
Land needed Saving
(acres) (acres)
50
33 <
25 <
20
16.6 <
14.3 <
12.5
> 17
8
5
3.4
2.3
1.8
Table 3.8 : The Relation of Building Form to Housing Densities in the County 
of London Plan,
200
Net residential density (ppa)
Theoretical mix of build- 100 136 j60 
ing forms &>)
Houses
Low rise flats
High rise flats
56
25
19
31
8
61
25
0
75
0
0
100
100 100 100 100
Actual mix
Low rise flats and houses 
High rise flats
87
13
100
38
62
100
100
100
100
100
would be necessary above 136ppa. The MHLG manual Flats and Houses 1958 
revised these figures somewhat, suggesting that densities of 60ppa could be
attained in two storey houses with garden developments, and that no high rise
97 accommodation at all was necessary up to levels of around 90ppa. The manual
saw a need for steadily rising proportions of high rise, but this figure would 
only need to rise above 5$ at levels over l40ppa.
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In the 1960s these generally accepted figures came under challenge. Stone 
argued that theoretical densities of 130 ppa were attainable with two storey 
flats, and with four storey flats 1?6 ppa could be reached. Both theoretically 
and in practice he demonstrated the sharply diminishing returns in terms of
density increases at higher storey heights, thereby calling into question the
98 accepted account of the need for higher building at high density. In 1962
Darbourne and Dark designed the first of many influential low and medium rise 
schemes breaking with previous paradigms; they achieved densities of 210 ppa
on the ground, using no blocks higher than eight storeys and giving 60/o of their
99 dwellings their own garden or patio.
The climax in this process of discrediting &n inadequately based conven­ 
tional wisdom was the first major theoretical work in this area, the built form
100 studies of Martin and March. March concluded:
High buildings in nuclear centres make sense only in terras of 
real estate speculation. In terms of accommodating built space -. 
on urban land they are extravagant and irrational gestures.
And he attacked'present housing criteria which assume that as densities increase? 
houses decrease in favour of flats and low buildings give way to high 1 . In 
contrast he argued:
With favourable land use planning, serai-detached houses can 
be built at 200 people to the acre. Three storey terraces under 
more normal circumstances can be built at up to 265 people to the 
acre. These are facts. All this density business is a dangerous 
convention. ^ 2
These arguments made quite clear the lack of any necessary connection between 
high building and high density development.
Several other formulations of this faulty planning technology can be 
considered more briefly.
(i) It was often argued that although increasing high densities produced 
sharply diminishing returns in terms of land savings, yet it could nonetheless
make an important contribution by saving particularly valuable land on the urban
103periphery, land valuable in terms of accessibility and in terms of price.
Stone produced a table specifically to consider this objection, taking into
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account both housing land and non-housing uses (such as commercial and 
industrial uses). On a conservative estimate of non-housing land requirement, 
this effectively demonstrated that variations in building form apart from in-
•
creases in low rise densities had little or no effect on the overall si.ze of
104 the urban area (Table 3.9). ,
Table 3.9 : Building Forms and Total Urban Land required for 10,000 people 
(assuming 300 acres for all non-housing uses)
Housing Provision: Housing Land Total Urban Land Land
(acres) (acres) Saved
Detached 2 storey houses with
gardens
Terraced houses and gardens
Two storey flats - no gardens
Five storey flats
Twenty storey flats
300
100
90
65
50
600\
4oo{
39of
365^
350^
200
10
35
15
On the argument about the prices of land saved, a 197^ study again by Stone
argued:
The real costs of providing and maintaining dwellings rise more 
rapidly with increasing storey height than the requirement for 
land falls; hence the real costs of each acre of land saved 
rises with increases in the number of storeys. The cost per 
acre of land saved also increases as the size of the dwelling 
falls. The land saved by developing four bedspace dwellings in 
k storey flats instead of 2 storey blocks costs(the public 
authority) about £21,500 per acre (in 1964). The cost per acre 
of land saved is £46,700 if fifteen storey blocks are used. If 
two bedspace dwellings are used in this way to save land, the 
costs are about twice as much as for four bedspace dwellings. In 
the long run the land saved is farmland typically worth about 
£200 an acre in 1964. Clearly high building is an extravagant 
way of saving land. '°^
ii) Even if no connection was made between high rise/high density urban 
development and urban land savings as a whole, it was universally believed that 
the use of high buildings on a particular site allowed the creation of open
*
spaces within the city - areas of grass and greer» in sharp contrast to the
diminutive backyards of the terrace houses or crammed tenement blocks of the
106 nineteenth century. In practice, the space about buildings per habitable
room falls more sharply with increasing densities than can be nu.de up by
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107 providing accommodation in taller blocks (Table 3.10). Since about 200
square feet per habitable room are normally required for access, parking etc., 
the implication is that:
... even if high flatted blocks are used, play spaces, areas of planting 
and other amenities can only be provided at densities of 15>0 
habitable rooms per acre or less. Densities much greater, however 
high the blocks, are impossible without a serious sacrifice of 
amenities since the gain in space about buildings from building 
higher is soon exhausted.'10^
It may seem strange to argue that above 7 storeys virtually no extra space is 
gained by building higher, until it is realized that the spaces present in 
high rise schemes are obtained by massing space per building - space per 
dwelling or per person is static. In addition, of course, the spaces created 
by massing have less and less specific use value -small grass verges, blank 
areas of grass, tarmac parking lots, and spaces overshadowed by or very close
to high blocks have no positive value at all, and no space represents an
109 amenity unless it can be used for some purpose.
(iii) Finally, it was often argued that high building allowed mixed development - 
•typically the provision of accommodation for large families in houses. Since 
this depended on the creation of open space by building high, and space could 
not be created by such means, this argument was as fallacious as those in terms 
of open space provision. Space for houses could be created by increasing
densities, but as the MHLG consistently argued this meant using low rise flats
110not high rise. In practice, because of daylighting requirements, the poten­ 
tial ground space for houses created by high rise building is much less than
111 even Table 3o10 suggests.
• 
•
FJELIO HOUSING DENSITIES
Public housing densities since 196*f (when records start) have shown a marked
112 fall in the proportion of dwellings in schemes over 100 ppa (Table 3.11). Very
high' density schemes (over 200 ppa), accounted for 10^ of new council dwellings
<f
in 196^ but this figure fell to just IF;' by 1973. At the peak of the high rise 
boom in 1967 nearly 1^0,000 people a year were being rehoused at densities over 
100 ppa, a quarter of all .those moving into public housing (Table 3.12),
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Table 3*10*. Space about buildings at various densities and storey heights
(Square 
Density
feet per habitable room) 
in Average number of storeys Decrease
Habitable Rooms
per acre
50 
100
150
200
Gain in
Table 3.
1
621 
185
40
-
""**•
space 125
2
746 
310
165
93
V
41
11: Distribution of Public
3
787 
351
206
134
V
21
4
808 
372
227
155
13
^
821 
385
240
168
6
829 
393
248
176
8
7
835 
399
254
182"*"
6
I
J
in
space
436
145
72
Housing Approvals by Density, 1964-73
Proportion of dwellings approved (/£) England and Wales
Year
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
Density (ppa)
Under 60
36.8
34.3
32.8
34.4
25.8
37.0
35.0
38.1
34.5
39.1
60-100
34.4
40.5
35.5
38.7
49.3
39.7
45.2
44.9
45.3
50.5
100-14O
9.3
9.0
11.4
7.6
9.9
9.5
12.5
9.1
10.1
6.3
140-200
9.4
8.7
13.6
11.9
9.4
10.8
5.7
5.2
8.1
3.1
Over 200
10.1
7.5
6,7
7.4
5.6
3.0
1.6
2.7
1.8
1.0
28.8
25.2
31.7
26.9
24.9
23.3
19.8
17.0
20.0
10.4
One in every ten persons rehoused was in a scheme with a density above 180 ppa.
Large numbers of people in schemes with high proportions of family accommo­ 
dation (as measured by the density of persons per dwelling), were also being 
rehoused at high net residential densities, although the proportion was slightly 
lower than in public housing overall.
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Table 3.12; Distribution of persons in schemes by densities of persons jper
Density of
Under 70
70-100
100-140
140-180
180-200
200-240
Over 240
Total
acre and per dwelling,
scheme (ppa)
Under 2.4
21,037
3,098
1,481
423
545
208
210
27,002
1967 (England and Wales)
Dwelling size(persons)
2,5-3-4
33,264
12,599
14,049
22,101
4,595
8,463
14,752
109,823
2.5-4.4 Over 4.4 All schemes
153,328 113,389
58,149 52,142
23,045 4,040
14,979 9,715
13,145 340
3,569 6,348
5,854
272,048 186,063
321,020
125,938
42,626
47,185
18,678
18,678
20,816
594,936
3.4; The Fragmentation of the Public Housing Drive 
THE STRUCTURE OF HOUSING AUTHORITIES
The urban containment orientation of the planning system v/as powerfully 
institutionalised in the opposing interests of the top tier pre-1974 local 
authorities, the counties and county boroughs. But the local government struc­ 
ture allocated the housing function to the bottom tier authorities, producing 
a much more complex nexus of conflicting interest, which meshed with the 
planning system primarily in forcing inner and core city authorities (usually
county boroughs) back on their own land resources in meeting their housing
114 needs. Although the new towns and town development procedures provided a not
115 unimportant means of decanting overspill population, there were no other cear.B
of equalizing standards of public housing provision. Housing developments in 
other planning or housing authority areas were possible, but the difficulties
and controversial!ty of such developments made them relatively infrequent, except
"1^ 
where they were possible oi\ directly adjacent or unbuilt up/nori green belt land.'
In the conurbations, middle class and suburban areas proved highly successful
throughout the post-war period in preventing development by those authorities
11 1"7 
with more acute housing stress in their areas. ' The core areas of conurbations
were surrounded by a variety of smaller authorities most of whom defended their 
autonomy and the character of their areas as vigorously as the counties resisted 
urban growth. The London government reorganization in 19&3-5 merely
^institutionalized this conflict on a borough level, a pattern followed by
118the 1972 local government reorganization. As a result, apart from the over­ 
spill procedures, housing authorities had to meet their redevelopment and 
rehousing targets in situ.
Within the inner and core cities, the effect of these restrictions was 
intensified by the inflation of land values, and by the spread of high density 
public housing developments (which increased the potential value of sites to 
local authorities, and thus affected the cost of all housing land, but particu­ 
larly land not acquired through clearance of unfit properties). As a result,
redevelopment emerged as the major means of providing better housing in inner
119 urban areas.
SLUM CLEARANCE AND HIGH RISE120
The land scarcity in urban areas put enormous pressure on city authorities 
with large numbers of unfit dwellings to create building land via slum 
clearance. Since housing gains could be made in redevelopments built at high 
density, slum clearance could also allow the rehousing of some waiting list 
applicants. The danger of this situation was that the scale and pace of the 
clearance programme were no longer determined simply by the numbers of unfit 
houses. They were also influenced by the extent of housing need in the local 
authority area,as measured by the length of the Council's waiting list. If slum 
clearance had-the effect of increasing the incidence of housing need, it could 
become a self-generating cycle of public authority activity which ultimately had 
little relation to the problems of unfit housing. Clearance would result in in-
i
creased housing need; which in the closed urban land system in city areas would 
justify further clearance to provide land for housing waiting list applicants; 
which would worsen the housing situation and produce further redevelopment. 
Under what kinds of conditions could such a cycle be set in motion?
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a) The most basic pre-requisite was inadequate social accounting, specifically 
a lack of attention to the transition costs of the urban renewal process. No 
assumption was more deeply ingrained in the housing apparatus than that the
•
gains from redevelopment swamped the costs involved in the transition period in 
terms of accommodation lost or blighted, the disruption of communities and the
«ft
social upheaval accompanying renewal. On the whole these costs were considered
121 so trivial that they were not measured. A recent study of Camden shows that
the Borough claimed to make a housing gain of 4?8 dwellings in its current 
clearance programme, but that this benefit was more than offset by the loss of 
an estimated 6^,000 'bedspace years' through accommodation being absent or 
unused during the clearance process. This study argues:
A council can only claim a real housing gain when the clearance 
programme has offset the housing capacity which it has 'borrowed 1 
from other sources during the period of blight and redevelopment. 
In the case of Camden 's programmes between 19&5 an<i 1973 it will.pp 
be over 100 years before the 'lost* houssing capacity is made up. .
If a redevelopment programme works perfectly the decrease in the local housing 
stock will still be substantial during the transition from one set of dwellings 
to another. If the programme goes wrong, as programmes frequently did, then 
areas are blighted, sites are cleared and left empty, and the housing stock is 
depleted even further. Nor did local authority completions in many areas even 
keep pace with the rate of demolition. Between 1951 and 1966 Liverpool 
demolished 39jGOO dwellings and built only ^0,000 while Manchester demolished
^8,000 dwellings and completed only 37* 000, a net decrease in the local housing
123 stock of nearly 25 per cent of the cleared total. Policies like these could
hardly fail to create additional pressure on housing resources.
*
b) It has been fairly commonly assumed that local authorities in Britain 
rehouse virtually all those who lost housing accommodation during redevelopment. 
The extent to which clearance 'dishoused 1 people has never been known. Because 
the people involved were 'fringe 1 groups, such as immigrants, furnished tenants, 
single people, or people unable to pay local authority rents, the problem has 
been ignored. The same study of Carnden found that the Council in fact rehoused
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only just over half the people displaced by their clearance programme between 
1965 and 1973» and that clearance 'dishoused* 7i500 people, twice as many as 
were housed from the waiting list in the redevelopment schemes. Local authori­ 
ties were able to push part of the problem created by their policies elsewhere, 
causing further pressure in the shrinking private rental sector.
c) Both these arguments are fairly conservative criticisms of the clearance 
programmes of city authorities. Since redevelopment caused blight it not only 
created additional demand pressure on local housing stocks, it could also tend 
to create unfit housing. And once a scheme was announced many people would
leave a future clearance area, often halving the population by the time a C.P.O.
12*t was declared. Local authorities always measured the housing gains of
redevelopment from these artificially depressed population figur.es. Consequently 
1he arguments in (a) and (b) represent minimum estimates of the adverse impact of 
clearance.
d) For the clearance process to make a major dent in the local housing stock 
there had to be a very loose fit between the measurement of unfit housing and
the clearance process. Many writers have commented on the inadequacy of the
125 criteria on which certain clearance decisions are based, and the possibility
of including completely fit housing in clearance areas to get sufficiently
i ^ f~\ 
large or well shaped sites for rebuilding. Such completely fit housing
127 accounted for 9.6 per cent of all cleared houses in the 1960s,' but the number
of houses demolished because of 'bad layout 1 or erroneously classified as unfit 
has never been measured. During the 1960s it was common to point out that the 
definition of- housing unfitness in many authorities seemed to be determined
primarily by the local authority's estimate of what it could reasonably develop
1 pR 
in the foreseeable future rather than by objective housing conditions. ~ Tnis
v/as usually held to lead to deliberate under-estimating of the extent of housing 
unfitness. But the argument could be turned on its head and used to suggest 
that often the houses demolished by councils were not unfit> and that local 
authorities could often define habitable housing as unfit, particularly before
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opposition to clearance became common. The Camden study found that very few 
of the dwellings in the borough's current programme are unfit, and in a G.L.C. 
Housing Condition Survey 59 per cent of all the houses demolished in .London 
between 196? and 1971 were rated as in 'good' or 'fair' condition on an objec­ 
tive scale, i.e. were at least capable of being rehabilitated. From that
129 period alone London lost 5^*000 fit dwellings. Of course the proportion of
cleared housing which is not unfit has been increasing since 1960. Before that 
a majority of houses demolished were probably genuine slums. But since 1960 
over one million dwellings have been cleared and the logic of the closed urban 
system within which public housing operated must cast a doubt over much of this 
activity.
The unacknowledged cost of clearance in part explains why so many slum 
clearance authorities believed that high densities needed to be maintained in 
their developments. Operating with fairly short time horizons these authorities 
often saw their problems as originating with inadequate housing gains from 
development rather than from the clearance process itself. High rise-high
density development seemed the only way of breaking out of a cycle of lengthening
130 housing lists which redevelopment in the past had done little to reduce. The
worsening situation which clearance could create also came to justify densities 
such that high building was necessary to achieve them, often densities which 
should not have been aimed for in designing housing to provide acceptable accommo­ 
dation for a sixty year period. High rise was also attractive because of 
erroneous impressions of shorter completion times with high blocks, or as a way 
of providing the maximum number of dwellings on one part of a clearance area
•
which would allow the remainder of the area's population to be rehoused and thus 
speed clearance.
POPULATION DECLINE AND HIGH DENSITY DEVELOPMENT
An extraordinary aspect of much of the post-war public housing drive has
been the prevalence of high density redevelopment policies in urban areas
1^51 experiencing very rapid losses of population (Table 3*13). However, when the
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increased rate of household formation is taken into account, it becomes clear 
that most major cities had a static or a rising population of households, at 
least during the 1950s.
•
The loss of population raised other issues which could lead housing. 
authorities to try and check the trend by redevelopment policies, such as high 
rise, which claimed to avoid population dispersal.
Frequently the saving in costs from population loss is far less 
than the corresponding loss from rates and rate deficiency grants. It 
is often worthwhile for a local authority to develop at very high 
densities and on very expensive land, rather than house people more^^ 
economically on land within the boundaries of another authority. ^
In practice the drift from the major cities was not checked by such policies; 
those primarily affected were people unable to move into the private sector 
market and thus 'trapped 1 in the housing waiting lists or slum properties of 
the inner urban areas.
Table 3.13; Changes in the Population of Some Major British Cities, 1931-71
City Population increase (per cent)
61 1961-71
Coventry 17.6 5.7
Hull 1.5 -6.1
Bradford 1.2 -0.6
Leeds 0.9 -2.9
Birmingham -0.3 -9.0
Sheffield -0.4 -3.8
Glasgow -3.2 -16.0
Liverpool -5.8 -19.9
Manchester -6.0 -19.5
Oldham -6.6 -8.5
Salford -13.7 -16.7
3.5» The Costs of High Rise Housing
Because of the limitation of official data it is not possible to measure the
the 
cost of/high rise boom with any great accuracy. An informed guess would put
these costs at between £1,000 million and £1,500 millions, however (compared 
with a total construction investment of £60,000 million for the period 
70).
- 99 -
CONSTRUCTION COSTS
That high rise housing in Britain is an expensive building form has always
been known, although in the late 1950s wildly over-optimistic expectations of a
13^- 
decline in construction costs were held. The first national data on costs
showed that in 1960 all forms of high rise were more than twice as expensive 
per square foot as three bedroom houses (Figure 3.2). This differential 
began to fall from about 1963 onwards, when high flat were between 1.65 and 1.80 
as expensive as houses. Of course, since high flats provided an average only 
two thirds the floor space of a house v the cost differential, per dwelling was 
less than these figures suggest, falling from a figure of 1*57 to 1.33 between 
1962 and 1966. The dwelling costs tended to be used by those claiming a 
substantial fall in high flat costs, but clearly the cost per square foot is 
a more objective yardstick in incorporating some reference to the amenity level 
provided. From 1968 onwards the differential between, high rise and house costs 
ceased to fall (unlike that of low rise flats), and if anything rose again, 
bringing out the importance of demand factors in affecting construction costs.
High rise costs were also expected to fall as a result of the industrialized 
building campaign. In fact both costs per dwelling and per square foot were less 
with industrialized high flats than in traditional blocks by 196*f. After 196? 
this cost advantage widened considerably but by 1970 had disappeared as the 
industrialized high rise market collapsed (Figure 3.3). The gap between high 
rise and house costs did not narrow appreciably as a result of industrialized 
building, however.
The total construction costs of high rise can only be estimated by multi­ 
plying average cost by the base numbers included in the government statistics. 
This covers less than half the high rise in Britain (some 216,000 flats), the 
dwellings not covered being principally the 68,000 high flats built in England 
and Wales before 1960,. around 89,000 built by the LCC/GLC since 1960, high 
flats in Scotland (69*000 built since 19oO), plus other schemes on which cost 
data were not available. Expenditure on high flats within the cost figures
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.^t_2_;__Ki,.'ji_glat Con?tmction Costs .As. a ,PrQHortion__pf ...Ho.use 
Construction Costs (costsjper square foot of chveljiiyr space),
1960-75
(England and Wales)
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increased by more than five times between 1960 and 1966, while the numbers 
of flats included tripled (Table 3.1*0. The difference between the cost 
and base number increases is due very largely to the shift of more and more 
high rise into the taller and more expensive blocks.
With the available data a very crude estimate can be made of the extra 
costs incurred by local authorities as a result of building high rise rather 
than low rise building forms. Dividing the aggregate cost of high rise in 
each year by the average cost of two storey three bedroom houses in that year 
gives a ceteris paribus measure of the number of houses that could have been 
built with the money spent on high rise. Between 1960 and 1973 this measure 
suggests that 293»^000 houses could have been built for £753 million, a housing 
gain of 78,000 dwellings. In other words over 37 per cent more dwe3J.ings 
could have been built at no extra cost, while the dwellings provided would have 
been on average over 30 per cent larger than the high flats actually built. 
Table 3>1^t The Aggregate Costs of High Rise Construction. 1960-73
(England and Wales, excluding G.L.C. tenders) 
Approval Storey Heights: Annual Cost (£OOOs)
Date
1960
1961
1962
1963
196*f
1965
1966
1967
1968
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
5 6-8 9-11 12 & over
3,019 3,350 7,276 9,3^9
2,736 3,118 7,038 9,328
3,865 3,979 10,^08 13,^25
3,373 2,2^7 11,920 38,956
8,996 6,630 11,050 6^,991
9,111 7,037 12,36^ 71,865
13,931 22,927 1^,503 75,951
25,376 21,8^3 8,998 70,^82
8,5^6 25,550 8,93*+ 39,833
' 5-8 9-1^ 15 & over
( 3^, 100 17,726 31,038 )
18,578 *f,550 10,991
12,059 5/H1 ^,250
9,207 2,37^ 5,032
6,25^ 1,765 1:^25
7,005 268 1,^86
All High Rise
22,99^
22,220
31,677
56 s 4 96
91,667
100,377
127,312
126,699
82,863
3^,119
21,720
16,613
9,Wf
8,759
Number of
High Flats
10,106
8,*K>2
10,608
l8,Wf
29,389
29,^32
3^,138
33,772
21,5^3
8,356
5,160
3,5^3
1,5^9
1,126
This crude comparison must immediately be qualified, however. Regional
not 
variations in construction costs an/ controlled for in the D.O.E. figures, ye
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they have a very marked impact on different dwelling costs. High rise in 
London costs 10 per cent more than the national average, but is cheaper in
relation to houses, since council houses in London cost JO per cent more than
139 the national average.
The D.O E. stati-stics overestimate the cost differential involved 
in high rise since London accounts for a large proportion of the high flats 
but only a small proportion of the houses included. What is being compared 
is thus (higher than average) high rise costs in London with (loxver than 
average) house costs in the provinces.
DEVELOPMENT COSTS
Another method of assessing the costs involved in high rise housing would 
be to examine the conclusions of housing economics studies. This has the 
additional advantage that it is possible to look not just at construction costs, 
but also at those for land, site development, garaging and maintenance.
Land costs per dwelling fall with increasing density in relation to a 
particular site, and although high rise was an unnecessary way of achieving 
higher densities this argument was often advanced in its defence. However, 
since land costs are responsive to density zoning, the overall land cost savings 
involved in high density development are less than might be supposed. Taking 
land costs per dwelling at ten dwellings an acre as 100 per cent costs fall to
82 per cent at twenty dwellings an acre, ?6 per cent at thirty dwellings and
1^-1 73 per cent at forty dwellings an acre. This shallow curve is not enough
to offset the drop in land values as one moves away from the city centre. So 
the land cost per dwelling at high densities in an inner urban zone may be only
slightly less or even more than the cost in a lower density development in an
1^2 outer zone.
i
Site development costs do fall markedly with high flats, to about half
those of two storey dwellings, although again the decline dimishes with storey
1/+3 height and has virtually levelled off at ten storeys. These costs account
for less than 10 per cent of development costs in two storey dwellings, hcvever,
so very large savings are necessary to have any impact on overall cost.
Garaging costs increase markedly in high rise developments. Those in 
schemes with at least one high rise block were 40 per cent above those in 
completely low rise schemes in 1964, and as 100 per cent car parking provision 
became mandatory the differential rose until in 1967 a high rise garage cost 
more than twice as much as those on low rise schemes. At this date the 
cost per car in a. high flat scheme was £44-5, over 10 per cent of the average 
cost of a high flat and 17 per cent of the cost of a house.
Finally maintenance costs in high rise were 53 per cent more than in low 
rise schemes in 1964. Since then this differential has widened consistently 
to as much as 100 per cent, as labour costs have risen, and the problems and 
defects of the high flat stock have become evident.
The best overall impression of these costs (excluding land costs, however) 
is provided by Stone (Table 3.15). This suggests that total dwelling costs 
with high flats are about half as much again as those of two storey housing.
The only available figures including land costs (but excluding maintenance 
costs) indicate a much lower cost differential between 2 storey and 15 storey 
development in 1964, amounting to only 13 per cent in the innermost London 
zone for which data is available, and 26 per cent in inner Birmingham
Table 3» 15? High Rise Housing Costs as a proportion of House Costs, 
2 Storey House costs « 100
Storey Height: 4 10
Dwelling Cost
Garage
Site Development
Total Initial Cost
Maintenance (Capitalized Cost)
Total Development Cost
117
150
72
114
113
114
155
150
57
143
153
145
164-
150
53
150
153
150
- 
Table 3.16). In practice these figures seem to underestimate the cost
differential involved in high rise since it seems doubtful that two storey
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Table 3.16; Total Cost of Development per Dwelling (£)
Mile from 2 Storey 10 storey 15 storey 
centre
London
Birmingham
pensity (dws
10-20 
20-30
0-10 
10-20 
20-30
per acre)
5,650
Mto
^.150 
3, 7 to 
3, too
16
6,170 
5,500
5,070 
^,760
M6o
6, too 
5,710
5,230 
^,930 
^,630
39
dwellings would be built in inner urban areas at only 16 dv/ellings per acre, 
less than two-fifths of the density for high flats. A more valid comparison 
would be the cost differential between high flats in an inner zone with low 
density low rise in an outer zone. On this basis, a high flat within ten 
miles of Birmingham city centre cost to per cent more than a two storey dwelling 
ten to twenty miles out, while the same differential for the two London zones
shown was 32 per cent. Away from the very high metropolitan land prices in
1^9 London, the differentials between building forms widened considerably.
It is impossible to do more than guess at the opportunity costs of high 
rise housing, the proportion of total cost which could have been saved by build­ 
ing houses. In London and Scotland (where high rise costs are low and house 
costs relatively high), the differential would have been substantially less than 
in the rest of the country. But even in the most favourable circumstances, the 
extra costs of high rise must have been an extremely significant proportion of 
total costs, and the loss of alternative dwellings in the public housing 
programme substantial.
THE COST OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES
Government subsidies for high flats h-ive assumed throughout the post-war 
period that since high rise housing was necessary in some urban areas the 
Exchequer had a duty to offset the extra costs which a local authority vould 
incur in meeting housing need by high building.
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The 1956-65 high flat subsidy paid 1.4 times the basic house subsidy at 
four storeys, 1.7 times the basic subsidy at five storeys, 2.6 at ten storeys,
3 .£ times the basic subsidy at fifteen
150storeys and reached a ratio of 3.4 at tv/enty storeys. In view of our conclu­ 
sions about the cost differential between low and high riser schemes this may 
seem to have oversubsidized high flats until it is appreciated that the govern­ 
ment subsidized not the building costs themselves, but the rent deficiency which 
would otherwise have to be paid by local authorities. A hypothetical example is 
sufficient to demonstrate that with the same rent and rate fund subsidy, an 
initial difference in capital costs of a high rise flat over a house of 60 per 
cent of the house costs could make necessary the payment of a subsidy over four 
times the house subsidy in order to make up the great, rent deficiency with the 
high flat (Table 3.17). 151
Table 3.1?: Government Subsidy Calculation: a hypothetical example
(£s)
House 
High Flat
House 
High Flat
(1) Capital 
Cost
2,000 
3,200
(5) Less 
Rent
65 
65
(2) Loan 
Charges
100 
160
(6) Net 
Cost
55 
130
(3) Plus 
Repairs
20 
35
(7) Less Rate 
Subsidy
31 
31
(k) Total 
Cost
120 
195
(8) Gives: Exchequer 
Subsidy
2k 
99
The Exchequer subsidy was designed not to equalize the costs of high and lew
•
rise housing for local authorities but to leave an incentive for local authorities 
to opt for low rise building. The 1957 Act in Scotland which introduced the high 
flat subsidy specifically stated that the Exchequer would meet two thirds of the
extra costs of high risa, and this was also the aim of the subsidy scale in
152 England and Wales. But since the local authority could make land savings vita
high rise this meant that the extra costs of high building were considerably less
than a third before 1965. .After the 1967 Act the extra annual cost to the local 
authority of high building was 10-16 per cent of the cost of houses ?.n London and
- 10? -
30-55 per cent in Birmingham (depending on the dwelling size and the rate of 
interest). 155
The aggregate costs of the high rise subsidies can be assessed only for 
high flats approved under the 1956 and 1961 Acts in England and Wales, 216,000 
in all. (Since statistics are only available for storey height ranges such as 
5-9 storeys, minimum and maximum costs have been calculated assuming that all 
the flats in each range were at the minimum or maximum height. ) By 1966 the 
subsidy bill for high rise buil since 1956 was between £10.6 million and £12.5 
million, or between 14.4 per cent and 16.9 per cent of all post-war subsidies 
in that year. Between 1962 and 1966 the cost of high rise subsidies increased 
by 260 per cent and as a proportion of post-war subsidies nearly doubled 
(Table 3.18).
Table 3.1S *• The Cost of High Rise Subsidies, 1957-66
(England and Wales)
Year Cost of Exchequer Subsidy and percentage of all post-war subsidies
Minimum Assumptions
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
Costf£OOOs)
345
815
1,375
2,162
2,992
3,900
4,936
6,520
. 8,587
10,648
Per cent
0.82
1.75
2.279
4.31
5.67
7.07
8.42
10.25
12.50
14.41
Maximum Assumptions
Cost(£OOOs) 
462
1.059
1.752
2,696
3,686
4,766
5,980
7.796
10,157
12,492
Per cent
1.10
2.27
3.56
5.37
6.98
8.63
10.20
12.25
14.78
16.90
Since the abolition of the progressive storey height element the flat rate 
subsidy addition of £26 for all flats over six storeys has added a further £4.0,"; 
million to this annual bill for the 155t^O flats approved in England and Wales 
from 1966 to 1973- Of coarse a large part of the cost of high flat subsidies 
since 1966 is included in the basic subsidy element and thus cannot be ar^
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The subsidies for high flats will be paid out for sixty years after the 
date of approval. Over this period the Exchequer will pay between £6^fO million 
and £?50 million for the total subsidy on high flats approved under the 1956 
and 1961 Acts. The high flat supplement paid since 1966 will cost a further 
£2*f1 million over sixty years. A complete estimate of the* cost of high rise 
subsidies would need to take into account also subsidies on high flats approved 
before 1956 1 subsidies on Scottish high rise and the proportion of the overall 
subsidy of high rise built since 1966 which is met by the basic percentage
grant subsidy. Rough and ready calculations suggest that it could well total
155 £1,300 million spread over eighty years from 1953.
3.6: Living in High Rise
The literature on how living in high flats affects people is now quite
156 
large and we shall attempt only a brief review of it. A preliminary caveat
roust be entered concerning the variations in methodology between the less 
satisfactory 'user reaction 1 studies sponsored by the D.00 E. (in itself the
'user 1 terminology suggests the perspective from which the studies were con-
157 
ducted), and those studies carried out by non-official sociologists.
Virtually all the available sociological evidence suggests that the vast 
majority of the population would prefer to live in a house rather than a flat*
Although resistance to flatted development on abstract or principled grounds
159has diminished in post-war Britain, and more and more people have experienced
flat life, this overwhelming housing preference has remained little changed.
In contrast to countries like France, the single family house remains the
i (\*\ 
dominant housing image in Britain. Some 92 per cent of new private housing
16? 
is provided in this form, and only around 1 per cent in high flats. For
many people, living in a flat provides a transition phase when they first move 
into the private housing market, particularly in high cost areas such as London.' 
Amongst local authority tenants this preference is equally strong. In 196?
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the GLC found that 75 per cent of their applicants preferred a house and garden,
although at this period only 9 per cent of the authority's housing output was in
l6*f this form, while 65 per cent was in-high flats. Very substantial majorities
of residents in high flats would prefer to live in houses, according to"all the
•
165 studies asking about housing vpref erences. Wanting a house is the major
166 reason for residents to be potential movers, except amongst elderly households.
LEVELS OF SATISFACTION WITH HOUSING
Asked how satisfied they are with their housing, most people will give
1 (^D
, strongly affirmative answers. As a result the levels of dissatisfaction with 
their accommodation amongst high flat residents are riot high, although they are 
appreciably greater than those found in other building forms. In Glasgow, where 
tenement living has a long history, only 8 per cent of people in high flats were 
generally dissatisfied. Else\vhere, however v surveys have found that around
one in every five people in tall blocks are dissatisfied, while amongst family
169 households the proportion rises to around half. In Newcastle J>5pe~r cent of
mothers in high flats thought their accommodation worse than before rehousing,
170 even though many of them came from slum dwellings. Even surveys ihat have
found quite low levels of general dissatisfaction have turned up some major '
grumbles intrinsically related to high rise provision. In London and Sheffield
62 per cent of respondents wanted a garden, 56 per cent found the lifts inadequate,
*f? per cent 'would move' or were nervous, over 30 per cent were not proud of the
171estate or found it unattractive. Taking account of the degree of self- 
selection that may take place in the locating of people in high rise blocks, i.e. 
the possibility that those households most opposed to living there may have
refused a tenancy, these levels of dissatisfaction are acknowledged by the D..G.S.
172 to be 'not negligible'.
•
The D.O.E. surveys asked residents separate questions about their satisfac­ 
tion with their dwelling and their estate (a remarkably difficult distinction to 
make with any accuracy if one is living in a high flat, since the block of flats 
itself ic neither part of the dwelling nor part of the estate). Their results
- 110
show that residents are much more satisfied with their flats than with their
173 estates. Tephcott's Glasgow study showed that the high rise blocls themselves
are very much the focus of dislike, while even low amenity estates are little
•
17/t
criticized. More recent D.O.E. research has shown that the wider neighbour­ 
hood setting is an important, component of resident satisfaction and that
neighbourhoods dominated by industrial buildings, residential decay, railways
175 or busy roads are particularly disliked.
Residents in high flat estates are highly critical of their appearance. 
They dislike concrete surfaces, greyness, dark colours, car parks (especially 
multi-storey car parks) and an institutional or monumental appearance, which 
leads to frequent comparisons of high rise schemes with prisons, barracks or
even concentration camps. Small scale building, traditional materials, space
•\ rj(i 
about buildings, grass and trees, colour and brightness are greatly valued.
Density levels have an important effect on residents 1 feelings. Above 
60-80 bed spaces per acre (bspa), satisfaction with accommodation declines 
sharply and largely irrespective of the building form or other variables.
General levels of satisfaction do not decline much above 100 bspa, and at high
177 density low rise flats are not preferred more than high rise.
Preferences about storey height show a marked bipolar peak, however, v;ith 
the lower and the very top floors being preferred because of convenience and
quietness respectively. A GLC survey concluded: 'the taller the block the
178 larger the number of dissatisfied tenants there are likely to be 1 . Some
studies have detected increased anxiety amongst residents too high up to be
179 able to reach their flats if lifts break down. Very few residents in low
rise flats would prefer to live in high rise, mainly elderly people who would 
like to avoid climbing stairs.
t
LIFE CYCLE EFFECTS
The only point about high rise on which there is now a sociological
consensus is the markedly unfavourable effects of this form cf accommodation
181 for families with children. Life in a high flat may have a particularly
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damaging effect on young children whose play is restricted and whose development
182 may be inhibited. And the effect on children's mothers is equally serious.
Elderly people are in general much less critical of high rise, and rela­ 
tively few of them wish to take on the Job of running a house. But there is 
no clear evidence that they are well catered for in high flats, although they
are amongst the largest group of residents. When given a free choice about 
storey height, they almost never choose to live above the second floor. It
has been suggested that about 75 per cent of old people would prefer to live in
x i 186 a bungalow.
Adult households and young single people are probably those residents best
18? off in high rise, as they are in flats generally. There is some evidence
that those with high incomes, cars and jobs are better satisfied than those
188 without by high flat life.
SOCIAL EFFECTS OF HIGH RISE
The discussion of the social effects of high rise is hampered by the 
disparity between many of the results discussed and the possible effects of a 
particular type of accommodation. Nevertheless there are some significant 
results in this area.
People who live in flats have a greater vulnerability to certain kinds of 
illnesses because they undertake less physical activity and go out of doors
less. Respiratory infections are the main problem and groups affected include
189 children, young mothers and women over 50. The effects of high flats are
probably even more marked in this respect. Hird in addition found that old
190 people often felt dizzy in high blocks s and the D.O.E. found that 'vertigo
191 was experienced by one in five of those living on the sixth floor or above 1 .
Mental health may be affected by living in flats or high flats. Cappon
192 suggests on theoretical grounds that high flats are undesirable and a greater
incidence of psycho-neurotic disorders and emotional stress has been found
193amongst flat dwellers than those in houses. The available evidence is not
by any means conclusive, however, and the matter is controversial.
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One potent source of anxiety for flat dwellers may be safety. Mothers
are particularly worried about children falling from windows or being injured
19*t by lifts. Residents may also worry about fire safety, since there have now
been at least two deaths in flat fires at heights above the level which the
195 local fire brigade could reach with their equipment,, A number of studies
have shown that people in flats are also abnormally worried about crime.
Vandalism and associated minor crimes appear to be more frequent in high 
flats than other types of accommodation. American studies have shown a close
association of crime and high rise, part of which may be an independent build-
197 ing form effect. In Britain 28 per cent of high flat residents saw
vandalism as a major problem in the mid-1960s and the indications are that this
situation has worsened, 198 A D.O.E, survey carried out ten years later found
the following distribution of council dwellings admitted by their occupiers to
199 be unpopular (Table 3.19). 30 percent of these are high rise, and nearly a
Table 3.19 ' Distribution of Unpopular Local Authority Accommodation in
England and Wales
Type
Houses
Walk up flats
Walk up maisonettes
High rise slab blocks
High rise point blocks
Other
Total
Number
16,000
11,500
10,600
1^,700
^,000
5,200
62,OOO
Percentage
26
19
17
2k
6
8
100
quarter of the total are slab blocks of the kind favoured by MHLG throughout 
the high rise boom. Considering the small proportion of national local 
authority stocks in high rise (around 7 per cent of the total), and considering 
the newness of the high rise stock, this picture suggests rapid decay. Proposals 
by Birkenhead and Liverpool to demolish five slab blocks where accommodation h.-3.s
*•, "*/~>
become unlettable have been rejected by the D.O.E. in the last year (1976-7 }.^v ^' 
And at other estates huge repair billc have been incurred; at the system built
Aylesbury estate in Southwark, for example, repairs costing £2.3 million were
necessary four years after it was completed at a cost of £12 million, princi-
201 pally as a result of vandalism. One by-product of high levels of vandalism
*
has been that the enormously expensive multi-storey car parks on high rise 
estates are very rarely used for fear of car thefts or 'mugging 1 ; so much so
•
that several local authorities are trying to convert their boarded up car parks
202 into flats rather than pull them down.
Loneliness and social isolation are perhaps the most frequently cited 
adverse aspects of high flat life. Between 20 per cent and ^-0 per cent of
respondents in different households confess to feeling lonely or cut off in
203 high flats, particularly in point blocks. A study of a deck access block
specifically designed to foster neighbourliness (Hyde Park in Sheffield), found 
the density of contacts between residents was greater than in point blocks, but
still very much less than in old established housing areas and new estates-of
2QU. 
council houses. Again family and elderly households are most liable to feel
lonely.
The overall lifestyles of residents are adversely affected in a number of 
ways. Space and storage standards are generally low in high flats. Little use 
is or can be made of the open space provided. Lifts function as major barriers
to activity outside the dwelling, particularly as lift failures become increa-
205 singly common through maintenance strikes and age. And individuals* control
of their environment is much less in flats and particularly in high flats. 
Taylor argues:
Not only do flatted estates impose a bureaucratic anonymity which 
violates the individuality of family life, but they have gone on to 
deny fundamentally the changes and chances of a rapidly improving 
standard of living, which is at last making it financially possible , 
for most people to breathe the freedom of doing their own thing.
Overall then, high rise flats can at best be characterized as a clearly 
second best form of house accommodation. In the long term the effects of life 
in high rise may be proved to be seriously detrimental to the interests of 
elderly or adult households as well as to those of families with children.
J>.7 ; High Rise Housing as a Technological Shortcut to Social Change
The purpose of this review of six aspects of the high rise issue has been 
to bring out the problematic quality of the policy. There were strong pressures 
for the adoption of high rise - such as the centrality of high rise in 'the 
ideology of modern architecture, the apparent link between high rise and 
technological advance and the undoubted link between high rise and industrial 
concentration in construction, the faulty planning technology widely accepted 
in post-war Britain, and the fragmentation of the public housing effort.
But there were also strong factors against the policy, particularly the 
extra costs of high rise, the unpopularity of high flats and the reduced 
amenity provided. If we take each of the pressures for the policy and test thea 
against the apparent irrationality of building large numbers of high flats, then 
it is difficult not to conclude that the sum of these influences is still 
incommensurate with the scale of adoption of high rise; there is still an 
unexplained 'rationality deficit 1 involved in the policy. Even if we are pre­ 
pared to ascribe particular social efficacy to groups advocating high rise - 
such as the national construction firms who assiduously fostered the image of 
high rise as technologically sophisticated, or the social groups most insistent 
on policies of urban containment - the disparity between causes and effect 
remains. 
TECHNOLOGICAL SHORTCUTS TO SOCIAL CHANGE
In order to develop a more convincing fit between the justifications of 
high rise and the policy followed, it is essential to have some overall 
characterization of the positive reasons for adopting high rise, a characteriza­ 
tion which can introduce the possibility of the whole being greater than the sun
of its component parts. This possibility is contained in Etzioni and Eemp's
207 
notion of 'technological shortcuts to social change 1 . These can be defined
as 'solutions' to a social problem which permit economies to be made in resource
tr
allocation for managing the problem, or permit the problem to be tackled more 
directly.
The view of social problems necessary for decision-makers to see oppor­ 
tunities for such shortcuts was extremely prevalent in the 1950s and '60s. It 
has been graphically summed up by Weinberg:
In view of the simplicity of technological engineering, and the 
complexity of social engineering, to what extent can social problems 
be circumvented by ^educing them to technological problems? Can we 
identify Quick Technological Fixes for profound and almost infinitely 
complicated social problems, "fixes" that are within the grasp of 
modern technology, and which would either eliminate the original 
social problem without requiring a change in the individual's social 
attitudes, or would so alter the problem as to make its resolution 
more feasible.20o
The paradigm cases of such quick technological fixes have included the intro­ 
duction of birth control devices, particularly the contraceptive pill, the use 
of drugs to combat heroin and alcohol addiction, and the adoption of instruc­ 
tional television to avoid constraints set by teacher shortages. But as 
Etzioni and Remp make clear (and as our discussion of planning technology 
assumed), the term 'technology 1 cannot be simply confined to science-based 
knowledge or techniques. It refers much more generally to 'bodies of skills,
knowledge and procedures for making, using and doing useful things', to all
209 
techniques which are 'means for accomplishing recognized purposes'. But
since the variety of human purposes is very great social scientists have 
normally imposed some limitations on this common-sense definition. Merrell's 
authoritative definition therefore suggests that 'the concept of technology
centres on processes that are primarily biological or physical rather than on
210 psychological or social processes'. Among Etzioni and Remp's case studies
are thus included procedures for screening out drunken drivers to improve 
traffic safety, and methods of gun control to reduce accidents and violent crin 
neither of which is linked to science-based technology. 
THE 'SOCIAL PROBLEM' TACKLED BY HIGH RISE
What was the nature of the 'social problem 1 for which high rise housing 
could be seen as a quick technological fix? To recap briefly, because of the 
ecological development of British cities, the housing problems to which the 
post-war public housing effort was directed were overwhelmingly concentrated in
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the inner and core city areas of the major conurbations, and in some isolated 
towns in heavy industrial regions. The distribution of people between areas of 
good housing and the 'slums 1 was marked by a profound class cleavage, a cleavage 
which combined with the gross disparities in housing amenity involved, posed a 
major threat to the overall cohesion of the social formation and the legitimacy 
of the state. In order to remove this threat the public housing programme 
committed large but insufficient resources to an attempt to provide decent 
housing for the mass of people living in poor conditions. The primary constraint 
on public housing's success was the variation in its effectiveness in different 
areas of the country. While most rural housing authorities successfully met 
their public housing needs in the inter-war or immediate post-war periods, the 
organization of the housing drive in major urban areas and the political con­ 
straints on its effectiveness there generated acute contradictions within 
public housing. The social base with most at stake in public housing, the 
inner city working class, organized politically almost solely through the Labour 
party, did not succeed in establishing the necessary planning framework and 
local government structure to pursue the enormous housing drive that was 
needed. By the 1950s, the social base with least to gain from public housing, 
primarily the surburban middle class and rural upper class, organized in the 
Conservative party, had succeeded in orientating the planning system towards 
urban containment, halting all expansion of the new towns programme and resis­ 
ting any extension of political control or land availability by inner and core 
city authorities. The cities were, in effect, forced to meet their housing 
needs in situ, to use up their remaining building land (in competition with 
private housing), to develop piecemeal on small sites, to begin rebuilding areas 
without moving out large numbers of people and without any linear expansion of 
the urban area. Greater equality in housing conditions was to be achieved with 
inadequate funding, without any substantial diversion of land from rural to 
urban use and without any significant equalization of densities across 
metropolitan areas. Even within inner and core cities themselves, equalization 
of housing densities was -not pursued..
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HIGH RISE AS TECHNOLOGICAL SHORTCUT
It was this situation of acute crisis which allowed high rise and mass 
housing solutions to be successfully introduced and promoted as technological 
shortcuts. They appeared to provide the means of cutting the gordian knot of 
conflicting social and institutional pressures confining the public housing 
programme in a vicious circle of solutions and problem intensification. By 
building high rise/high density schemes, it was claimed, a direct attack could 
be mounted on inner city housing conditions without altering the planning system, 
the local government structure or the existing balance of social pressures. 
Inner and core city authorities could tackle their own problems in situ, without 
loss of population via overspill s without boundary or building land extensions, 
without co-operation across local authority boundaries. With the minimum 
necessary change of the institutional status quo, i.e. with no change, and 
within the existing configuration of class power and party politics, high rise 
apparently provided the state with a direct means of intervening to alleviate 
the worst housing conditions. All that was needed was the provision of substan­ 
tial extra state finance to meet the costs of high rise, and money which was not 
available for the simple expansion of public housing programmes was granted 
without controversy to meet this need. At a later stage when the public housing 
drive began to run up against constraints from competing private sector demands 
on construction industry resources, industrialized high rise combined the 
technological shortcut of high rise with the appeal of mass production to 
create an even stronger means of by-passing a restrictive organizational frame.
A large part of the appeal of high rise was based on its claim to newness, 
to be the product of technical advances in construction, building research and 
industrial organization. Although these aspects were constantly emphasized by 
the construction industry, especially over industrialized high rise, the 
legitimation of these -claims provided by architectural ideology was an especially 
important influence in procuring acceptance. In addition the technological basis 
of high rise housing was consistently over-estimated as a consequence of its real
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impact on architectural designing and planning technology.
There was another diffuse but nonetheless important reason for the accep­ 
tance of high rise housing by the public housing apparatus. This was the
prevalence of an extremely optimistic ethos about technology in post-war British
211 society! an ethos particularly well developed in the political elite. Both
decision makers and 'public opinion* were predisposed to accept policies such 
as high rise erabued with the appropriate technological aura.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The National Level Political Process on the Issue
H.1 : The National lasue System
Before considering the concrete activities of the various groups and 
organizations involved in influencing central government policy on high rise 
and exerting a general influence on the kind of "building undertaken "by housing 
authorities, it is useful to present a much broader preview of this analysis which 
relates to the dimensions of the issue discussed in the previous chapter.
To do this in a brief but effective way, this section focuses on a diagram 
of the 'national issue system'. The diagram is drawn using some techniques of 
systems analysis outlined by Cortes, Przeworski and Sprague and it attempts 
to map influence flows involved in producing high rise outputs. It is not • 
possible to quantify these flows, but this representation does provide an 
appropriate mode of representing the inter-relationship of the basic variables 
which functioned as inputs with the processing of these inputs by specific 
elements of the political system, (Figure^.l).
The main inputs into the debate on high rise distinguished in Chapter 3 
were mediated to state bodies principally via the organizations linked to the 
social interest concerned. Thus developments in construction industry technology 
were mediated to the central state and local authorities primarily by the con­ 
struction industry, although they also had an important influence on architectural 
ideology. Similarly architectural ideology directly entered the debate over high 
rise only to the extent that it influenced the position adopted by the profession, 
although for our purposes its influences via the associated development of planning 
technology was probably more important. Two of the imputs discussed in Chapter 
3 had a direct influence-on the Ministry of Housing, the planning system and -fte 
organization of housing authorities, since in both these cases the Ministry ve.-s the 
most important organizational actor concerned with such problems. The structure 
of local government functions in respect of housing also exerted an important
H
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influence on the 'national local government system' , by which is meant 
the set of organizations and actors which together define the national 
role and state of opinion in local government as a whole. The most' • 
important influences on the development of high rise policy were the 
pressures from the construction industry directed at both MHLG and at local 
authorities, the influences from the planning system on MHLG policy, and the 
influence of MHLG on local authorities. Other influences shown were 
distinctly subsidiary to these four.
Once high rise building got under way the initial influences were 
supplemented by powerful feedback processes which maintained the increase 
in the rate of high flat building and contributed to the steady rise in 
the proportion of all public housing being built in high rise up to 19&7. 
At a national level these feedback processes flowed from the output of 
high rise by local authorities to the construction industry, producing an' 
increased committment to high building by fbms which in turn resulted in 
increased pressure for high flat contracts on local authorities and central 
government. Secondly, high rise outputs fed into the national local govern­ 
ment system creating a cumulative endorsement of high flats as a suitable 
form of public housing provision, which in turn influenced local authorities 
directly to adopt or extend programs of high rise building.
Overall it is interesting to note how relatively £ew of the influences 
involved in national level policy formation and debate affected local authori­ 
ties directly. Apart from industrial pressures and feedback via the national 
local government system all other influences were mediated to local authorities 
via the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. The complexity of 
the processes influencing the Ministry and indeed operating within the 
Ministry itself made its influences on local authorities a rather odd, even 
schizophrenic one. This filtering has mcr,t significance in explaining her.: 
it was that the architectural profession had less influence on the development 
of local authorities' policies than the construction industry. The non- 
involvement of the professional associations in direct contact with loc?J.
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authorities meant that their influence was bound up in the evolution of 
central government policy, although the profession did have some impact 
on the national local government system, especially in the early days of 
the debate over high flats.
Cortes et al argue that all operations carried out in a system can be
reduced to one of five types, identity, proportional transformation, delay
2or advancement, accumulation and difference/differentiation. Applying
this schema to the various locii of operations we have distinguished, 
suggests that the construction industry and the Ministry proportionally 
transformed their inputs throughout, in the direction of increasing them 
up until 1967. The architectural profession was initially important in 
anticipating technical changes, but early on in the period moved towards 
an identity operation. The planning system accumulated inputs over the 
period until the mid 1950s when they exerted a strong influence on the 
change in Ministry policy towards high flats; thereafter both the planning 
system and local government organization caused a cumulation of problems 
which increased the Ministry pressure for high rise. Similarly the con­ 
struction industry and the national local government system accumulated 
feedback favourable to further high rise building from existing outputs.
So far we have considered the issue system solely from the viewpoint 
of the build up of influences favourable to an expansion of high rise housing 
provision. But how did the system come to change and to be put into reverse 
in the late 1960s? Was this produced by new inputs and did it lead to 
changes in the pattern of influence flows? We would argue that this process 
of change can basically be understood as one in which the existing issue 
system decayed. The overall configuration of influences in favour of high 
rise building did not suddenly alter. Rather, some originally important 
influences, such as that from architectural ideology and construebion industry 
technology became attenuated, the scale and intensity of housing problems we 
reduced over the years, and the planning technology on which high rise 
building was premissed was eroded. By the mid 1960s the high ri.se boot: vis,
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sustained only by construction industry pressure and the feedback effects 
generated by existing outputs. Construction industry pressure could not 
prevent a switch of Ministry policy between the end of 1965 and early '1967 
which sought to correct the distortion built into central government policy 
by the combination of a new subsidy scheme and inherited methods of 
Ministry cost control. This policy change had already begun to reduce 
high building when the Ronan Point disaster began to switch feedback 
processes operating via the national local government system into reverse. 
At the same time, public expenditure cuts in housing brought about a reduction 
in demand and a consequent change in the context of relations between the 
construction industry and local authorities, a change which strengthened 
councils 1 ability to resist industrial pressure.
k.2i The Influence of the Construction Industry
The study of construction industry influence on national level housing 
construction policy is hampered by a number of factors. Firstly, this 
influence rarely surfaces in the public realm, since the issue lies outside 
the scope of conventionally 'political* issues. Secondly, industrial 
influence had tended to be exerted informally and behind-the-scenes, since 
this is a more effective way of gaining leverage on the decision making process 
than public statements or campaigns. Thirdly, the most direct influence was 
exerted at the local level or in the national local government system. Indus­ 
trial influence on central government partly reflected Ministry perceptions 
of the developing trends in local authority contractual relations which 
resulted from this influence.
We have already noted in section 1.2 the increasing dominance of central 
government consultative machinery in housing by industrial interests during 
the- post-war period; and in section 3.2 we have described the pattern of 
industrial concentration on high rise contracts, and the dominance of the 
industrialized high rise market by seven major national contractors. In this 
section we shall focus on three specific forms of industrial influence in 
favour of high rise: firstly, a variety of industrial initiatives directly
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advocating greater high rise building and attempting to influence central 
government in this directionJ secondly, the advertising campaign in favour 
of greater high rise building which the industry directed at local authorities
*
from the mid 1950s onwards; and lastly, the orchestration of the 1960s, 
industrialized building campaign, and the industrial influence on the 
central state and local authorities alike.
PRO-HIGH RISE INITIATIVES
Industrial initiatives specifically directed to influence central state 
policy in favour of high rise housing were not a very important element in 
the development of industrial pressure for high rise. Since the building form 
was defined as the prerogative of the client and his architect, the industry 
could not directly put forward proposals for particular approaches to housing 
problems, although the industrialized building campaign certainly suppressed 
this constraint in pushing for the adoption of heavy pre fabric at ion methods. 
Two industrial initiatives were important in helping to define a generalized 
ideological context favourable to high rise. These were the High Paddington 
scheme, and the 19&3 Fulham Study.
The High Paddington scheme was initially drawn up by the architect 
Sergei Kadleigh in 1952 with the collaboration of several other design 
professionals and several contractual firms. The scheme proposed the 
erection of a mixed-purpose mega-structure on the site of Paddington railway 
station, with a huge multi-storey district building of 50 storeys builb 
over a new ground level. The upper floors of this building were supposed to 
house 8,000 people. Unveiled to an enthusiastic reception from the industrial, 
engineering and local government press - but widely criticized by planners 
and architects - this rather fantastic scheme became the focus of a long and
i
detailed technical research project, carried out by a committee of seven
building contractors under the chairmanship of the Conservative Paddington
^ M.P., R.A. Alien. Its three volume study was completed in 1955 and submitted
to the L.C.C. in a bid to break the density ceilings laid down in the Countv
- 138 -
of London Plan. Since the inception of the. project, however, the develop­ 
ment of high rise building had moved on and the study was rejected by the 
Housing and Planning Committees as bold but impracticable.
The seaond industrial initiative originated with central government. In 
1963 Keith Joseph decided to seek industrialists' views on the ways to 
tackle Britain's urban problems, with a view to encouraging private enter­ 
prise to take on a larger share of the urban renewal effort. The MHLG 
invited Taylor Woodrow Ltd., the second largest construction group in 
Britain at the time, to undertake a study of Fulham and produce proposals 
for the urban renewal policy to be pursued in the study area, which 
covered some U80 acres with a population of ^0,000 people. Taylor Woodrow's 
team responded by calling for 'large scale rebuilding rather than piecemeal 
development of worn out housing areas' . This necessity was argued not in terns 
of acute housing need - 'there are very few real slums in the area' - but 
in terms of the need for modern, purpose built accommodation rather than 
houses converted irto flats or flatlets. The study argued that this redevelop­ 
ment could be carried cut completely by private enterprise, but that to make 
this feasible the permitted density level would have to be increased from 
136 ppa to around 250 ppa. System building would be used in constructing 
the new housing, most of which would be in long medium rise blocks to 
attain the very high densities needed. The Metropolitan Borough of Fulham 
welcomed the stress on comprehensive redevelopment but criticized the density
proposals: 'For our part we consider that the primary purpose of planning
7 control is to-resist blind economic pressures and recognize social needs'.'
In practice the study's role was severely limited by its stress on private 
enterprise, but it did exert a considerable influence on the design pro­ 
fessions as an argument for practicable high density design, playing a 
significant part in leading to the medium rise boom of 1966-8.
There were other instances of projects for high rise building being 
initiated by the construction industry, but these were even closer to the
*
level of fantasy than either High Paddington or the Fulham Study. For exacp.la,
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in 195^ the monopoly glass manufacturer, Pilkington Brothers, set up a 
front organization known as the Glass Age Development Committee composed of
Q
architects, engineers and others. The Committee drew up a plan to roof 
over the streets in an &3 acre area of Soho with glass, to construct a new 
ground level at roof top height and on this to build six, giant 25 storey 
tower blocks, thus 'allowing the existing residential population to be 
doubled or trebled 1 « Such schemes seem quite improbable from contemporary
experience, but they exerted much more influence at the time, as the
9 Buchanan Report for example bore witness in I960.
INDUSTRIAL ADVERTISING AND HIGH RISE
Advertising was one of the most important general ways in which the 
construction industry influenced local authorities and the national local 
government system, and in a more diffuse way maintained a public opinion 
context favourable to industrial interests. The technological sophistication 
of high rise, its association with modernity and progress were all systematically 
nurtured and advanced by advertising.
The prominence of high rise as a motif in construction industry advertising 
from the mid-1950s until the later '60s is difficult to overstate. Over 
and over, pictures of high blocks were used to establish the credentials of 
a firm to undertake the largest public housing projects. So potent was the 
image of modernity associated with high rise that a whole range of other 
advertisers competed with each other to associate their products with the 
building form. This was particularly true of the various nationalized fuel 
industries, with coal and gas struggling to ensure that their fuels were not 
excluded from this increasing share of the public housing market, and the 
electricity boards trying to further exploit their advantages, by, for
example, pushing ahead the adoption of full central heating in high flats.
f 
But high rise was also used by a whole range of advertisers as a marketing
tool, for products ranging from vater heaters to refuse disposal systems to 
pivot hung windows to building sealant, a truly massive lint. The overall
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effect of this was to fill the local government press and the professional 
journals with a continuous stream of pictures of high blocks in which their 
•unquestioned pro-value was never in doubt - the advertiser did not need 
to argue the virtues of his product in terms of the virtues of high 
rise; simply to be associated with high rise was a recommendation in itself. 
Typical Wimpey advertisements during this period, for example, consisted of 
large pictures of 25 storey blocks in Glasgow with the heading 'Wimpey 
answer the Housing Problem]'
To give an overall account of the character and development of industrial 
advertising is difficult because of the predominantly visual character of the 
pro-high rise message. We have therefore chosen to try and encapsulate such an 
account in the analysis of the advertising output of a single large con­ 
struction firm. Wates 1 advertisements were particularly useful for our 
purposes because of the use of rather more copy material in them than was 
the case with some other firms' output.
Wates began using high rise as the dominant illustrative motif of their 
advertisements directed at the local authority market during the mid '50s, 
and within a few years were beginning to identify themselves as 'Wates - 
the specialists' in high rise building. From 1956 the company began to 
include an increasing amount of copy directly advocating the greater use 
of high flats by local authorities. In October 1957, below pictures of the 
L.C.C. blocks at Roehampton (built by Wates), the copy declared:
House large numbers of people in a limited urban area 
- and give them plenty of space and modern amenities. 
House them in tall buildings and stem the urban sprawl.
A year later copy accompanying pictures of the L.C.C.'s Brandon Estate 
stressed the company's technological capabilities:
12, 16, 18 STOREYS -
High buildings go up fast the Wates way.
A dominant theme of the company's output was their evident anxiety to 
get in on the planning of high rise schemes at a stage when negotiated contract 1 
would be possible, although this was naturally put in other
A I960 advertisement declared:
Wates 1 achievements in multi-storey buildings for local 
authorities are a matter of record. Wates wide experience 
in this type of construction is available to you, but in' ' • 
order to take full advantage of their special "know-how" and ' 
facilities you should contact them the moment you begin to 
think about such a project. For among the very many things 
Wates know about high building is that success is founded upon con 
sultation and co-operation between all concerned right from the 
Earliest stages. 13.
In 1962 Wates began running a series of advertisements illustrated for 
the first time not with pictures of high blocks, but of harassed planners 
and housing managers , and accompanied by copy re-emphasizing the theme that 
high flats saved land. The first asked:
HOUSING PROBLEMS GIVING YOU GREEN-BELT BLUES?
Don't pack your overspill population off outside your
conurbation; put them up at home by putting homes in a
high block. Wates will show you designs up to 20
storeys high, which can be modified as necessary to meet your
own special needs. Working in close collaboration with your
experts, Wates will do the whole job for you; from preliminary
survey to final coat of paint. For this they quote a firm price,
inclusive of fees and charges from which final rents can be
calculated before you begin. So, don't send people packing because
your supply of land is low; send for Wates and build high.
Later advertisements stressed the same theme. For example:
BIG HOUSING HEADACHES ... LITTLE BUILDING ACRES? 15 
And: HOUSING LIST LONG... BUILDING LAID SHORT? 1 ° 
The package deal emphasis of these advertisements was also pursued in 
copy apparently aimed at smaller authorities with little experience of high 
rise:
If a high flat scheme sounds like a pretty tall order 
to you, the solution is to call in Wates, the specialists. 
... Wates lay your housing problems low by helping you build 
high, and that's the best way to get down to it. 17
The launching of the industrialized buildin~ campaign left the 
company temporarily out in the cold, however. Between the autumn of 
1962 and mid 1963, the Wates advertisements dried, up while the firm focused its 
energies on producing a new image in line with the campaign's emphasis on 
prefabrication. Their solution was basically an extension of the lion-trtdit,: onal
methods of on-site pre-casting of components which they introduced into 
house building in the 19^03. Clearly unable to compete in the prefabrication 
stakes with factory produced systems, (despite the adoption of the terms 
'site factory' to describe the ort-site casting), the company's techniques 
for high blocks had to emphasize other aspects of its use. The technique 
was relaunched as 'Wates System' with a series of advertisements which 
were now dominated by pictures of high rise blocks under construction, usually 
showing concrete panels being lifted into position by a tower crane and two 
or three operatives. And in 1965 Wates claimed that their system was the 
only one 'which does not deny the basic proportion that the only man who can 
put the spark of beauty into a building is the architect who is free to design 
it the way he wants it*. This was also combined with a more explicit 
knocking of rival systems:
You can go to any industrialized builder in Britain
and get a ready made building system. Instant designs.
Dwellings off the hook. Pre-casting pre-conceived at a
factory miles from the site. You'll end up with a
decent modern building that doesn't disgrace anybody, but you
will wonder how much of it you can honestly call yours. 18
This clear courting of architects and attempt to play upon their 
professional values was paralleled by copy aimed at councillors, and 
apparently at Labour councillors. A series starting in 196^ on 'The wates 
System and the artisan' was calculated to appeal to the councillor vith 
a trade union background. In July, copy accompanying the ubiquitous picture 
of a tower block under construction declared:
WATES SYSTEM - One way to get a building up faster isV————L—————— -*—£-——- -——-____,-——— •-' ' ~ ———
to get good men and treat thc.jTi right.
Today a small group of men build more in a week than 
twice their number three years ago. How is this possible? 
It's the Wates system in action. 
Building used to be largely 'an unskilled trade. 
Bedevilled >;y insecurity. But under the Wates System, 
site operatives are full staff nenbers. Each man is 
an expert, highly skilled: and, of course, highly paid. 
... We're building a-jter than ever before. A lot of 
Britain's present success in rapid rehousing is due lo the 
Wates' system. 19.
The stress on labour relations did not last long, but other sources of 
identification could be suggested. After the publication of Crossinan's 
White Paper, the company's advertisements began to emphasize 'Wates believe
passionately that system building is the key to this country's plans to
20 build half a million homes a year by 1910*. The importance of speed
of construction also began to be re-emphasized. One picture of a
very small site in Battersea, for example, vas headlined: 'Just how
21 quickly could you build 192 flats here?'
From 1966 onwards the advertisements began to introduce images of poor 
housing accommodation into their message that industrialized high rise 
was an answer to housing problems. For example, the copy accompanying 
a picture of the interior of a damp basement flat ran:
Should you build trad or system? 
Ask the woman who lives here.
(Photo)
She'll give you the answer. 00 
Build how you like, but build quickly.^
A similarly illustrated advertisement in December 1966 argued:
WHAT'S IT WORTH TO GET HER OUT OF THIS?
A lot of discussion about system building turns on
aesthetics and economic viability. Does it look good?
Is it really cheaper?
There is a third criterion.
Can it get people out of rotten slums quicker?
Unreservedly, yes. Wates recently built an 11 storey
block of hk flats in ten weeks. Tenants were moving
in six months earlier than had been expected.
Wates believe passionately that system building is the
key to this country's plans to build half a million
homes a year by 1970. 23
This an<sJLysis has demonstrated the directness of the advocacy of high 
rise in construction industry advertising, the wide variety of approaches 
and arguments used to sell high blocks, and the close links between high 
rise and the industrialized building carr.paipn made by the company. Wates'
t>
advertisements .were, as we have already noted, rather exceptional in the
amount of copy they contained. But they were not exceptional in the stress
• • i •they placed on nigh rise.
THE INDUSTRIALIZED BUILDING CAMPAIGN
This section presents an integrated account of the 1960s industrialized 
building campaign which did so much to consolidate industrial influence, 
particularly on high rise housing. We shall look both at construction
•
industry pressure and governmental response, thus somewhat anticipating 
the account in section 4-#.
The 1960s campaign's origins can be traced back to the non-traditional 
housebuilding drive launched in the 19^0s and reinvigorated briefly during 
the Conservatives' 1951-^ housing drive. The campaign attracted the large 
national firms, Wimpey, Wates, and Laing:
non-traditional houses seemed more likely to offer 
a nation wide market than did traditional ones, for 
local authorities are naturally inclined to employ local 
contractors for straightforward traditional housing 
schemes. 25
With the ending of physical controls in 195^, central government support
r>£> came to an end, and demand for non-traditional houses slumped.'1' Helped
by the support of cities such as Birmingham, Leeds and Coventry, however,
the major non-traditional firms successfully diversified into flat building
27 and procured acceptance of their standard designs by local authorities.
In Birmingham, for example, 'must blocks of dwellings were designed entirely
28 by contractors' in the later 1950s.
These developments kept the idea of non-traditional building alive 
but the stimulus for the 1960s campaign came frmm two different sources. 
The first was the success of industrialized school building'i« cutting
costs and achieving high design standards, mainly via local authority
29 consortia building systems. The second was the availability of heavy
prefabrication methods in France and Scandinavia which could be quickly
imported given a change in central government attitudes to favour indus-
. . . . 30- trialization again.
In late 196l the first local authority housing consortium vas
established by Leeds, Sheffield and Hull aimed at 'developing new systems
PI of construction exploiting modern methods of manufacture and asserf;.iy',"
and MHLG's new Housing Development Group began work on a low rise housing 
system. The Ministerial shuffle and change of MPBW nomenclature gave
op
further clear inlications of a shifjt in central government attitudes.
In mid-1962, however, the industrialized building campaign began in 
earnest as the large corporations moved in to pre-empt these slow government- 
local authority initiaties. By the autumn the Municipal Journal observed 
'an almost overnight transformation 1 in opinion in the industry and amongst 
architects as a result of several key decisions by the national firms:
The real breakthrough came in May with the formation 
of a new company - Taylor Woodrow-Anglian Ltd - to produce 
dwellings in the factory. Since then Concrete Ltd have 
issued details of their Bison wall frame system for 
prefabricated flats and John Laing have announced their 
'• acquisition of the sole rights of the Sectra system of 
rapid multi-storey flat? construction. 33
This activity started an impressive bandwagon which smaller contractors 
struggled to climb aboard. A construction materials pressure group, 
the Cement and Concrete Association, organized the requisite national publicity 
with a conference on f Housing from the Factory 1 in October 1962. 
Sir Keith Joseph told the conference that he welcomed the new methods but 
his department were keen to push ahead the use of industrialized methods on 
houses and low rise buildings as well as high flats. The MHLG Chief 
architect, A.W. Cleeve Barr, sketched out lines of the incipient debate 
between ! hard' and 'soft 1 line definitions of industrialized methods:
The question is whether the industry is to be dominated 
by a number of large firms each with its own system, 
producing a limited range of flats or houses around which 
its standardized production is based, or whether there cannot 
be -some wider interchange of components based on a common 
approach to standardization and dimensional co-ordination. 3^
The hard line position came to be characterized by an emphasis on using 
proprietary systems on a massive scale, and only those systems which used 
very large pre-fabricated components and could be erected 'dry'. The 'soft 
line 1 on industrialized buildings was taken by the NFBTE, whose president 
argued strongly against concentrating on prefabrication of this sort 
at the expense of other methods, and in favour of developing as far as
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possible all methods of speeding up and rationalizing production. At 
the same time the NFBTE lent its weight to the campaign and tried to 
dispell the hostility of some smaller and medium size firms, Their 
Director-bid a conference in 1963:
Small builders feared they would be 'pushed out* by the 
new building methods, but in his view this was not so. 
f We're looking for a surplus' (for industrialized building) 
'over and above traditional building 1 he said. 35
There was, however, remarkably little diversification of the corporate 
campaign in relation to high rise before I96k 9 although at this time this 
was the principal industrialized market. While tie hard line definition 
seemed to have triumphed in 1963, a great deal of favourable publicity 
was focused on a few firms. In May a Municipal Journal survey of housing
systems included only five suitable for high flats - Bison, Camus, Larsen
?6 Nielson, Sectra and Reema.
Government pressure behind industrialization, combined with somewhat 
more effective attempts to divert attention from the corporate (largely 
high rise) campaign on to low rise systems, continued throughout 196^. 
In September the Municipal Journal remarked:
The process which began with the first breakthrough 
only two years ago has snowballed into a veritable 
avalanche. 37
This diversification of the campaign was stressed by Sir Keith Joseph 
in his speech to the 1963 Conservative Party Campaign in which he 
claimed that the industrialization program would boost housing output 
to UOOjOOO hones a year. (The speech won him a standing ovation and made
OD
his political reputation). Diversification was supposed to be fostered 
by the National Building Agency, set up in December 1963 under the MPBW
•
•as a quasi-governmental body to influence and supervise the industrializa-
39 tion campaign/ but which never looked at high rise systems even after it,
was transferred to MHLG in 1966.
I-2-1LG itself became involved in a vast number of consultations with 
firms (TOO meetings by July l$6k) and local authorities, of which TO (out
of 510 contacted) had joined consortia by mid 1961*. Sir Keith explained:
'the Ministry helps and encourages local authorities to play their parts in
1*0 
the development and use of promising systems 1 . In practice it seems
likely that the large, national firms probably got more help than smaller 
companies, if only because their size and target markets made it more 
worthwhile for civil servants to facilitate their activities. For 
example, a senior administrator interviewed for this study when asked 
to give an instance of how MHLG helped the development of the industrialized 
building campaign, replied that he personally had had contacts with Laing, 
Wates and Mowlem:
I remember Laings came to the department saying that they 
had a system costed out and ready to import, but they 
needed a market - some guarantee. The department advised 
them what local authorities to approach and spread the 
word to the regional architects , who would often visit the 
local authority and help negotiations along. 1*1
By late 19&1* there were something like 2l*0 systems in development , 
the vast majority being systems for houses 3 and although not all of 
these had reached production calls for some rationalization of systems 
were already being voiced, by local authorities and already established
firms. The industry reserved most of its criticism for the consortia
1*2
movement. Only one consortia, the first Yorkshire Development Group,
actually developed a high flat system, the others stuck to houses. MHLG 
made the major public authority contribution by co-operating with Laing
on modifications to the Jespersen system, which won the firm contracts for
1+1* 
8,200 flats between 19^5 and 1970.
By far the most important consequence of the industrialization 
campaign for the large firms, apart from earning contracts and publicity 
for the' more advanced proprietary systems, was to increase the size of 
local authority contracts. Cleeve Barr put the government's message at 
its clearest in 19&3. Local authorities would have to adapt their 
procedures to factory models :
The factories must have large, controlled and continuing 
orders to make production economical. This should le well
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within the capacity of the larger authorities.. 
and the smaller authorities will have to try (to 
generate bigger contracts) if they are not to miss 
the advantages of these methods.
As the original hard line definition of industrialization began to 
be watered down, these sorts of arguments came to be applied to systems 
which had little to do with factory production.
The election of a Labour government in October I96h committed to an 
expansion of house building to 500.000 homes a year gave a further boost 
to the emphasis on industrialization,, following the publication of The 
Housing Programme, 1965-1970 MHLG sent local authorities its toughest 
ever instructions to use industrialized methods, without which it was 
claimed the public sector target in the White Paper could not be achieved. 
The circular said that the Ministry had decided T to launch a concentrated 
drive to increase and improve the use of industrialized methods of house- . 
building in the public sector 1 .
The most important change in the Labour government's drive was a 
clear committment to a very broad definition of industrialization. This 
included: 'all measures needed to enable the industry to work more like
a factory industry. 1 (even including) ...'schemes using fully rationalised
Uft 
traditional methods'. The main beneficiary of this enlarged definition
was Wimpey, whose output of high flats had fallen from 7,000 in 19&3 to
3,150 by 1967 because of competition from the heavy prefabrication systems, but
whose low rise output now expanded by an extra U,000 dwellings a year by
1+9 
1967, keeping output levels buoyant.
The circular called unequivocally for local authorities to adopt 
industrialized building i,'~ they wanted to maintain or expand MHLG approved 
programmes and urged them to 's/void having a succession of small schemes 
each using a different system. Wherever possible each contract should be
i7
for 100 dwellings or more ' .
Over the past few years many of the best firms in the 
industry have put a great effort and jiuc.h capital into 
the development cf new techniques, but this effort will 
be wasted unless these can be given the conditions to
operate really effectively.., Clients must play their 
parts to ensure:-
a) that firms have continuous programs;
b) that industrialized building is concentrated on larger 
and more straightforward sites where it can be used to 
greatest effect;
c) that the number of plan types in a scheme is' kept down and 
satisfactory plan types are kept in use to enable the 
industry - and the client - to get the advantages of 
longer runs. 50
The pressurejbr large, simple contracts was justified by the claim that 'the 
use of carefully prepared standard designs will release scarce professional 
time to concentrate on raising the quality of layouts'.
The circular described the drive as 'a short term effort aimed at 
giving the industrialized building program the best possible conditions to 
get on its feet. This means that in this first phase all the conditions 
for successful use of the methods will need to be met to the full 1 . In 
the long run, 'it should be possible to use the new methods more flexibly than 
in the initial stages'. What this prospect meant in practice was; firstly, 
as local authorities dished out more contracts they could expect system 
sponsors to be ready to tailor their systems more closely to their specific 
needs; and secondly, that the Ministry and NBA were still beavering away at 
dimensional co-ordination, although the circular admitted that 'this is not 
the kind of development in which quick solutions can be expected'.
The impact of this new push more than doubled local authority orders 
for industrialized dwellings between 196U and 1967, destined to be the peak 
year of the boom.
(iii) Contractual influence during the Campaign Overall the period from 
1961 to 19^7 was marked by a staggering increase in the extent of industrial 
influence on central government, on the design professions and on local 
authorities„ The basis of this change in relations was the enormous 
expansion of construction activity in the early 60s. In 196^, Sir 
Herbert Manzoni (who had been Birmingham's Chief Engineer and Planner from 
1935 until 1963) wrote:
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It is doubtful whether at any time during the present 
century there has been such great activity in the construction 
industry as there is now, and all the indications are that 
this is likely to increase. 52
In the context of relatively limited resources, of labour and particularly of
capital, of soaring cost levels and restrictive public housing cost limits,
t 
this meant that construction companies were increasingly in a position
to demand concessions from government and local authorities in return for 
their continued involvement in the public housing drive. To what extent these 
concessions affected profits is difficult to assess. But on a whole range 
of proxy variables for profits - such as the use of unnecessarily expensive 
building forms, size of contracts, forms of tendering and reduction of 
risk and uncertainty - it is clear that public housing authorities were 
falling over themselves to attract industrial interest. Industrialized 
building took this process to its logical limit as the design professions, 
local authorities and central government increasingly approved the sacrifice 
of previously maintained design and amenity standards to the over-riding impera­ 
tives of production.
Important as this contractual change was, however> the speed and scale 
of the industrialized building boom and the integrally related expansion of 
high rise housing construction were also in part attributable to a change 
in the methods of exerting industrial influence within the state apparatus, 
and particularly in the national local government system. Whereas in the 
past contractors had stood rather apart from housing authorities, th:-; new 
contracting and tendering procedures associated with industrialized building 
placed a premium on the development of close or closed relations between 
local authorities and particular firms. The sine qua non of success for 
firms was access, and the means of obtaining access diversified. In 1963i *
the NFBTE Director commented on the industrialized building campaign:
V/e are now in the days of the 'hard sell 1 in which 
hundreds of hopefuls parade their wares, using methods 
ranging from the press conference to the knock on the 
door, wooing local authorities, hospital boards, 
nationalized industries and government departments, 53
In fact the development of techniques for marketing to local authorities, 
telescoped, into the peak years of the campaign, was more startling than tuio 
modest picture suggested. In 1966, an article in Official Architecture and. 
Planning warned:
Contractors employ armies of men to find housing' programmes 
large enough to "warrant a reasonable product of their 
reinforced concrete monoliths. These men are high 
pressures sales staff. 5^
Construction companies, particularly the large firms, began to offer ever more 
lavish enticements to persuade decision-makers in local authorities to con­ 
sider their systems, ranging from sophisticated publicity presentations through 
a variety of business entertainment functions to expenses paid trips to other 
authorities or other countries to inspect systems. An increasing number of 
public relations firms and consultancies were employed to gain local authority 
contracts, s. trend pioneered by T. Dan Smith's multiple P.R. outlets. The 
final element in this development was the growth of corrupiion which the Fouls en
and other scandals have demonstrated was clearly linked with the industrialized
55 building campaign. MacEwan observes of this period:
There was no human need for the tower blocks or more 
of the industrialized building system of recent years. 
But a commercial demand was organized by political 
manoeuvring and high pressure salesmanship, helped 
along by corruption, regardless of human needs and 
consequences. 56
(iv) The Collapse of the Campaign, The artificiality of the apparent success 
of the industrialized systems' penetration of public housing and the central!ty 
of high rise in the industrialized campaign's momentum are both amply demonstrated 
by the collapse of the campaign from mid-1967 onwards, (which is described 
statistically in section 3-3) . Three events combined to bring about a drar.a-cic 
downturn in the industrialized market. The first was the introduction 
of mandatory housing cost yardsticks discriminating against high rise building i-. 
April 1967. Closely following this, the partial collapse of a 21 storey blocV. 
of system bui.lt flats in Newham in May 1968, 
with the loss of five lives produced the first thoroughgoing
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examination of the industrialization drive by the Tribunal of Inquiry 
appointed to investigate the disaster. Their report was markedly 
critical of the procedures and regulations in force at the time of the 
collapse, and of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, the 
Ministry's Building Regulations Advisory Committee, the National Building 
Agency and in a general way both the architectural and structural engineering 
professions for their failure to appreciate the new dangers and requirements 
involved in high rise system building. The Ministry it concluded relied 
on the building Codes of Practice to ensure a buildings safety, without 
appreciating that system building was a completely new mode of construction, 
not covered by the regulations in force which were formulated at a time when 
heavy prefabrications systeins were not used in Britain. In effect the
Ministry embarked on the industrialization campaign without the necessary
57 expertise to be aware of possible risks. The report also presented an
obliquely disturbing insight into the mcdes of operation of contractors 
and local authorities, and its recommendations involved checks on the 
structural stability of all high blocks, and the strengthening of system built 
high rise at very considerable expense. At the time of publication high 
rise systems, (i.e. systems with a high rise capability) still accounted 
for '(Qjj of all industrialized approvals, although only half of the dwellings 
built in these systeins were actually high flats. The Tribunal report 
produced a rapid fall in demand for these systems which in combina­ 
tion with the cut back on high rise imposed by the new yardsticks made an
CO
enormous dent in the overall market.
Thirdly, the industrialized market was additionally affected by the 
government's public expenditure cuts in 1968. The reduction in public 
housing programmes vas severe enough to produce a narked alteration in the 
context of relations "between contractors-rc-nd housing authorities, which in 
turn had its most serious impact on the industrialized housing market. I?y 
1970 even the proportion of houses built by industrialized methods had 
fallen below 20/f-', and the proportion of low rise flats to less thsr/. a sixth.59
These levels, which continued until 1972, were below those achieved in 
only two years after lie start of the campaign. This switch away from 
industrialized methods even on non-high rise projects apparently reflected 
an effort by local authorities and the design professions to recapture 
control over their building output from contractors, and is suggestive 
of the degree of reluctance with which some authorities adopted indus­ 
trialized methods in the first place.
i*.3: High Rise Housing and the National Local Government System
Local authorities do not make decisions about housing construction 
policy, or indeed most aspects of policy, in isolation. Like all social 
institutions local authorities have a number of distinct roles. In 
particular over and above their local roles, Councils are located and locate 
themselves in what may be termed the 'national local government system 1 . . 
This may be taken to describe the complex web of inter- and supra- 
authority relations which can exert a strong influence on the policies pursued
\
by particular corporations. No real study of this system has yet been made 
in Britain so that our remarks here are necessarily exploratory and tentative. 
At a political level the national local government system finds powerful 
organizational expression in the local authority associations, and their 
relations with central departments, ministers, M.Ps, interest groups, the national 
party organizations and the publicservice trade unions. This constellation 
of actors and organizations determines the parameters within which local 
authorities operate, parameters which range from the organization of local 
government itself and the distribution of functions between the central state 
and local government to the constantly defined and redefined methods of central 
control, the context of central-local relations, levels of central state
funding of local services and the distribution of funding between urban
f
areas and policy programs. At an ideological level the system provides 
an important source of values and ideas for actors in particular localities. 
This role has very strong institutional support in the fora of the local 
government press (both the general and professional outlets), the function.!
service associations and their publications and activities, the apparatus 
of local government professionalism, and the regular conferences/seminars and 
meetings which play such a large part in the nationalization of local 
policy change - all these define the boundaries of policy consideration 
and debate in local authorities as a whole.
We shall tackle three related topicsmder this heading: firstly, the 
influence of key local authorities and local government organizations on national 
trends in the introduction of high rise and industrialized high rise; 
secondly, the pattern of innovation in relation to high rise amongst local 
authorities; and thirdly, the relations between local authorities and con­ 
struction firms which underlay the pattern of high rise adoption (insofar 
as these relations can be discerned fj'om aggregate level data).
»
INTER-AUTHORITY INFLUENCES AND THEIHTRODUCTION OF HIGH RISE
The national local government system is a many tiered one, with 
inter-locking and crosscutting bases for influence flows. Firstly there 
are the differences between authority types, In the pre-197^ structure there 
were four levels of housing authority - county boroughs, municipal boroughs, 
urban districts and rural districts. Independent of this structure much 
the largest housing authority was the London County Council, (later 
reorganized in the even larger Greater London Council). The 'higher level' 
housing authorities clearly set patterns which were followed by lower level 
authorities, because of greater resources, better staffing and more 
vigorous political processes in these authorities. Secondly s within 
authority types larger authorities tended to set the patterns followed by 
smaller authorities. Thirdly there were strong regional effects within the 
local government system, such that influential authorities served as models 
for adjacent small author5.ties confronting similar types of housing problem. 
These various types of influence flow were clearly discernible on r.igh 
rise housing. The size of the L.C.C. housing program, combined with the 
concentration of a large part of the high rise building effort .in tac. London
region, meant that the authority became -fte most important trend-setter on 
high rise within the national local governmentsystem. This also oved a 
good deal to the pre-eminence of the L.C.C. architects 1 department amongst 
public authority architects. It was only after the transfer of control 
of the Council's housing construction from the Valuer to the architects' 
department in 19^9 that L.C.C. influence began to grow with the discernible 
improvement in design standards which followed. ' L.C.C. schemes began 
using high flats as a basic building form in the late'^Os, in Scandinavian 
style blocks. But their most famous scheme was the Alton estates at 
Roehampton, which played such a large part in the growth of the mixed 
development orthodoxy of the period. Planned in the early 1950s for the tree- 
clad sites of large Victorian villas adjacent to Richmond Park, these 
estates mixed high blocks with houses and low flats in a real approximation 
to a garden city setting, and at densities of around TO ppa. The mixing 
of housing forms contrasted with the uniform flatted estates the L.C.C. had 
built in the 1930s. Later written into official policy by the Ministry, 
mixed development was supposed to soften the visual impact of the high 
blocks and by accommodating dwellings of different sizes and types help 
to produce a socially balanced community. The L.C.C. architects also 
built several scaled down facsimiles of Corbusier's Unite block, and the 
viev: of these flats across the park at Roehampton became one of the most 
familiar and potent image of post-war British architecture.
The adoption of high rise was at this stage advocated for positive 
amenity reasons. In 1955 the L.C.C. Chief Architect Whitfield Lewis 
declared:
As far as the L.C.C. are concerned, the use of high blocks 
of flats is part of the policy of mixed development 
first put forward in the Forsbaw-Ahercrombie Plan for the 
County of London in 19^3. 67
And he later
...emphasized that really high blocks had not arisen as a 
result of any general increase in zone densities laid down 
in the L.C.C. Development Flan. Densities had always been 
operated flexibly ... 68
- '1.56
By this stage, however, storey heights were being pushed up on all the 
L.C.C. sites and as piecemeal rather than comprehensive redevelopment 
more common, the mixed development content of schemes was reduced, densities 
were pushed up and the little ground space freed by using high blocks was
•
being covered with houses or low rise flats. As provincial authorities began 
building high rise they tended to take L.C.C. practice as a model or a touch­ 
stone for judging their own activity. By the late 1950s, L.C.C. plans
69 for blocks around twenty storeys were widely copied.
Provincial authorities were also influential in disseminating knowledge 
of high rise and coping with some of the early design and application pro­ 
blems. In 1951 Glasgow began to switch a large proportion of its housing 
program into high rise, and the city went on to make large slab blocks 
the distinctive trade-mark of its contemporary public housing, in much
the same way as point blocks became identified with the L.C.C. architects'
70 department. A succession of eminent private architects designed massive
redevelopment schemes consisting almost entirely of giant high rise blocks, 
the climax of this development being the 33 storey Red Road scheme of the 
mid'60s. Liverpool's lead on high rise was also widely publicized. In 
1955 the City sent a delegation from its Housing Committee to tour 
public housing developments in the United States which on its return 
published a report advocating the use of high rise housing on similar lines 
in Britain. Its verdict on these projects was astonishingly favourable:
One surprising feeling which emerged was that high density 
in itself is not a bad thing provided the architectural solution 
addpted is intelligent and well and carefully conceived ... 
For example s Dyckman Houses (a project consisting entirely of 
IT storey brownstone tenements) had an open, free feelinCyin the 
scheme, although its density of development was 290 ppa.
The report concluded by arguing that densities in the central area of 
Liverpool could be very greatly increased from those envisaged in the 
Development Plan, and that this 'could be achieved without in any way pro­ 
ducing a depressing effects on tenants'. The City Architect, Bradbury, 
became a committed exponent of very high density high rise development uni
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slab blocks, and vith little or no mixed development content. In 1962 
Liverpool sent another delegation to France to inspect industrialized 
building systems, and following thjs report placed a £9 million contract 
for 2,500 dwellings in the Camus system, to be built almost entirely in
T?
2k storeys slab blocks.
A very similar initiative by a leading housing authority on high rise
H5T 
was the (report of a Sheffield deputation which toured high rise schemes
in Denmark, Germany, Holland, France and Switzerland, and concluded:
The members of the delegation have returned from 
their tour satisfied that housing development in the 
form of well designed multi-storey flats can provide 
living standards which are in every way adequate as an 
alternative to two storey housing,., the multi-storey flat can 
provide exceptional amenities in the form of more open space, 
community buildings, services and equipment.
The deputation was greatly influenced in this view by the City Architect, 
Lewis Wolmersley, and they ended by approving his policy of comprehensive 
redevelopment.
It is strongly urged that the temptation to carry out 
small piecemeal rebuilding as and when groups of outworn 
houses become condemned be resisted and that so far as 
the redevelopment of slum areas is concerned attention be 
concentrated on two or three large, comprehensive schemes. 73
The first such scheme approved by the Council on the basis of this 
report was the £5 million Park Hill development, which together with its
successor Hyde Park estate, defined a type of linear high rise which was
7h 
particularly influential during the mid '60s medium rise boom*
Two other major housing authorities, Birmingham and Leeds, played 
an important"role as models for non-traditional and later industrialized 
high rise building.
THE ADOPTION PROCESS ON HIGH RISE
The patterns of-innovation, filtering and adoption of high rise in the 
national local government system cannot be studied systematically for the 
1950s owing to the lack of available d&ta for this period. But it is uossible 
to study the process involved in the adoption of j^dustrialized hi
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during the 1960s from data collated from Department of Environment
files. Although the patterns of adoption involved clearly differed in certain
key respects , they are sufficiently similar to shed some light on the pro-
•
bable course of the earlier innovation. And the definition of industrialized 
building used by the D.O.E, is sufficiently generous to include over 10% 
of all high rise building in the 1960s. Full details of this analysis are 
given in Appendix 1 and \re shall only touch briefly on the main findings in 
this section.
The cumulative distribution of authorities experienced in the use of 
industrialized high rise shows a trend consistent with an S-shape curve, 
rising steeply overall until 1966 and flattening out by 1968. 
The county boroughs were earlier adopters of industrialized high rise than 
other authorities but the numbers of new adopters in this category began to 
decline in 19614, while the number of new adopters in the London boroughs 
reached a peak in 1965, and in the urban districts in 1966-7. There vere 
clear cut differences between authority types in the cumulative percentage
of local authorities with some experience of using industrialized high
77 rise. Final adoption levels reached 88$ in the London boroughs, 66$
in the county boroughs, 12$ among municipal boroughs, 5$ among urban
districts and 1*5$ among rursl districts. The number of authorities awarding
contracts for industrialized high rise reached a peak in 1966 and from 1967
7ft
to 1970 declined very sharply. County boroughs accounted for 58$ 
of users in 1963, but this dropped to around two fifths from 1965 on, 
vith a Darge fall in the numbers using high flats in 1969. The London 
boroughs in contrast accounted for less than 10$ of users in 1963, but th:s 
figure rose steadily to 36$ in 1966, somewhat declined over the next two 
years, and peaked in 1969 at over half of all users, when London authorities 
continued to approve high rise schemes at a time when provincial authorities 
were turning to other building forms. London authorities followed 
this lead a year later.
In terms of dwellings approved, the county boroughs dominated the
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industrialized high rise market until 1966 when the rate of construction
TQ 
in London increased remarkably, (Table U.1). The smaller authorities'
involvement in the market peaked in 196U, when they accounted for nearly 
a fifth of approvals but thereafter dropped to nearly half this figure.
Table U.1 ; Dwellings approved by Housing Authorities in industrialised
high rise
% of tender approvals in:
Year
1963
196U
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
G.L, C.
5.0
1.6
6.8
10.1
3.8
M
9.5
36.5
H.1
37.2
—
London
Boroughs
3.3
9.9
18.1
U3.1
U1.U
18.8
55. U
19.7
33.9
53.1
79.9
County
Boroupjhs
73.9
68.9
6U.1
3U.9
1*2.5
6U.9
32.7
18.2
33.3
9-7
8.9
Municipal
Boroughs
15.2
13.8
3.U
U.3
3.1
U.9
1.0
2.6
. —
—
—
Urban
Districts
2.0
fc.1
U.5
6.8
8.6
3.U
1.3
h.3
28.8
—
—
Other
0.5
1.7
3.2
0.8
0.6
3.3
—
—
—
—
—
Total
Dwellin ;
11,576
15,217
16 S 519
23,22?
26,319
19.03U
1 1 ,020
3,195
1,765
1 ,91*0
5**8
The later start by the London boroughs in using industrialized high rise
is reflected in the steady rise of their contract sizes until 1968, when
80 
contracts were affected by the reaction to Ronan Point. Overall, contract
sizes rose steadily from 161 dwellings in 1963 to 33^ dwellings in 1969, 
the increase being particularly sharp in 1966 and 1967, by which time average 
contract sizes were nearly 300 dwellings in the larger authorities as a whole, 
which accounted for nearly 93% of the industrialized high rise market.
These variations in the adoption and use of industrialized high rise 
suggest that the change agent involved in the innovation process may have
been different, and certainly worked differently in the different areas and
ft i 
levels of the national local government system. We have argued that
contractual pressure played a key role in the rapid dissemination of high rise 
and particularly industrialized high flats. By looking at the relations be­ 
tween local authorities and the construction industry it may be possible to 
determine the extent to which the differences between authority tynes in 
their adoption and use of high rise can be explained in terms of contractual 
influences.
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INDUSTRIAL INFLUENCE ON LOCAL AUTHORITY INNOVATION
The pattern of relations between local authorities and contractors over 
industrialized high rise offers one of the best clues to the probable 
change agent involved for two reasons. Firstly, the differences between the 
firms in terms of their products reflected different degrees of involvement 
in the industrialized building campaign, primarily the distinction between the 
non-traditional systems such as Wimpey's 'no-fines' or the rationalized tradi­ 
tional systems marketed by many smaller firms., and the heavy prefabrication 
systems of Laing, Wates, Camus, Taylor Woodrow-Anglian and Crudens, with the 
Bison system marked by Concrete roughly in the middle of the spectrum. 
Secondly, these differences in product were allied to differing market, 
strategies by the firms and different reasons for adopting industrialized 
high rise among the local authorities using them. The 'soft line' systems 
were generally marketed in fairly small scale package deal contracts to 
authorities whose high rise effort formed a small or peripheral element in 
their housing programs. The 'hard line* systems in contrast were marketed 
in large contracts to housing authorities for whom high rise was a basic 
building form, and for whom system building was a necessity because of Ministry 
pressure, labour shortages or the difficulties of attracting contractors into 
their area.
A preliminary index of the likely change agent involved in the adoption 
of industrialized high rise is the extent of local authorities' dealings with 
construction firms on these contracts. Where a local authority gave contracts t< 
only one firm, it is very likely that the initiative to introduce high rise 
came from the firm rather than the authority. Authorities dealing with two 
firms are an ambiguous category since in a large number of cases this reflects 
only the supercession of an older rationalized traditional method of building 
by a technique introduced in the industrialized building campaign. Local 
authorities dealing with a larger number of contractors can be assumed to have 
responded to internal pressures to innovate on a broad front, from their archi­ 
tects, other design professionals or from councillors. Over two thivns O f
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all local authorities using industrialized high rise fall into the first
Op
two categories, (Table k.2). ' The proportion is predictably much higher
in the smaller authorities and is least in the London boroughs. Most of
Table h.2. : Contractual Relations of Housing Authorities by Authority
Type on Industrialized
Number of authorities
dealing with :
One firm
Two firms
Three firms
Four firms
Five or more firms
total
Hifch Rise
London
Boroughs
10
8
8
2
1
29
, 1963-73
County
Boroughs
27
13
6
5
3
^
Municipal
Boroughs
3U
It
-
-
—
3.8
Urban Other
Districts
29 9
3
_ _
- . -
— —
32 9
All
109
26
1U
7
k
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the remaining authorities fall in the intermediate category. Only eleven 
authorities dealt vith four or more firms (excluding the G.L.C., which is not 
shown in the Table): these were Liverpool, Manchester,Birmingham, Leeds, 
Sunderland, Newcastle, Leicester, and Nottingham amongst the county boroughs, and 
Waltham Forest, Enfield and Barking in London.
Looking at the type of firm which the different authority types tended to
deal with shows some interesting variations in contractual patterns, (Table
DO 
H.3). Large majorities of the smaller authorities dealt with a single
large contractor, (i.e. one of the seven firms which we demonstrated 
accounted for three quarters of all industrialized high rise approvals in 
section 3.2; these firms are Wimpey, Laing, Wates, Concrete, Taylor Woodrow- 
Anglian, Camus and Crudens). Virtually all those smaller authorities not 
dealing with a single large firm dealt with a single medium or small firm. 
Less than half the county boroughs and less than three tenths of the London 
boroughs gave industrialized high rise contracts to just one large firr.. 
Nearly hal f the London boroughs and just over a third of the county boroughs 
gave contracts to at least two of the larger firms. The detailed breakdown of 
local authority relations with contractors shows that all but two of the 
fifty three authorities dealing with more than one firm gave at .least one
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Table k,3 : Contractual Relations on Industrialized High Rise by
Authority Type and Number and Type of Firm. ( 1963~73) .
Proportion of London County Municipal 
authorities ($) Boroughs Boroughs Boroughs
dealing with :
One large firm 
Several large 
firms
Several large and 
small firms
One large and
one or more small
firms
Several small
firms
One small firm
Total •
28 , 
21
23
11+
7
7
100$
17
17
17
—
1*
100$
68 
5
...
5
—
23
101$
Urban Other -All
Districts
71 (71) 5^ 
3-11
10
6-10
1
21 (29) 1^
101$ (100$) 100^
contract to a large firm, and all of the twenty five authorities dealing with 
three or more firms did so.
Looking in detail at the contractual relations of the seven market
8U leaders reveals some marked differences between them. Much of the largest
contractor, Wimpey, dealt primarily with small county boroughs, municipal 
boroughs and urban districts building^ only f no fines' high rise, although 
these authorities did not necessarily account for the bulk of 'no fines' 
building. The second largest firm Concrete, also dealt with a large number 
of such authorities, although they formed only just over half of the firm's clients 
compared with Wimpey's two thirds. Concrete's widespread involvement reflected 
the handling of the Bison system by a number of general contractors, some of 
them medium size building firms with local contacts. The other five firms
* •
dealt primarily with local authorities employing several systems. Only Laing 
and Wates had a wide market, the other three systems being used in six or fewer 
local authorities. Wates dealt primarily vith London authorities, while Lain^'s 
contracts were more geographically dispersed.
These differences in relations with local authorites reflected very 
different marketing strategies during the industrialized building campaign. 
Wimpey built up a good deal of business with the county boroughs r,efore tha
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campaign began. When it did, the firm came under pressure from the never 
heavy prefabrication systems which swept the board in the larger housing 
authorities, so that to maintain their high rise output Wimpey had to build 
up their contacts with the smaller authorities offering small package deal 
arrangements and probably accounting for a high proportion' of adoptions in 
these cases. Concrete had a regionally patchy success with the large housing 
authorities during the campaign, but also developed their marketing to 
smaller local authorities. The other five firms were centrally involved 
in the pressure for the adoption of heavy prefabrication systems and 
directed their energies, to winning large contracts from the major housing 
authorities.
Overall, contractual influence from Wimpey and Concrete together with
over 
a variety of smaller firms can be seen as the primary reason why/half
of all local authorities adopting industrialized high rise did so. A small
minority of the largest housing authorities adopted industrialized
high rise as a result of internal decision making 9 although this is not to
say that industrial influence was unimportant in the adoption decision
or in the subsequent development of their policy. The change agent in the
remaining 25% of all authorities adopting industrialized high rise cannot
be specified more precisely with the data available.
h.h: The Professions.
In considering the professional input into the debate on high rise 
housing this section looks at the contributions of three groups, the design 
professions, housing managers and sociologists.
THE DESIGN PROFESSIONS
Virtually every major British architect who designed housing schemes in 
the post-war period has been associated with high rise housing develor.rent in 
one form or another. Amongst public authority architects the L.C.C. occupied
QC-
pride of place, not only in Britain but also internationally. J.'ost
of the L.C.C. department'^ leading lights were closely associated with high
rise. J.H. Forshaw who was the authority's Chief Architect until 19H5
vhen he became Chief Architect at the Ministry of Health, drew up the 
Forshaw-Abercrombie Plan which laid the planning foundations for mixed 
development. Whitfield-Lewis, who followed a similar career path, overs aw 
the L.C.C. f s housing during the early years of the high rise boom. 
Cleeve-Barr moved from the L.C.C. housing division to be MHLG Chief 
Architect and then to the National Building Agency where he was a leading 
force behind theindustrialized building campaign. R. Matthews, L.C.C. 
chief architect until 1951 and then Professor of Architecture at Edinburgh, 
oversaw the start of the L.C.C.'s high rise building and later designed
ft7some of Glasgow's largest high rise estates. K. Campbell was the 
housing architect in charge of the G.L.C.'s high rise program in the 
1960s, which was marked by steadiTy falling design and amenity standards
oo
as industrialization proceeded. Other major public departments also came 
to be associated with high flat building. The Liverpool city architect, 
R. Bradbury, controlled a department which produced large slab blocks of 
very poor design throughout the 1950s and continued and intensified 
the policy during the industrialized building campaign. The Sheffield city
architect, L. Wolmersley, was an enthusiastic publicist for the virtues
the 
of tall buildings in the 1950s responsible for .Park Hill and Hyde Park
89 estates, and later for Hulme Five in Manchester. The Birmingham city
architect, A. Sheppard Fidler, was an enthusiastic exponent of suburban
90 high rise building in the *50s. And perhaps the most fervent propagandist
for high rise 5 high density development was the architect to Paddington
Borough, R.A. Jensen, who produced numerous articles about European
high rise in the 50s and an influential book, High Density Living in 1966,
which single-mindedly plugged the idea, of tower block schemes at over
91300 ppa.
Private architects also contributed strongly to the high rise housing
boom. F. Gibberd pioneered the 'planning 1 use of high rise by building
92a 14 storey block at Harlow New Town. Fowell and Moya made their reputa­ 
tions with the pathbreaking Churchill Gardens scheme in Pimlico.^^ ^\»
J. . I \£
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Smithson's Golden Lane entry, universally reproduced in architectural texts,
9k 
established their reputation and outlined a pattern later used in Park Hill.
Sir Bejsil Spence, designer of Coventry Cathedral and a member of the RIBA
Council., went on to design the enormous Gorbals redevelopment scheme in
95 Glasgow. The prestigious firm of Chamberlain, Powell and Bon produced
the Barbican scheme including hi storey tower blocks as the main residential
accommodation in 195&. D. Lasdun produced an influential design for two
07 
'cluster blocks' in Bethnall Green in 1959. Even E. Lyons, long associated
with the tradition of vernacular house-building inaugurated by Span, went
on to design the Worlds End estate in Chelsea, the last of e, long series of
98 schemes which tried to break through the 200 ppa limit in London. In fact,
just about the only private architect of any standing in the profession who did 
not include high rise in his housing schemes was J. Stirling, whose 1962
Preston development presaged the style which the profession as a whole only
99 adopted towards the end of the decade. Even the 'Pop' architects when
they designed more 'realistic' projects tended to adopt high rise for housing,
4 f±f\
as in C. Price's 'Potteries Thinkbelt' proposals.
Partly because of the uniform acceptance of high rise housing amongst 
the leading architects, the more formal endorsement of the building form by 
professional organizations and groupings was not essential to the development 
of the high rise boom. In fact architects rarely committed themselves to 
specific design solutions as a profession, a tendency bemoaned by the editor 
of the Architectural Review in 1953:
Good design by individual architects does not alter the fact 
that their failure as a body to give a lead and impose on it 
the ideas their knowledge and technical resources tell them are the 
best ideas, is the failure of modern architecture itself... 101
This restraint in the profession which ruled out the production of a concerted 
line on design issues, did not prevent architects from acting so homogenously
«r
as to seem concerted in their designs. But it did detract from the acceptance 
of high flats by local authorities and others involved in public bousing, 
Indeed J.M. Richards argued in the early 1950s:
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By letting it be imagined that high flats vere their 
sole objective, the town minded modern architects 
failed to vin a clear cut victory over the garden 
suburb sentimentalists. 102
•
In 1955 this situation was changed by the RIBA's most decisive intervention
to indicate official professional support for high rise housing, the holding
*
cf a 'Symposium on High Flats' in the Institute's Portland Place headquarters. 
Opening with a speech by Dame Evelyn Sharp, the Symposium was an unprecedented 
example of professional support for a particular building form and it exercised 
a decisive influence on virtually all the major housing authorities' architects' 
departments. All the most famous exponents of high rise building, including
Whit field Lewis, Bradbury, Sheppard Fidler, Cleeve Barr, Gibberd and Jensen,
103 gave addresses, and an executive of Wates Ltd gave 'the contractor's viewpoint'.
The central direction cf all these contributions was towards the legitimation of 
high rise solutions to the rehousing problems of the major cities rather than 
the presentation of technical information or the exposition of novel design solu­ 
tions. The only critical note in the proceedings was sounded by L.J. Martin, 
then the L.C.C. chief architect who, while making the normal genuflections to 
Le Corbusier and Gropius, noted that enormous problems of design 'on the 
borderline between statistics and architecture 1 had been insufficiently
1Qlj
studied. ' Two years later, the KEBA followed up the success of their first 
effort by convening a second symposium on a key problem for exponents of high 
rise, 'Family life in High Density Housing 1 . Although much less influential 
than its predecessor, the symposium's overall message was again largely un­ 
critical and optimistic. For the remainder of the high rise housing l»»o»» \A*&. 
ft\8A K«fb ewJt' of (ftfcsi?* v»Mfts, p*rttj k<c*M$e erf & \*Afern*A. bu-rnvcrjl -Q/' 
over rank and file demands for reform of the Institute's management. Kor
did the Institute make a similar commitment on the industrialized building issue 
until 196? when a conference on 'Industrialized Housing and the Architect*
was held at Portland Place, but by this stage the peak of the campaign had
107 already been passed.
The position adopted by other organizations in the profession was rr.ucb 
lerjs c:!ear cut on high flat building. In the »erly 1950s, the Architectural
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Association was dominated by the influence of Mies van der Rohe, and vas 
relatively uninvolved in housing design using high rise. This situation 
changed markedly after the completion of Corbusier's Unite' which was adopted 
by the Smithsons as exemplar of their 'new Brutalist 1 philosophy. But the 
AA and its schools never lined up unequivocally in favour of high rise 
mass housing. Similarly, the Architects Journal, although its contents 
reflected the dominance of high rise motifs in public housing designs, 
did not adopt a clear cut advocacy position. The same cannot be said of 
the major 'high brow' journal, the Architectural Review which under the 
influence of its proprietor, de Cronin Hastings, and its editor J.M. Richards, 
evolved a design philosophy within which high rise, high density designing tended 
to be evaluated more positively than it deserved. The essence of this 
philosophy (it was actually called 'Townscape Philosophy 1 ) was a single minded 
pursuit of 'urbanist' visual effects, which involved high density massing 
of building forms to produce dramatic architectural photographs, a desire 
summed up in the 1960s by the journals number one pro-image, the Italian 
hill town. In 1955, the AR devoted a whole issue to the 'Outrage 1 of 
new town 'prairie planning' and the evils of 'Subtopia', a campaign which 
rumbled on into the 1960s. This attitude changed only at the very 
end of the high rise boom. N. Taylor recalled:
In 1967, as an assistant editor of the Architectural Review, 
I was asked by my editor to put together a special issue of 
the magazine which would illustrate 'the best of current 
housing design', together with a text explaining 'what we think 
should be done 1 . He made quite clear that what was wanted 
by him and the other editors was a typical AR tract on the great 
god Urbanity and her cosmetic soul sister Townscape„ My idea 
of importing into the argument some sociological evidence of vhat 
ordinary people actually wanted was scornfully dismissed by the 
proprietor de Cronin Hastings with the words 'But we know what 
should be done 1 .
t
In fact Taylor and his contributors found that they 'suddenly came to the 
conclusion that almost all the most renowned high density housing schemes were
dangerous rubbish', a view which eventually dominated the November issue,
111 which was published v.ith unusual disclaimers by the editors.
The overall AR position only really moved away from its early post-war 
line in the 1970s.
The other design professions can be treated more briefly, mainly 
because they normally followed the lead given by architects on the choice 
of building form. The close integration of the planning profession with 
architecture throughout the 1950s and '60s meant that the planners never really 
began to assess high rise independently of the climate of architectural 
opinion although some signs of change were evident by the late '60s
as the technical economic and sociological bases of planning slowly
112improved. Many of the key figures in the profession were, of course,
architects or engineers. The Royal Town Planning Institute throughout 
the post-war period was dominated by an exaggerated concern to stop 
urban sprawl. The major theme of the Institute's 1966 Conference for
example was reported as 'Urban Contraction must be the Priority', a stance
11 - 
that could not fail to have basic implications for housing construction policy.
Structural engineers were also firm advocates of high rise 9 for the
simple reason that their services were normally not required in housing
11Uschemes whereas they played an essential role in the design of high blocks.
Their endorsement meant that engineers in local government service generally 
were favourably disposed to high building, particularly where the chief 
engineer retained control of planning. This support increased noticeably 
during the industrialized building canpaign which further expanded the scope
for the exercise of engineering skills in housing design. And of course,
\
engineers in. direct labour organisations quickly acquired a fairly direct, 
interest in high rise building if they were to maintain the credibility of 
their departments in the face of competition from technologically more 
sophisticated private contractors. Engineers also were the most enthusiastic 
subscribers to the idea of sleeping urbcr redevelopment, both large scale 
comprehensive redevelopment as practised by the main housing authorities , and
the far more radical proposals envisrced in such plans as the Buchanan
117 Report and the Fulham study.
-•169 -
THE SOCIAL PROFESSIONS
The attitudes of the professionsinvolved in the social aspects of 
housing were in general slightly more ambiguous than those of the design 
professions. Public health inspectors as a body persistently pressed for 
rapid action on slum clearance, for the comprehensive treatment of areas of 
bad housing and for quick solutions to rehousing problems. But, in the 
early post-war period at least, they were also opposed to veiy high density 
schemes which had in the past been associated with ill health, and to tenement 
blocks in particular. In 195^, for example, the Glasgow Medical Officer 
of Health used his annual report to criticize the City Council's redevelop­ 
ment proposals for the Gorbals-, a move which precipitated an acrimonious 
dispute with the Council over the publication and circulation of the report. 
The densities proposed he said:
... are far in excess of what has been customary and 
it is difficult to believe that they will not have 
adverse effects on the health of the community. 118
And in 1955 he again singled out high rise as 'causing a deterioration in the
1 -JQ 
internal design of houses'. By the end of the decade, honever, these
attitudes were voiced less and less frequently. The undercurrents of dis­ 
quiet about high rise amongst some social workers and doctors again only
120 began to be notified very late in the 1960s.
The profession most directly involved in the protection of council 
clients interests in housing construction policy was of course, the housing 
managers. The Institute of Housing Managers was the main professional organiza­ 
tion but had an uphill struggle during the early post-war period against a 
minimalist view of their functions among housing managers which centred on rent 
collection and the tradition of coercive tenant management inaugurated in 
the nineteenth century by Octavia Hill. Within this perspective the problem 
of tenant resistance to rehousing in high flats was a golden opportunity for 
housing managers to display their professional skills, an attitude summed 
up in a 1958 Municipal Journal editorial:
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It may be necessary to accommodate many people in 
multi-storey flats who would much prefer a house. 
For this rearson and because the transition from a 
house to a flat does involve a very big change with 
a need for more 'give and take', housing officers 
may have to be particularly diplomatic in dealing with 
new flat dwellers. 121
The editorial went on to appeal for tenants' 'co-operation with the Council 
and with each other on such matters as not walking on specified lawns and 
respecting certain parts of the grounds allocated to play areas for children 
of certain ages'. In other words., the housing management problems involved 
in high rise were seen as probtms of managing tenants, a perspective 
which persisted throughout the 1950s and the early years of the next decade. 
Some housing managers in authorities committed -to high flat building admitted 
that four fifths of their tenants wanted to live in houses, but this did 
not seem to lead them into trying to influence the building forms being 
provided by the architects, partly because no authority except the L.C.C. 
seems to have operated any procedures for systematically monitoring tenant 
reaction to their accommodation. 122
The professionalization of housing management in the early 60s altered 
this situation in two rather different directions, depending on the role 
played by the housing department in each authority. The basic distinction 
was between authorities where the housing department was involved in the control 
of slum clearance and housing construction policy, where the architects 
department often played a technical role, and authorities where the department 
was relatively uninvolved in the production aspects of housing. In the first 
type of authority, professionalism was often taken to imply a broadening of the
scope of the housing departments' interests and the adoption of more business-
1 n 
like methods and values taking fuller account of the imperatives of production.^
The end result of this process was demonstrated by J.W. Boddy, the Liverpool 
Director of Housing in a speech to the 19CU Housing Centre Trust Conference 
in which he declared that the industrialization of housing provision vould 
have to ro -ahead whether some people liked it or not:
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There can be no difficulties in industrialized housing 
which cannot be overcome - the only thing which can 
slide up is prejudice, but this must be set aside.
He went on to claim that 'repetition is going to be the means of solving 
the housing problem 1 so that it was wrong to shy away from the monotony 
involved in industrialized production:
The days of the small, hand to mouth builders are 
limited so far as new dwellings are concerned.
He also reported as, ... pleased that Liverpool was compelled to build 
upwards, as it would be appalling to see housing extending 
over the country with two storey buildings. "The rehousing 
of people in cities should be tackled on a national basis. I 
am advocating a national system of prefabricated buildings', he 
said. 12U
Where housing departments were not involved in the housing construction 
process, however, the development of professionalism slowly lea^ to a partial 
reassessment of the departments' role in advancing the interests of their 
consumers, the tenants. This in turn lead to a more activist involvement 
in the basic design decision such as the choice of building form and the 
scrutiny of designs to try to spot defects that would later occasion management
problems. This strand of development was on the whole well supported by
125 the Housing Centre Trust and its journal, Housing Review . The reappraisal
of attitudes towards discontented tenants involved in this view of housing 
management was an important element in leading local authorities to review 
their committment to high rise from 19^7 onwards. About this time, for
example, the G.L.C. found that their new housing was almost exactly a mirror
1P6 
image of tenant preferences. Clearly the new consumer orientated concep-
"* ^\ T
tion of housing management could not accommodate this level of inconsistency. '
THE SOCIOLOGICAL INPUT
The final contribution to the debate amongst professionals involved in 
the housing construction process vas provided by sociologists. In the
»
•K
post-war era the prestige of the discipline was noticeably high and 
sociologists themselves were eager to involve themselves in the policy process. 
The newly prominent social responsibility themes in architectural ideology
- 1??.
meant that the design professions vere unusually responsive to their 
arguments and findings. In practice, the message which sociologists provided 
was noticeably split between those researchers who were concerned to emphasize 
the importance of providing accommodation in line with public housing
clients' needs and preferences and the view of others who seemed
\
prepared to defend architects*position and procedures for purely aesthetic
1 pft 
reasons, often without adequate research backing. The picture was
further complicated by the 'official* sociologists working for MHLG or 
local authorities whose work tended not to question the basic parameters 
of established policy.
The divisions between sociologists and the complex ways in which their 
findings could affect policy are well illustrated in the treatment of the
seminal study carried out by Michael Young and Peter Wilmott, Family and
129Kinship in East London. In 195^ the Municipal Journal reported preliminary
findings which showed that most people wanted to stay in the East End 
and that the urban rehousing process effectively destroyed the strong 
matri-local community which existed in Bethnal Green. An editorial 
concluded:
Before inviting these problems by breaking up existing 
communities should not urban development be intensified? 
Building could and should go higher... City after city 
is declaring that its building land is exhausted or 
nearing exhaustion. It does not necessarily follow that 
future developments must be elsewhere. 130
Young and Wilmott by no means accepted this interpretation of their 
findings, however, and their position was made clear in a powerfully argued 
letter to the' Times in May 1957:
In our submission the choice is not between high flats and high
density on the one hand and houses, low density and dispersal on
the other.
In the course of three years social research in East London we
have interviewed hundreds of local people: the overwhelming .majority
of them want, a house rather than n flat, inside rather than outside
the "Hast End. Should the aim not be to provide as r;,any nevr and
reconditioned houses as possible while avoiding dispersal? If
this be so then the authorities should build high only for these
who cannot be accommodated an the ground. Houses would coine
first, flats second. Such an approach would dor.and a good deal, of
fresh thinking, and we would merely refer briefly to some e:<r-: ?.lcs of
what might be done. For a start architects mif.iit i/a'c, on one :>xcc
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the suburban standards they usually adopt when they turn from flats 
to urban housing, and instead apply their ingenuity to 
designing decent terraced houses with small gardens at high densities. 
Skillful layout would reduce the waste of space on roads.
.. The major error surely is to imagine that the metropolis can 
or should be made in the imagp of Welwyn, Harlow or Stevenage. That 
is not what most Londoners want - not if the price is to continue 
the mass migration and force the majority of those who remain to 
live in flats. 131
This perceptive contribution presaged virtually every major design innova­ 
tion in public housing made during the V60s and'70s, but it remained uninfluen- 
tial at the time partly because of the willingness of other sociologists 
to contribute to the conventional wisdom on high rise. A reply by John 
Vfestergaard argued that Young and Wilmott were,
... unduly pessimistic about the popular response to imaginative 
1 vertical'building.
The antipathy towards flats, although strong, is not immutable. 
Where new flats of even moderately good design have been provided, 
mixed with houses and maisonetters at high overall density, and . 
where tenants have thus been enabled to live in areas where 
they were 'born and bred' close to their work and the accustoned 
variety of urban facilities - there the old dislike of buildings 
may be already weakening. This was evident at Lansbury in the 
East End where I collaborated in a social survey a few years ago.
... The success of the new tall blocks suggests that the traditional 
attitude is not permanent. Moreover exclusive or predominant 
provision of houses with gardens - even if possible at high 
densities - may not in the long run by a rational policy. To take one 
example s elderly households - who will make up a substantial 
proportion of an are-i that has achieved a 'normal' population structure 
may well be more suitably housed in tall blocks of flats with lifts 3 
thus leaving more space for other housing. Such considerations 
only emphasize the potentialities of imaginatively designed 'nixed 1 , %,._, 
development at densities higher than those adopted in current plans.
133 This fragmentation of sociological opinion was quite general, and meant
that it was not until research explicitly directed towards the social 
dimensions of high flat living got under way in the 1960s "that the profession 
slowly came round to a better founded and generally more critical appraisal 
of the implications of the high rise boom.
U. 5 : Media Coverage of the High Rise Housing Issue
The most difficult problem involved in an objective description of 
policy making concerns the influence which can be ascribed to 'public 
opinion 1 , however this may be conceived. A conviction that movements of 
popular opinion can exert a*diffuse but nonetheless powerful influence 
on decision making has characteristically informed most pluralist writings.
Yet because of the intangibility of the processes involved, the evidence adduced
135 for this view is almost invariably slender and tangential.
We have chosen to assess the openness or restrictiveness of the public 
debate on high rise by means of a content analysis of various newspapers 
and magazines 9 reported in full in Appendix II. Coverage in the general 
media (The Times, and local newspapers) is taken as defining the timing and 
extent of information available to the general public, and that in local 
government magazines (the Municipal Journal and the Housing and Planning Beview) 
as defining the timing and content of decision-makers 1 consideration. Figure
k.2 shows that the timing of coverage in these outlets was almost completely
1 1.£\ 
out of phase. In particular while the elite debate reached a peak in
195^, and thereafter the high rise issue was progressively routinized, coverage
in the general media was negligible until the 1968 Ronan Point disaster.
In other words, it is difficult to see any role for an informed public opinion
on high rise before the decisive national policy changes in 1965~7. Hven
at the local newspaper level coverage of the issue was very slight before
1968, although there is certainly evidence that it had begun to increase in
the mid 60s."
An analysis of the favourableness of coverage suggests that the bulk
of it was 'neutral' news reportage, combined with considerable direct
' 137 advocacy of high rise in the local government press until 1968. The
proportion of critical coverage of high building was very low. I .'any -aspects 
of the issue were not d^'scup.sed in the covera7-i- that was given. For exazrrjie, 
over the 1950-70 period less than 3;* of high rise covernpe in the 
Municipal Journal was devoted to discussion of the overall suitabili 4 - r^
*. ** *•
ffij'JJTe. 4»2s Coverage of the Hl^h Rise Housinf: ISSUP in The 
gjl^Ah.e :.:imicij)al Journal. 1930-70.
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high rise as a building form, or to its social implications, and around
1/' of coverage was concerned with its differential costs. Instead, once the
brief elite deba,te about high flats, had been resolved in about 195** 9 coverage
135 focused on specific designs, building techniques or contractual performance.
We also attempted to classify the proximate sources of coverage, that is 
to say the events which secured media attention, or the background of persons 
writing articles or supplying information used in them. Most newspaper 
coverage seems to have been stimulated by central or local government
officials' announcements, by meetings or conferences (usually of professional
139 bodies) or to have been initiated by the paper itself 0 In contrast, the
local government press seems to have relied very largely on local authorities T
own reportage of their activities in housing, on similar 'public relations'
1^0 releases by construction firms, and on articles by design professionals.
Interest and pressure groups opposed to high rise or putting forward the 
'consumer' interests of public housing clients secured little coverage, 
however.
Finally, although it is impossible to prove this via quantitative methods, 
it is worth noting that the coverage we have surveyed was not marked by 
very developed argument or analysis. It was, on the contrary, overwhelmingly 
factual and this 'facticity 1 conduced to the acceptance of high rise as a 
normal, indeed routine and unexceptional element in housing construction 
policy. Much of the coverage in the local government press consisted solely 
of 'puffs' and 'plugs' for particular local authority schemes, architects 
or construction films. Local newspaper coverage also took on this aspect in the
1950s and 60s, with a lot of reportage of tower block opening ceremonies and
1U1 'ultra-modern skyscraper flats',' but little or no independent discussion
t 
of the issues involved. In short the debate on high rise before 1968
as well as being selective, restricted to the decision makers' media, 
largely inspired by production interests and quite markedly one aided, was 
a low level one. The standard of discussion remained poor, much of it 
consisting of unanalysed maxims or assumptions of the 'if you cannot V.uii-
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out, build up 1 variety. Of course, the level of argument was considerably 
better in the purely professional journals, and a good deal of critical 
coverage was published in Town and Country Planning throughout the' pos't 
war period. But it is difficult not to conclude from our analysis that the 
nature of the high rise debate as much as the lack of coverage in the 
general media, excluded public opinion from any effective inf3.uence on policy.
k t 6 : Pressure Group Activity
The permissive subsidy structure vhich allowed local authorities to 
build high flats without incurring extra costs largely accounts for the low 
level of national debate about high rise and for the scarcity of pro-high 
rise initiatives from the construction industry and the design professions. 
For all these groups advocating high flat building, the centre of attention 
was largely displaced to the local level and they were largely uninvolved 
in pressure group activity in its overt forms. In contrast for groups 
opposed to the level of high rise building attempts to influence central
government to change the subsidy structure formed a central element in their
lk2 activity. The consideration of pressure group activity thus involves looking
at the only organizations or sets of actors publicly critical of high rise 
during the peak years of the boom, the Town and Country Planning Association, 
and what may be loosely termed f the child lobby 1 .
TKE TCPA
The Town and Country Planning Association was the most consistent source 
of opposition to high density inner city redevelopment and high flat biiildin^ 
throughout the post-war period. Founded in 1919 as a promotional body committed 
to the establishment of a new towns programme, the TCPA was dominated from the 
late 1930s to the mid 50s by Frederick Osborn, who was chairman of the Associr 
Executive and editor of its influential journal s Town and Country Planninp. 
Osborn managed to influence the 19^0 Barlowe Commission Report in favour of 
the disposal of industrial activity from the major metropolitan areas. 
During the war, he was active in trying to move the context of planning dis­ 
cussion inwards decentralist options. He was shocked, however v bv tlie
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Forshaw-Abercrombie Plan published in 19^3. Abercrombie had been a prominent 
exponent of decentralization in the past and continued to deploy these 
arguments but in Osborn 's view he had bowed to the pressure of the L.C.C. 
architects department and produced 'a Plan that doesn't do the main thing neces-
1 Ili.1
sary - permit people to have decent family homes'. By 19*15, Osborn
was already pessimistic about the future of inner city housing. The TCPA
^ . . lobbied M.Ps. a vain attempt to alter the subsidy scales introduced in 19^6
After Macmillan's announcement of an end to further designation of new 
towns and the introduction of even higher expensive site subsidies in 1952 
Osborn noted:
The Minister for Housing has been stampeded by the
agricultural lobby into a. campaign for high rise building, and the
British people must become 'flat minded 1 - which amounts to a
teveisal of the dispersal and new towns policy the (Tory)
party accepted a few years ago.
The TCPA Executive made representations to this effect to MHLG throughout' 
the 50s. Osborn himself was a vigilant campaigner against particular 
schemes for high density redevelopment, writing letters to the nat-ional
and provincial press stressing the extra costs of high rise building and
1^7 the undue weight accorded it by the Ministry subsidy scales. This tactic
was partially successful since some exponents of mixed development began 
to argue that the expensive sites subsidy with the flats addition dissuaded
local authorities from pursuing proper mixed development, and gave incentives
1^8 for 'site cramming,1 . Partly because of this the Ministry decided
to recast the subsidies in 1955 and simultaneously introduced the Town 
Development Act which the TCPA greatly welcomed. At the same time the new 
subsidy for high flats was disquieting „ although the TCPA like KHLG seemed to 
underestimate its long run implications. The 1956 TCPA Conference was Marked 
by a fierce debate on housing densities between OsLorn and Sergei K^cLleigh , 
the architect responsible for tr-.e High Paddington proposals,
During the late '50s , Osboru's involvement in the TCPA declined with 
ill health arid his place was taken by a group of younger men. Prcr.ineiit
»
among them was the L.S.E. academic, Peter Self, author of an influertial
- 179 -
book Cities in Flood published in 1957, which displayed a critical 
but somewhat equivocal attitude to high rise housing. As the volume 
of high flat building increased in the 60s the TCPA's low key opposition 
between 1957 and 1962 was reawakened. In 1963, Self denounced 'high 
density housing backers who live spaciously 1 , and criticised the 'false 
thinking' used to .justify high flats.
In February 196^4, the TCPA produced possibly its most influential 
document on housing subsidies. Its implicit position was very critical 
of the 19b1 Housing Act and its proposals called for the revision of 
housing subsidies to give real help to needy local authorities. In particular 
the Association argued the Minister should have power to vary the subsidy accor­ 
ding to the rate of interest. On high rise the report made a number of 
recommendations:
High population densities are an unfortunate necessity in 
many areas but high rise buildings are not and the Association 
prefers to see families occupying houses with gardens wherever 
possible. Where blocks of flats are essential they should be 
no higher than three or four storeys, at which height building 
costs are little more than for ordinary houses. The Association 
recommends a single fixed dwelling subsidy of a size appropriate 
for a two or three storey house. 151
These detailed proposals probably exerted some influence on the Labour 
government later in the year, which was pledged to introduce a similar 
scheme for subsidy variation with interest rates. Crpssinan said that
the new administration had few specific ideas on how this pledge might be
152fulfilled by the time they took office. Several TCPA proposals were
present in the Labour White Paper of November 1965. The expensive site 
subsidy was recast in line with their suggestions and the high rise
ICO
subsidy additions above 6 storeys were abolished. The introduction of 
the U/2 subsidy which reflected the cost variations with high rise more 
than compensated for .the loss of this additional subsidy, however, and 
throughout 19^6 and early 1967 high rise vas more heavily subsidized and subject 
to fewer cost controls than ever. In an effort to alter this situation 
the TCPA Executive sent Crossman a letter in June 1966 arguing once ffco.n
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for a policy of discouraging flat building and greater use of houses in 
conurbation on public housing developments:
A given outlay of Exchequer subsidy will finance the 
construction of many more houses than flats. To 
house 10,000 people in a new or expanding town costs 
£1.7 million less than accommodating them in tall flats 
in overcrowded cities.
The introduction of limits on densities in public housing and the 
imposition of strict housing cost yardsticks discriminating against high 
rise in April 196? represented a very belated victory for the arguments which 
Osborn and the TCPA has been consistently putting forward over the post­ 
war period.
THE CHILD LOBBY
The other main set of organizations critical of high rise were those 
involved in children's welfare. It was always known that life in flats was 
generally less suitable for children than living in a house but during 
the 1950s the basis of this impression was not well established. The 
various children's organizations successfully influenced the recommendations 
of the 1952 CHAC report Living in Flats » which concentrated on detailed 
proposals for playgrounds and children's facilities in blocks. This 
line of advance was also the organizations' main contribution to the PIHA 
symposium on 'Families Living at High Density' held in 1957, when most 
contributions were generally optimistic about the effects of life in flats 
on children and mothers. Until the early 1960s, not very much concern 
was voiced about high flats in particular, and the problem was conceived alrios- 
entirely in terms of facilities, and detailed design issues. Although the 
levels of playground provision in public housing developments were low the 
publicity given to the issue remained poor,
In 1961 an L.S.E.. sociologist, Joan Maizels, carried out the first
study of children in hi ("h rise housing with money from the Joseph Rowntree
151Memorial Trust. The research uncovered a very disturbing picture of Ihe
effects of high flat life on pre-school children who were found to play
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outside very rarely,to have less than normal contact with other children or 
people and to cause extra problems for their mothers because of the difficult 
and cramping conditions of their accommodation. The report produced an 
attempt by Labour M.Ps to persuade the Minister for Housing to enforce 
compulsory playground provision in high flat schemes. Although this initiative 
failed the research was used by tiose who argued against the level of high 
rise building as such and initiated a number of other studies of the 
social implications of high rise. The Rowntree Trust financed a large 
scale project in Glasgow in 1966-9 carried out by Pearl Jephcott which again 
stressed the problems for families with children, as did perhaps the best 
study of high rise for Newoastle Council for Social Service by Betty Gittus
1 (-O
in 1967. Finally the NSPCC entered the same field publishing a highly
1 59 
critical study based on a national survey of families in high rise in 1970.
It was largely as a result of these interest group backed studies that MKL'G 
came to adopt a firmly anti-high rise position for family housing long before 
their own research was complete.
The pressure from the children's organizations continued long 
after the reversal of policy on high rise in 1967» primarily directed to 
securing first increased provision of facilities, and latterly the moving 
of families with children out of high rise together. This policy was 
adopted by a number of local authorities such as Newcastle upon Tyne as
early as 1968 and imitated by a growing number of authorities in the early
161 seventies. ' In May 197^, the Conservative M.P. for Acton, Sir George
Young, published the results of a small survey of families living in high flats 
in his constituency and secured an official promise from the Minister for
Housing and Construction of immediate D.O.E. action on the continuing problem
1£>P 
of children in tower blocks. The official line now became to speed
up the process of moving families with children out of high rise completely., 
as a first stage of which the D.O.E. launched (at this incredibly late sta<;;e)-.
... a study to see how many families with young children 
are housed off tie ground and to consider the feasibility
of expecting all'local authorities to house them in ground 
floor dwellings. 163
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Early in 1975 9 some eight years after Ministry policy finally moved todiscourare 
high 
/fouildings, the senior D.O.E. sociologists in charge °f the study confessed:
... local authorities will be obliged to continue 
housing families in unsuitable high rise accommodation 
for years to come. 1 6h
The most serious recent development which has put in jeopardy the goal
of moving all young children out of high flats is the selling off of council
houses begun under the Heath administration and likely to resume under any
new Conservative administration. This policy would dramatically reduce
the numbers of houses in local authority housing stocks in conurbation areas
while leaving the flats stock largely untouched; particularly in London,
the policy is likely to mean that the dwellings into which tower block families
might be able to move will instead be taken out of the local authority stock
for good.
U.T : Parliamentary Consideration
Parliamentary consideration of high rise housing is important for 
our analysis in several respects. Firstly it was the only direct inter­ 
vention on the issue by national politicians. None of the party organizations 
apparently took up a policy position on high rise or indeed on mass housing 
issues generally. Support for slum clearance and redevelopment and for a 
speedy end to the country's housing problems was professed by both Labour 
and Conservative ministers. Divisions in attitudes to mass housing reflected 
primarily the personal positions of Ministers and M.Ps or the interest group 
links which influenced them. Contacts with local authorities in their
constituencies and with local authority associations were particularly
)
important in shaping M.Ps attitudes. Secondly, Parliamentary consideration
was potentially important as a generator of public debate on high risei
housing via press'and media coverage of Parliamentary proceedings and via 
links with a broader interest group debate, such as it was.
Altogether the House of Commons focused attention on high rise housing 
five times in the post-war period, coinciding naturally enough with the
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introduction of legislation on housing subsidies in 19^6, 1956, 19^1 , 1965
and 1967. The basic features of these debates are summarized in Table
166
Table
19146
: Parliamentary Consideration of the High Rise Housing Issue
Hours of References M.Ps Amendments II. Ps 
debate _ in speeches speaking moved- _____ voting
Second Reading 0.5
Committee
Third Reading
1956
Second Reading 
Committee 
Third Reading
1961
Second Reading 
Committee U.5 
Recommittal 2.8 
Third Reading
1965
Second Reading -
1967
Second Reading - 
Committee 0.5 
Third Reading
h 
3
(debate) 
(debate)
1
8
3
3
12
15
1
8
28
377
Expressed in terms of these quantitative indices this consideration is 
strikingly unimpressive, with just over five hours of extended debate in 
Coianittee and full Commons consideration for less than three hours. 
References to high rise and M.Ps devoting a major part of their contrf.bution 
to the issue in debate are almost equally scarce, while theissue provoked a 
vote on only two occasions, once in Committee and again at the RecoinirJ.ttal 
stage in 1961.
The 19^6 Housing (Financial and Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill set up tn* 
basic post-war subsidy structure which lasted until the 1967 Act, in the 
process introducing the revised expensive sit-e subsidies with an ir.creir.ent fo 
flat building over four storeys with lifts. When the provisions fo -r,this
were published by the Ministry of Health in February they immediately 
aroused controversy. The TCPA Secretary, Osborne, wrote to the Times 
protesting that the subsidies 'put a heavy bonus on flat building 1 and
•
were extravagantly large, as well as conflicting with the governments, 
planning policies by encouraging town cramming rather than the dispersal 
of slum residents to new towns. Osborne circulated a memorandum to 
M.Ps on these lines before the Second Reading and briefed Gilbert McAllister, 
a Labour M.P. and former secretary to the TCPA, to oppose the expensive site 
subsidies. McAllister began by reminding his fellow Labour M.Ps that the 
desperation of people for new housing should not now be allowed to force 
the government into the worst expedients of Tory housing ministers during 
the Depression.
I should like to remind the Minister (Aneuran Sevan), that 
it has always been the policy of the Labour Party to provide for 
increasing living space for our people, and that the policy 
of the Labour Party as decided at the Conference held in 
December 19^ is completely at variance with thePri nc;i-P-T-e 
embodied in Clause h of this Bill.. 168
McAllister also condemned the complete failure to. accord weight to what he 
saw as most peoples' resistance to rehousing in flats:
Perhaps the Minister is of the opinion that the wishes
of the people of this country should not be consulted..
but his view does not square with my view of Socialism or vith "bat
I have always regarded as the outlook and policy of our great
Labour Party. 169
Despite the power of McAllister's speech he failed to evoke any response 
from the Labour benches. Barbara Castle, for example, argued that he had 
overstated his point: '1 have read the Bill very carefully and I do not see
that it will lead to more flats going up where flats grew before or to
*i -L • • -i ,1TO flats going up in new places'.
Although the 19^6 provisions were substantially increased in 1952, the sue
i
sidy structure was not altered and the role of the expensive site subsidy 
was not rentioned in the Ccninons debate. So that it was not until the 
introduction of the 1956 housing Subsidies Bill, vhicn produced what Eevp.n 
called 'the first major debate on housing since 19^5' , that the issue vss
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raised again. Duncan Sandys in introducing the progressive storey height 
subsidy argued previous flat subsidies had been fixed at a time when there 
was little experience of flat building so that flats had been over- 
subsidized in relation to houses, (largely because London costs had been 
used in calculating subsidies). In addition the subsidy he argued
'has unintentionally influenced local authorities to concentrate on building
171 blocks of 3, U and 5 storeys, which are most monotonous 1 . In the
Standing Committee on the Bill, Ben Parkin, Labour member for Faddington, 
North, pressed the Minister not just to give subsidies for high rise but to 
use his authority and loan sanction control powers to actively encourage high 
flat construction. Parkin was an advocate of high rise largely because
Paddington Council pursued very high density schemes under the influence of
172 their Housing Officer, R.A. Jensen. Sandys expressed only vague sympathy
for Parkin's views but would go no further. There was no real indication of 
opposition to the high flat provisions, since the TCPA had secured substantial 
subsidies for Town Development dwellings in the same Bill. But at least 
one rural member, Viscount Hinchinbrooke, called for the diversion of 
these subsidies from 'spoliating the countryside 1 to the creation of 'first
4
class flats of 12, 15 and 20 storeys' on the pattern of Continental developments
THE 1961 DEBATES
Once the 1956 subsidies came into force, local authorities' use of 
high flats increased substantially to 15$ of all public housing approvals 
by 1960. In discussions on the 1961 Housing Bill the Association of 
Municipal Corporations pressed for a more generous subsidy for high flats, 
unsuccessfully, since the Ministry retained the existing scale. Several
Labour M.Ps from conurbation constituencies were briefed by their local
17U authorities to try and influence the Idnistry attitude in debate.
In the Standing Committee the right wir^; Labour housing expert, James McColl, 
moved an amendment seconded by the Labour front bench spokesman, Michael 
Stewart, which would increase the level of high flats subsidy at any height'
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by £2. Julius Silverman and Frank Allaun, two Labour members on the
left wing of the party, moved a rival amendment proposingto increase the high
flat subsidies by between ^0 and 50/'. McColl described his motion as a
'moderate, compromising and revisionist approach' aiming only to take account
175 of inflation in construction costs since 1956. Four Tory M.Ps intervened
to support the amendment, arguing that if any concessions were to be made 
this was the area, to do it. Many speakers from all sides implied that the 
Ministry was lukewarm in its attitude to high flats, while McColl pointed
to 'the general divergence of views between "planners" and "housers"' in the
176Ministry. The left wing M.Ps' speeches centred particularly on the housing
problems and contractual difficulties of the major cities, particularly 
Birmingham, London and Manchester.
The Minister, Henry Brooke, argued against any change on several 
bases. Firstly, he declared that the government simply could not afford 
to accept either of the amendments. Secondly, he countered the accounts 
of local authorities' problems by arguing that Ministry figures showed that the 
cost differential between houses and high flats had if anything lessened 
since 1956".
At the division, only one Tory member vjted for the 'moderate' 
Labour amendment, which was comfortably defeated. All the Labour members 
then supported the Silverman-Allaun amendment, which also failed.
The debate did not end there, however, since the Opposition decided 
to reintroduce the Silverman-Allaun amendment at the Recommittal stage as 
additional discretionary powers for the Minister where he was 'satisfied 
that the cost of building flats is exceptionally high by comparison with 
the average costs of similar building in England and tfales and that by reason 
of the shortage of available land or the number of people requiring accomoda-
tion in the neighbourhood ... it is desirr.ble that (dwellings) should be
177 provided in a block of (high) flats'. Stewart in moving the arcendrrent
criticized the Ministry figures as inadequate and claimed that if the 
amendment was accepted it would allow subsidy to be directed --t tho Minister'«
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discretion to the conurbations while at the same time avoiding any risk
of paying out over-large subsidies on high flats in other locations. This
position won some initial support from Conservative members but was
briskly attacked by Sir Keith Joseph on the grounds that national high
rise costs were already stable, and at some heights costs were falling,
so that the subsidy levels fixed in 1956 were still appropriate. He refused to
accept the cost figures for individual schemes quoted by Labour Members because
of the very large variation in costs between different block designs. The
availability of the proposed discretionary subsidy would serve only to put the
Ministry under greater pressure from inefficient local authorities and to
1 7ft
'encourage relatively poor or slack design 1 . The amendment was rejected 
on a straight party vote by 200 votes to 153, with two Liberals and two 
Conservative backbenchers voting with the Opposition.
The Opfc-sition also introduced a second amendment at this stage, moved 
by Mrs Irene White, who had secured the money from the Eowntree Memorial 
Trust for Joan Maizel's pioneering work. Two to Five in High Flats. This ve.s
published by the Housing Centre on May 11, two days after the Committee
179 
discussions and six weeks before the Recommittal debate. Its conclusions
were disturbing and Mrs White's amendment was designed to alleviate the 
problems of children in flats. It proposed that:
In the case of flats for which (a high flat) subsidy 
is payable ... the Minister shall by regulation require 
the authority to provide adequate play space for children, 
including those of pre-school age, unless he is satisfied 
that adequate play facilities are available in a park or 
other public ground adjacent to the flats. 180
It might be thought that this amendment was relatively uncontroversial, tut
1R1 
the Conservatives decided to oppose it.
Brooke argued that the Ministry could not compel local authorities to 
provide particular facilities in the direct manner demanded ty the r.otion, 
nor could the Ministry begin to intervene on one among many design points, 
In addition the proposal, was inappropriate in a piece of financial le;-islc.-.t' cr•. 
But.the Ministry was of course aware of the problems and did attempt to 
ensure that adequate facilities were available before granting lo".r.
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182 sanction. Finally he promised that the matter would be looked at again
following the report of the Parker Morris Committee, which would no doubt 
contain recommendations on the matter: (in fact Homes for Today and Tomorrow 
was completely silent on this and other problems of high rise, and nothing 
was ever done by the Ministry on children in flats). Despite strong support 
from several Labour members from both wings of the party, together with 
two speeches of very muted criticism from Tory backbenchers, the amendment 
was again voted down on party lines by 216 to 161.
THE REDUCTION OF HIGH RISE SUBSIDIES
In the light of the pressure on the Conservatives from the official 
Opposition in 1961, it is surprising that Labour attitudes could change 
as quickly as they did in government away from high rise. Both 
amongst front bench spokesmen and ordinary members the pro-high rise values 
disappeared almost without trace, with only the residual identification of 
members like Frank Allaun of high rise with the solution of inner city 
housing problems reminiscent of Labour's 1961 view. Of course, the 1965 
Housing Subsidies Bill represented only a partial switch of emphasis from 
high rise.
Introducing the Second Reading debate, Bob Mellish, (Parliamentary 
Secretary at MHLG) explained:
It is no longer true, as it was as recently as 1961, that 
building very high is very much more expensive than building 
to six or eight storeys. As (the Minister) has said, publicly, 
he will not encourage higher building purely for its own sake. 
It is essential in the great cities and conurbations, but 
each, of the applications made for higher building will be 
watched by (the Minister). 183
Interestingly enough, this position was now attacked by the Conservative 
front bench spokesman, Boyd-Carpenter, who called it 'a mistake 1 , disputed 
the claims made by Mellish for cost reductions from industrialized building 
and argued that it was foolish that : the higher building, vhich is certainly
one of the methods of solving the problems of Inner London, should be
181* discriminated against in this way', Crossman then pointed out that the
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changed basic subsidy plus the high flat and increased expensive 
site increments could mean that at certain interest rates the government 
vas paying as much as 80 or 90£ of the extra costs of high rise in 
subsidies, (whereas previous flat increments had assumed that the subsidy 
would meet two thirds of these extra costs).
Later in the debate, Frank Allaun also criticized the high flat 
increment reductions, saying that several local authorities had contacted 
him because they were concerned that if interest rates fell and the basic 
subsidy was reduced then they would get less help with high rise than 
under the 196l Act. Mellish gave an assurance that there was not intended 
to be a disincentive to high rise and that the Ministry recognized that 'in
the conurbations we must build high in order to achieve the housing targets ! of
1 f\(~\ 
the White Paper. But the dominant tone of references to high rise was
for the first time markedly critical. Roy Hattersley attacked the prestige 
building of high rise; Eric Heffer declared that high flats 'themselves 
created more problems than they solve'; and Arthur Blenkinsop called for
an examination of 'whether we can get relatively high densities in ways
1 Av
which are more satisfactory for families and social needs'. In his summing
up Crossman pointed out that the Bill shifted a good deal of emphasis from 
the high flat subsidy to the increased expensive site subsidy in dealing 
with the problems of inner city developments. And he criticized high building 
outside these areas:
There is no reason to put a l6 storey building plump
in the middle of the suburbs of s. small provincial town
just because the architect felt it would be better with a high
rise building. It is getting a bit too American for my taste. 188
The Bill failed to reach the Committee stage because of the dissolution 
of Parliament for the March 1966 general election. The proposals were 
reintroduced virtually unchanged early in 1967, (although with a great deal
j»
of additional material on non-financial topics)- The high flat provisions 
attracted very little attention in comparison with previous debates. In
Committee there was about half an hour's discussion of the high flat
' 189 clauses.
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H,8 ; The Formulation of Central Government Policy
With the consideration of decision making inside the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government, this part of the research reaches a difficult 
core problem. To understand the specific reasons why the structure of 
central government subsidies was changed to favour the building of high 
rise housing by local authorities,maintained for the peak decade of the 
high rise housing boom and eventually changed to remove the incentive to build 
high would require access to central government records and files if an 
authoritative account were to be constructed. Since this access was 
not available, this account is less than authoritative. It is based 
on a comprehensive review of Ministry publications, circulars and informaJL 
statements over the post-war period, supplemented at key points "by material dravTi 
from interviews with five senior civil servants immediately involved in the 
setting of high rise housing policy. These include the head of the Ministry's 
housing design section throughout the 1950s, who became Deputy Chief Architect 
in 196^ s plus several administrators who wished to avoid all attribution. In­ 
formants were of course relying on memory in their replies and presented them 
with particular slants, but in practice their replies proved remarkably 
helpful and accurate.
It may be useful to recap on the allocation of responsibilities for
policy within the Ministry discussed in general terms in section 1.1, with
1QO specific reference to high rise policy, (Table ^.5). The most important
aspect of this pattern of involvement is the separation of actors involved 
in one decision from those involved in closely related areas of policy, 
particularly the sub-division of responsibility and information between 
administrative and professional staff. Together with the chronic under- 
staff in{- of the Housing Division until 19&3, this pattern of involvement 
contributed to sorr-e of the Ministry's nir.takes in handling the growth of high 
rise housing.
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Trble h . s • Involvement in DecinicnB on Hi ph Pise . 
TASK IVOLVED in VT!LG
Getting of housing Ministers, Ac":rinintr&tors Local t?uthcrity 
targets /problems Senior profensional staff associations, If
interest
Policy advice on Houninp; Under-Secret ary . Local authority
subsidies one or tvo Assistant associations , local
Secretaries authorities
Bet '.;r?rt.i nation of Accountant General's Local authority 
subsidy levels section, quantity survey- associations
ors , Treasury
Design advice s monitoring Architects and quantity Contacts with RIBA 
of design trends, deter- surveyors, CHAC and local authority 
mination of cost yardsticks by architects 
and standards
Loon sanction super- Ordinary contracts: Local authority 
vision of contracts admin, staff at architects department
Executive level
High r5.se contracts :
architects (in regional
offices from 1962-H)
THE 1956 POLICY CHANGE
A central problem involved in the analysis of Ministry policy is the vide 
gap between the overall housing construction policy suggested by their 
design advice, and the actual housing outputs produced vithin a subsidy 
structure very favourable to hif-h rise. This essentially schizophrenic 
stance requires some prior explanation. Its origins can be located in the 
pre-suppositicna built into the expensive sites subsidy at its inception 
in the 1930s. A basic assumption r.ade at the time was that local authorities 
vanted to build houses in suburban areas at near garden city standards, that 
they vculd be reluctant to develop central urban areas, and that they vould 
be especially reluctant to redevelop using flats. The subsidy therefore was 
open-ended; i.e. no restriction vas placed on the overall nmr.fcers of flats 
being built and no provision w,i,3 Kade for monitoring the densities being 
produced by flat developments. This policy carried over into th? ; c:vc-var 
period, and until 1956 when the gf-ncral houslr^ subsidy was -/ithdri.vj. could
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still have been plausibly defended as an accurate appreciation of local 
authority attitudes. However, this orientation seems to have continued 
after the housing program had been switched overwhelmingly into slum 
clearance and redevelopment, with the new high flats subsidy the most prominent 
feature of Ministry encouragement to undertake central area redevelopment.
The effect of this orientation on the operation of Ministry control 
procedures (principally on loan sanction policy) was to build in a fatal 
flaw from the outset. One informant confessed:
We tended to accept the fact that the planners were the 
determinators of density levels because they were working 
in the wider concept of land use. So that when we or 
one of our housing architects were advising on or 
vetting a scheme of housing, we didn't tend to question 
the density. We asked what the density was and that was 
part of our brief.
Interviewer:
When you say 'the planners', which set of planners 
do you mean?
Informant:
Oh, the planners in central government didn't come into 
approving detailed local schemes at all. When I say 
the planners I mean the local authority's planner under 
his zoning plan would say "I want 80 persons per acre on 
that site" or "I want 150 persons per acre here". 
So that the Ministry planners didn't come into that. 191
The Ministry architects in exercising loan sanction control over high flat 
schemes thus accepted the density levels involved as given. Costs were 
thus controlled within parameters set by the local authority itself.
The architects branch knew from the 1930s on that flats are more expensive 
than houses,-and from the late 19^0s on that high rise flats are particularly 
costly. The assumption that local authorities were reluctant to build flats and 
later that they were reluctant to build high flats, was the main reason why no 
attempt was made to control densities in relation to which contract costs 
were assessed. This was initially underpinned by the requirement that local 
authorities make a rate fund contribution to the annual cost of housing 
equivalent to half the government subsidy being paid on the accommodation, vhich 
implied that Councils would have to bear at least a third of tha cosV; of hi^-i
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192 rise directly as veil as the effect on rent levels involved.
But in 19:~6 this requirement was allowed to lapse at the same time 
as the 'expensive site subsidy previously paid on high flats was replaced
by the progressive storey height subsidy and a drastically reduced expensive sites
193 subsidy, (Table U.6). Before 1956> four storey flats on land costing
£15,000 an acre received roughly three times the basic subsidy paid for 
houses on land costing less than £5,000, most of this being an expensive site 
subsidy payable only on flats, plus an addition of £10.50 per dwelling for 
flats in four or more storeys. The subsidy was not varied with storey height
Table U.6 ; Subsidies on High Rise Dwellings, 19^6-65 
Subsidy per dwelling ($s)
19^6 to 1952 1952 to 1956 1956 to 1961 1961 to 1965 1962.. 
House Subsidy 16.5 26.7 22.1 2l*.0 . 6U.O
Flat subsidy:
k storeys (No high flat subsidy but 32.0 32.0 69.0
5 storeys additional £10.5 per dwelling on 38.0 38.0 95.0
6 storeys the expensive site subsidy for 50.0 50.0 107.0
	flats over four storeys)
10 storeys 57.Q 57.0 107-0
15 storeys 65.8 65.8 107.0
20 storeys 7^.5 7^.5 107.0
Expensive site subsidy per dwelling
Land cost per acre:
£5,000 30.0 5^.5 
£10.000 33.8 59.0 
£15,000 39.8 66.8 
£20,000 Vf.3 76.5 
£50,000 62.3 96.0
Expensive site subsidy per acre
Land cost per acre:
£5,000 60.0 60.0 2.-4.0 
£10,000 230.0 230.0 2CU.O 
£15,000 1400.0 1*00.0 37^.0 
£20,000' 570.0 570.0 5^.0 
£50,000 1,556.0 1,556.0 1,530.0
Kote: The subsidy per dwelling figures for 19^5 are taken from the 1965 V.'rdte 
Pav>er sample figures and assume an interest race of 65^.
, . . 
were built. At the same time, the old expensive site subsidy paid
only with the price of the land. And, of course, the more dwellings could be 
accommodated on a given piece of land the greater the expensive site
subsidy total received, hence the complaints of Osborn and others that the
, ., . 19^4 subsidy vas an incentive to site cramming.
The 1956 change in the subsidies introduced a new subsidy paid per
*
dwelling for flats which rose steeply up to six storeys and by an increment 
of £1.75 with each further storey. Flats in six storey blocks received 
more than twice the subsidy paid on houses, and fifteen storey flats nearly 
three times as much, irrespective of the cost of the. land on -which they
per
dwelling was abolished. In its place there was a subsidy paid per acre of 
land. The implication of this change was to make the progressive storey height 
subsidy the dominant means of central government support for central urban 
development. To see this consider the effect of the expensive site subsidy 
change on a local authority developing land at densities of thirty dwellings 
per acre. On land costing £10,000 an acre the new subsidy paid only 3.3^ 
of the old subsidy; in fact the new subsidy paid the same amount at this 
density as the old only when land costs passed beyond the £200,000 per acre 
mark, an impossibly high figure at the time. Of course, the progressive 
storey height subsidy by no means made up for the loss in the expensive 
site subsidy. The important thino. is the relative contribution of the 
two subsidy elements. Thirty dwellings in four storey flats built on an 
acre of land costing £5 ,000 would have received a total annual subsidy 
of £2,751 under the 1952 scale, of which £801 was the basic subsidy, £315 
for lift served flats and £1,635 the expensive site subsidy. Under the 
1956 scale the scheme would receive only £1,080, of which only £50 was 
expensive site subsidy, £663 was basic. subsidy , and £297 from the progressive 
storey height subsidy. If the development was in six storey flats the loss cf 
subsidy under the rew scale would fall from £1,731 to £1,191 and at 
fifteen ctoreys the ne\r scale paid out £717 less than the old.
There appear to have been four reasons for the Minis try's reor^fu,:'. nation 
of subsidies in this manner. Firstly, the whole range of subsidies en public
housing were being cut "back as the government moved to stimulate
195 private house building and to cut back on general Council housing. The
1952 expensive site subsidy was also cut because it was very costly, but to 
have further reduced subsidies for inner city redevelopment at the same time 
as the general housing subsidy was withdrawn would have been politically 
unacceptable. The government may have hoped that the transfer of this subsidy 
to high flats would accomplish a further reduction, however, since only a few 
thousand high flats a year were being built in the early 550s, a very much 
smaller number than were eligible for the expensive sites subsidy. If the 
Ministry were convinced of the innate conservatism of local authorities 
over high building, and thus failed to predict the scale of the high 
rise housing boom which followed the introduction of the progressive storey 
height subsidy, then the shift must have looked like a good opportunity to 
drastically reduce support for redevelopment without appearing to have done' 
so.
Secondly, some change -was made necessary by the demands from several 
local authorities, particularly Birmingham, to be allowed to start building
flats in their suburban areas in order to make the most intensive use of their
196 remaining building land. Under the 1952 arrangements extra subsidy
for flat developments was often not payable since suburban land prices fell 
below the qualifying levels for the expensive site subsidy. The switch to a 
building form subsidy eliminated this difficulty and encouraged higher density 
building on low cost land, a solution particularly attractive to Conservative 
ministers intent on freezing the new towns program and encouraging urban 
authorities to meet more of their housing needs within their own boundaries.
Thirdly the 1952 provisions had come under criticism for encouraging 
'site creating 1 with low rise flats, rather than the mixed development option
briefly recommended in'the Ministry's 1952 guide loving in Flats end laid
197 out in detail as official policy in Flats and Houses 1958. Since it was
thought that the use of high flats could free ground space for houses, the 
progressive storey height subsidy was seen as enhancing the possibilities of
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mixed development. Again this incentive only worked on the assumption 
that local authority conservatism would keep the proportion of high rise 
dwellings down, rather than high building becoming simply a means of 
achieving even greater 'densification' of public housing developments.
Finally the expensive site subsidy had to be changed because, it was 
proving increasingly difficult to administer. Applications for the subsidy 
to be paid could be made only when land transactions and estate development 
had been completed and so typically lagged a long way behind local authorities' 
accumulation of costs. Each application had to be assessed by the quantity 
surveyors in relation to the price of the land, and a sizeable backlog 
of claims continuously built up. This bottleneck imposed a constraint 
on local authorities' slum clearance activities since this was the only 
government provision for inner city redevelopment. The reduction of the 
expensive site subsidy to a minor role and the transferral of the burden 
to the progressive storey height subsidy, which could be assessed by the
architects branch at the loan sanction stage in the normal way, speeded up
198 the process.
POLICY DURING THE HIGH RISE BOOM
The general context of Ministerial and senior civil service attitudes 
during the period of the high rise boom supports the view that the L'inistry 
thought of themselves as more progressive than the predominantly conservative 
local authorities. In 1953, the Labour M.P., R.A. Alien raised the 
example of the High Paddington scheme in a Commons debate on the loss of 
agricultural land and was told by Marples, the Parliamentary Secretary at the 
Ministry that he wished it every success. He added, 'I only hope the 
nation as a whole would become a little more "flat-minded".' The remark
led the Municipal Journal to editorialize enthusiastically: 'This is the
190 
first official support for the principle of the scheme 1 . Perhaps
the clearest exponent of the progressive Ministry-conservative local authorities 
dichotomy was Daire Evelyn Sharp, who addressed the 1955 1<JBA Syicposiuu on High 
Flats. She began by quoting a poem which contained ' an exciting passage arout
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the beauty of high towers' and continued:
I am assuming that certainly from the point of view of
this conference, high dwellings are acceptable and the
pattern of urban housing which high dwellings D.mply.
I know this is not necessarily accepted by the whole of
the public. We are, I suppose, the most conservative people •
in the world, and some of us are uneasy and upset by the sight
of anything new and unaccustomed. 200
Henry Brooke, who sat on the CHAC sub-committee which drew up Living in Flats 
and became Ministerin 1957 "was also committed to this view:
Long before I became Minister, I urged people to get 
rid of this foolish prejudice against living in flats. 
Of course, houses suit some of the people better and 
flats suit others, but my view is that a number of 
towns and cities allowed that prejudice to remain far 
too long after the war, when in London it had become 
accepted that it was a good thing to build flats. 201
And of course, ministerial encouragement for high rise housing fitted 
in closely with the planning orientation of successive Conservative ministers 
who opposed the extention of county borough boundaries into rural counties 
or any expansion of the new towns programme.
There were, however s several sources of tension within Ministry policy 
from the outset which grew more pronounced as the high flats boom got under 
way. The first of these was a division between some of the architects 
branch who favoured economy in building and stricter cost control over local 
authority schemes,and the administrators and Chief Architect who preferred to 
let the policy continue unchanged. A leading member ofthe first group was
the head of the housing design section in the 50s, Alec Bellamy, who was
203 largely responsible for the production of the MHLG housing manuals. In
1956 he went on a year long study trip to research U.S. high rise public 
housing projects. On his return he rewrote the draft of an earlier unpublished 
manual on flat developments which was issued by the Ministry as Flats and 
Housing 1958* This showed for the first time that high densities of around 
110 ppa could be obtained without using high rise at all, and that up to this 
level maximum economy could be achieved by using as large a proportion of houses 
as feasible for the density. Above this level maximum economy could be 
obtained by mixing high and low rise flats, with as lar^e a proportion of "»OT
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flats as was feasible for the density. The booklet also showed how high blocks 
could be designed as cheaply as possible by using large slab blocks rather 
than point blocks, more intensive use of elevators etc e The overall r.essage 
of the- booklet was emphatically the need to cut costs:
High buildings cost more than low ones and the lessons
of the chapters (on layouts) is that money can be
saved in tens of thousands of pounds by planning for only
the minimum of high buildings, or often none at all.
The key to economy by intelligent layout is to get the
required economy with the minimum use of high building. 20U
One informant when asked about the criteria used by the architects' branch 
in assessing schemes for loan sanctions replied:
What the design group drew up was what the architects 1 
branch enforced on local authorities. 205
Unlike previous manuals, however, Flats and Houses, 1958 was purely advisory 
and does not seem to have been enforced, although it certainly had influence« 
Sears and Meacher have shown that the Ministry in at least one case in the 
early 1960s insisted on the use of slab designs rather than point blocks. 
But the wider question of the use of building forms in relation to density 
was not tackled. Local authorities' use of high rise continued to increase 
dramatically partly because densities themselves were being increased, but 
partly also because the Ministry failed to put any effective pressure behind 
their own advice. In 1961 the Ministry resisted strong pressures from the 
local authorities associations, delegations from the large housing authorities 
and Parliamentary criticism aimed at securing an increase in the high flats 
subsidy. Indeed the increase in the base rate of the house subsidy froir.
£22 to £2k for housing authorities defined as being 'needy' slightly
207 reduced the incentive to build high built into the subsidy structure.
However, at the same time the house subsidy for non-needy authorities
was reduced to only £8 while the progressive storey height increments for ohe.ie
authorities were left unchanged. As a result while the non-needy authorities
received only a third of the house subsidy paid to need;- authorities, this
proportion increased to over two fifths :rt four storeys, 58/i ?;t i'ive
storeys, 6^ at six storeys and 76;.' at twenty storeys. Putting the pcint anotr-'-r
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way, these authorities were paid four times their basic house subsidy 
on six storey flats and seven times at twenty storeys. This perverse pro­ 
vision thas gave a peculiarly atrong incentive to local authorities to 
build high in areas where high rise was least needed, i.e. the better off 
non-conurbation authorities.
•
In the early '60s, the Ministry occasionally made pleas to 
local authorities to think again about their use of high flats. In March 
1962, Cleeve Barr told the RIBA:
If fewer tall blocks of flats were built in high density
housing schemes the saving would more than pay for
the higher space and heating standards recommended by the
CHAC report, Homes for Today and Tomorrow.. Tall blocks
of flats would continue to be necessary in developments over
100 ppa but the tendency within such areas would be likely
to be in the direction of fewer and taller blocks. Reasonable
schemes could be produced at densities of the order of
80-100ppa without using blocks above four storeys in height.
... The higher cost of building over four storeys was still
not sufficient^- realized by architects... The saving in cost by
using a reasonable proportion of tall blocks (say 20-30^
of accommodation) as compared vith a high proportion (say TO/?
of accommodation) would be about 30/j of the total cost of the
scheme. More attention by architects to the fundamental
economics of housing layout could therefore save substantial
sums of money. 209
In 1963, the Ministry fried again by issuing a set of advisory Housing Cost
Yardsticks taken from the figures published in 1958, and providing a compre-
210 hensive set of guidelines for schemes of various densities. By this
time, however, the high rise issue was inextricably linked with the industrialized 
building campaign. The slow response to the Ministry's efforts to broaden 
the campaign to cover ether building forms meant that the 1963 yardsticks were 
never effectively applied, and served principally to increase the pressure
on local authorities to raise densities in order to. justify the high rise
211 content of their developments.
According to one informant the Ministry's failure to enforce the 1958 
and 1963 design recommendations by cutting down the over-use of high rise, 
reflected in part the broader difficulties and weaknesses of its position viz-a- 
viz the local authorities.
The (1963) yardsticks booklet was pressed on iccal authorities
in a circular to' the effect that scheir.e:- more cxDv-^i.ve than this
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would not necessarily be approved. That's circular
1*0/63. But of course persuasion on thepart of the
regional architects was going on all the time from 1958 through
1963 until the subsidy over k% of costs vas introduced by
Dick Crossman.
Interviewer:
Why then did high rise building increase so much in this period? 
Informant:
Urn. Let's put it this way. This advisory yardstick was 
pressed by the department generally from this date, but... 
the subsidy per dwelling apart from the expensive site 
subsidy remained a unit cost per dwelling. How in that 
situation our administrators would say, "Veil, you give 
all the advice you can. And, er, we'll press them hard to 
be economical". A great deal of scope existed at that period 
for the local authorities who were actually doing the building 
and working on the drawings to say, "Oh, we know all about this". 
Look at Preston. They had a very powerful chief engineer 
at one time who built high rise everywhere, He didn't look 
at this (the yardstick booklet). And he'd arrive on the 
doorstep one day with a tender and say "I want approval 
for this scheme, What the hell's it all being held up for?" 
Government's rather open to being exploited in this situation. 
They are guiding and persuading. But if local authorities, who 
after all are spending their own money, don't see fit to 
take any notice; and if when the tender's in, it's too bloody 
late to do anything about it; and if that particular government 
in office wants numbers - then the administrators' line is often 
"Well, we'll' approve this one. Lut don't let it happen 
again!" 212
A second source of tension which eventually had important implications 
for the high rise housing boom was external to the Ministry. A very large 
proportion of high building throughout the period was concentrated in 
London, and much of this was built by the L.C.C./G..L.C. Yte have already noted 
the L.C.C.'s key role as innovator within the national local government 
system in breaking down barriers to the acceptance of nigh flats and nixed
development. One of the reasons vhy L.C.C. design standards were so influen-
Lu
tial, particular, schemes such as the .-Roehampton estates, may be that the
^
L.C.C./G.L.C. sought approval for all its borrowings in an annual Bill in 
Parliament and thus departmental loan sanction procedures were never applied 
to its schemes. As a result, the Ministry were payr'ng out subsidies under 
the Housing Acts for schemes over which they had no cost control. In parti­ 
cular, they had no control over the mix of building forms adopted. One 
informant re- called:
Whilst we were all delighted to see Robert Matthew,
Chief Architect of the L.C.C.,producing schemes of
mixed development the government had no control over
any of those schemes. They forked out the standard
rate of subsidy for whatever the L.C.C. chose to build
because it didn't have to come to the government for
loan sanction. How they set the stage in my view for
building point blocks and good mixed development in
the form of Roehamwton and many other schemes subsequently*
And when it became the Provinces' turn to build to
similar kinds of densities - high rise was the fashion.
It was just an image. They didn't do any of the arithmetic.
They just said, 'Well, they're doing high rise. We'd like
some high rise'. 213
The third source of tension in policy during the high rise boom was 
produced by the split between the planning and housing divisions within the 
Ministry. The former were inherited from the Ministry of Town and Country 
Planning and retained a decentralist position not uninfluenced by the TCPA 
which was not very much in tune with Ministerial opinion in the early 
1950s s or with architectural fasions on inner city development. In 1953 a 
a scheme drawn up by Paddington Borough for a 15 storey flatted estate -with 
densities of 300 ppa was rejected by the L.C.C. Planning Committee, and the 
Ministry planners supported this judgement on appeal, a decision which 
firmly enforced a limit of around 200 ppa on high rise schemes in London. 
Except in such appeal cases, however, the planners had no involvement with the 
setting of public housing densities and in the late f50s, under their Chief 
Planner, J.ft. James, they seemed anxious to widen their influences. The 
planning division's main concerns were to stop the prevalent low densities 
in housing construction outside the large cities, and to reduce the pressure 
to push up densities in inner city redevelopments. In September 19^1 James
told the Housing Centre Conference that very high density solutions to housing
21U problems were unacceptable and did not save rural land, A year later tha
planners' most important intervention in public housing policy in the post—,;ar 
period until then, the Planning Bulletin Residential Areas; Higher Densities. 
stressed that large gains in economical land use would follow an increase
in housing densities at the lower end of the spectrum, but that increasing
215 already high densities had only a very small effect. In J.Jay 196 :; s the senior
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planning officer in the Urban Planning Group told the Royal Society of 
Health Conference that people preferred living in houses and that the 
days of high rise building 'may be numbered*.
These three sources of tension in high rise policy were all fully 
developed by 1962-3. Yet because of the Ministry's commitment to the 
industrialized building campaign no change in policy was feasible. The 
result was an acute contradiction in policy before 19&7. ^ne Ministry was 
promoting industrialization primarily in a bid to increase building 
industry productivity and thus lower costs. Yet at the same time this 
effort entailed concentrating on a building form more than twice as ex­ 
pensive as conventional houses. This contradiction was not perceived at a 
Ministerial level, however. Sir Keith Joseph, for example, confessed 
of this period:
I suppose that I was genuinely convinced I had a new 
answer. It was prefabrication and, Heaven help me, 
high blocks, 217
Finally, it is worth looking at one relatively unimportant element in 
Ministry policy during the period of the high rise boom which sheds an 
interesting light on departmental priorities at this time. This was the 
Ministry's research into tenants' reactions to living in high rise. Socio­ 
logical research only began in 1959 following the setting up of
218 the Housing Development Group. T.he first survey into high rise, in Leo as,
Liverpool and London began in 19&3 in connection with the HDG's involvement
219 in the redevelopment of St Mary's, Oldham. Its explicit focus was
'families living at high density' and the survey was supposed to help HLG 
decide which problems to tackle in its Oldham scheme. The survey's findings 
were not very critical of high rise per se» but contained much information 
suggesting that high flats were better avoided. In the event St. Mary's 
was designed as a medium rise scheme. Trta from the study were first published
in 1966 but only fully issued in 1970, three years after most high rise
220 building had ceased. MHLG did not follow UT> this study until 1967
when a second survey on 'the estate outside the duelling 1 was undcrtai.en
to determine residents 1 reactions to aspects of housing layout.
In 1969 the two research officers most involved in the study published
an article in the Architects Journal arguing that their results showed that
tenant resistance to 5 living off the ground 1 was much less than press comment
and other sociological studies suggested, a view not particularly well
substantiated when the full report was published in 1972, five years
221 after high rise building had virtually come to an end. HDG sociologists
also did work in the late 60s on the relations between density, building
which
forms and tenant satisfaction/was dominated by a concern to service architect­ 
ural and design decision-making, focusing on specific manageable issues at the
222 expense of broader questions. For example, tenants' satisfaction was given
prominence, tenants* pseferences in the absence of the constraining needs 
to adapt to their immediate housing situation were not. Overall, the 
sociological research which MHLG undertookhad little impact on government 
policy before the 196? policy change, and strikingly little effect on local 
authorities because of the extraordinarily poor publicity for Ministry 
studies and the time lags between completion of the research and publication 
of the results.
THE POLICY CHANGES, 1965-?
The decisive change in departmental and Ministerial attitudes to 
high rise housing was produced by the proposals for a new basic public 
housing subsidy introduced by the Labour government of 196U-6. The Party 
came to power pledged to introduce a new kind of subsidy for public housing 
which would protect local authorities from the fluctuations in interest 
rates whioh constantly threatened the viability of their programs under the 
1961 Act. This was to take the form of a government commitment to absorb 
the additional interest burden when interest rates rose above a standard 
figure, eventually fixed at k%. The size of the subsidy was thus determined 
by the level of interest rates. But it wes also crucially influenced by 
the.cost of the capital project itself. At any given interest rate level, 
a costly project attracted more subsidy than a cheaper one. The subsid^ vas
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equivalent in effect to a percentage grant so that the increased cost of high 
rise building was for the first time reflected in the basic housing subsidy itself
a change which obviously brought into question the continued need for
223 the progressive storey height subsidy.
•
In the event the Ministry did not adopt the TCPA suggestion that the 
storey height subsidy should be abolished altogether, but the progressive 
increments paid for additional stories above the sixth were scrapped, with 
the previous increments for the fourth, fifth and sixth stories left 
unchanged. These new provisions came into effect for all schemes given loan 
sanction after November 1965 when the White Paper was published and had 
some astonishing implications for the structure of incentives given to local 
authorities. Taking the sample figures in the White Paper as a basis for 
comparison it can be seen that subsidies for houses increased by a factor 
of 2.7,for four storey flats by 2.8,and for higher storey flats by a factor 
falling gradually to 1.U at twenty storeys. These figures are calculated on the 
basis that high flats would cost no more than houses; in fact they would 
receive a larger basic subsidy plus the high flat addition, implying that 
flats up to around six storeys in height would receive almost as large an 
increase in subsidy as houses, and that the incentive to build high 
built into the 1956 structure would only begin to be reduced significantly 
at the upper storey height levels (Table ^.6). Overall high flat subsidies 
were effectively doubled s and their higher costs more fully offset than at 
any time in the past, particularly below about ten storeys.
As a result of the subsidy change local authorities were now in a much 
easier position on high flat costs. There were still no effective cost 
controls on high rise, indeed the 1963 yardsticks were now so out of date that 
they could hardly have been enforced. Councils could pass on to the govern­ 
ment under the new basic subsidy a fixed proportion of the extra costs so that 
incentives to economy were reduced. In 1966-68 the short, sharp medium
rise boom (i.e. in the 5~9 stor<y range) pushed the volume of high rise housir.?
, to a post-war peak.
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This disastrous mix up in Ministry policy was partly the result of the 
failure to pass through the 1965 Housing Subsidies Bill before the 1966 
election and the need to reintroduce it in the next session. But 'it seems
•
to have dawned on the Ministry only slowly that by introducing the new 
subsidy without cost restrictions the stage had been set for a boom in 
the most expensive form of high rise building. Some attempt was made to 
bring local authorities to heel using existing methods. A number of regional
offices began withholding loan sanction for schemes where the mix of building
225 forms clearly did not conform to the economic mix for the density.
The G.L.C's schemes began to be subjected to loan sanction scrutiny for 
the first time. But in the absence of any density controls these inter­ 
ventions were ineffective.
This situation had to change. Asked why there was such a long lag before 
density limitations linked to cost controls were introduced a senior 
architect replied:
Again itte part of the history of swallowing the 
(Flats and Houses, 1958) booklet. Without it government 
would look at proposals from local authorities to build 
high and say 'If it's right, it's going to cost so much more 
than if it is a lower building jand there fore we'11 increase the 
subsidy' - no further questioning. After this we press on with 
scrutiny of schemes under it, to try and reduce the waste 
and overbuilding of high blocks and we come out vith the 
("1963 yardsticks), with strong words about unless you're 
as economical as this shows we won't approve it. But still in a situ- 
tion where the authority is left with the initiative and govern­ 
ment is paying out subsidy on the basis of a check that for 
what it is it's not expensive. You have a £H,OQO flat. If it's 
an expensively designed block we ? re going to turn it down. But if 
it's a reasonable design and reasonably economical, for wh?.t 
rt ij^, then we'll accept it. But of course the cby the h'/j subsidy 
was.in the offing, we on the professional side could walk down 
the corridor arid say to the administrators, 'This (the housing 
cost yardstick) is ^iiat you want; this is what you must have'. 
So that for the first time, and only because of the k% 
subsidy, cost control related to density became the order of the 
day. It should have been the order of the day at a much 
earlier date in my view. 226
In April 19&7» directly following the Royal Assent to the Kousinr 
Subsidies Bill, the Ministry issued circular 35/67 to local authorities. 
This laid down the first ever Ministry guideline on the maximum censities 
permitted in public housing developments, irrespective of the density li-.iitc
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defined in local. Development Plans. This ceiling was fixed at 165 ppa 
in conurbations and 120 ppa elsewhere. A mandatory system of housing cost 
yardsticks linked to density was introduced, to which all schemes had to 
conform if they were to receive subsidy. A tolerance level of 105 over 
the yardstick was allowed, although this excess did not qualify for subsidy, 
schemes above the tolerance level would not get loan sanction at all. The 
yardstick was calculated on the assumption that the most economical mix of 
building forms would be used at each density and a further strong warning 
against the over-use of high flats was coupled with a reminder that most 
tenants preferred living in houses in the circular. One administrator 
remarked of the yardsticks:
We knew that we'd only provided cost at each point in 
the table to cover the minimum necessary amount of high 
building in themix.
Interviewer: 
Was this in effect discriminating against high rise?
Informant:
. 227Well yes, but why not? _
In practice, the yardsticks made high rise building extremely difficult, 
as a comparison between the 1967 costs of different dwelling types and the
OO&
costs allowed in the yardsticks shows, (Table U.7K Two storey four 
bedspace houses at £2,21^ were within the limit at the low density of 60 ppa 
with a margin of 15$. Three storey flats at an average £2,718 were within 
the limit for four or five person dwellings at 80 ppa and for three person 
dwellings at .slightly over 100ppa. Flats over twelve storeys cost 
£3,718 on average and were within the cost limits only for five person 
dwellings built over the new density ceiling of 165 ppa. The average cost of 
all flats over five storeys was £3,752'although they were on average 20;'.: smalle:
in terms of floor area than houses, and thus probably accommodated fever
229 people. A review of the new limits by two leading architects in the
Municipal Journal concluded:
The future of high rise development vould seem, with or without 
the 10$ excess loan sanction, to be limited unless the 
density of 165 ppa is used. 230
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Table U.7 ; CostJ^jmits in the Housing Cost Yardsticks, 1967,
(Total cost allowed per dwelling £)
Net density NUMBER OF PERSONS PER"DWELLING:
One Two Three Four Five
60
80
100
120
160
200
2,038
2,2l*6
2,1*37
2,566
2,58U
2,581*
2,172
2,322
2,1*30
2,638
2,902
2,967
2,3^9
2,550
2,667
2,787
3,132
3,336
2,592
2,792
2,936
3,036
3,396
3,640
2,865
3,0l*0
3,210
3,315
3,670
3,960
The Ministry's Chief Quantity Surveyor defended the yardsticks in
general as 'not stultifying', despite architects' criticisms. But on
the realities of the yardsticks for high rise buildings he commented only:
'Some authorities are realizing that fewer tall buildings mean lower
231 costs in use and easier maintenance'. - A great many high rise
schemes still went through in some regions, however, where the regional 
architects seem to have allowed Councils to calculate different densities 
for estates as a whole and forparticular contracts, while in London the 
availability of yardsti ck supplements for regionally high building costs
(based on house costs) combined with the relatively low London prices for
232 high blocks to ease the yardstick constraints for some years. But as
tender prices continued to rise while the yardstick levels lagged behind 
the yardstick limits bore more and more heavily on high rise schemes. By 
1970 only a few hundred high flats were being given tender approval, virtually 
all of them in London.
A final factor in moving the Ministry into a firmly anti-high rise stance, 
even in its public pronouncements, was the Ronan Point collapse in
*
May 1968. The Griffiths Tribunal report vas critical of MHLG (for encouraging 
system building while not assessing the technical safety of the heavy prefabric; 
tion systems), of the National Building Agency, the Building Research Station 
and the Ministry's Building Regulations Advisor:/ Committee. ^ An
extensive shake-up of the relevant Ministry divisions was carried out in the 
wake of these findings. In addition two areas of intense controversy 
developed out of the Beport. The first concerned new safety standards. On 
November 6th 9 the Ministry technical panel circulated to building firms 
and local authorities their suggestions for new requirements on structural 
stability, which included the incorporation of steel loops between walls and 
floor panels in system built flats, to prevent the progressive collapse 
which the Report had shown could occur as the result of gas explosions, high 
winds or fire. Two weeks later a group from the NFBTE System Building Committee
began a week of talks with Ministry officials on this draft which resulted
23U 
in the publication of a radically revised set of Ministry standards. In
this the original steel loop solution, which was very expensive for system 
building maimfacturers, became f Method A 1 , and a new solution known as 
1 Method B' was put forward as an alternative. The description of this was 
noticeably short and vague, requiring only 'providing a form of construction 
of such stiffness and continuity as to ensure the stability of the building 
against forces liable to damage load supporting members'. Furthermore, the 
original recommended standard of resistance to pressures of 5Ibs per square 
inch was amended so that:
Where residual risks are lessened by control of the 
incidence of an explosion in magnitude or frequency, a 
corresponding reduction can be made in the pressure. 235
Where gas was removed from system built flats much lower standards were 
enforced, although the risks due to high winds and fires pointed out by 
the Griffiths Tribunal report were clearly not reduced in such blocks. 
The second area of controversy concerned how much of the costs of 
strengthening the system built flats would be met by a grant from the Ministry 
and how much would have to be borne by the local authorities with system 
built blocks. Initially the Ministry announced a hO% grant which prompted 
an angry campaign by local authorities and come backbench M.P.s to tiy and 
increase this fignore. In June 19&9, Desmond Plummer, the leader of the
«
G.L.'C. declared:
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We do not accept that the offer represents fairly 
the extent of the Ministry's responsibilities. The 
Government pressurized us into erecting these types 
of system built flats to save time and money. 236
•
This campaign rumbled on till the new year when the Minister agreed to raise
237 the offer to a 50% grant. Overall, this operation cost MHLG and the local
4
authorities some £30,000,000, but this refers only to the direct cost of 
strengthening contracts. Loss of rents, payments for replacing gas appliances
and heating systems, etc., undoubtedly took the overall bill to a much higher
238 figure.
By 19TO Ministry policy had come round to a firmly anti-high rise 
position. Cost yardsticks were being enforced and had effectively eliminated 
high density and high rise public housing developments. Along with the 
control of public housing densities, the planning assumptions which had 
produced and underlain the high rise boom were being questioned and partially 
revised. Ministry pressure on density levels in the G.L.C. Development Plan 
was the most important instance of this change. The Department of the 
Environment wrote into the Plan the restriction of new housing to a density 
range of 70 to 100 habitable rooms per acre (about 80-100 ppa), with 
housing for families 'normally in the lower part of the range*. And the 
D.O.E. revision continued:
High densities will only be acceptable either where 
the number of family dwellings in any given scheme is small and 
can be provided primarily in low rise building, or where 
dwelling houses as distinct from flats or maisonettes are 
provided. 239
While this position is maintained the likelihood of further high rise building in 
British cities seems slight.
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CONCLUSIONS
This analysis of influences on national policy-making on high 
rise has confirmed the interpretation of it as a 'technological shortcut 
to social change'. For we have argued that changes in central government 
policy or the national local government system cannot be seen as the results 
of specific professional, industrial or local authority initiatives aimed 
at influencing national policy, important though these were. Rather these 
interests affected policy in much more diffuse ways, by creating and sus­ 
taining a climate of opinion in the public housing apparatus favourable 
to high rise, and by constraining Ministry policy change within narrow 
limits. The progressive storey height subsidy was transformed from a 
modest, cost cutting exercise into a major policy shift, by industrial and 
professional pressure, the industrialized building campaign and the 
magnification of these influences by the national local government system.
MHLG's weak structural position within the public housing process 
stemmed firstly from its non-executive position, its dependence on local 
authorities to produce outputs. Secondly, it reflected the dependence of both 
central and local government on industrial involvement to secure production. 
Even without the internal divisions over policy o n housing construction issues«, 
these factors would have severely limited the department's ability to 
restrain the over-building of high rise.
The industry's pressure on central and local government in a period 
of high demand on construction resources can be seen as the basic dynamic 
of the high rise boom. This pressure was exerted by formal and informal 
contacts, by extensive marketing and advertising, by the contractors' 
industrialized building drive, and by the ability of large firms to 
withhold their involvement and capital unless riven incentives to undertake 
public housing work. Such incentives included chances in tendering methods, 
larger contracts, continuity of T.-Jork, extended coutrol of building desic-n, 
the adoption of proprietary systems, or changes in the buildin- form \:sed.
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High rise housing incorporated all these concessions, defining a technologi­ 
cally sophisticated market in which the largest firms were insulated 
from small firm competition and were able to undertake work in peculiarly 
favourable conditions.
The operations of the national local government system facilitated and • 
magnified industrial pressure, leading to rapid adoption by smaller 
authorities of large authorities' innovations in housing construction policy. 
The selectivity and low level of debate in this system quickly constituted 
a dominant conventional wisdom on high rise housing, responding uncritically 
to industrial and professional initiatives. At the same time, the powerful local 
authority incentive to make public housing policies effective within a 
basically unfavourable organizational context vested considerable social and 
political significance in high flat building. Local authority pressure behind 
high rise (well illustrated in the 1961 Commons debate), ascribed it a central 
place in the conurbations' housing drive. At the same time the sensitivity of 
local authority building to Ministry subsidy changes prevented MHLG effectively 
controlling the over-building of high rise until the adoption of a percentage 
grant subsidy in 1965 threatened to transform MHLG's lack of control of 
densities into a blank cheque for local authorities.
Contrary to the prevailing conventional wisdom on the high rise period, 
the design professions could not be seen as important national influences 
on the level of high flat building. Their legitimizing influence within the 
national local government system was particularly important in leading to the 
acceptance of'high.rise and later industrialized building. And their tendency 
to focus on a limited decision context, a,nd indeed to rationalize these limits 
lead to a debate on high rise which was extremely restrictive in definition. But
t
professional bodies as such were not bound up in advocacy of high flat building ar.c 
in many ways were unintegrated into the evolution of national policy.
The interest, group process, Parliamentary considerations and public 
opinion were all noticeably uninfluential in setting central rovom.rent policy , i. id 
seem to have had little effect on the overall level of high buildir.r Lofore '963. 
The interest group process was frogmentr,ry, confined to the few altruistic
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elite bodies opposing high rise provision or protecting childrens' 
interests. The views of public housing clients were apparently never 
channelled into the national political process, while the elite debate, 
on high rise largely ignored critical contributions. Public opinion 
could hardly be seen as involved in the issue until after Ronan Point, 
since the level of information about high rise available in the general 
media was negligible prior to this point. Finally the level of Parliamentary 
scrutiny of high rise policy was negligible and largely responsive to the 
nexus of industrials-local authority interests already discussed.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Theoretical Approaches to the Study of National Policy Making 
Since our account of national policy making on high rise is now complete, 
this chapter briefly reviews our findings in the light of the account of the 
British political system suggested by some of the major theoretical approaches 
in political science. A case study of this kind cannot easily form the basis 
for developed theoretical argument, however important theoretical approaches 
may have been in influencing the questions asked, the issues selected and the 
methodologies employed. But it can usefully serve as a basis for the compara­ 
tive assessment of theoretical approaches, for the exposition of gaps in the 
analyses, the testing of hypothesized relations in an empirical context and 
the assessment of the different approaches' utility in empirical research.
We have chosen to examine the implications of our findings in the light of 
four theoretical frameworks all of which have influenced this research at some 
stage and in varying ways. Two of these approaches, pluralist analysis and 
elite theory, are central themes in contemporary political science. The other 
two, 'new pluralist' theory and the neo-Marxist critique, are less well known 
but are especially relevant to the understanding of the political process in 
advanced industrial societies.
PLURALIST ANALYSES
Pluralist analyses have dominated most recent accounts of the British 
political system. The state apparatus is seen as made quite highly responsive
to the wishes of citizens by the central mechanisms of representative government •-
^ 
electoral and party competition, an extensive and equable interest group
2 process, and the safeguards built into the recruitment and socialization of
"T
political leaders ensuring deference to the public interest. Political power
is seen as concentrated in the hands of elected officials operating in legally
k 
defined contexts in close contact with a large number of separate elites but
constrained by an open political process and rigorous public and media scrutiny.
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The ordinary citizen, interested minority groups and 'public opinion 1 are ail 
seen as potentially important political influences sustained by a participatory 
political culture.
Our research has discovered a very different pattern of influences on
national policy making over high rise housing, however, one in which the
*
pluralist emphasis on electoral and party political input-s, on the capacity of 
ordinary citizens to intervene or organize to affect decisions and on the con­ 
trol of public policy by elected officials seems misplaced. Rather a closed 
and narrow process of elite decision making, operating in a technical/ 
administrative context with a minimum of public debate and in terms of socially 
constructed trade-offs influenced overwhelmingly by production interests, 
effectively determined policy. Formal or explicitly political lobbying v/as 
relatively unimportant as an influence on policy. Rather the diffuse processes 
of ideological control and influence over the national local government system 
by the design professions and construction interests created a 'mobilization 
of bias 1 in favour of high rise housing,against which even well placed opposing 
groups such as the TCPA were quite ineffective. The importance of these pro­ 
cesses also meant that formal or representative interest groups played little 
part in shaping the policy and particular firms and professionals dominated 
influence exerting activity on the issue.
The primacy which we have ascribed to construction interests as influences 
on policy, and the extent to which public authority dependence on contractual 
involvement lead to policy changes to appease sectional interests, are the most 
damaging findings for pluralist analysis. Of course, there is little novelty
in the discovery of a high degree of business influence on government policy -
7 especially in fields such as business regulations or tariff fixing. Here
legitimate business interests are involved and conflicts of interest ,\re fairly 
low level and non-immediate. But in the case of high rise the business
•
interests shaping decision making were those of a very few firms and their 
influence directly affected an area of social policy in which it would be hard 
to discover legitimate business interests. We hcive argued that contractual
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pressure effectively altered the accommodation provided by public authorities 
in ways which were clearly contrary to the interests of tenants and of the 
public housing drive as a whole, and that this pressure exerted a strong dis­ 
torting influence on debate in the design professions and the national local 
government system.
Finally, one of the most striking features of our findings has been the 
extent to which it has proved impossible to construct a satisfactory account 
of policy change in terms of the system of actors. Such accounts were clearly 
incommensurate with the scale and development of the high rise boom. We have 
thus been lead to ascribe considerable efficacy to structural relations and 
variables in the economic and ideological systems in accounting for policy 
change. Specific policy influencing activity has emerged as significant only 
within these basic relations, and has occasionally been almost absent. For 
example, rural and suburban middle class pressures for urban containment 
exerted a crucial influence on housing construction policies. But almost no 
overt activity to try to influence policy on subsidies or forms of housing
Q
provision was discovered. This influence was overwhelmingly a structural or 
contextual one. For pluralist analyses, such findings pose a severe problem, 
since they imply a potentially critical blind spot in pluralist methodology. 
This point is worth some further development.
Despite the predominance of pluralist accounts of politics in Britain, 
there have been very few systematic analyses of policy making by political
Q
scientists. Rather the predominance has been established by textbooks and 
general discussions of the political system, by political histories and by 
short illustrative case studies. Three features of these cases studies' 
methodology have tended to produce pluralist conclusions automatically. First, 
the issues studied have usually been those which have generated controversy or
been seen as important or 'key 1 issues within conventional approaches to
10 
politics. No systematic sample of issues has thus been considered. Secondly,
issues have been institutionally defined, as particular Acts of Parliament or
executive decisions, and have been analysed over very short time periods only 
up to the point of decision and largely in terms of overt activity. There 
have been very few studies of policy implementation or the distributive conse­ 
quences of outcomes. The stark contrast between Hewitt's account of who 
benefited from the introduction of the 19^-7 planning system and the analysis
of this system's operations given by Hall et al. is indicative of the inadequacy
12 of such an approach. Thirdly, following on from these points, pluralist
analyses are pervasively phrased in terms of a restrictive and subjective
13definition of interests as policy preferences. This links in with the conven­ 
tional definition of issues and the lack of analysis of outcomes to provide a 
reinforcing and fundamentally circular process in which conclusions are pre­ 
determined by methodology. In particular socially constructed trade-offs
between issues which may encapsulate power relations become incorporated into
1*f 
the very structure of academic analysis and thus cannot be studied. An •
awareness of such possibilities involves the political scientist in difficult 
attempts to assess 'objective 1 interests (however these may be defined), and to 
probe beneath conventional accounts of policy options, as we have done in 
Chapter Three. In effect an independent analytical position must be defined 
before an accurate assessment of the issue can be obtained. Despite the dangers 
of other forms of circularity in such an approach, we believe that it has been 
successfully attempted here.
ELITE THEORY
The confinement of policy making activity on the high rise issue to elite 
groups and actors does not imply that our findings support elite theory approaches 
to politics. Essentially such approaches posit the existence of a cohesive
ruling elite in which political power is concentrated over a wide range of issues
"" ^ 
and whose commitments can be seen as fundamental in interpreting social policy.
Decision making is not seen as confined tc elected officials, but as extended 
beyond government institutions by interlocking organizational ties, informal 
influence groupings, friendship and socialization netv;orks and close continuities
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of values and social positions. Most British studies within this perspective 
have concentrated on establishing similarities or dissimilarities in the social
characteristics of various elite groups, and almost no decisional research or
17 studies of elite interaction have been carried out.
We have argued in Chapter One that a 'public housing apparatus' influencing 
the development of national housing construction policy could be identified, and 
that this elite grouping was substantially cohesive and controlled many aspects 
of policy development. And certainly non-elites have emerged as 'passive 
observers or at best sporadic participants but never directing agents'. But 
there are three features of our findings which militate against the acceptance 
of an elite theory approach.
Firstly, the elite groups with which we have been concerned have been medium 
level ones. The low political salience of the high rise issue meant that 
Ministerial or Parliamentary involvement was negligible, and that influence 
flows and activity took place at the administrative level in government,. The 
non-governmental actors and organizations were also quite far removed from 
commanding institutional heights. In terms of overall levels of industrial con­ 
centration in Britain, for example, the top construction firms are still quite 
small organizations.
Secondly, and as a corollary of our first point, the evidence of connections 
at elite level between housing construction issues and other issue areas is
quite slender. The departmental structure of central government is far too
19 fragmented to conceive of much linkage, and this is of course even more the
case in relation to the design professions. The contractual interests are a
rather different matter. In three other areas of public policy concerned with
20the built environment - the motorway lobby, the post-1953 property and city
21 centre redevelopment boom, and the early 1970s switch to 'big hospital' solu-
22 tions in the NHS - the top construction firms played key parts in conjunction
with a wide variety of other economic interests, including car manufacturers, 
road haulage interests, elite motoring organizations, financial institutions and 
medical technology firms. In each case too, the construction firms seem to have
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dominated the professions involved. But these are all areas in which construc­ 
tion work is directly involved, and there is little to suggest from the existing 
literature on these topics that large construction, firms form part.of a
r
cohesive elite, rather than one interest involved in a number of different 
coalitions.
Thirdly, the point which we made against pluralist approaches concerning 
the under-determination of accounts of policy development on high rise in ternis 
of the system of actors, is equally applicable to elite theory approaches. The 
structural influences on policy cannot be captured within elite theory, in which
the emphasis on narrowly political activity is in some writers even more accen-
23tuated than in pluralist analyses. Nothing resembling a conscious elite
'conspiracy 1 on high rise could be discovered. The value consensus on the 
policy which was achieved partly reflected the extent of interaction and common 
interest within the public housing apparatus. But it was more basically deter­ 
mined by impersonal structural relations and their development, and only on 
quite detailed questions could it be ascribed to particular initiatives or 
actions by elite groups and organizations.
NEW PLURALIST THEORY
By 'new pluralist' theory we denote primarily the recent work of Bell,
Galbraithj Etzioni and Sartori (sometimes collectively described as the post-
2k industrial society thesis). These writers have adapted pluralist theory to
the changed political situation in advanced industrial societies by accepting 
Mills' claim that the traditional pluralist polity concerns only the 'middle 
levels of power*. Phenomena such as a vigorous interest group process are 
reinterpreted as non-rational and potentially disruptive elements from which
the sophisticated administrative and planning processes of industrial societies
P5increasingly need to be insulated. The job of ensuring that administrators
in the expanded state remain responsive to 'public opinion' and safeguard the 
public interest is seen as decreasingly fulfilled by representative or electoral
processes. Rather two other factors are important. Firstly, the professionali- 
zation of administration provides these safeguards since its distinctive feature 
is that a strong attachment to the public interest is built into professional
•
n6 
ideology, socialization and self-regulation.'1 Bell and Galbraith expect the
increasing dependence of modern organizations on the professions and the
'educational and scientific estate 1 to lead to a thorough-going socialization
27 of their goals, even in the case of business. Secondly, the development of
liberal democratic states as decentralized administrative networks (i.e. the 
growth of QUAGOs and QUANGOS, the multiplication of agency types and the
pO
blurring of the public-private dichotomy), " is seen as leading to a fragmented 
structure of elites, each influencing only a narrow range of issues and with
power quite widely dispersed into the 'tecnnostructure 1 or administrative
29 levels of organizations. Finally the advanced industrial state is seen as
the most efficient means of meeting the needs of ordinary citizens and as' 
overwhelmingly orientated to those needs. For example Sartori argues:
Micro democracies can still be conceived in input,that is, as a 
demo-power. But macro democracies are best conceived and 
furthered in output, that is, in terms of demo-distribution. What 
can still be mightily improved is not the power end of the 
problem - more power to the people - but its end-result; more 
equal benefits or less unequal privations to the people.. It 
can hardly be denied that for the public at large, popular rale 
means the fulfilment of popular wants and needs.30
In relation to our findings new pluralist theory clearly represents a 
significant advance on earlier pluralism and elite theory. The configuration 
of decision making activity which it suggests is clearly appropriate to our 
analysis, particularly in the stress laid on professional roles, on the restric-
»
tive scope of elite power, on the decentralization of power in the state 
apparatus and on the predominance of technical/administrative factors in elite 
debate and decision making.
•
The riorustive or theoretical conclusions which new pluralist writers 
typically draw found little support in our analysis, however. Despite the 
centrality of professional roles on housing construction issuer, profesEionalic::, 
alone proved an inadequate safeguard of the public interest. The dependence of
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architects even within the state apparatus on contractual involvement to meet 
output targets, and the operations of planners within a context prestructured 
by the spatially defined interests of different social groups, meant that the 
design professions were strikingly lacking in the independence or autonomy 
suggested by new pluralist accounts. Furthermore the strong technocratic 
elements in professional ideology seem to have swamped other components (such 
as the social responsibility strand in architectural ideology) which would have 
ensured responsiveness to 'public opinion 1 , and to have legitimized persistent 
decision making running contrary to majority preferences. In much the same 
way, the fragmentation and decentralization of the state apparatus not only 
removed high rise policy from any effective political scrutiny at the national 
level, but also conduced to the penetration and capture of parts of this 
apparatus and related professions by a sectional economic interest. Both rrain 
components of the decision making configuration to which new pluralist theory 
ascribes significance as defences of the public interest thus turn out in the 
case of high rise housing to have increased the likelihood of large scale dis­ 
tortion of public policy.
THE NEC-MARXIST CRITIQUE
The essential features of neo-Marxiot theory, in contrast to traditional 
Marxist accounts of politics, are the acknowledgement of the relative autonomy
of the state in advanced capitalist societies and the definition of a non-
31 
coercive state role within a functionalist account of state intervention.
The first point is a belated recognition of the genuine separation of political 
and economic power in liberal democracies? and neo-Marxist writers reject elite
theory's attempts to relink these power bases in terms of the values or back-
•zo 
grounds of actors. State intervention in their functionalist accounts ?.s
seen as directed towards preserving the overall cohesion of the social forriar.ion, 
that is with the legitimation of a social system within which private capital is 
dominant, rather than with the short term defence of the interests of
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capitalists.'''"7 'Tight-fit' functionalist accounts tend to see liberal demo­ 
cratic states as making concessions only under pressure from working class 
organizations or activity; 'loose-fit' accounts see a possible role for pre­ 
emptive concessions by the state. The analysis of state policy is made 
slightly more complex than in traditional Marxist accounts by the acknowledge­ 
ment of different 'fractions' of capital with conflicting interests.^ 
Monopoly capital is generally seen as most influential on state policy.
Neo-marxist accounts have rarely been applied empirically and they are 
phrased in a much more general way than the other theoretical approaches 
reviewed, so that it is more difficult to assess their applicability to our 
findings. For many of the propositions involved no clear criteria of what 
would count as proof or disproof seem to be available.
Nevertheless there are some considerable points of agreement with our 
account. The neo-Marxist stress on the importance of class interest as 
influences on state policy is especially relevant to the pursuit of the public 
housing drive within an organizational framework and planning system fundamen­ 
tally inimical to its success. Their stress on the political influence of 
capital, even where the area of social life controlled by the state rather than 
by private firms has increased, is well born out by the importance of contractual 
interests' influence on housing construction policy up to 1970, particularly by 
their exploitation of their favourable position viz a viz local authorities and 
the design professions. Both the main structural influences on policy which we 
have outlined could thus be well integrated into such an approach. Our research 
has shown empirically how diffuse social class pressures and specific influence 
exerting activity by private firms could come to set an influential ideological 
context for the development of state policy, without in any way positing the 
conscious pursuit of either of these interests by decision makers.
Whether our findings could support the sweeping claims of neo-Marxist 
theory that such influences, and the related distortion of state policy, are 
inherent under capitalism seems problematic ? however, r.Cvo major points of
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objection must be made. Firstly, the relations which we have charted between 
large contractual interests and public authorites up to 1970 have not endured. 
With the abandonment of the 500,000 homes target and the collapse of indus­ 
trialized building, large contractors' involvement in public housing decreased 
sharply, and the policy shift towards rehabilitation (begun in 1969 and carried 
to its limit under the Heath government), further damaged their interests. 
Of course we would expect some variation in contractual relations with the 
state of demand, but the extent of this change goes well beyond this and must 
call into question any suggestion that state agencies' dependence on large 
construction firms is a permanent feature of public housing in Britain. 
Secondly, the influence of a small group of large contractors which we have 
charted cannot easily be interpreted within nee-Marxist accounts. Such firms 
cannot be seen as constituting a 'fraction' of capital, but on the other hand 
their interests were not those of capitalists as a whole. In so far as there 
is a general interest of capital involved in public housing construction 
policy, it is in keeping down housing costs as an element in wage costs. But
this interest was systematically frustrated by the large construction firms'
37 success in persuading public authorites to build high cost forms of housing.
A final point more in line with neo-Marxist theory is worth making. We 
have argued that class and contractual interests produced a'rationality deficit 1 
in public housing up to the late 1960s. One major consequence of the growing 
problem of public housing construction programmes was a major decline in the 
credibility of aid. support for public housing as a whole,and a shift towards
private house -building and the channelling of more state subsidies into private
38 hands via rehabilitation. In a general sense this shift could be seen as
favourable to the interests of the middle class and of private property owners
and as unfavourable for less well off and working class people, precisely the
39 group who had suffered most from the cper^.ion of mass housing polJ cies.
Conclusions
This brief review of our findings has suggested that neither pluralist 
analysis nor elite theory in their traditional or.classical forms .adequately 
capture the nature of policy making in the extended state apparatus of advanced 
industrial societies. The descriptive accuracy of 'new pluralist 1 theory, 
particularly in its characterization of technocratic deicison making, is in 
contrast impressive, but it remains flawed in its lack of reference to 
structural processes and influences. Nor is 'new pluralist' optimism about 
the growth of technocracy justified by our findings. Rather elements of neo- 
Marxist analyses stressing the political power of private capital and ques­ 
tioning the interpretation preferred by decision makers of the purposes of 
state intervention v/ere found to have considerable accuracy.
These must for the moment remain interim conclusions, for only in the light 
of evidence on local authorities' handling of high rise policy to which ve turn 
in Part II can firm conclusions be drawn about the political process surrounding 
the issue.
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PART TWO
LOCAL COMMUNITIES TACKLE MASS HOUSING
CHAPTER SIX
Urban Politics in a Nationalized Society.
The second part of this study focuses on how local communities in Britain 
tackled mass housing in the post war period. This analysis is important for 
two reasons. Firstly high rise housing was ultimately a policy pursued not by 
the central state but by local authorities. Thus it is only at the local 
level that the operations of the political process on the issue can be examined 
in detail. Secondly, this local level analysis is an indispensable part of 
the argument made in Part I that control of local policy was progressively 
displaced from the local to the national level during the post-war period, for 
it is only at the local level that adequate empirical support can be uncovered. 
The uniformity of national trends in the use of high rise, in the absence of 
such supporting evidence, is indicative only of surface correlations, potentially 
explicable in a number of ways. In contrast, the case studies of particular 
local authorities given below can provide a radically different type of evidence 
concerning the causation of policy change.
The study of the urban political process at the local institutional level 
raises three major questions:
(i) How can the focus of urban political analysis be theoretically defined? 
(ii) How does our study of local decision making differ from and connect with
the existing literature on British urban politics? 
(iii) How can the case study method generate information of general validity
rather' than information of relevance only to a particular locality?' 
Each of these questions is treated briefly below, and a final section provides 
some general information on the research procedures adopted in the case studies.
6«1' The Definition of
Defining the scope end focus of 'urban 1 research hn.s been an intractable 
problem for social scientists. Urban sociology until the Is to 1Q60j was lar,:;el;
cut off from the sociological mainstream, and concentrated on very specific
2 
methodologically-defined areas such as ecological analyses and community studies.
In political science, the urban tag functioned only as *a catch all adjective'
•z
loosely denoting political events taking place in or having a focus in cities. 
The * community 1 component in early community power studies was progressively 
displaced by an explicitly institutional focus, and in Britain an administra­ 
tively orientated version of this approach has been dominant throughout the
A 
post-war period.
Since the late 1960s, urban sociology has been revitalized as a field of 
study by various new conceptions of its role. All of these have had in common, 
however, a move away from a formal, institutional or spatial designation of the 
urban field tov/ards a content definition, i.e. one in terms of certain social 
processes, such as housing (Rex and Moore), access to scarce urban resources 
(Pahl), the built environment (Harvey), and 'collective consumption* processes 
(Castells, Lojkine, Preteceille). We shall focus on the methodological 
implications of this last definition, since in our view it provides a basis on 
which many of the earlier problems of urban research in political science can 
be resolved.
Collective consumption is used by Castells to refer to
consumption processes whose organization and management 
cannot be other than collective given the nature and 
size of the problems. 6
(my emphasis) 
This includes social services, health care, educational and other community
facilities, public housing and transport, and urban planning (which Castells
fj 
argues is centrally directed towards collective consumption processes). It
also includes 'problems relating to the organisation and functioning of the 
consumption unit (the agglomeration), in so far as changes in the unit also
Q
have effects on the consumption processor in question 1 . Not all the service 
areas involved are controlled by local authorities, and all of them are 
pervasively influenced by policy formulated by the central state
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and the national government.
This fairly broad notion provides a means by which consumption processes 
central to the city as social unit can be analysed in terms of state intervention 
and in relation to the goals and activities of major social interests. A very 
general theoretical background is provided for a view of local political 
institutions as one_ arena in which particular social conflicts may be condensed 
or reflected.
6*2: Part II as Urban Political Research.
The adoption of this content definition of urban politics does not entail
or imply the adoption of the substantive analyses to which Castells et al are
9committed. For our purposes, its chief utility is to make clear the status
of the whole of this research as urban political analysis. Since local 
political institutions or city boundaries are not seen as defining a separate 
field of research, our local level case studies are freed from many of the 
assumptions felt to be necessary by previous researchers in urban politics. 
Thus we do not assume that local authorities retained effective control of 
housing construction policy, but set out to determine whether they did or not.
And we do not focus solely on the internal or endogenous politics of a particular
11 authority or area, but devote equal attention to external influences on the
authority, from central government departments, the national local government 
system, the professions or industrial interests. Our research seeks to cover 
the full range of influences on local authorities 1 policies and relevant 
developments -in the urban system, rather than confining the scope of analysis 
in advance as a definition of urban research in institutional or spatial terns 
implies.
Since decisions on housing construction policy were ultimately taken by 
local authorities, the local authority ar?.s. and organization constitute the moat 
important limits of each case study. Sut these studies ere from the outset 
situated within the account of national policy given in Part I. Their functions
are both to specify this account, and to provide an analysis of the local and 
non-local influences on particular local authorities' housing construction 
policies. Treating the high rise housing issue in terms of collective
•
consumption also implies a more direct focus on the impact of the policy on the 
urban system, which again c^n only be carried out at the local level.
Our local level research connects with the existing literature on urban 
politics and local government in a number of ways, however. Firstly, because 
the input orientation of previous research has been so pronounced, we have not 
devoted much attention to the general characteristics of electoral and party 
politics at the local level. Working outwards from this well-studied area, 
our attention has been focused on comparatively unexplored areas, such as the 
policy role of the local bureaucracy and the conduct of internal Council 
politics. Secondly, our case study narratives are in part structured by 
existing accounts of local politics. They assume a knowledge of the basic 
organization and conventions of local government and of the theory of local 
democracy.
12 6.3; The Use of Case Studies.
Perhaps the most basic difference in this research made possible by the 
definition of urban politics in terms of collective consumption, is the use 
which we can make of local case studies.
The case study has several important limitations in conventionally def^r.oj. 
urban politics. As the history of community power studies suggests, case 
studies within an institutional-spatial definition of urban politics confront 
in an acute form the problems of all inductive reasoning. Generalizations
from one or a few cases can only be made in terms of their typicality, and
must 
ultimately differing results across ca'ses/be interpreted either as indicative
1 3 of incorrect methodology in one set of studies, or as indicative of the
extent of variation across different areas. The community power literature 
was bedevilled by these problems to such an extent that by the later 1960s,
researchers were abandoning case study research altogether in favour of the
15 analysis of community output data. *
But these problems are not intrinsic to the case study method itself, as 
is widely supposed. Rather they are indicative of the limitations on-the use 
of this method. The commujQity power literature misused it by attempting to 
{ test f general but low level descriptive propositions concerning the configura­ 
tion of power influences in communities. This was more a response to the 
difficulties involved in analyses of the concept of power than it was an 
appropriate use of case studies.
Essentially our view of case studies has been stated by Mitchell, who sees
them as the description of concrete or real sets of events in their full •
17particularity. Events are traced over some time period leading to a
particular outcome which is interpreted theoretically. Within this broad 
description cases may be used at several levels; for example as apt illustra­ 
tion, solely to relate an abstract instance to a concrete setting without any 
development over time; or for situational analysis, in which a set of events of 
fairly short duration is analysed with a view to uncovering their theoretical 
implications. For Kitchell, however, the basic case study form must cover a 
longer duration and aim to establish necessary dependencies amongst elements 
in a given context. Unlike survey based methodologies which look for surface 
or existential correlations amongst phenomena, case studies are concerned to 
establish logical relations. It follows that for Kitchell the basis for 
generalization from a real case study is not the typicality of the case in any 
sense, but th.e logicality of the analysis of the case. The case demonstrates 
the operation of general principles in a defined context, (the res-1 context). 
Problems of choosing a typical case in this approach disappear, end the 
uniqueness and particularity of each sfudy is explicitly recognized.
The key element in this view of case studies is the level of theoretic-,1 ! 
interpretation which is aimed at. Unlike community power studies, we are 
concerned to use our ccse material to penetrate beyond surface correlations to
detect the more fundamental and general processes involved. The typicality 
of the cases selected is dissolved as a problem since we hope to detect a logic 
of action involved in policy development, to establish the existence o.f 
structural relations which can be taken to operate in other areas in substanti­ 
ally the same form.
This conception of the role of case studies is obviously formulated from 
a particular theoretical perspective, one positing the existence of such 
structural relations. But this does not in our view imply that particular 
results will be produced by the method. There is no guarantee involved that 
a plausible account in terms of structural relations will be forthcoming. 
But the attempt to establish such an account places our use of case material on 
a radically different plane from that of previous research.
This view of case studies means that detailed, narrative accounts are 
necessary, so that the studies in Chapters 7 to 9 are quite full. Although 
these studies have inevitably been influenced by some perspectives on urban 
politics more than others, we have endeavoured to include material relevant to 
a wide range of theories; and Chapter 10 re-examines the 'urban 1 variants of 
the theories discussed in Chapter 5 in the light of our findings. We have 
chosen not to refer backwards and forwards to any external theoretical apparatus 
in the case study chapters, but to attempt to internalize our approach in t.-ie 
narrative, to cue theoretically important points and references to analyses 
developed in Part I. A heavy burden is thus placed on the reader, but this 
procedure was made inevitable by limits of space and by the need to avoid 
presenting the studies in ways which are repetitive of points made in Part I cr 
of each other. Instead we have attempted to isolate to some degree and focus 
on the distinctive aspects of each authority's policy.
6.4: Research Methodology.
*
THE SELECTION OF CASES
Since the basis for generalization from our case studies is in no cense 
the. typicality of the areas studied, the selection, of cases did not pose r./
central problem for the analysis. Nevertheless the selection was made with 
a view to looking at authorities with different basic characteristics. The 
cases chosen are: 
(i) The London Borough of Newham (including the two county boroughs of West
Ham and Bast Ham which existed up to the 1965 reorganization of London
government).
(ii) Birmingham County Borough, 
(iii) Bristol County Borough.
These cases were chosen to include one of the three types of authority 
which we argued in Chapter 2 account for the vast bulk of the high rise stock 
in England and Wales, viz. an inner London borough, a major provincial conurba­ 
tion authority and a large freestanding city. (The selection of Newham in 
London was influenced by the consideration that it was the only authority in 
the Group A boroughs where the analysis would not have to take account of-L.C.C./ 
G.L.C. policy in the area, a task for which we clearly had insufficient research 
resources.) The authorities were also chosen to provide a reasonable spread 
in terms of their populations, areas, the size of their high rise stocks, their 
propensity to use high rise, geographical situations and location in the urban 
system, (Table 6.1).
Table 6.1; Selected Characteristics of the Case Study Authorities.
Newham L.B. Birmingham C.B. Bristol C.3.
Population (1972)
Area (1972) in acres
High Rise Flats
Proportion of Council 
Housing in High Flats 1972
237,392
8,986
6,849
28$
1,013,000
51,000
24,013
2*
426,657
26,350
5,434
A A*~f 
1 *t/3
Clearly none of these authorities came anywhere near constituting an autonomous 
labour pool, such as'those defined by the Standard Metropolitan Labour Areas, but 
the relations between the local government unit and the built up area seems to 
be the most important for our purposes and forms a consistently central theme
?o in Chapters 7 to 9.
Regionally all three cases are in southern England, partly because they 
were chosen with access from Oxford in mind, This has some important' 
implications. Firstly, only Newham suffered the kind of post-war population 
loss experienced in some cities in the depressed industrial areas of north west 
England and Scotland. The population pressures underlying high rise may thus 
be more important in the case studies than in such areas. Secondly the level 
of housing stress and housing unfitness at the start of the post-war period was 
again probably less than in these regions, although it was undoubtedly extensive 
in Newham and Birmingham.
RESEARCH SOURCES
The primary sources of information used in the case studies were: 
(i) Local authority documentary sources - these included minutes, papers, letters, 
reports, contract details etc. In Birmingham and Bristol full access was 
accorded, which was invaluable in allowing these very large authorities to be 
studied at all. In Newham this level of access was not obtained. Council 
reports and Committee Minutes were read in the copies available in Newham's 
public libraries, and access to some key Newham documents and to a collection of 
officer papers for East Ham was obtained.
(ii) Local press coverage provided an important alternative source of coverage 
of the public debate over high rise in all three areas. In Birmingham and 
Bristol library-compiled files of press cuttings covering planning, housing, 
construction and urban development issues were fully surveyed for the post-war 
period, together v,rith a small number of specific references culled by other 
means. In Newham library indexed items proved inadequate, and a corvprohensive 
content analysis of local press coverage of the high rise issue was carried out 
for the key 1965-70 period, (which is reported in Appendix Ii). 
(iii) Department of the Environment file.: provided indispensable inforration 
which the local authorities concerned rarely seemed to have collected systematic­ 
ally, covering contract composition, datej of approval and completion, cost,
use of industrialized methods and in some cases contractor and estate location. 
All three Housing Departments kindly provided lists of their high rise blocks, 
with additional data oh the numbers of flats in each, location and in Newham 
and Birmingham, bedroom composition.
( iv ) Secondary material of various kinds was also extensively used, sc.^c of it 
kindly supplied by interviewees and covering published Council reports and 
documents.
(v) Interviews with 'housing influentials 1 were carried out to supplement the 
documentary sources on specific points, and to gain an overall impression of 
how those concerned viewed their authorities' policies. Interviews were 
confined to the committees and chief officers directly concerned, with housing. 
The head of the architecture and housing departments were interviewed in all 
three areas, vrLth more than one head being interviewed where retired chief 
officers were available. Committee influentials were identified by the' 
following procedure. A list of committee members on the committee most 
directly concerned with housing construction policy was compiled for the 
entire post-war period. Following the interpretation suggested by Dearlove,
all ordinary members serving for less than two years were classed as
22 'uninfluential'. All members achieving the post of Chairman or Vice-Chairnan,
holding a similar position on a related committee at the time of their 
membership (such as planning or housing management committees) or elected to 
a leadership post in one of the main party groups on the Council, and all
members acknowledged as party spokesmen on the committee (i.e. the 'front
23
benchers' for the opposition party), were counted as influentials. I-Ienbers
who served for longer than two years without achieving 'influential 1 status 
but who usually played an active committee role, were classed as 'coinpetents 1 . 
Finally a fairly small number of committee members who served for long periods 
of time without achieving 'influential 5 status, while at the same time rarely 
contributing to committee discussion, were classed as 'loyalists', since taeir 
sole committee activity appeared to be to support their chairman or p?.rty
spokesman. With these four categories formulated the following procedure 
was adopted for interview selection. Firstly, all influential members in 
the period of high rise policy were approached, plus any competent members 
known to have been involved in major policy decisions. Secondly, any 
deficiencies in the first list caused by the non-availability of interviewees 
or non-response were made up with interviews with particularly long serving 
loyalist or competent members. Since our purpose was to construct a narrative, 
and not a picture of committee members 1 post hoc values concerning high rise
we would argue that this procedure was a systematic and effective one.
-three 
In all thirty/interviews were carried out, fifteen in Newham, eleven in
Birmingham and seven in Bristol. This total is not large, partly because of 
high mortality rates amongst people qualifying for interviews, and because 
on the advice of the various Town Clerks' departments, approaches were not 
made to people judged too old or too frail. These difficulties were only 
really serious in Bristol, however; in the other authorities very full and 
interesting accounts were obtained from a variety of committee and party 
standpoints. Most of the interviews were taped and transcribed. The
interviews followed the suggestions of Dexter in aiming to sustain a dialogue
25 with interviewees rather than being questionnaire directed. In. each case,
however, a standard list of questions was prepared and introduced piecemeal at 
differing points in the conversations. Host interviews lasted for around an 
hour, although there was a considerable range from 40 minutes up to four hours. 
A majority of interviewees were extremely helpful and frank in their replies s 
and all of them gave their time most generously. Certainly this evidence vas 
an indispensable part of the narratives constructed below.
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13« See J. Walton, 'Disciplinei Method and Community Power: A Note on the 
Sociology of Knowledge', American Sociological Review, 31 (1966), 
684-9.
14. C.M. Bonjean and D.M. Olson, 'Community Leadership: Directions of Research', 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 9 (1964), p. 290.
•
15* See T.N. Clark, Community Power and Policy Outputs (London, Sage, 1973).
« 
16. C.M. Bonjean, T.N. Clark and R. Lineberry, Community Politics; a
Behavioural Approach (New York, Free Press, 1971)» for 'prepositional
inventories'.
17o Mitchell, 'The Use of Case Studies in Social Science Research 1 .
18o For examples of attempted applications of this kind of approach, see
M. Castells and F. Godard, Monopolvillet 1*enterprise, 1'etat, 1'urbain 
(Paris, Mouton, 1974); and E. Cherki, 'Populisms et ideologic revolution- 
naire dans le mouvement des squatters', Sociologie du Travail, 18 (1976), 
192-215* How successful these attempts can be counted it is difficult 
to say.
19e Sources, Municipal Year Book, 1972; Institute of Municipal Treasurers 
and Accountants, Housing Management and Maintenance Statistics, 1971-72 
(London, Institute, 1973), Table 2*
20* In addition a pilot study of high rise building in Oxford C.B. was carried 
out: I would like to thank the City Architect, D.B. Murray, and his 
Chief Assistant Architect, Mr A. ¥hite, for their help and time in 
interviews.
21. I would like to thank here particularly Councillor Kebbell in Newham; 
J*E. Austin in East Ham; H. Walton and A.G. Sheppard Fidler in 
Birmingham; Mr Abbey in Bristol.
22. Dearlove, Politics of Policy in Local Government, 123-30, 115-23. 
See also Gyford, Local Politics in Britain, pp. 29> 32.
23. See Dearlove, Politics of Policy in Local Government, pp. 130-6, 138-9, 
113-18; Gyford, Local Politics in Britain, 77-84; Newton, Second City 
Politics, Ch. 6.
24. See Newton, Second City Politics, Ch. 6, and Gyford, Local Politics in 
Britain, pp. 29-36, for more developed role typologies based on survey 
data. For the basic philosophy of our approach see E.J. Webb, D.T. 
Campbell, R.D. Schwartz, L. Sechrest, Unobtrusive Measures ; Non Reactive 
Research in the Social Sciences (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1966).
25. L.A. Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing (Evanston, North­ 
western University Press, 1970).
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Newham.
7.1; The Urban Background.
The London Borough of Newham was formed in the 1965 reorganisation of 
London government by the amalgamation of the county boroughs of Vest Ham and 
East Ham. It lies just outside the old L.C.C. area to the east of Tower 
Hamlets but, as its inclusion in the G.L.C.'s Group A boroughs implies, its 
acute housing and social problems make it part of the real inner city of 
Greater London, (Figure 7.1).
Newham is a depressed area. 'More than the old East End of Bethnall
2 Green, Newham depicts the new "grey areas'". Between 1951 and 1971 the
borough lost over 20$ of its population. Today the number of residents at
231,000 is still declining at the rate of nearly 3>000 people a .year, despite
3 the growth of a sizeable coloured immigrant community.
On almost any 'quality of life* index - such as the perinatal mortality 
rate, pupil-teacher ratios, lack of basic housing facilities, levels of air 
pollution, the provision of public open space, the extent of vacant land 
holdings, etc. - the Newham area is one of the worst parts of Greater London, 
(Table 7.1). 4
Not surprisingly, Newham fails to attract many middle class residents.
After Tower Hamlets, it has the largest proportion of semi-skilled, unskilled
5 and service workers of any area in London. Migration from the Borougn nas
additionally been age-selective. Between 1951 and 1966 the area lost 12;- of 
its population as a whole, but over 2C?b of those aged 15 to 44, while it 
actually gained 9/£ of the over 65s.
In the 1970s much of the area's traditional economic base has run do;r.n or 
disappeared. The giant Beckton gas works have closed, and the Royal Group of 
Docks has progressively declined in importance and will close in 1981. Other
0.5
Pi/rure 7.1: Mev/h^m in Greater Lonron.
altham\ Redbridge 
Forest
Hounslow
Richmond 1 Wandsworth 
upon ThamesJ
Kingston
upon
Thames
12 kilometres
;=!_
8 mile*
iwn Copyright Reserved
Source: GLC Department of Planning ar.d
Group ! A' Boroughs 
Inner London
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industries related to the docks have moved out to Tilbury or been displaced by
clearance. The area's future is now heavily dependent on the outcome of the
n 
Dockland Redevelopment Project. The roots of the area's current problems
lie for the most part in its relatively short history.
•
Table 7.1: 'Quality of Life' Indices for Newham, 1971.
Stillbirths per 1,000 births
Perinatal mortality rate
Secondary pupil/teacher ratio
% of Secondary School pupils over 16
Awards for higher education as %
of secondary school population
c/o households having exclusive use of
hot water, fixed bath, inside WC
% households without access to
inside Vi'G
Average smoke pollution (m.c.m.)
Average SOp pollution (m.c.m.)
/£ of area public open space
% of area vacant land
cfo of population manual workers
% of residents with university degrees
Newham
17.9
30
17.2
6.0
2.7
55
34
71
267
4.3
11.0
70
1.2
G.L .C •
Average
11.7
21
15.9
10.4
8.1
76
15
n.a.
n.a.
10.2
5.4
52
4.6
HISTORY
West Ham was a small township by the fourteenth century, and developed 
slowly in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as a centre for
'offensive trades' - such as soap making and bone boiling - which were
8excluded from the London area proper. But the major stimulus to its growtn
was the building of the Royal Victoria Dock in the early 1850s, followed by
the Royal Albert Dock in East Ham later in the century. Between 1851 and
. o 
1901 the population of the Kewham area increased eighteen fold, (Table 7.2;."'
•
One of the first consequences of this rapid population growth was that 
virtually all of the area's housing was built YD.thin a fifty year period. In
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West Ham the local vestry lacked the power to enforce adequate by-laws and. 
housing was built in a virtually unregulated manner. Charles Dickens noted 
in Household Words in 1857: 'Cut off from the support of the Local Kanap-ir.r 
Act this outskirt is free to possess new streets of houses without drains, 
roads, gas or pavement 1 . Parts of Canning Town were built on marshland 
below river level and liable to flooding. The worst of the jerry-building 
only came to an end in 1889 when West Ham became a County Borough, Around 
this time the bulk of new development shifted from the southern dock areas 
towards suburban housing in the north for the commuting middle classes moving 
out of East London* This suburban expansion spilled over into East Ham by 
the 1890s to such an extent that East Ham achieved county borough status by 
1915.
Table 7.2: Population trends in Newham, 1801-1971.
Date
1801
1851
1901
1925
1951
1961
1966
1971
West Ham
6,500
18,800
267,358
318,500
170,993
157,367
134,426
East Ham
820
1,737
95,989
147,200
120,836
105,682
102,966
Newham
7,320
20,537
363,347
465,700
291,829
263,049
259,620
237,392
During the inter-war period the area's population continued to expand 
with little new building. Overcrowding increased in West Ham and by the 
1930s the suburban expansion had already moved on. In West Ham the initial 
pattern of development became fixed in an environment of low overall anenity.
Housing conditions were already poor and in the south of the borough large
11 
numbers of people were living below the poverty line. The 1931 Census
4 .-)
showed that densitieis were 4»6 persons per room in West Ham as a whole.
The area's housing problems were scarcely touched by local authority 
housing until after 1945. West Ham Council built only 2,000 dwellings befc::
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1939, most of them in an estate of four storey tenement blocks at Manor Road
which very quickly became the area's most notorious 'dump 1 estate in the r>ost-
13 war period. The smali amount of council building stemmed less from the
lack of political will on the part of the local authorities as from a -shortage 
of land suitable for the kind of suburban development typical of the period. 
West Ham had elected Kier Hardie as the first ever Labour K.P. and during the 
1920s the Labour Party extended its electoral dominance to the northern wards
*1 A
of Vest Ham and central East Ham. Both councils were Labour controlled iron 
the mid-1930s and West Ham became a completely one-party Council in 1946, a 
situation which persisted until 1960.
HOUSING AND CLASS IN NEWTHAM
Newham's ward boundaries were inherited with little change fror; the two 
county boroughs, (Figure 7.2). All the wards have roughly the same populaticr, 
the particularly large wards such as Customs House, South, Stratford and Nev 
Town having large areas of land vacant or occupied by transport industries.
There are very marked differences still between the eastern and western 
parts of Newham. Politically the eastern area has been less inclined to 
elect Labour candidates in the 1960s. In 1968 opposition councillors elected 
by the northern and eastern wards achieved parity in the Council with Labour 
councillors, (Figure 7.3). Labour retained control by using the Mayor's 
casting vote in a tied aldermanic election, however, and since then have 
continued to dominate on Kewham Council. This electoral pattern can be 
explained primarily in terms of class. Those wards with the most pronounced 
skew in their social composition towards manual and lower manual workers were 
the most consistent Labour areas, while wards with a social composition nore 
akin to that of Greater London as a whole have at times elected Ratepayer or 
Tory candidates, (Figure 7.4).
The relationship between class and housing unfitness is more ccrrrplicaved, 
(Figure 7.5). Some of the most working class wards have been almost
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completely redeveloped with local authority housing. In Beckton, for example, 
over 9Q/-- of housing is owned by the local authority and less than 1C£o of 
housing stock is unfit. Many of the unfit houses lie in northern wards where 
private rental is still the dominant form of tenure, (Figure 7.6). 17 This 
is also an area of large multi-occupied houses and has substantial numbers of 
coloured residents, who rarely live in council housing.
The distribution of high rise housing is not related in any clear way to 
these variables, at first sight. High flats form over 3O/.5 of local authority 
housing stocks in a band of wards mainly in the central area of the borough,
•JO
(Figure 7«7). Large stocks of high flats are concentrated in a few wards in 
the western part of the borough, mainly in Beckton, Stratford, Plaistow and
Plashet. A statistical analysis of the distribution of high rise in Ke-.rhas
III 
described in Appendix / suggests that high rise housing is built in wards with
substantial amounts of council housing, high net residential densities and a 
fairly poor physical environment. In all about 21,000 people live in high
flats in Newham, over half of them in family accommodation and nearly two thirds
1Q 
of them in blocks over 10 storeys high (Table 7.3). There are 111 high rise
blocks with 6,849 flats.
Table 7»3s Newham's High Rise Housing Stock.
Storev height:
Number of blocks:
Dwellings :
% of high rise
stock:
Number of bedrooms:
Dwellings :
'/.? of high rise:
5 8
3 43
95 1,750
1.4 25.6
Bedsit
30
Oc4
9 11
1 H
92 611
1.4 8.9
One
3,217
47.0
12
6
278
4.1
Two
3,233
47.2
15 21
20 1
1,162 80
17eO 1.2
Three
369
5*4
22
14
1,637 1
23.9
Total
6,849
100.0^
23
9
,144
16.7
Since access to officers' reports and papers was not available for ",'est Ho.;i 
or (in the main) for Kewham, much greater reliance on interviews T/ras necessary.
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Cllr E. Kebbell 
Cllr Dunlop
Cllr D. Lee 
Cllr W. Ferrier
East Ham 
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Aid. J. Hart 
Cllr E. Lonsdale 
Newham 
E.P. Davies 
T.E. North 
K. Lund
Aid. S. Boyce 
Aid. J. Hart
Cllr E. Kebbell 
Cllr W. Watts 
Cllr E.- Lonsdale
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Cllrs Ferrier) 
D. Lee )
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Chief Housing Officer, 1948-54. 
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Chief Assistant Architect, 1961-65. 
Leader of the Labour Group, 194O-65. 
Chairman of the Housing Committee 1955-58. 
Chairman of the Housing Committee 1958-65.
Member, Town Planning & Reconstruction Cmtee 
1952-65.
Member, Housing Cmtee 1954-65. 
Member, Housing Cmtee 1956-65.
Chief Housing Officer, 1945-65. 
Leader of the Labour Group 1945-65. 
Ratepayer councillor 1960-65o
Housing Manager 1965-
Borough Architect & Planning Officer 1965-69.
Deputy Borough Architect 1965-69, Director of 
Planning and Architecture 1969-
Leader of the Labour Group 1965-
Deputy Leader of the Labour Group 1965- , 
and Chairman of the Policy & Resources Cmtee.
Chairman, Housing Cmtee 1965-71.
Chairman, Housing & Town Planning Cmtee 1971-
Leader of the Opposition 1965-
Housing Cmtee Members 1965-74.
Housing Cmtee Members 1964- 
Chief Executive, 1973-
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7*2; Housing; Policy in West Ham. 
POST WAR PLAINING
West Ham faced acute housing problems at the end of the war, with some
2lfo of its housing stock destroyed during the blitz, and very extensive war
20 damage. Reconstruction planning began in 1941 following the election of
Sam Boyce as leader of the Labour group, which had been criticized at the
21 start of the war for its poor and inactive leadership. The Borough Architect
and Planning Officer was T.E. North, who had joined West Ham in 1931. North 
was invited to collaborate with Abercrombie in the drafting of the Greater
London Plan, and several detailed design studies envisaging the use of high
22 flats and houses in a 1:3 ratio were included in the final version.
Densities of 100 ppa were envisaged, although the high flat schemes had net 
density levels double this. A large reduction in the Borough population via 
overspill to a figure of 165,000, the strict separation of industrial and 
residential areas, and replanning in neighbourhood units were other features 
of the Plan.
These ideas were not immediately influential. Post-war rebuilding got 
under way mainly as large estates of houses, and the Housing Committee
personnel proved slow to adapt to the change from being one of the smallest to
23one of the largest spending committees of the Council. North received
support for his ideas from the Town Planning and Reconstruction Committee,
however. Housing approvals went ahead quite fast in 1946-7 but in 1948
25 fell to just over 100, partly because of central government cuts but also
because of the lack of large sites for further estates. Redevelopment had
to be switched into small, piecemeal schemes on bomb sites and acutely decayed
housing areas; in the process the borough began building an increasing
p/r
proportion of low rise flats. In 1949 North tried to get the HC to a^ree -,o 
a scheme for six storey flats in the northern (lower density) area of the 
borough. 2^ But with the subsidy structure of the time, the six storey scheme 
would have been 5Q/o more expensive per flat to Vest Ham than a four storey
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scheme and the HC rejected the idea, despite being impressed by high flats
po
they had toured in other parts of London. This decision defined a licit for
29new development. But the low rise estates that were completed were clearly
unpopular with tenants and councillors and soon ran into acute problems from
•2/-\
vandalism and misuse of facilities.
The unpopularity of the newest estates provoked the Chief Housing Officer, 
J.J. Atkinson, into two attempts to influence housing construction decisions, 
an area of policy over which he had had no influence hitherto. Housing was 
still at this stage nominally under the Borough Engineer, and Atkinson ! s 
position was thus a weak one. (in contrast North's prestige was very high
at this time. He had become a fellow of RIBA and in 1950 was awarded their
"51 
'Distinction in Town Planning 1 for his reconstruction work. In 1951 he
became a member of CHAG, helping to draw up the plans for Hacmillan's 'Peoples
•2O
House', and in 1952 he was awarded the O.B.E.).
Atkinson's first attempt in Hay 1951 was to secure a revision of the 
housing programme in the Draft Development Plan. He called for a programme 
of out-Borough housing, arguing that at the 1950-55 rate clearance could take 
twenty years before any reduction of the housing waiting list could begin. He 
rejected pressures to increase the Borough's population target which had 
been evident in Council debates, arguing:
It is likely that any increase in the optimum population 
(target) would lead to a higher proportion of flats being 
built. In view of the known unpopularity of flats in this 
area, any steps which, would do this should be carefully 
considered. It must be pointed out that the population 
now and at any time in the future is the number of people 
who choose to live within the Borough... $5
This initiative failed to influence the HC, however, partly because the 
Draft Plan had already been approved, and partly because they refused to 
contemplate building outside the Borough and were worried that the Abercrcnbie 
population target was too low. 54" In March 1952 Atkinson returned to the 
question of flat building in presenting the CHAC report Liviiiq in ?1 tr to 
the HC. c;:/',C, he argued.
- 26k -
consider that for the family with several children it
is well nigh impossible to provide in flats a wholly
suitable environment. The report emphasizes that even
with the highest densities it should be possible to
provide a proportion of houses.
COMMENT; The dislike of flats is particularly strong in
West Ham, where the people have not previously been accustomed
to this form of living. It is essential therefore that the
number of flats built should be the absolute minimum possible
within the Council's planning policy.35
The EC confined their immediate response to the provision of more 
facilities for blocks of flats, particularly playgrounds. But in April, a 
Council debate on the housing programme showed strong support for Atkinson's 
position. The debate led to a decision to write to the Minister of Housing 
and Local Government, then Harold Macmillan, enquiring about an increased 
government subsidy under the forthcoming Housing Bill which would ease West 
Ham's difficulties in securing tenders within Ministry cost limits, particularly 
with schemes of houses. This produced a brusque reply from the Ministry,in 
which the Council was advised to put its own operations in order before coming 
begging for more help from Whitehall. The Council was told to 'strain every 
nerve' to get its capital and maintenance costs down to the national average. 
'The responsibility for achieving costs comparable with those of other local 
authorities lies firmly with the Council'. The special plea about the difficulty 
of building houses within the cost limit received short shrift:
As to the general preference in West Ham for houses rather 
than flats, the Minister has indicated that there are some 
types of families for whom houses with gardens are preferable, 
where they could be provided, but in some towns there is an 
unwarrantable prejudice against flats so that excessive 
amounts of land are being consumed in the provision at low 
densities of ordinary houses. The national interest, the 
Minister stated, required that this should be curbed and the 
Council is advised to reconsider this in the national interest 
as well as in their own financial interest. 36
The HC sent a reply to the Ministry which pointed out that all their tenders 
had fallen within the Ministry's cost limits and that the costs of land and 
construction were far" more in London than over the country as a whole.
As far as the policy of building houses rather than flats is 
concerned (we) feel the Council has gone as far in the direction 
of building flats as would be wise, and would conform with 
densities under the Greater London Plan. At some future date 
to have properties on hand which might prove difficult to let 
would, we feel, be a far greater burden to overcome. 37
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With this the correspondence closed. (Amongst other issues it left West Ham's 
claim to special treatment on the lines of the L.C.C. boroughs unresolved. 
The persistent Ministry policy of relating subsidy levels in the area to those
•
of outer rather than inner London was to cause similar representations, and 
disputes at later subsidy reviews)•
and Demolition
Date
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
Public Housing
Completion
(1)
-
116
691
255
186
210
246
253
448
794
640
471
610
569
447
471
425
636
593 ,
Private Housing
Completion
U)
2
5
12
12
29
37
72
79
101
255
25
34
29
83
78
70
71
87
58
Clearance
(3)
not
56
37
42
130
132
218
125
363
253
285
(D - (3)
available
738
603
429
480
437
229
346
62
383
303
(D + (2) - (3)
993'
628
463
509
520
307
416
132
470
366 -
THE FIRST HIGH FLATS
Paradoxically enough, the Borough's first high flats scheme emerged soon 
after this exchange of letters. In July 1952 North brought forward a plan for 
an integrated development of low rise flats, a nursery, library and shops plus 
a ten storey block of flats for a site in a lower density area in the north of 
the Borough. This produced a decision from the HC to break their own 4 storey
limit;
notwithstanding their recommendation on an earlier scheme 
this particular site would be most appropriate for the 
purpose (of building a high block) and accordingly (we) 
recommend that the officers be authorized to prepare a 
scheme incorporating these features...In arriving at this 
decision your Committee have had regard to the special 
nature of the-site and the low density of the surrounding 
area in comparison with the Borough as a whole. 36
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This scheme took nearly two years to be designed arid secure Ministry 
approval and towards the end of this period, the HC decided to build another 
high block on 'a little tiny site all on its own 1 . 59 North proposed a four 
storey development but the HC after discussion decided on a ten storey blcck 
to get more rehousing. At this stage it was clear that high rise was being 
used simply to raise densities, a step made feasible by the more generous 
subsidies in the 1952 Act. The Housing department issued a statement claiming 
that:
We are now building these multi-storey flats because 
the Council feel some attempt should be made to utilise 
the space we have got to its best advantage ... The areas 
in which any more of the new multi-storey flats will be 
built will have to be chosen carefully ... It is unlikely 
that any of the skyscrapers will be built in the south of 
the Borough where such building is more expensive because 
of the need for deep pile driving. 4-1
These two schemes produced some far reaching changes which affected the later 
programme. Despite the larger subsidies, the construction costs of the high 
flats were still so high - Jjfo more than comparable low rise flats on one of 
the sites - that a rent rebate scheme had to be introduced in mid-1957 when 
the first block was finally occupied, to offset the higher charges necessary. r> 
And in late 1954 when the blocks went out to tender, West Ham adopted a system
of selective tendering for the first time, which was used almost exclusively
44 on high flat contracts.
The costs and delays with the ten storey point blocks meant that no more 
ivere built, but the architects department produced instead a design for a 
cheaper eight storey flat block which was used to raise densities on some sch'-i-: 
until mid-1957-
1956-60: MORE OF THE SAME
The introduction of the progressive storey height subsidy coincided vr.th 
the first review of West Ham's housing programme since the Development ?.l:-. 
In all just 1,500 council homes had been completed in the period 1951-55, plus 
just over 500 private houses, (Table 7.4). Councillors were bitterly
- 26? -
disappointed to find that North's new programme envisaged only 600 ao^rcvals
a year despite the reorientation of national policy and the easing of
46
programming limits. This disquiet produced a revision of the officials'
plans by Boyce and others in the Council leadership which incorporated a 
programme of out-Borough horsing for the first time, toughened up the waiting 
list requirements and called for more high density and high rise building.^
North responded to this decision by producing plans for a fifteen storey 
block, only to have this opposed by the new Chief Housing Officer in coiirdttee. 
HC members also intervened on two other schemes and forced North to adopt a 
single 11 storey type-block design in order to cut costs. These two 
decisions effectively stopped any real development of high flat designs by 
the architects department, and over the next five years West Ham's high flat 
programme consisted almost entirely of these flats. The proportion of high 
rise increased from 13/j in 1956 to over half by 1961, however, and large' 
estates consisting entirely of high flats were planned for the first tine, 
(Figure 7.8). 5°
1960: RAISING THE CEILING
In 1960 a number of changes combined to produce a major switch in 
vJest Ham's policy. Firstly, the chair of the HC passed to Councillor Kebbell,
a younger member heavily influenced by North's views who felt that the Borough
51
needed to mount a crash programme to clear the slums. Secondly the Cnief
Housing Officer who had opposed North's plans for higher blocks in 1956 retired 
And the reorientation of national policy towards 'needy 1 authorities implied
«
an easing of Ministry programming restrictions on the Borough's progr^ir:e.
Over the 1956-60 period, as slum clearance totals slowly mounted, so the 
inadequacy of the 600 houses annual target became increasingly apparent. Net
*
housinr- gains in fact fell from over 730 dwellings in 1955 to just 62 by 
1962. 52 North therefore brought forward with a favourable Treasurer's report, 
proposals to end the out-Borough programme and to increase approvals to 1,CC-0
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homes a year.^ But he claimed that only hy building really high blocks up
to 21 storeys could this be achieved, at the same time as some houses were
54 provided for large families. Council members greeted this report with
enthusiasm and approved the new limit, also endorsing the employment of 
private architects to design some of the blocks, and an investigation into
ways of procuring greater contractual commitment to West Ham's housing
55 programme. In December 1960 the EC decided to create a fully fledged
56 Housing Management department, and the new appointee Dodson, preoccupied with
this reorganization, gave North's ideas firm backing and did not oppose the
57 adoption of a major high rise programme.
CO
The first schemes approved in 1961 were for sixteen storey blocks, but
later in the year designs up to twenty two storeys were-approved, including
59 what was at this stage, London's tallest residential block. The new
programme showed a clear improvement on the blocks previously built in te"rms 
of design and styling, and rapidly began to win back for North's department 
the leading position which it had held in the -immediate post-war period and 
lost in the interim through Committee restrictiveness. The employment of 
nationally known private firms was a key element in this change. It is worth 
digressing briefly at this stage in order to look in more depth at the 
history of one estate designed in this period, to give something of the context 
in which detailed decisions were made and the consequences which flowed from 
them.
BARNWOOD COURT
The estate on which we shall focus, Barnwood Court, lies in the extreme 
south of the borough in a zone the Abercrombie Plan envisaged as suitable only 
for industry, (Figure 7.9). In the draft Development Plan, however, the 
Ministry arbitrarily insisted on retaining this small residential enclave of 
decaying houses, although it was some miles from the nearest shops and could 
barely maintain sufficient intake for its small primary school. North
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opposed this decision and was at a loss how to redevelop the grossly unfit
fi? 
housing. He therefore 'hung on and hung on 1 through the CPO procedure and
tried to persuade the Ministry's .regional architect to get the area rezoned for 
industrial use. There was a fair chance that this would have succeeded but 
while the Ministry were making up their minds the ward councillor who was on 
the EC mounted a successful campaign to get some action taken on the area. 
And the Town Clerk's department refused to consider any change of use on the 
grounds that the Council would be open to damages claims from those dispossessed 
by the CPO if the land was not used for housing.
The architects department was thus forced to prepare plans for the area 
after all, and eventually opted for a very high density scheme to house 700 
people in two tall blocks, as a way of making a clean break with the area's 
past and at the same time preserving a viable community. 'When it came to 
designing housing there', North told the Committee, 'there's only one thing for 
it which is to go higher so that at least people have some sort of a view. 
Because if you put houses back there all you'll see is the docks on the one
C-Z
side and the factories on the other'.
In September 1961 the design brief was allocated to a nationally known 
firm of private architects (stillman and Eastwick-Pield) who produced stylish 
but expensive plans for two 20 storey blocks. The Finance Committee 
insisted on the insertion of 13$ more accommodation to meet the costs of the
65 playground and community centre included. This was accommodated by adding
three more storeys to the blocks. But when the scheme was resubmitted in 
July 1962 the Finance Committee were still worried about the cost and held up 
approval for another three months while the Treasurer prepared a report 'on the 
average cost of construction of different types of dwellings'. Finally the 
blocks went out to tender early in 1963 and the private architects obtained 
permission to negotiate a tender, which w/is not usual practice in West Ham at 
the time. 67 Tender negotiations with Laing, the firm recommended by the 
architects, 68took until April 1964 by which time the bill for the scheme stood
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69 at £1.17 million. During this time also the block designs were changed,
so that the final scheme accommodated 792 people in one and three bedroom 
flats, ensuring a large child population.
Work on the estate was finished in the autumn of 1966 and a Tenants 
Association quickly established amongst residents in the'first block. Their 
inaugural party attracted considerable press coverage, headlined 'Community 
Spirit of Outpost on the Point 1 in the Newham Recorder. Describing the 
estate the article went on:
The 22 storey skyscrapers which form Barnwood Court are 
flanked on one side by dockland and on the other by factories. 
The nearest shops are an eight pence bus ride away and places 
of entertainment even further. But the residents of the airy, 
ultra-modern homes do not mind. They are determined to make 
it a little self contained community and provide their own 
entertainment. 70
There were ambitious plans to equip the community centre when it was opened. 
'Our aim is to get a real community here with something for everyone to enjoy* 
said the Association secretary. On August 1967 the community centre was 
opened by the Housing Committee chairman, Councillor Kebbell. This occasioned 
a further lyrical article, headlined 'The Plats folk say it with music 1 , in
which the Council's efforts on behalf of 'one of the remotest Borough outposts 1
71were again detailed. At the end of January 1968 the Civic Trust announced
an award for the flats to go to the architects and the Council for their
successful rebuilding of a community on 'one of the most dismal sites in
72London 1 .
By this time, however, the honeymoon period was over, and the award was 
greeted with derision by the Tenant's Association committee. Their complaints 
centred around 'the unfinished nature of the scheme. Several courtyard shops, 
including one reserved for a chemist, had not been let, road works had
apparently been abandoned half completed, and the block entrances were 'like
% 
going into a prison* yard. Ve did hear that though the architects have
suggested a way of making it brighter the council will not do anything about 
if . There were also complaints of vandalism, lift control panels ripped off,
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pram sheds destroyed, facilities abused and lift breakdowns. Plate glass 
windows in the community centre were being smashed by 'teenage rowdies from 
other parts of the Borough 1 and were being replaced only by sheets of corrugated
iron. 'Something has got to be done to stop this sort of thing 1 , said the
V5Association Chairman, 'it can't go on like this'.
Residents views were not mentioned in the local press in April when a 
presentation ceremony for the awards was held at the Town Hall. The Trust 
citation was quoted at length:
The solution now seems to be so obvious and inevitable 
that it is easy to forget that so many similar attempts 
have failed... This must be one of the few housing 
developments where the environment is not immediately 
destroyed by washing lines on the balcony and the tenants' 
choice of curtains. The architects have recognized that 
these things do happen. 74
On April 9th the BBC 2 Man Alive programme screened a documentary on the 
flats which after voicing tenant grievances confronted them with the designers. 
In North's view, 'the tenants didn't half let off steam. Everything was wror^l
But whilst they moaned like hell, we were holding this in almost palatial
75conditions in the community hall I ! d built them 1 * To him a lot of the
complaints seemed to stem not from the buildings themselves so much as from 
abuses of its facilities, such as the milkman jamming one lift in the mornings 
in order to get his round done, or tenants giving up hobbies like carpentry 
rather than use communal facilities which were provided. Other points were 
matters of management. There was no area for children's ball games for exsurls-. 
To the general complaints about the lack of community feeling in the flats, all 
the Council spokesmen replied in terms which distinguished between providing a 
suitable housing background for a community to develop, which they claimed the 
Council had done, and providing a community ready made, which they ri;;htly 
claimed nobody could do. Since they envisaged providing a favourable hou:.ii:rr 
background exclusively.in terms of eliminating poor quality housing and producir.- 
a dwelling with up to date amenities, they contrived to leave the impression that 
the failings of the estate were really a reflection of residents' shcrtcc-rir-s.
Henry Raynor, writing in The Times TV column the following day seems to have 
absorbed this message most:
The fortunate outsider, compelled neither to plan for the 
accommodation of too many people on too cmr.ll a space, nor 
to live in what the planners have provided, became awsre of 
the helplessness of everybody who spoke... Of course the 
outsider is puzzled by the unadaptability of people who miss 
an old neighbourhood but seem unable to create a new. and 
worried by a way of city life which forces authorities to think 
in terms of the number of people who can be packed into any 
available space. 77
As in most other blocks of tall flats in Newham, there was a considerable 
reaction amongst residents to the Ronan Point collapse. In February 1969 a 
minor row about repairs to rogue electricity cables blew up after Kebbell had 
kept the nature of the repairs a secret to avoid 'spreading alarm and despond-
ryo
ency'. In March 1970 a Council structural survey found the blocks to be
'at slight risk while gas was installed' and the flats were converted to all
79 electric use.
By this stage the flats were already looking the worse for wear. Stories
of ghosts in the basement areas became common, perhaps an indication of hostility
s
80 projected onto the least attractive part of the blocks. The Tenants
Association went through a bad patch following the withdrawal of the councillor
81chairman who had personal problems. The Association was later revived by
another councillor and the Housing Department began to give flats in the scheme 
to young teachers and student doctors, partly because they were now difficult 
to let, and partly because in the Housing Director's view 'these people give the
Op
blocks a bit of a lift. 1
The estat-e now stands beside fast emptying docks which are due to be 
redeveloped, a redevelopment which may in time end the area's isolation. In 
the interim the enclave seems to be running to seed at an accelerating rate, 
with only a pub and a battered community centre by way of amenities.
TALL BLOCKS AIID HOUSES
Barnwood Court's history was repeated in a broadly similar fashion across
- 275 -
all the estates planned in this period. The HC and the architects department 
were quite clearly aware of the feelings against high rise amongst people being
O"Z
rehoused from slum houses and the waiting list. y .But only in one instance did
•
these feelings become overt, in 1962 when the three councillors and the local 
Labour party of Bermesyde ward unsuccessfully opposed a plan to build a 16 storey 
block in their area, which had had no high flats until then. (Although the 
Council was entirely Labour at this stage all three councillors had the whip 
withdrawn for a token period for voting against the Labour group's decision in 
Council).
For the most part, the high flat programme proved acceptable to HC members 
because of its combination with a renewal of house building* The new mix of 
5 : 1 high rise to family houses (ironically the mirror image of North's 
proposals in the Abercrombie Plan) resulted in large phalanxes of high flats 
surrounded by streets of houses, which meant that little open space was provided 
even on large schemes, while on small sites tall blocks were built on their own
at high densities. Overall densities consistently reached levels over 150 ppa
R6 
in this period, and high rise accounted for over 70^ of all approvals by 1963. -
These strands of West Ham 1 s policy reached their most complete expression in the 
system building programme.
THE SYSTEM BUILDING COMMITMENT
The 1961-66 Programme was premissed upon, firstly, expanding the design 
capacity at the Borough 1 s disposal by employing private architects, and secondly 
securing a better contractual involvement in West Ham's housing effort. The 
Borough's contracting record, despite the adoption of selective tendering, was a 
poor one. Analysis of the thirty high block contracts awarded between 1954 and
1964 (worth around £14.6 million) shows that on over a third more than eight
87 
tenders were invited, and on only one were there less than five bids.
Twenty eight firms entered tenders (plus the Works department) and eleven of 
these were successful. But no consistent relations were established with fires 
nor were national firms involved. Only three firms won more than one high rise
- 2?6 -
contract, one being a local firm and the other two London regional contractors 
who won contracts on less than a quarter of all their tenders. Costs in 
VJest Ham were high and building labour was attracted from the Borough by -the 
massive office building boom in central London from the late 1950s.
It was largely to meet this difficulty of attracting capital commitment by 
large firms and of retaining labour that North began to think of industrialized 
building. The architects department had employed a non-traditional house
oo
building system in the mid- 1 50s with poor results, and it was only when North's 
Ministry and CHAC contacts suggested a move towards industrialized high rise in 
1959 that his interest in prefabricated systems was reawakened. His interest
became serious in 1962 when he persuaded the whole HC to attend the CCA
89 'Housing from the Factory1 Conference. The committee members were very
impressed by a Costain system at this Conference. In this a block of flats
was built at ground level with each successive floor being jacked up for a "new
90 floor to be built underneath. In response to a CCA offer a delegation
91 inspected the system in action at Coventry and the architects department
92 negotiated with Costain on two specially designed blocks. This deal fell
through because of the prohibitive costs of the system - (Costain's bid was 
15$ more than the final price of the blocks' tender let by open competition). 
But the experience clearly opened up the HC to accept industrialized building and 
over the next year West Ham explored a number of other techniques, including 
Bovis' Tracoba system. t North was also one of the architects to take part in
the seminal visit to inspect system building in Scandinavia organized by the
96 
Association of Municipal Corporations in June 1962. He recalled that
the system I was most impressed with was the one that we 
used eventually, (Larsen-Nielson)... . I'd been all over 
their main factory in Denmark. They're amazing people. 
Both Larsen and Nielson were there to talk to us, about a 
dozen architects I And they knew what was going on, oh yes I 
I must say it did impress me. I thought, 'This will be the 
answer to our growing problem of manpower shortage'».. At 
that time I think they were the biggest producers of any system 
in the world. 97
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In October North flew at his own expense to Vienna to inspect the Camus system.
and reported back to the Committee in terms suggesting he was by then coinnitted
98 to adopting a heavy prefabrication system. Their interest led him to look for
a site large enough to accommodate a worthwhile system building programme, and 
early in 1964 he suggested that industrialized building be adopted to develop a 
large clearance area at Clever Road in Customs House ward on which the C.P.O. 
had just gone through. The architects department grouped all the high flats
into Phase 1 of this development, envisaging four 23 storey blocks with 110 flats
99 in each. The EC approved an investigation into systems suitable for this
scheme, and North in practice looked at just the Camus and Larsen-Nielson systems. 
His report following these enquiries explained:
'System building 1 , as it is called, is in my opinion far 
more suitable for tall blocks than for two and three storey 
dwellings. I doubt whether any of the new methods can equal 
in all respects houses built in this country by traditional 
methods. The investigations which have been carried out at 
this stage therefore are solely concerned with the construction 
of tall blocks of flats.
The possibility of using industrialized building for building forms intermediate 
between houses and tall blocks was thus not considered. North went on to claim 
that only the Camus and Larsen-Nielson systems were already being built by local 
authorities in Britain, (which was quite incorrect), and he later modified this 
to argue that he was 'confining myself to those (systems) with the highest 
degree of prefabrication 1 .
The deputy architect and third in command in North's department investigated 
the Camus system being built at Liverpool by a regional contractor there and were 
not very impressed. Camus (Great Britain), the subsidiary of the French fir:: 
who licensed the system in Britain were unsure of the contracting arrangements 
which would L>pply in London, and West Ham's 500 dwelling order would not be 
enough to interest a general contractor there. Even if other loc^l authorities 
placed orders to get s total approximating Liverpool's 2,500 dwelling contract, 
a factory would still have to be built in London which would take at le.^st a yeoi 
Although the Liverpool general contractor hoped to cut costs by 10/ they made i:0
- 2?8
promises about shorter completion times.
The Larsen-Neilson system on the other hand was being manufactured under
-jQ-Z
licence by the British firm of Taylor Woodrow- Anglian, ^ formed by the merger 
of Myton Ltd. (a Taylor Woodrow subsidiary), and Anglian Building Products (a 
major subsidiary of Ready Mixed Concrete Ltd. , then a holding company for about 
fifty concrete producing firms with an authorized capital of £6 million). "*"
Taylor Woodrow-Anglian was thus backed by the second largest construction firm
105 and one of the largest concrete producing groups. The firm could supply
West Ham from their existing factory and were already building the G.L.C's
s\f\(i
Morris Walk development just across the river in Woolwich. A five hundred 
dwelling contract could be built in two and a half years, saving six months 
construction time. 'Answers to questions about cost were extremely vague. ' 
There was, however, one major difficulty with a Larsen-Nielson contract:
Taylor Woodrow-Anglian intimated that several large orders were 
imminent and any local authority wanting say, 500 dwellings, 
would have to use basic standard plans using components going 
through the factory. This is not a satisfactory condition as 
it means simply that an Authority would have to take what the 
contractor is doing at any particular time and not necessarily 
what it wants.
To overcome this difficulty a letter of intent would have 
to be given guaranteeing the construction of approximately 1,000 
dwellings spread over an agreed period of time. This would mean, 
in fact, negotiations with one contractor for three large con­
tracts having the same tall block content as those under107 consideration. '
North at this stage seemed to have no doubts about simply doubling the scale of 
the 'industrialized building programme to accommodate the demand set out by 
Taylor Woodrow-Anglian 's managing director, and he urged the Committee t-j inspsct 
the systems and come to a decision 'as soon as possible' since,
It would appear that many authorities are making enquiries 
these firms and some are in an advanced stage of negotiation.
The technical information contained in North's report was confined to the cryrtic
comment :
The detailed construction of each system, is different, especially 
at the joints, but both have proved satisfactory over a long period.
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The report did not mention that the 200 foot high tower blocks for which the 
systems were envisaged were quite unlike anything built in the Larsen-Nielson 
system over its fifteen years in use, 1 9although Camus blocks had been built 
up to 23 storeys high. 110
The HC responded very favourably to this report and flew en masse to 
Liverpool to inspect the Camus system, which they found unimpressive in 
appearance. The Morris Walk development on the other hand convinced them 
that
industrial methods and factory techniques should be used 
to supplement the Council's house building programme. ^2
(my emphasis)
The HC refused to accept a package deal solution, however, and thus agreed with 
North's idea of giving a letter of intent to purchs.se 1,000 dwellings to 
Taylor Woodrow-Anglian, a decision which diverted a very large part of the 
building programme into industrialized building. By the end of 1964 two more
clearance areas in Customs House at Mortlake and Eldon Roads had been earmarked
113 for the system built high rise. And tender negotiations with Taylor tfoodrow-
114 Anglian got successfully under way. West Ham accepted the firm's insistence
that the structural engineers for the blocks should be Phillips Consultant
Engineers, an 80?£ owned Taylor Woodrow subsidiary, who were employed by
115 Taylor Woodrow-Anglian themselves on the superstructure, not by the Council.
This was a most unusual step since it is normal for such engineers to be a firn 
independent of the main contractor and employed directly by the client to safe­ 
guard his interests in getting a structurally sound building. The Griffiths 
tribunal noted' that it was 'desirable 1 for structural engineers to 'be entirely 
independent of the contractors 1 . 1 The letter of intent to purchase 1,000 
Larsen-Nielcon flats was finally signed early in 1965.
The large scale system building commitment posed a major threat to the
l,Torks Department which'up to then had a privileged 'insider' position in tenderir.
117for contracts and which now felt under threat. The Borough Engineer first
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asked to be included in the system building programme, and when this proved
impossible he and North negotiated a deal whereby some of the work on traditional
11R high rise would be guaranteed to his department.
•
In May 1965 control of housing passed from ¥est Ham to the new Newham 
authority.
7»3s East Ham's Housing Policy.
POST WAR PLANNING
East Ham also suffered from the blitz, but the scale of housing destruction 
was quite unlike that in West Ham where docks and housing were intermingled. 
War damage to houses rather than sheer loss of accommodation was thus the .major 
problem and the Borough's post-war housing effort grew rather slowly out of a
large scale rehabilitation drive launched by the energetic Chief Housing Officer,
119 J.E. Austin. Austin, who was originally a public health inspector, was
successful in establishing his own department after the war and in acquiring
complete control of the planning, scheduling and contracting phases of housing
120 construction. The Housing Department had its own architectural and layout
staffs and its own land bank which Austin used with little reference to the 
planning powers of the Borough Engineer and the Town Planning Committee. (For 
example, at one stage in the late 1950s he was negotiating in secret with the 
Port of London Authority to exchange an area of council housing standing in the 
way of P.L.A. expansion plans for a larger open area in Beckton Flats even though
East Ham was at this stage supposed to be developing a plan for the flats area
191 as a whole). Austin's relations with the small Housing Committee were very
*
close, and much of the decision making on the committee was confined to a leadership 
group consisting of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, the Mayor and a senior alderman, 
with the full HC ratifying these decisions post hoc.
As in West Ham, East Ham's basic planning policy was influenced very largely 
by the Abercrombie Plan which proposed a target population of just under 100,000 
and densities of 100 ppa, except in the extreme north east of the Borough where
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122 
they would fall to 77 ppa. The Council in 1946 refused to envisage a
significant population fall, settling for a target only 3,000 less than t>-ir 
current population. But at the same time they were reluctant to approve 
early redevelopment proposals including blocks of flats. Both Austin and 
the Borough Engineer insisted that these desires were contradictory, 12\nd 
Austin called for 'the acceptance of flat provision without prescription as
to height', and a readiness to tolerate 'eccentric densities' well above
124 
100 ppa on some developments. Although the Council gave this approval
in principle, East Ham's very slow start on permanent housing, which resulted 
in only 670 approvals in the five years 1946-50, left the question of Council 
members' attitudes to specific proposals unresolved for some years.
The Borough's first experiment with high rise came in 1950. The Council 
hadi by this stage become concerned about the prospect of continuing housing 
problems and sought to revise the Borough's population target upwards in'order
to enhance its programming priority and accommodate more people within the
125 area. At one small site in an unpleasant situation close to a tin factory
Austin's architectural staff recommended using two higher blocks in order to 
create some open space. The HC approved plans for eight storey blocks
consisting entirely of three bedroom flats, including lifts so that 'peracibula-
127 tors may be conveyed to the top floor'. This was a complete departure iron
the agreement in principle of 1946, when it was envisaged that flats would only 
be used to provide accommodation for single people or childless couples. In
1 PR
the event the blocks proved very expensive and between 1951 and 1957 the 
housing department put forward no more plans for high flats in East Ham it3elf. 
An eight storey block was, however, included in an out-Borough estate in
Essey despite the opposition first of Essex County Council (which was resoIvGcl
\ 129 
only after arbitration by the Ministry regional architect), and secondly of
the local residents .association, (which was by and Iprg-e ignored, ?1though a
1 ^50 
meetinr was held in the area to outline the Council's proposals).
•J
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1956-61: THE EMERGENCE OF A HIGH FLAT PROGRAMME
As in West Ham, the introduction of the progressive storey height subsid 
produced a quick response from the housing architects. Austin put forward 
a succession of plans for small, eight storey flat blocks in 1956-8, with
some marked variations betvreen schemes. At one site only 25$ of accommodation
131 
was in high rise, but at most high flats accounted for three quarters of the
dwellings and there was little open space provision. 1 ^2 In 1958 under a 
fifth of housing approvals was high rise, and in 1959 there were no high 
flats approvals at all, (Figure 7.10). ^
The high flats total began to increase quite sharply from 1960 onwards, 
however, largely because of a revision of the slum clearance programme made 
in 1957. Austin reported to the HC that the Borough had lost 4,200 people 
in the period 1951-6 through out-migration, as well as a further 3»000 in out- 
Borough housing development, a trend which he attributed to the continued 
existence of bad housing and a waiting list of 6,000 families. To cope 
with this adverse trend the HC agreed to reschedule several large sites for 
clearance in the immediate future and to try to make larger housing gains on 
redevelopments. Significant clearance and redevelopment began in 1959 at 
North Woolwich in the extreme south of the Borough, and reached a stable and 
modest level in the early '60s, (Table 7.5). The housing department produced 
plans for the first high rise estate at North Woolwich although the storey 
height limit remained at eight storeys. The estate attracted tenders fron 
Wates who from an initial contract of £130,000 went on to win further contract
4-2. f.
worth half a million pounds over the next two years.' In fact, from this 
point on all East Ham high rise contracts were shared between Wates and a
local firm, and a policy of negotiating follow-up contracts with these firms
137 
after a run-off competition was adopted by the Housing Department. Costc
were kept very low since Bast Ham's basic block design was now relatively e-;y 
to build, given the advances in high rise techniques. The block designs v;ero
extremely conservative, being for the most part simple extensions of low r-Lse
, . 138 designs.
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Table 7.5; The Housing Situation in East Ham t 1946-64; Annual Construction
and Demolition. 
/
Date Public Housing Private Housing Slum • (1) - (3) (1 1 ) V(2) - (3) 
Completions Completions Clearance
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
d)
50
200
233
128
48
161
300
325
534
270
253
330
313
538
359
267
323
414
(2) 
2
—
1
2
—
2
3
15
423
4
2
—
—
-
_
-
-
3
84
13)
26
38
42
-
108
47
121
198
49
173
508
232
211
330
205
491
238
169
274
241
512
234
211
330
205
491
238
169
277
325
The second area brought forward for clearance covered a large part of 
Little Ilford ward and entailed a complex trading of land between the EC and
the Education Committee which left Austin with a considerable loss of
139 
accommodation as a result of redevelopment unless densities were increased.
This was also East Ham's first attempt at comprehensive redevelopment and his 
department quickly decided that if a suitably striking design was to be 
produced the eight storey limit would have to be breached. In 1961 Austin 
secured HC approval for layout plans in which the initial designs for eight 
storey blocks were replaced by fifteen storey blocks. This decision
•
encouraged him to attempt the same change at two smaller sites, one of which 
won an MHLG Good Design in Housing award in 1964. These changes pushed
the proportion of the Borough's housing approvals in high rise up to 58fc by
- 28.5 -
1 /I *•?
1963. But it did not indicate a fundamental change in attitude in favour 
of large scale high rise building. Austin and the HC remained very conserva­ 
tive in, their tastes, and the 15 storey blocks were in many ways further 
extensions of the previous designs.
The Little Ilford redevelopment, which involved clearing 837 dwellings
on a 38 acre site, was the East Ham Housing Department's major planning and
144 
design achievement, Initially planned with two fifteen storey and six
eight storey blocks it was 'densified' under Newham, so that the planned 
population was increased by almost 40/£ and the smaller blocks' heights were 
raised to twelve storeys,
1963-65, TRANSITION DIFFICULTIES
From July 1963 onward West and East Ham were due to merge to form the
London Borough of Newham under the proposals of the London Government Act,
145 
although the final transfer of control took place only in May 1965. The
first Newham Council was elected in 1964 and in the summer appointed North,
the West Ham architect, to be Chief Architect and Planner, and an outside
146 
candidate E. Davies to be Housing Manager. Austin himself was due to
retire but his relations with West Ham officers were not good, partly because 
his staff were passed over for some key Newham jobs, and partly because the
post of East Haiu Borough Engineer was given for a year to the West Ham officer
14-7 appointed by Kewham. A serious incident arose during 1964 when Austin
found that an MHLG architect was opposing a scheme put forward by his
department partly on the basis of an alternative plan prepared by the Zr. r-;ir.ee::
1.13 
planning staff but rejected by the Town Planning and Housing Committees.
An East Ham delegation to the Minister secured the removal of opposition to -:he 
scheme, 1 '' 9 but the question of how plans were passed to the Ministry architect 
remained unsolved. A joint working party of West and East Ham officers w-<? 
not markedly successful in co-ordinati:>{;; "the two Boroughs' plans. Altho^i 
a-r-ouiont was reached on some schemes, the clear pressure to increase densities
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on the T.Iest Ham side led Austin to try and push as many of has schemes throu-;:: 
to tender approval as possible before the May 1965 deadline. 150 In his last 
report to the KG he explicitly played down the trend towards greater high flat
•
building in the early '60s:
The realization that the Council do undertake house building 
as part of mixed development continues to stimulate demand for 
houses in lieu of flats. That flat life is indeed the price of 
"city living" is still not appreciated by many whose obvious and 
natural desires are for houses. The needs of the larger growing 
family are often satisfied only by parlour type homes with gardens 
and more provision of this type may well have to be seriously 
considered in future schemes.
In one way, housing large families with children in high blocks, East Ham had 
been much less consistent than West Ham at that time, having built three bedroom 
multi-storey flats, for example. But on the whole Austin's department 
remained in close touch with tenant wishes and was mainly concerned in its 
designs to build something which was practicable and relatively familiar. This 
attitude was strongly held by most East Ham councillors and it remained an 
important influence on the type of scheme approved for the East Ham area under 
Newhanu
7*4: Housing Policy in Newham, 1965-68.
1964-65: ASSIMILATING EAST HAM
Both West and East Jlaia Councils opposed the Newham merger, arguing that
it was foolish to combine two of the three existing authorities with experience
152of the whole range of local government services. For East Ham the r.er^er
implied a levelling down in its service provision in terms of housing and
education particularly, a change made all the harder because of the pattern or"
1 S^control in the llewhara Labour group. ^ In 1960 a 12»5P increase in East Ha--'s 
rates sparked a ratepayer protest movement, and against all local predictions
t
the Ratepayer candidates consistently won Council seats from Labour ovrjr the 
next four years; by 1964 they held a third of the seats on the East 1::.:: Council. 
As a result of their success two thirds of the lie wham Labour group vvrc fro:.
- 28? •-
Vest Ham wards, although western wards accounted for only a small majority of 
members overall.
West Ham dominance in housing construction matters was assured by the 
scale of its building programme, and strengthened by the appointment of North 
as Borough Architect in Newham. In December 1964 Newham's Housing Committee 
(HC) considered a joint report by the County Borough officers 1 working party 
on slum clearance up to 1971, which consisted entirely of a spatchcock 
amalgamation of their existing programmes (Table 7.6). 154 The contrast between 
the two programmes was extreme, particularly on the proportion of fit housing 
scheduled for demolition and on the housing gains to be made. North criticized 
the East Ham proposals as making no contribution to Newham's overall problems, 
while East Ham councillors objected to the idea that their area should now 
take on the burden of West Ham's past failures. In the end the HC sided with 
North, asking for a review of East Ham proposals 'on the possibility of • 
developing at a higher density' and recommending 'that the "system building"
programme currently being carried out in West Ham be continued and extended to
155 include suitable sites in Newham 1 .
Table 7.6; The West Ham and East Ham Programmes, 1964-71.
West Ham East Ham Newham
Demolitions:
Slum properties
Non-slum properties
Temporary accommodation
Total Demolitions
New Completions
Proportion of demolitions 
fit properties
Redevelopment gain (/£)
1,524
1,893
208
3,624 
8,416
132
2,414
636
576
3,626 
4,281
18
3,937
2,529
784
7,250 
12,697
n.a 0
n.a.
The decision produced an angry reaction. The East Ham HC Chairman 
told the press:
I'm speaking on behalf of the people of East Ham when I say 
we don't want that kind of thing here. I've fought this 
idea for many-years and I would cry it from the rooftops if 
an attempt was made to make East Ham's development similar to 
West Ham's. 156
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Of West Ham's tower blocks he remarked: 'I was shocked to see the surroundings
t_^
people will be expected to live in'. A prominent Newham councillor from 
East Ham warned: 'I think it would be awful to spoil East Ham with'higher 
blocks of flats. East Ham is built over as it is'. And Ratepayer and Liberal
councillors denounced West Ham's housing as f a mass of pigeon holes' and f a
157 series of Dartmoor prisons'. The protests did not halt the 'densification 1
of East Ham developments - densities were increased by 40$ at Little Ilford for
158 
example. But the protests did succeed in deflecting proposals for the
industrialized building programme away from the built up area of East Ham and
in producing a running controversy over Newham plans for 22 storey blocks in
159 the area.
TRADITIONAL HIGH RISE
Newham 1 s traditional high rise programme showed two major changes from that 
in V/est Ham. Firstly, as traditional developments became a progressively
reduced and more peripheral factor in Newham's housing programme^ densities were
160 
raised, so that on some sites net density figures of 215 ppa were being attained.
Secondly the Newham Housing Manager, E.P. Davies, seemed unconcerned about the 
problems of housing families in high rise, and as a result the proportion of 
larger flats in the high rise programme rose. At one clearance area, re­ 
developed entirely in three 22 storey flat blocks, the progression was 
particularly stark. Phase One had no three bedroom flats; the second block 
had 59$ two bedroom and 27$ three bedroom flats; and the final block, approved 
in late 1968, had 66$ two bedroom and 34$ three bedroom accommodation.
At three other sites between a fifth and a third of the high flats had three or
162 more bedrooms. Density increases on these developments were accomplished by
the simple elimination of family houses from the schemes.
The decline in the standards apparently acceptable to the housing
*
department reached its nadir in the redevelopment of the street market at
Queens Road. The market was one of three in the ;/est Ham area, one of which
* /"•* 
was redeveloped in 1959 as part of a road improvement/high flat scheme. 1 -> T
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second, Angel Lane in Stratford, was the site of West Ham and Newham Councils' 
biggest property venture - a massive shopping and office block scheme which was 
first agreed in 1959 and finally completed in 1976. 164 North's vague, plans
• '
for the rather run down Queens Road site were nipped in the bud in 1963 by the
intervention of Samuel Properties Ltd. (a subsidiary of the Hill Samuel
«
merchant bank). The company secretly bought up a large amount of property
round the market and then approached West Ham with a proposal that they should
165 jointly redevelop the area. In return for the use of compulsory purchase
to complete the land assembly operation, West Ham would get a rent for the 
ground space and a certain amount of council housing. Samuel's proposed to 
build at their expense a large office block, a new market, shops, and commercial 
multi-storey car parks. North recommended acceptance of the idea ,and a deal 
was worked out by the Borough Treasurer. At a later stage in the negotiations 
MHLG refused permission for the office block, but North intervened to save
the deal, suggesting that the offices be replaced by a similar shaped block of
1 fifi 
council flats. The final designs, drawn up for Samuel's by the leading
private architects Govell, Matthews and Partners, included the original 200
council flats in a single 23 storey block built over a five storey car park,
167 
plus further council flats in a 9 storey block over two floors of shops.
On a negotiated contract with a Bovis subsidiary signed in 1968 the development
cost Newham nearly £1.6 million, over £4,000 a flat and the scheme took four
, , ..., 168 years to build.
The final scheme included 213 flats in the 28 storey block, (of which 
half had two bedrooms and an eighth had three), and 92 flats in the smaller
•
block, (of which three fifths had three bedrooms and 2lfo had two bedrooms). 
Altogether nearly 1,100 people are housed on 2.8 acres of land at net 
residential densities of 380 ppa; there is no open space on site and the
i
rest of the development is taken up-by shops and car parks. In broader
. 170 
planning terms the scheme seems to have been equally disastrous.
Even taking into account the Queens Road blocks, the flow of traditional 
high rise projects in Newham was decreasing through 1964-67 as a greater
proportion of the Borough's high rise programme was switched into system 
building and it is this which accounts for the decline in the share of 
approvals in high flats from over 82$ in 1964 to 61^ in 1967, (Figure 7.1 .}.' 71
THii ft'LFALSION C? SYSTEM BUILDING
The system building commitment made by West Ham became the central element
172in ilewham's expanded housing programme. The first contract for the Clever
and Eldon Road blocks was signed in December 1965 for £2.7 million, and the 
second in late 1966 for £2.5 million (a 10/j cost increase to £4,400 per flat).' 75 
In September 1966 North reported to the HC his proposals for extending the 
system building programme:
The Newham Housing Programme is considerably larger than the 
combined programmes of the two old Boroughs, and the current 
four year programme as approved by the Minister of Housing and 
Local Government is the largest of the 32 London Boroughs. The 
labour force on residential development in the Borough has remained 
relatively constant over the last few years, and to cope with our 
expanding programme it is essential if we are to achieve our tar~e7s, 
that system building- be continuously used in our Programme. 174
This meant that 'approximately one third to one half of our Programme should 
be built by industrialized methods', or in hard figures 'between 600 and 850 
dwellings per year'. 'One system would not be capable of doing this ... 
as I would suggest it is not advisable to have "all our eggs in one basket 1". 
The report made two recommendations. The first, which was accepted by
the Committee almost without discussion, was that a further notice of intent
• 
to purchase 1,000 dwellings in identical 23 storey tower blocks should be
given to Taylor Ucodrow-Anglian, since the first contract was proceeding
satisfactorily. The new blocks would be built partly in Customs House, ar.u
175
partly in some northern wards.
Secondly North recommended that a further system should be employed for a 
net; type-plan tower block to form the basis of what his department now ter-.sa 
the Lockton ne;; town project. Beckton Flats are a large area of wr^telani, 
partly marsh, partly derelict gas works, lying north of the King George V. 
dock uhich were the subject of intermittent planning by }jast Ham C.B. t:irrj.~hout
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the post-war period. Newham scrapped plans for a 1,000 dwelling lew densitv 
dovelopment drawn up by Austin in the early '60s ' cind were now looking to
the area to provide accommodation for around three times as many people - a
177very large redevelopment. North's report this time reviewed ten system on
a range of criteria, including the ability to build both high and low rise
17ft 
dwellings. He found three that fitted these criteria - Vates, Laing's
Jespersen system and Crudem's Skarne system. Crudens improved their standing 
by suggesting that they could also provide low rise flat components for erection 
by the Council's Works Department, which removed one major obstacle to the 
expansion of the system building programme. ilorth recommended that the L~C 
inspect the three systems with a view to holding a competition for 1,000 flats 
in 23 storey blocks. In the course of this investigation it transpired tliat
the Jespersen system could not be built above 16 storeys so Newhan's plans were
179 modified to take account of this as an alterna/tive. Council members-were
also impressed by the industrialized low rise they inspected and an extra 5CO 
low rise flats were included in the competition.
Like many previous schemes, Kewham's plans got bogged down in the 
difficulties and expense of the Beckton site. In mid 1967 the EC Chairman, 
Kebbell, announced the Borough's intention of building 'a small new town' for
12,000 people and claimed that the Council's resources were sufficient to
181 carry through the scheme alone. Over the next six months this position
became increasingly untenable, and was attacked by the Ratepayers who pressed
*• - • - -•,
the idea of securing G.L.C. involvement to lighten the cost burden on I"e-,-,:ia™. '"' 
Following a consultant's report which estimated the bill for drairing the 
Beckton area alone at £5 million, the Labour leader Boyce began to negotiate 
towards a deal with the G.L.C., and a joint development was cnnounced in 
December 1967. In practice throughout this period the competition fcr a 
second system hun^- in mid air and no progress on designs was made, although 
it was clear tuat a large scale commitment wculd be made soon. In this pericj 
VateG and Crudens seem to have lost interest in a competition and L:.in,j eej:.-s 
likely to win the eventual contract. North in fact began to look for
alternative sites for the second system to be built
Finally, the system building programme was further expanded in 1967 uiion 
Taylor. Voodrow-Anglian surested to Korth that progress on their first contract 
was such that further blocks at the Clever or Kortlake Road sites could be
1RRbuilt at substantial cost savings. ^ Korth responded by deleting two areas 
of family housing in these schemes and substituting two more 23 storey tower 
blocks consisting entirely of two bedroom accommodation, housing an extra 
600 people on the estates and costing a further £1.2 million. Again the
Housing Manager proved very willing to allow this densification process and
186 the provision of family accommodation in high rise to go ahead.
By early 1S68 then the Newham system building programme included plans 
for 5,200 flats in tower blocks (capable of housing more than 10,000 people) 
and a possible further 500 low rise flats.
CENTRAL GCVERIR2ET POLICY CHANGES
The withdrawal of the progressive storey height subsidy in November 1965 
did not affect Newham very much since the Treasurer reported that 'whilst the
height subsidy element would be less than at present, the overall level of
187subsidy for a tall block of flats would show an increase 1 . The EC nonethe­ 
less wrote to the Association of Municipal Corporations to press for the 
restoration of the subsidy and sent a delegation to the Ministry itself to
f.
protest at the change.
The introduction of the housing cost yardsticks in April 1967 proved a 
much more serious blow, particularly since Eewham's yardstick was set at only
10/2 above the national average, rather than the 12.5£> addition given to
188 Inner London boroughs. At a joint meeting of the Housin? and i'in-nce
Committees in July North outlined the consequences of the change as an end
to all future hijh flat schemes ;-.nd a switch to building 3 or 4 storey flats
, . 18° 
or maisonettes, -uhich he d?scribed as 'a deplorable form of development-.
No more f;..uily houses could be provided, he claimed, and open space provision 
would be cut. The Committees strongly opposed the yardsticks and tut- Town
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Clerk was instructed to write in protest to the Ministry and to seek help in 
this again from the A.M.C. At a press conference the Clerk declared that lov.T 
rise flat developments 'were not acceptable to local opinion', were necessarily 
'dreary and unimaginative' and would mean that the Council would not be able'
to provide the open space and greenery in which the high blocks have been
4 , 190 set'.
The yardstick decision meant that the Newham architects had to revise 
schemes that would not reach tender approval before the end of June 196? to 
meet the yardsticks. In practice there were two let-outs. Firstly, density 
limits over 165 ppa would be allowed in inner London if a justification for 
them could be provided. Secondly, where work on drawings and designs was well
advanced but schemes would not meet the deadline, the Ministry would consider
191 special pleading and allow ad hoc limits for subsidy purposes. The result
of these decisions was that six traditional high rise schemes at an early •
192 stage in programming were redesigned as low rise estates by mid-1968. *" But
the industrialized programme apparently went ahead unaffected since a great 
deal of work on type plan designs had already been done and contract negotiatio: 
were well advanced, at least with Taylor Woodrow-Anglian. The HC decided to
reduce density levels generally to around 120 ppa, but this was still a level
193 which had been attained using mainly high rise before 1965. By May 19c8 then,
Newham had definitely replanned less than 700 high flats, and further couple-ions 
of several thousand dwelling's in tower blocks were in the pipeline and liable to 
receive KKLG approval.
194 7«5t Ron an Point - Crisis of Legitimation.
The first wave of system built blocks in Customs House was to provide 
rehousing for nearly 2,000 people living in Becktonward clearance areas, in 
Victorian terraces blighted for nearly fifteen years by the threat of redevelop-
Until May 1968 there was no indication that anything would disturb the
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normal process of rehousing and further clearance in Beckton. Residents in 
the clearance area complained about construction noise and may have felt
r
vaguely worried by the discontents with Newham's high rise which were beginning
195 to be noticed by the local press. ^ But all accepted that their homes would
be pulled down within a year and that their housing future would be determined 
by the local bureaucracy without consulting them. The block at Eldon Road 
and the first Clever Road block were completed and occupied by people from 
other clearance areas. On May 16th in the Clever Road block, called Ronan 
Point after the Vice-Chairman of the Housing Committee, an old lady on the 
eighteenth floor lit her gas cooker early in the morning. An explosion 
occurred, the load bearing walls of her flat blew out and a phenomenon now 
known as progressive collapse took place. The living rooms of all the flats 
on one corner of the block collapsed on top of each other down to the podium, 
together with all the bedrooms above the sixteenth floor. Because virtually 
everyone was still in bed and some of the flats were unoccupied the death toll 
was only five people, together with 17 injured; in other circumstances it could 
have topped 30.
The collapse produced an acute crisis in Newham f s housing programme, with
a drastic fall in the Borough's completions in 1968, and an even sharper fall
1Q7 in housing gains being made from redevelopment, (Table 7.7). It also
produced a marked change in the Council's relations with clearance area 
residents in Beckton. The Minister of Housing announced an immediate Tribunal 
of Inquiry into the disaster, and the media gave saturation coverage to the 
issue. There were conflicting views about the cause of the disaster. The 
Times interviewed a wide range of architects, engineers and industrialized 
building manufacturers on May 16th and almost all of them 'insisted that the 
explosion was a rare chance for which.no designer could make allowances. 
Mr Ove Arup, (a leading structural engineer), said that to construct buildings 
capable of withstanding "bomb type" explosions would be like designing them to 
withstand earthquakes'. Taylor Woodrow-Anglian issued a statement to the
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press in which they claimed that any other type of building would have 
suffered worse damage. 'Because floors were hinged to walls they swung 
downwards at one end instead of crashing on to floors below with both ends 
unattached. 1 The managing director, Mr Geoffrey Davis, said: 'The type of 
structure used here is no less structurally safe than any' other form of
traditional structure... There is not the slightest sign, of structural
- ., .200 failure'.
Table 7.7: The Housing Situation, 1965-72; Annual Construction and Demolition.
Date Public Housing Private Housing Slum (l) - (3) (1) + (2) - (3) 
Completions Completions Clearance
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
(D
1,335
1,349
1,678
966
748
925
1,170
1,114
(2)
112
66
98
34
29
22
114
28
(3)
767
631
726
604
504
529
947
910
568
718
952
362
244
396
223
204
680
784
1,052
396
273
418
337
232
The Council's response was complicated by the results of the 1968 local
elections which brought the combined Ratepayer-Tory-Liberal opposition to
201 parity with Labour in terms of councillors, although Labour secured their
202 
position by electing ten Labour aldermen with the Mayor's casting voting.
Nevertheless, the Labour leadership came under some criticism for the system 
building programme from the opposition and some dissident Labour members, «M 
reacted to the collapse in an extremely defensive way. On May 17th, after 
legal advice to refrain from any action or comment possibly prejudicial to the
result of the Inquiry, the leadership inaugurated a policy of refusing to
?03 discuss anything to do with system building." ^ Construction work on the four
uncompleted and three' unstarted blocks was not halted or slowed down in any way, 
nor was the occupied block at Eldon Road evacuated.
Meanwhile people in the Beckton clearance area reacted equally strongly.
By lunchtime on Hay 16th five Beckton residents independently of each other 
started collecting signatures for a petition against being rehoused in the svste: 
built high flats. They soon came together and, as one of them described It, 
'from then on the whole thing sort of snowballed. People knocked on our dcors 
asking to sign and we decided to form a fighting committee 1 . This was 
the first time clearance area residents had possessed some form of collective 
organization in ilewham. When they presented the petition to the Council t-.ro 
days later with 700 signatures, the newly appointed protest committee were told 
by the HC Chairman that it could not be discussed until after the Inquiry.^ 
The petition stated 'under present conditions we will flatly refuse to leave 
our present slums to enter modern slums 1 , to which a letter from the Town Cic-rrk 
replied, 'whether the blocks become slums or not will depend on the people who
p/-v/r
live in them 1 . The Housing Chairman remarked to the Press that it was 
unnecessary for the Beckton residents 'to to.lk of doing battle with anyone at 
this stage 1 .
The Council leadership in practice used the Inquiry period to demonstrate 
their confidence in the system, a stance encouraged by TT;?-A« The firm told the 
first Inquiry sitting that the flats could not possibly be expected to stand
the force of an explosion which they put at perhaps as much as 600 Ibs per
208 square inch. A more helpful estimate was given by structural enjine&rs
appointed by the Treasury Solicitor who reported in July that the flats h-1
209 failed at a pressure of around 3 Ibs per square inch. On the same day that
these engineers told the Inquiry that they feared for the safety of thousands 
of residents in system built blocks, TT,\T-A and Newham Council convened a special 
Press Conference to announce that two more blocks at Clever Hi had seen 
completed and would be occupied immediately, a story extensively reported 
under headlines such as 'Ronan tenants want tower homes' and "To fear' 1 r,s 
families go back'. 21. 0 The Housing Chairman later described this as 'an exerciz? 
in p.-jycholotjy 1 , and explained: 'I am certain that if we had allowed the clocks 
to re^in empty we would have received applications from tenants in (t;io
>> 11 already occupied block) for rehousing'. The new blocks were also used
to launch a pet idea of the Labour leader, Boyce, and Kebbell known as the 
Young Married Couples scheme, in which nev/ly married people lived in a-ecu.-.r.ii 
flat and saved a guaranteed sum each month towards the cost of a house bvj.it 
for sale to them by Rewham. The one bedroom accommodation in the system
built high rise was earmarked for this scheme which could not go ahead unless
212 the blocks were occupied.
To the Beckton Committee seeing construction work on the blocks continuir.g 
at an increased rate and the new flats being occupied, it was apparent that 
the Council's moratorium on discussion was a very one sided affair. The 
protestors called a public meeting to discuss their housing future, but 
although it was made clear that Ronan Point would not be discussed Council
officials, the Council leadership, the local Labour i-i.P. and all the councillors
213 
invited refused to attend, except for one of the three Labour ward councillors.
The 200 people at the meeting made it obvious that they would not be rehoused
into the system built high rise. 'At one point in the meeting nearly everyone
214 was shouting that they were afraid to go into the tower blocks'. The
ward councillor was very evasive in his answers and had a rough ride. He 
explained the failure to stop work on the blocks by saying, 'If the Inquiry 
finds everything in apple pie order we would lose a lot of money' (in 
compensation to the builders). After the meeting broke up in disgust the 
Beckton Committee announced that as they were being 'cold-shouldered' by the
local Labour party they were turning for help to the Conservatives, who
215announced their support of the residents' protest. This was an unwise
move since the six Tory councillors had little influence and all the Labors- 
councillors, including the discontented backbenchers, now felt free to irnr-ro
216the group.
On July 50th, after a string of expert witnesses had criticized the T'.'-A
systcui, 217 the I'lewham architect blandly told the Inquiry that in his view
? 1R 
the flats were perfectly safe before the explosion. Three da-s later,
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however, the Council learnt privately that the Inquiry was about to submit 
an interim report to the Minister pointing out that the flats had been found 
liable to progressive collapse, that the safety -of all system built 'flats in
•
Britain should be checked and that gas should be disconnected from all
219 similar flats. The Council disconnected the gas from their occupied blocks
two days before the report became public, describing this as 'an extra
220 precautionary measure 1 . But public confidence in the Council's position
had by now evaporated. Residents in the occupied flats began clamouring to
p? 1 
be rehoused and the local press reported their misgivings prominently.
Despite this change and the interim report's reference to 'a phased 
programme to strengthen the blocks' the Council leadership still did nothing 
to halt progress on the unbuilt blocks. T¥-A made rapid progress on the 
contract. Between August and November the fourth Clever Rd block was 
finished but left unoccupied, the first Mortlake Rd block was structurally
completed and the remaining three blocks were all built up as far as the first
222 floor. This is important since once the foundations and base were complete
a change of building form became very expensive. And strengthening completed 
blocks was to prove more than ten times as expensive as strengthening the 
components at the manufacturing stage. 'Rush completion 1 of system built
tower blocks, if it occurred, thus meant considerable extra expense for local
225 
authorities and larger strengthening contracts for system building firms.
After the interim report the Newham architect did meet with W-A and Laing , 
and agree that the 2,000 flats in the second phase of the system building
programme and covered by letters of intent should now be built as low rise
224 
blocks, instead of 24 storey towers.
How much this decision was influenced by Ronan Point remains unclear.
North brought forward plans for the two additional blocks on the Clever and
Mortlake Road sites before the Griffiths Tribunal's findings were known and
• 9
seems to have been taken by surprise at the Committee's opposition to further
225 
approvals before the system was given a clean bill of health. This delay
probably forced him to give up an attempt to squeeze other high rise contracts 
past the Kiriistry's tightening yardsticks.
After the interim report the Council leadership began to define a 'realist 
position in respect of Wewham's commitments to system building around the
??/r
theme 'Homes must not be wasted'. Ratepayer councillors endorsed this view 
and the Liberal leader denounced the Beckton protest committee as 'a vocal 
minority trying to bring attention to themselves who will aggravate the prob- 
lem'. 227
On November 6th the Inquiry's final report was published and the basis
ppo
of the Council's policy since May disintegrated. The report apportioned 
no blame for the disaster to any of the individuals, companies or ,;ublic 
authorities involved. It cleared the gas explosion of being the major cause 
of the collapse after it ascertained that it was of average intensity for a 
domestic gas explosion. Most of its criticism was reserved for the Larsen- 
Nielson system. The system was found to be liable to progressive collapse 
as a result of a number of causes, including fire and wind pressures as well 
as minor explosions. The joints in the system were found to fail at pressures
of 3-12 Ibs/sq in. which could be produced by fires or high winds in one in
229 every 50 blocks during their sixty year lifetime. Government sponsored
Building Codes of Practice were criticized as blinkered and out of date. The 
National Building Agency and Building Research Station were censured for lack 
of awareness ofthe problems of system building, and the Ministry was
reproached by implication for encouraging the use of methods which it had not
230the expertise to assess. It was clear from all this that the failings cf
the system were so extensive and systematic that the collapse of Ronan Point 
could not be attributed in any sense to factors under Council control. The 
authority had merely gone along with national trends that proved to have been 
inadequately researched or assessed by anybody in Britain.
However, the report did make some specific criticir,r:^ of ITewham and 
Taylor V/'oodrow-Anglian, particularly the arrangement vhereuy the conp
employed an SQ/o ovmed Taylor Joodrow subsidiary as consultant
231 
engineers instead of this being an independent firm responsible to the client.
It also criticized the Newham architect and engineer over their procedures
•
for checking the structural calculations, commenting that 'their altogether 
too casual approach appeared to treat compliance with the (building) by-lavs 
as a tiresome formality rather than an important safeguard'. 2^2
Following the report a nationwide investigation into the structural 
stability of all high flat blocks was launched, and the strengthening of
O 1^^
system built blocks to much higher standards was set in train. Although 
watered down by pressure on MHLG from system building firms, these requirements
imposed large costs on local authorities, alleviated only by an initial.
234. MHLG promise of a 40yo grant towards strengthening costs.
The report threw Newham's entire housing programme out of gear. 330
235 families had to be moved out of the occupied tower blocks and work on all
high rise blocks was finally stopped while the Housing Committee argued throug.i
/~)'Zf. *
November and December about the future of the system built flats. At the 
end of November Labour backbenchers had succeeded in cutting the 220 extra 
flats planned at the Beckton sites for which contracts had not yet been signed.
The structurally finished Mortlake Rd block was to be completed but the last
237 three blocks were to be the subject of negotiations.
The Council leadership repeatedly pressed for the completion of the 
original contract in its entirety arguing?
Yfe must bear in mind that we have committed the contractors 
to heavy expenditure, possibly as much as £500,000 and that 
our responsibility is a dual one. ;;e are legally contracted 
for the works and cannot throw it out of hand... It is our 
duty to the homeless and the people on the housing list to go 
ahead with a scheme in the near future.
The first argument captured the finance conscious Ratepayer councillors and 
the completely specious second argument whittled away the dissident Lacour 
backbenchers. Although the decision over the last three blocks concerned trie 
fate of at least 1,000 Becktori residents the Newham leadership blankly r-iuzed
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to meet the protest committee and their case was not voiced by any councillor.
At a series of meetings with Taylor Woodrow-Anglian, attended by Kinistry 
observers, it became apparent 'that Taylor Woodrow-Anglian might.conceivably 
invoke the penalty clause of their contract with the Council, which one 
councillor described as "a,very substantial sum" 1 . 9 Although 'the general 
feelings of committee members with the exception of a few was that no more 
tall system blocks should be built in Newham.. the financial losses involved 
could be severe, possibly as much as £1 million 1 . 4 Alternative ways of 
carrying out the contract included reducing the blocks' height to 15, 12 or 
11 storeys or building low rise maisonettes. When the results of negotiations 
were referred to the Housing Committee there was a stormy and deadlocked 
discussion only ended by Kebbell's decision, amidst protests, to close the 
meeting and leave the final choice of action with the Policy Committee. 
Kebbell declared: 'My own mind is quite made up on the subject. I am sure 
that if the original contract with Taylor Woodrow-Anglian was completed 
together with the necessary strengthening work I would be quite happy with 
the result'o 241
The Policy Committee narrowed the issue down to either completing the 
original contract, or reducing the last three blocks to fifteen storeys, 
building additional low rise flats to fulfil the contract and paying the firm 
£50,000 agreed compensation. After observing that even the reduced height 
blocks 'would still be essentially high rise', they voted to complete the 
three blocks to 23 storeys, claiming they could not ask the ratepayers to pay 
£50,000 for nothing. 242 Reinforced by a three line Labour whip this view
«
secured a unanimous Council vote of endorsement. One leading Ratepayer menbsr 
explained the opposition parties' attitude:
If there were any fears whatsoever no amount of compensation 
would deter the Council from changing the contract.. Hany of 
us have really been opposed to tall blocks on humanitarian 
grounds, (and torn between) an emotional dislike of tower blocks 
and our responsibility to the ratepayers. 243
No council member apparently pointed out that the reduction in height to 15
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storeys would mean that at least 350 fewer people would have to live in 
high rise. The retreat before paying out compensation is particularly ironic 
since this was a very small fraction of the extra, costs which Newham incurred 
by failing to stop work on the blocks between May and November 1968. 
Strengthening contracts, which had to be given to TW-A since the blocks used 
their system, eventually cost £1,000,000, (half of which was paid by the 
government), while rebuilding and strengthening Ronan Point cost a further 
£300,000o244
The Council voted to go ahead with all nine blocks strengthened to the 
highest government standard enacted after the Inquiry and accepted assurances 
from its officers that the blocks would be as safe as humanly possible. Some
weeks after the vote TW-A revealed that this safety standard could not be
245 attained« The national standards had already been watered down in
November 1968. Now Newham had to accept a further reduction in safety to a
2^-6 level where gas supplies had to be permanently disconnected from the blocks. '
In February 1969 the Housing Committee voted Taylor Woodrow-Anglian their 
third major contract, for 1,000 low rise flats, despite backbench Labour 
mutterings, after Kebbell had argued that not to do so would accentuate the
disruption of the housing programme and that he was satisfied the firm would
247 'do the job that is wanted 1 . Then in June the Council leadership wrote
TW-A an extraordinary letter inviting them to contribute half of Newham's 
£600,000 bill for strengthening operations out of a sense of responsibility to 
the Borough's homeless and pending a settlement on legal liability for the 
collapse of Ronan Point. Not surprisingly with a new £4 million order
«
signed since the Inquiry and £1.3 million worth of strengthening contracts 
lined up, TW-A declined to make any payments or accept any liability.
Meanwhile the Council leadership had still refused to have any dealings 
with the Beckton residents committee (apart from a brief meeting before the
f
Inquiry report), despite extensive press publicity for their case. In 
February 1969 when all the decisions about their housing had already been taker.
the committee were told in a letter from the Town Clerk:
The Chairman of the Housing Committee is of the opinion 
that very little could be achieved at this stage by 
meeting your committee. But it is his firm intention 
at the appropriate time "to call a meeting of all the 
residents' associations concerned to explain the position. 
It is hoped, of course, that your association will be 
represented at this meeting. 249
The protest leader pungently described this as 'complete eyewash' s.ince no 
other associations of clearance area residents existed and no such meeting v;as 
ever called. He told the press? 'Approaching the problem in an orderly and
gentlemanly manner is getting us nowhere.... If you can't get anywhere peace-
250fully and with commonsense, what is left? 1
"What was left was a steadily escalating series of demonstrations ru:d 
meetings which were doomed to failure since all the relevant decisions had 
already been taken. A Conservative councillor sympathetic to the residents 
asked the Council in March to consider guaranteeing clearance area families 
freedom of choice about accommodation. The Housing Committee Chairman 
declared that clearance area residents would have to take the best dwellings
available: 'In asking for a hard and fast assurance Councillor ____ is being
251immature, unrealistic, impracticable and obstructive'. At this point
members of the protest committee in the public gallery disrupted the proceedings. 
The Beckton residents' relations with the Council leadership were henceforth
non-existent and they were later publicly denounced by the (supposedly impartial)
252Mayor when opening a new tower block. In I-'ay the issue of freedom of
choice was raised again as a formal motion but this was voted out by the Council
253 without even reaching the Housing Committee. After this meeting the Beckton
committee picket got involved in an alleged assault on one of their ward
councillors after he had explained his vote against the motion by sayi:^: th=t
254 they were f trying to hold the Council jip to ransom'. With this extensively
publicized incident the local Conservatives, embarrassed at their inability to 
control the increasing violence of the protest committee's actions snd 
pronouncements, quietly washed their hands of the affair and the improbable
255 
alliance came to an end.
During the summer of 1969 the issue went off the boil until in October trie 
Beckton protest committee were at last invited to 'discuss' their rehousin- 
with the Council leadership, only to be told that whatever their views the 
bulk of the residents would be rehoused in the last three blocks at Kortlaks 
Road, construction of vrhich would finish in March 1970. The committee left 
the meeting in an angry mood, declaring 'the big crunch will come when the 
Council give us new addresses and we refuse to go... This organization was
formed specifically to fight an attempt to move us into tower flats and notiiir.::
256has happened to weaken our determination'. The protestors began planning
their reaction to rehousing and mobilizing support to resist the move tp the 
tower blocks, in vain as it turned out since nothing at all happened.
In the event the Council's forecast of rehousing dates was very optinisr-ic 
and in February 1970 the Council organized two 'goodwill' public meetings, 
the main purpose of which was to tell the Beckton residents that their re­ 
housing had been postponed for a further six months at least by delays in 
building the strengthened blocks. In the event these became the first and
only occasion on which there was any opportunity for residents to tackle the
257 Council leadership in public. At the first meeting 100 people listened
to the Housing Chairman's opening speech in 'tense silence 1 while the protest 
committee picketed the meeting. When the first questioner was told by a 
Housing Department official that virtually all the residents would be rehoused 
in the system built high rise he replied amidst cheers, 'You can take that 
and stuff it!' The Chairman immediately threatened to close the meeting ai-d
«
was answered by a chorus of 'It's up to you!' Asked if residents who refused 
one allocation in a tower block would be given another allocation he replied 
'above derisive cheers': 'The Council, do not usually make a second offer if 
the first is considered sufficient and the refusal reason thought to be 
inadequate'. After a running fire of bitterly hostile questions one i^an 
shouted 'You claim you're bettering us but you're not. You're nicking cpace
off us - you are going to give us less than we started with. It's a bloody 
farce! 1 As the tone of the meeting became very angry and many people began 
to leave, the Housing Chairman quickly closed the proceedings and the Becirton
Committee claimed a moral victory for their boycott. The second meeting was
258 even briefer and more embittered.
The protest committee followed up their apparent success by holding a 
meeting of women members who reiterated their intention to oppose rehousing 
by force if necessary, and by organizing a picket of the Council at which many
2RQ
councillors refused to accept copies of their statement of objection. 
But their support had already begun to decline. Many of the residents reacted 
to the Council's immoveable stance at the public meetings with a feeling of 
despair, and as the rehousing date receded further into the future so the 
protest movement began to decay. People had already begun to leave the area. 
Families prepared to move to flats in other parts of the borough began to be 
rehoused. People ineligible for rehousing left in search of more permanent 
accommodation and by the summer those who remained were overwhelmingly 
anxious to be moved out of the area.
The climax of this process of decay came when the first families to move 
to houses received their allocations. Two of the protest leaders were
offered and accepted houses and the committee fell apart, split by bitter
?61 -personal animosities. The immediate consequence of the break up was that
the local press coverage of the issue ceased almost at once. In July a member
of the defunct committee secured some publicity for the' continuing plight of
the area's residents who still had no information about when rehousing would
«
begin. 2 The Housing Department promised to hold a meeting to let the 
residents know firm dates, which was never apparently held. Instead the 
residents were told individually that they would be rehoused over the next 
seven months as the tower blocks became ready for occupation. By April 1971 
nearly 1,000 people had moved into the three blocks, leaving a few families 
holding out for houses or ground floor flats in the now empty area, surroundea
by vandalized homes and the wreckage of the former community. ^
For the Beckton residents this result represented an unmistakeable, 
total 'defeat. They had failed to influence the Council's policy towards then 
in any significant way and their own organization had collapsed. Nor did the 
Beckton protest have much influence elsewhere in Newham.- Late in 1971 the 
residents in another large clearance area mounted a demonstration protest 
about the 'blitz conditions' in which they were forced to live and about their 
rehousing in flats instead of houses." This petered out very quickly with 
no discernible effect. 'Normal relations' between the Council and residentc. 
in clearance areas had thus been re-established.
The treatment of this protest movement by Newham raises serious cuesticr^ 
which were riot answered by Council members interviewed for this study. Sone 
members of the Council leadership repeatedly denied that there had ever been 
any protest over high rise in Newham. Another important member coinment-ed:
In my opinion there was never sufficient protest — 
I'm not saying there wasn't any protest mind you — 
but it was never sufficient to influence the decision 
of Council. 265
Virtually all those who acknowledged the existence of the protest movement 
argued that those involved were a small minority of Beckton residents and 
that they were artificially creating resistance to rehousing. Several thought 
the whole thin:; was a ploy designed to get the protest leaders offers of 
council houses. Only the Director of Housing was better informed:
Interviewer: 'Do you recall a protect about this time by a
group called the Beckton Ward. Residents Co^mA 
Director: 'Oh yes. Very strong protest 1 . 
Interviewer; 'How did that work out in the end? 1 
Director; 'Well 1 (surprised) 'like it had to. I cean
we're open, the facts are available. V.'e had 
protest meetings and we simply told the people 
the truth and said, "itou want to get out 01 these
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rotten slums. We've got to build the accommodation 
necessary for you. Here it is, on the doorstep, in 
high rise! And that's all we can offer you*... You
r
know, there's a skill in dealing with people that
r\ r /"
achieved that result ' .
FINAL DECISIONS
The last high flats in Newham were approved in 1970 although tenants -.rero
still moving into newly completed and strengthened blocks as late as 1974.
268 The low rise system built flats proved to be cheap but unattractive and
in I'lay 1972 (under a new Housing Chairman) the HG considered a report (from a 
new Borough Architect) containing feasibility studies on hi.-ii density layouts
with large numbers of houses. A level of 50^ house provision at densities of
269 110 ppa was adopted. Twenty eight years after the Abercrombie Plan,.
housing policy in Newham had almost come full circle.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Birmingham.
•
8 0 1; The Urban Background.
« 
Birmingham's most striking characteristic is its size. Sprawling over
51,000 acres (nearly 80 square miles), the county borough's 1971 population 
was 1,013,000 people, the largest total in Britain outside London and far 
outstripping any other provincial centre except Glasgow. The city's 
economy remained buoyant for most of the post-war period, but from the mid 
1960s a steady seepage of industrial and commercial jobs began, which was 
only partially compensated by the growth of professional services and the 
office boom. Between 1961 and 1971 the city population fell by 6.3$.
Although surrounded on three sides by other authorities in the Vfest 
Midlands Conurbation, (Figure 8 0 1), Birmingham until recently remained almost a 
whole-city authority. The western border with Smethwick always marred this 
picture, and in the post-war period the middle class suburbs of Solihull and 
Sutton Coldfield were also exceptions to this pattern. But continuous 
development now spills over the city boundaries at many points. In the t974 
local government reorganization the new Birmingham District annexed Sutton
»
Coldfield, but not the vast corporation estate at Chelmsley Wood, built in 
Warwickshire next to the north-east city boundary in the late 1960s.
The two post-war patterns of ward organization display the classic ring
formation on which the Chicago school of urban sociology focused so much
o
attention, (Figures 8«2a and 8.2b). After the ward reorganization in 1962
this pattern is particularly useful as a basis for background analysis. The 
major flaw in it is Edgebaston ward, where a very large proportion of the ward
t
area has been controlled since the late nineteenth century by the private
*
trust, the Calthorpe Estate. Originally the upper middle class area of the 
city, the Calthorpe Estate has been preserved as a middle class, low density
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enclave in the middle ring of wards. The break up of large houses into flats
and some new building in the 1960s have increased densities in Edgebaston frcn
•5 
their 1945 level of 25 ppa.
*
In 1971 42> of dwellings in Birmingham were owner occupied, 38£j rented 
from the Council and nearly 20^ from private landlords. Within the city 
there are marked variations in the importance of these tenures between aress. 
In Perry Ban- and Oscott over three quarters of all dwellings are owner 
occupied, while in Duddeston, Newt own and Ladywood over QQP/o of all dwelj.ir.gs 
are council owned. In Iioseley, Edgebaston, Sparkbrook and Rotten Park over 
4C$ of dwellings are rented from private landlords. All the wards with a 
distribution of tenures highly skewed to the private rental sector lie in the 
middle ring, (Figure 8o3)«> Wards highly skewed towards council housing are 
either in the inner ring or the outer ring. All wards skewed towards owner 
occupation are in the outer ring. Private renting is not significantly 
higher than the city average in any of the outer wards; in most it is well 
below half the average.
The ring pattern is also reflected fairly accurately in the patterns of 
lack of facilities discovered by the decennial censuses, (Figures 8.4a, 8,4b 
and So4c). The amenities covered change from each census to the next, 
reflecting the progressive upgrading of standards of acceptable accord-elation 
in the post-war period. It seems fairly reasonable to incorporate this 
upgrading in looking at the amelioration of housing conditions in these year's. 
One of the most interesting findings of such a representation is the extent to 
which the proportion of households without facilities has been reduced noct 
in the inner wards> while the middle ring wards have fallen behind relative 
to both the inner and the outer wards.
The relative importance of redevelopment and new bailding in inprovin- 
access to amenities, can be tr.pped first by looking at the gains and Iosr;es in 
the ward housing stocks during the 1950s and '60s (Pi sure 8.5a and 8 0 5'o). 
The loss of dwellings from the central wards has been enormous, out has reen
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fairly evenly spread over the two decades, partly because of the long delays 
involved in redeveloping the very large comprehensive redevelopment areas first 
scheduled in 1947. (These figures should be interpreted with caution, -since 
in clearance areas being processed at the time of each census the loss of 
dwellings could be temporary).
Secondly, the distribution of new local authority building between the 
wards has clearly played a key role in improving housing, particularly in the 
central wards, (Figures 8.6a, 8»6b and 8 0 6c). Before 1949 council housing 
consisted almost entirely of three bedroom houses and building was concentrated 
in the eastern and southern boundaries of the city. In the 1950s, this 
concentration split into two areas where building was extensive, in the north 
east and south west outer wards. The 1960s saw an extension of these areas, 
plus the beginnings of large scale rebuilding in the central wards. The lack 
of any very significant council activity in the middle ring wards is 
particularly noticeable in this period. Finally it should be borne in mind 
that much development in the late 1960s took place outside the city boundaries 
at Chelmsley Wood, (not shown here).
One last indicator is worth noticing because of its close relationship 
with these housing policies. This is the proportion of people with parents 
born in the New Commonwealth, the best available indicator of race. The 
.distribution of these people within Birmingham wards suggests that most 
coloured people live in the middle ring of wards in two areas around Soho-
o
Handsworth and Sparkbrook, (Figure 8.?). Very few coloured people live in 
any of the outer wards, while the proportion of coloured people in the inner
«
ward populations is much lower than in neighbouring middle ring wards. This 
seems to reflect the national pattern of coloured people living almost entirely 
in areas of private rental tenure or of low price owner occupied houses, areas 
which now contain the worst housing conditions in the city. It would be 
difficult not to conclude that the absence of council activity in the middle 
ring wards has contributed to the very high concentrations of coloured people
JiO^^
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in these areas, a concentration which in Birmingham's case has been powerfully
stimulated by the arguably discriminatory policies implemented under the
q cover- of local authority control of multi-occupation.
THE POLITICO BACKGROUND
*
Pew other cities' historical and political background can have been as 
comprehensively and intensively studied as Birmingham's. Ken Newton's 
Second City Politics provides one of the most sophisticated treatments of 
urban politics available in Britain, while a number of papers originating 
from this research fill in considerable detail in other areas. And the 
three volume official History of Birmingham now provides a valuable chronology 
running up to 1970. We used the third volume cf this history, A. Sutcliffe 
and Ro Smith's Birmingham, 1939-70, particularly intensively in the early 
stages of this research. Although this was actually found to contain so:;.e
seriously misleading information relating to the high rise housing issue,
11 there can be no doubt as to its high overall standard.
To summarize this weight of background information would not be possible 
or desirable. Full references are given below and the essential context hay 
been incorporated in the narrative.
HIGH RISE IN BIRMINGHAM
There are 24,013 high rise flats in Birmingham in a total of 4-63 Mgn 
blocks, (including blocks in the Corporation's peripheral estates just outside 
the city boundaries) 0 Virtually all these flats have one or two bcdroons, 
(Table 8 J)'. 12 The blocks range in height up to 20 storeys, and there arc 
also some 48S flats in two 33 storey tower blocks. In March 1972 yhen The 
building of high rise came to an end, high flats accounted for 21> of 
Birmingham's council housing erected under the Housing Acts. This finjure is 
considerably higher' than that for other authorities in the "/Jest Midi anas 
Conurbation where comparable figures vcre ; .arley 19/-1 ? V.'est Bromwich 9,-, 
'Jolverhampton 10^, Sutton Coldfield 1C^, Dudley 6>', Aldrid^G Brovr-bili? 3,.>,
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Stourbridge 4^, and Solihull 0^. It is also higher than the figures for 
other large British cities, such as: Liverpool 20>J, Leeds 19^, Newcastle i 
Tyne 16;j, Manchester 11?J, Sheffield 11^ and Hull 1Q^. 15 ' ' '
Table 8,_1; High Rise Flats in Birmingham, 1974.
Jwejllings_________ _^ of high flats
Storey 
height
5-9
10-14
15-19
20 and over
All storeys
Number of bedrooms
One
1583
3845
1629
1868
8925
Two
4160
5739
2495
1641
1 4035
Three
795
60
198
-
1053
All
6538
9644
4322
3509
24013
dumber of bedrooms
One
606
16.0
6.8
7«.8
37.2
Two
17.3
23.9
10o4
6.8
58.4
Three
3o3
0.2
0.8
—
4.4
• 1 T
„- 1 -i. J-
27.2
4C.2
15.0
14.5
100.0
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This research was fundamentally only possible because of the kind decisicr 
of Birmingham District Council's current Chief Executive, Mr ?. Amos, to c^-';e 
me full access to the post-war Minutes and papers of the House Building 
Committee, the Housing Management Committee, the Public Works Cori';iittee and 
various other sources. The House Building Committee minutes and papers were 
surveyed systematically for the period 1950-70, and the other sources used 
as occasion demanded. "without this access it would certainly not have beer. 
.possible to survey such a vast tapestry in the necessary detail and I would 
like to record my grateful thanks to LIr Amos and his patient and helpful 
staff.
In addition a total of 17 'housing influentials' were identified for 
interview purposes in the manner described in the Introduction to Part II. 
Of theue, two members of the Coriuittee had died. /our members failed to rv-I w. 
to letters and one declined, while one was living abroad. A total of nine 
interviews with Council members were thus carried out, (on effective iiitervi^-,- 
rate of 64^), together with two interviews with chief officers. Interviewee- 
were :
1) Alderman Harry Wat ton - Leader of the Labour group 1959-66, member of the 
House Building and Public Works Committees 1950-66 e
2) Alderman Sir Charles Burman - Chairman of the House Building Committee 
1950-52, member 1950-60*
3) Alderman Ernest Horton - Deputy Leader of the Labour'group 19H- , member 
of the House Building Committee 1954-62 and 1963-4.
4) Alderman Apps - Chairman of the House Building Committee 1966-8 and member 
1958-69.
5) Alderman Beaumont Dark - Chairman of the Housing Committee 1968-70 and 
member 1968-71; member of the House Building Committee 1967-8.
6) Lady Fisher of Rednall - Chairman of the Housing Management Committee
1965-6, member of the House Building Committee 1962-70.
7) Alderman G. Corbyn Barrow - Chairman of the Housing Management Committee
1964-5, and member 1960-65; member of the House Building Committee 1950-58.
8) Councillor Peter Hollingworth - member of the House Building Committee
1960-7.
9) Councillor A.L.S. Jackson - member of the House Building Committee 1952-66.
10) A.G. Sheppard Fidler - City Architect 1952-64.
11) J.Jo A. Atkinson - Deputy Housing Manager 1954-64, Housing Manager 1964-68, 
Director of Housing 1968-76.
8 0 2; The Development of High Rise Policy.
Discussion of flats in Birmingham began at almost the same time as 
public housing development began to be envisaged. Joseph Chamberlain 
urged the inclusion of flats in the Corporation's first Improvement Scheme in 
1875, and twelve years later the Council accepted the principle of working 
class flats, building their first two storey block in 1901, In the mid 1920s 
a few more blocks were built although the bulk of the inter-war development 
was on suburban housing estates. The 1930s flats boom revised the controlling 
Conservative council groups' attitude, however, and in 1935 the Council 
approved its first large scale development in four storey flats, a 'watershed 1
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according to Sutcliffe.
Throughout the inter-war period, public housing policy was decisively 
influenced by the Public Works Department (which was responsible for all 
planning, engineering and housing construction work) and its powerful chief 
officer, Sir Herbert Manzoni. By 1939 the city had completed over 48,000 
council houses and rehoused 200,000 people and in the late '30s began to turn 
its attention to slum clearance. In 1937 Manzoni secured approval for the 
designation of Birmingham's first major clearance area (covering 267 acres 
in Duddeston and Nechells) and in 1938 the Public Works Committee (hereafter 
PWC) approved a five year clearance plan. This envisaged rehousing 25,000
families, three fifths of them in flats on cleared sites and the remainder on
17 suburban housing estates,
RECONSTRUCTION PLANNING
As in other areas the war not only halted these plans but considerably 
worsened the housing situation; some 12,000 houses were destroyed in air raids. 
Manzoni's planning expanded to meet this change and he secured Council approval 
for the designation of four more central clearance areas. In 1947 the Labour
Council raised a massive loan to purchase all five areas, covering 1,000 acres
18 
and including 17,000 back-to-back houses and 13,000 other dwellings. Their
redevelopment was to take a further twenty five years.
Work on the city's Development Plan began, closely following the guidelines 
of Abercrombie and Jackson's West Midlands Plan. As approved in 1952 it 
provided for two density rings - an Inner Zone at 75 to 120 ppa covering a 
third of the- city, and an outer area at 50 ppa (except for the Calthorpe estate 
which was preserved at a level of 30 ppa). In practice, although the 120 ppa 
limit applied in later redevelopment areas, Manzoni 1 s war time plans for 
Duddeston envisaging densities of 160 ppa achieved by massed high rise were not 
completely abandoned^
Post-war housing construction of 7,000 permanent dwellings by mid-1951, 
many in non-traditional systems, got under way very much on pre-war lines.
As Sutcliffe and Smith point out, the Council leadership was slow to adjust
to the implications of urban containment policies so densities were low and
20 flats were rare. " In 1948, however, the PWC approved contracts for a. war time
design for six twelve storey blocks in Duddeston, (which amongst other features 
included five escape staircases to ensure their acceptability to tenants), 
costing £2,500 a flat. 21
In 1949 the Conservatives gained control of the Council after an election
22 campaign fiercely critical of Labour's housing record. A Housing Conference
was convened to speed up housing output, as a result of which control of 
housing construction policy was taken from the PWC and given to a new House 
Building Committee (HBC) under the chairmanship of an experienced civil 
engineering contractor, Sir Charles Burman. Burman ran the Committee virtually
single handed and insisted that all council members with connections with
23 house builders or the construction trade unions be excluded. A complete
break was made with the existing closed contractual relations between the 
Council and local builders, and large non-traditional firms such as Wimpey, 
Laing and ¥ates were invited to commit their resources to the city in return 
for large and continuing contracts. By 1951 Birmingham's housing output 
jumped 75^ up on the previous year to 3,500 dwellings, and in 1952 completions
touched 4,800. This increase suddenly projected the problem of land
25 availability in Council ownership into sharp focus. As a result of the
rapid fall in the Corporation's land stock, the Public Works Department
P6 architects included flats for the first time. In 1951 they accounted for
4^ of completions and a year later for a fifth. Burman announced that flct 
building would have to increase, particularly in the suburbs: 'If drastic and
far reaching proposals for flats were placed before the Council, I for one
27 would not be shocked'.
The contractual, pressures for flat building were also established st this 
time. Manzoni directed his department towards co-operation with trie builders 
in producing designs for flats in non-traditional systems, and in 1955
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Birmingham and Wimpey unveiled the first 6 and 8 storey 'no fines' blocks. 28 
Although Wimpey had only slight sucess in marketing these designs to other 
authorities, Birmingham ordered over 1,000 of the flats in the next two years,
both for redevelopment areas and to increase densities on post-war outlying
29 estates. Contract prices fell steadily to £2,000 a flat and virtually all
one and two bedroom accommodation was provided in the blocks. High rise 
approvals and flat completions rose steadily, (Table 8*2 and Figure 8 08).^°
SUBURBAN HIGH RISE
In 1952 Labour regained control of the Council, which they retained for 
the next fourteen years. The leader of the Labour group, Herbert Bradbeer,
took over as HBC Chairman and declined to run the one-man show created by
31
Burinan. For ideological reasons Labour members also wanted an architect to
take over public housing, not least to improve the bleak designs which were 
still current. With many genuflections to Manzoni's tripartite skills, and 
against strong Conservative opposition, control of housing construction and
designs (but not of planning or clearance timetabling) was vested in a new
32 City Architect. The new post went to A. Sheppard Fidler, the architect of
Crawley New Town, who quickly consolidated his international reputation by 
improving Birmingham's housing design, introducing landscaping and mixed 
development. His position was weakened however by Manzoni's strict non- 
interventionist interpretation of the division of planning and housing design 
responsibilities. The Public Works Department in designing new estates drew
up the road lines without consultation and only afterwards passed them to the
33Architects Department to fill in the housing layout. Departmental relations
worsened throughout the 1950s until in 1962 Sheppard Fidler produced his own
34 plans for a major development, flatly contradicting Manzoni's designs. The
City Architect was also blamed in some quarters for the steady fall in housing 
output which reached 3,000 in 1954, 2,500 in 1956 and 2,000 in 1959. In 
practice, housing output was restricted by government controls, high interest 
rates, the lack of large sites for development and the extra time taken to
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Table 8 0 2; Ili^h Rise Approvals in Birmingham, 1951-70.
Year
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
Total
High Rise
Approvals
180
306
180
698
761
524
486
1,015
1,143
1,193
336
809
668
2,420
4,487
3,406
1,931
2,154
430
185
23,312
All Tender
Approvals
4,654
3,498
3,249
3,968
2,687
2,125
1,775
3,195
2,018
3,704
856
2,082
2,292
4,077
8,741
7,559
8,989
7,877
1,461
1,589
76,392
/* of Approvals
High Rise
3.9
8.8
5.5
17*6
28o3
24.7
27.4
31.8
56«,6
32.2
39.3
33*9
29o1
59«4
51.3
45.1
21.5
27.3
29o4
11.6
30.5
Sheppard Fidler's main design innovation, was to combine mixed devc-Iopnent
•2/•
with the pre-existing trend towards suburban flat building. Shortly after 
his arrival, however, he discovered that Manzoni's architects had been 
designing high flat schemes for sites which because they were in low cost 
suburban areas did not qualify for the expensive sites subsidy. A Biminghan 
delegation to MHLG- initially won only sympathy and a promise of reform in 
the next legislative round, so that 'drastic cuts' in the multi-storey 
programme were forecast. Bradbeer posed the paradox that Birmingham r.i^v.t 
have to look for more expensive sites in order to lower rents,,' But 
negotiations went on over the next six months, largely because Hacnillan vas 
anxious to encourage the city in flat building as a me-.ns of defusing de~—s 
for a Yfest Midlands''satellite town 1 . '.Tn November by a process which renairiG 
obscure and was never oxpl^ned at the time, the liinistry decided to £rar.t 
special subsidies to RLrmin-ham for itn suburban flats, a decision vhich led
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the local precs to report, 'the road is clear for further suburban buildir.:;' 
Three months later Macmillan opened the city's first high rise blocks in 
Duddeston and Ivechells declaring, 'Birjiiin-hain has taught the t.hole country 1 .^"0 
In October 1955 the Ministry announced the separation of the expensive site 
and storey hei;;ht subsidies, with virtually all the emphasis on the latter/ 1 
The 1S56 Act produced a marked switch towards building in the redevelop­ 
ment areas, but overall suburban building accounted for over two thirds of 
all Birmingham's public housing between 1953 arid 1960, and redevelopment areas 
for less than a quarter, (Table 8.3). 42 Althou^i high flats accounted for 
only a third of planned suburban dwellings, (compared with three fifths in 
redevelopment areas) the scale of the suburban programme meant that it none­ 
theless accounted for 60>S of all high rise. Residents in higher amenity areas 
and neighbouring authorities objected strongly to the use of high rise/5 
One Conservative councillor remarked in an interview:
Sheppard Fidler wanted point blocks everywhere. He 
put one right up a ;ainst a really good house, what would 
now be a £50,000 house with a swimming pool and everything. 
And all these blithering flat dwellers were going to look 
straight down into this chap's swimming pool,. I protested, 
I said 'You don't put point blocks in nice residential areas 
like thisJ You'll ruin the privacy'. 44
Table 8<,3: Birmingham's Annual Housing Programme, 1 953-60 0
Building form Area ;
Redevelopment
Areas
Suburbs Overspill Total
Houses 
Low Rise 
High Rise
All Forms 
^ of buil,ii>]g_ form
Houses 
Lov^ Rise
iii{-;h Rise
/'!]. Forms
•MM
260 
2,055 
3,669
5,984
4 
21
39
24
4o4 
34o3 
61 o3
100oO
,6 
,5
o2
.3
4,610 27.5 
6,549 38 6 9 
5,655 33.6
16,814 lOOcO
80o7 
68.6
, 60o4
68o3
Ho
••••H^
844 
942 
44
1,830
•
14. 
9.
Co
7.
7 
9
4
4
1
46
51 
2
100
.1 
o5
.4
oO
1.0.
i, 5^6 
9,366
? '1 G 2 5
1 CO
ICO
10:
100
23
-•• *•" 
>^-
« —— ,-N
' ' - V,
.0
.0
.0
« '^
II,
• ^x 
• -^
.0
.0
But althou.^---! these decisions v;ere defended in terms of :;iving f.'.at ^rollers
45 
pleasant surroundings and good views, no real policy of equ^.l.i.zlr^ houGir.;;
amenities was pursued. Redevelopment area densities were still over twice 
those of new suburban estates.
One of the puzzles of Birmingham's housing policy in the 1950s is uhv 
high rise was used so extensively to achieve densities of 75-80 ppa in the 
suburbs when Sheppard Pidler's own redevelopment area designs demonstrated 
that densities nearly twice as great could be achieved using only low rise/'"" 
In a 1957 address he remarked:
Most tenants would undoubtedly prefer to live in houses .. 
A house is the favourite choice of 80$ of (local authority) 
tenants and there is no doubt that the desire for f a place 
of one's own 1 is very strong in most of us. There is a 
general feeling, however, that at densities somewhere between 
70 and 100 habitable rooms per acre (around 77 to 110 ppa) 
their exclusive uce becomes unsatisfactory, while the Ministry 
handbook, The Density of Residential Areas categorically states 
that 'the absolute i^ximum density for 2 storey terrace housing 
is about 105 rooms per acre'. 47
This explained high rise in clearance areas, but not in the suburbs. It 
seems then that hi{;h flats were being preferred on design grounds by the 
architects department and were not made necessary by a need to exploit the 
remaining available land.
The puzzle of low density high rise is compounded by the steady increase 
in storey heights throughout the 1950s. Eight storey blocks were introduced
in 1954, and in 1958 twelve storey flats were used for the first time since
50 the costly Duddeston blocks and the Aston estate of 1951-2. At the sar.e
time a new 9 storey type block was introduced. In 1959 storey heights reached
51 14 storeys in the suburbs, and 16 storeys in redevelopment areas. 3y 19-0
nearly 27$ of the city's housing approvals \TCS in blocks of 15 storeys or
52 more.
Contractually 'limpey and other large builders dominated the city's hi,;::. 
rise building, although local builders began to compete effectively en 
traditional contracts in 1957-8 for the fir.?t time, an involvoi?.er:t vhich slcvl;
53increased over the next few years.
8<»3: rj?he Reorientation of Policy, 1958-63. 
THE DECLINE IN FLAT BUILDING
•
According to Sutcliffe, the shift towards redevelopment after 1356
brought about far reaching changes in attitudes to flats: 'Hindsight distin-
«
guishes the year 1958 as the be/jinning of the end of Birmingham f s brief
54 dalliance with the suburban flat 1 . In fact there was an HBC decision in
1958 to reduce the use of high rise outside redevelopment areas, but althov.-h 
the decision was never formally reversed, this policy change was very 
temporary.
One of the reasons underlying the 1958 decision was an increase in worries 
about flat life. At the start of the flats programme a Birmingham Ccxincil
delegation toured blocks in London and returned with the verdict - 'Life in
56 
a flats it isn't so bad'. Local newspapers such as the Birmingham Post ani
iixi-L editorialized in favour of flats criticized a loc-j.l H.P. for 'repea^ir.g
outworn parrot-cries about Birmingham's need for a "satellite" to;-m raid its
57not being "flat minded".' In 1957 the Post argued that Council leaders
were too cautious about flats: 'The great majority in the City accepts local­ 
ized higher densities and higher cost as a way of preserving the amenity of
open spaces within the city and outside. There is no blindness to the iss.i^r
58 involved 1 . Three years later the Evening Dispatch called for: 'reall;/ hir-
building . .. tall towers 20, 30 or 40 storeys high to release more space for
59 sleeping parklands in the new Birmingham 1 . These varied positions were
strengthened by extravagant press commentary about urban sprawl, :;uch as the 
B Ir n 1 Tii ; \L Ga 2 e 1 1 o article headlined:
CCi'OPUS ~ '/here will it all end - this creeping 
red rash that is pushing the countryside further 
and further from our doors? ^ 
While there's still time - stop it.1
But in the late '50s -more critical attitudes also began to be voiced. In 
1955 it was reported that the- first Duddeston flats were /mown as a 'concentra­ 
tion caiup ' and that 'many of the tenants are lon.r;i;jg for ;:.• chan^o t.o a house
with a little garden'. In 1957 David Eversley (then a TCPA activist ai-l 
secretary of the Midlands 'New Towns Society) published a scathing article 
headlined 'Saucer City' attacking peripheral high flats and the failure to 
redevelop central areas. A Birmingham University survey had found *a wide­ 
spread feeling against flats amongst tenants displaced from slum property ..
No one was found who would not rather have a house. Everyone thought the
(~\ r) 
tall flats were unsuitable for people with children'. The Planning Chairza
replied only that 'these flats will be a real feather in the cap for Birring-
^"x
ham 1 . But the city's Housing Manager told a housing conference in 1953
that at least 80$ of Birmingham's flat dwellers disliked their homes and 
wanted to live in houses.
The 1958 decision partly reflecting these criticisms and those of 
Committee members, stemmed from a Ministry request for a cut of 500 dwellings 
from the 2,700 planned for 1958* The cut was met by postponing a large-high 
flat contract, which provided an occasion when criticism of high rise was 
voiced. But high rise continued to rise as a proportion of all approvals 
despite this meeting and in 1960 the Conservative leader, Alderman Griffin, 
raised another criticism of high rise in the context of a growing crisis in 
the Housing Revenue Account. He was reportedly 'staggered' to find that the 
Council lost £78.60 annually on each high flat, compared with £5"'.30 on fcnir 
storey dwellings and £43.50 on low rise. The loss from the city's high rise- 
stock already stood at £159,000 a year, and Griffin forecast a housing deficit 
'because we are building more and more multi-storey dwellings and losing zi'-re 
and more money in the process' . Since Labour were still at this tine 
conduit ted to nairtaining low rent levels of some kind, and the Labour group 
was already deeply divided over increases, this may have been one factor 
restraining the use of high rise over the next few years. In I960 the 
proportion of flats, in Birmingham's housing output reached a peak of £;>;-•. but 
high rise fell from the 1959 approvals peak to average around 36f$ over the r.ex 
three years. 67 At the same time the use of more expensive taller blocks
tailed off. ITo blocks over t5 storeys were approved in 1961 and very few
flats over 10 storeys, (Table 8.4). 8
Taole 8,4: Approvals by .Storey Height, 1931-70.
Year I lumber___________ ft of high rise
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1939
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
5-9.
180
306
180
698
761
524
486
733
449
422
268
301
347
136
72
70
72
—
—
36
10-14
~
-
-
_
—
-
-
67
154
593
68
136
228
1156
2763
2100
5H
1146
—
43
15-19 20
— — .
«. _
— _
— —
— —
_ _
-
215 -
540 -
178
— —
372 -
93 -
1012 116
992 660
182 1054
430 925
494 5H
430
106
1951-70 6041 8968 4614 3699
5-9
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
72
39
35
80
37
52
6
2
2
4
—
-
19
26
10-14
—
-
—
—
-
-
-
7
13
50
20
17
34
48
62
62
26
53
-
23
38
15-1
_
—
—
—
—
—
-
21
47
15
—
46
H
42
22
5
22
23
-
57
20
9 20
_
—
—
—
—
-
-
—
—
—
-
-
-
5
15
31
48
24
100
—
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INDUSTRIALIZED BUILDING - THE FIRST ATTEMPT
The swing away from high flats in 1958-60 was temporary primarily because 
the early '60s saw a sudden worsening of Birmingham's housing situation. , The 
growth of slum clearance combined with the ,;entle decline of public housing 
output under Ilinistry controls and financial pressures to whittle away to 
nothing by 1961 the increases in the local housing stock as a result of Cour. ci._ 
activities, (Table 8 0 5). 69 But in 1962 the city's housing output fell oy 
half and for the first time the Council knocked down almost twice as many 
houses as it built. At almost the same time, Birmingham was able to buy a 
350 acre site at Castle Bromwich Airfield for housing purposes (the availabilit;
of which caused the rejection of Birmingham's application for a city bound--
70 
extension to provide land for building at T.vythall in 1960).
Sheppard Tidier decided to neize tl.is opportunity to shake off his 
association vith falling outputs and to make a major effort to boost
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completions. Although he simultaneously became involved in a long
with Manzoni over the planning of the development which eventually delayed t:.o
project, on the housing front he moved very quickly towards adopting •
industrialized building, He was particularly impressed by Liverpool's
£9 million contract for Cajnus system built flats and became convinced that
Birmingham should make a similar commitment, which would be large enough to
attract a major firm to act as regional contractor in the system and build
71 a factory for its manufacture.
Table 8»5;. The Housing Situation, 1946-73: Annual Construction and Lcnoliticvi,
Year Public Private Slum Net impact of Net impact of
Housing Housing Clearance ( 1 ) - (3) (l) + (2) - (3).
1946
1947 
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
19S9
1970
1971
1972
1973
(1)
417
888 
1452
1251
2065
3555
4817
4089
3105
3455
2621
2490
2470
2106
2002
2139
1161
2349
2542
4036
4728
9033
8023
7249
5S90
3412
1444
(2)
492 
670 
421
443
610
432
662
680
832
1824
648
747
833
896
1277
989
1067
1634
1436
1254
1518
1640
1907
1839
953
1148
1303
(3)
(Figures
1072
1364
1135
814
1471
1094
2213
2209
2446
2187
2930
4061
5703
5479
4556
3119
4405
2966
unavailable 1946-54)
2382
1257
1355
1656
635
908
- 74
- 1048
- 97
355
1136
667
3330
2554
2693
2771
- 993
- 1522
4206
1905
2102
2489
1531
2185
915
19
1537
1791
2390
2185
4970
4461
4532
3724
155
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Sheppard ]:lJ.ler began by trying to organize an HEG trip to rrance to sc 
the Camus system. .But although his views convinced his Chairman, r.rnco-j .Bo 
they ran irto opposition from the Labour leader, Harry ;.;atton. faaUor. h:,d 
become leader in 1959 after challenging Herbert Bradbeer in the leadership
election. Ilis victory was the result of several years careful planning
72 
'gathering power unto myself is how he described it, and he replaced
Bradbeer's loose, rather bumbling leadership by vigorous activity and tirht
group discipline, characteristics which led him to be known by some Labour
73 councillors as 'the Fuhrer'. He quickly centralized power in the Lab OUT £i-c-
and the Council under his control, and developed close links with the very
right wing Labour Party machine in the wards and constituencies run by
74Harold Nash. Watton's close friends, Denis Thomas and Bond, became the
chairmen of the PWC and HBC respectively. Watt on himself sat on both 
committees and his support was obviously essential to Sheppard Fidler if his 
initiative was to succeed.)
Watton insisted that the delegation include the PWC, that it look at the
full range of French systems, not just at Camus, and that it go at Council
75 expense rather than being paid for by Camus. The enlarged party, which did
not include Watton who stayed at home, seemed to have mixed views about their 
trip. Bond and some members of the HBC and Housing Management chairman were
r-ir
impressed by Camus. But another member recalled:
Even we with our bit of expertise in the early days 
(of industrialized building) weren't fools. When we 
went to look at Camus there were other French systems 
that we were supposed to be looking at. But in fact 
though the champagne flowed happily at the Camus sites, 
all competitors were merely vanned by an office boy in 
a hut .... and after some struggle he'd manage to find 
the keys to let us in. In other words it was fixed in 
France that 'Camus are going to have Birmingham' and they 
tried to lead us by the nose. „„ 
Well, we'd £Gt Ijritish systems as wellj
(his emphasis)
At a meeting with Watton, Sheppard Fidler told him that he had decided to 
recommend adoptirg Camus. Watton recalled:
I went up to the Town Clerk's room, and the City 
Architect, pointed out'to us what advantage we would get 
by adopting the C:oau3 syctc:a for I think a place we were 
planning,'perhaps a little bit slowly in retrospect, at 
Castle Bronr,:i:;h /.Lrfieici. But I was wary of this cClO 
million worth of what would obviously be a concrc\,e town, 
and eventually I said: 'Under 1:0 ci:'ci;..i,;tcnces shall I 
reco:;ir;,ov}d the HOC to give this sort of cor.'tract out. In 
fact 1 ohall see that they don't! 1 78
Sheppard tidier pressed ahead, however, and in December 1962 with Bond's 
support he presented a long, mainly technical report to the E3C backed uo by
endorseraents from Hacey and the Housing Lanagenent Coruaitbee, arruir..:; for a
79 Camus contract for around 2,500 flats. He stressed the urgency of t:-.ci-J.ir..^
development at Castle Bromwich quickly, the strong backing of the Ilinistry, 
the unprecedented level of industrial interest and the opportunity open to r::3 
city to reduce its housing problems. His report came under fire from a riunbe 
of HBC members, including a local builders' merchant who claimed Castle 3rcr- 
wich could be developed in two years by traditional builders. But t-o 
decisive contributions were made by the Conservative housing spokesman, C*»vci- 
llor Tom Matthews and by v/atton. Hat thews accepted that they 'should adopt 
a radical system of building in order to step up the rate of production', bu~ 
not Camus. 'Systems evolved by British firms had not been investigated 1 , 
the Camus cost claims were highly dubious, the initial investment was too high
and the contracting arrangements unclear. I Matthews ran a local joinery sub- 
fin 
contracting business, and he argued that if firms already working on
Birmingham high flat contracts were cllowed to tender for a 1,000 dwelling 
type block contract they could be as quick and as cheap as Camus. Vatton 
backed up this point saying,
.. there has to be serious discussion of the points 
at issue. I have a feeling there is some pucl:ir;g of 
the Camus system and that Castle ?,ro:,r.;ich was being 
used for this purpose. I think there night be sor.ie ^ 
exaggerated statements beinj made in support of Car;iu=i.
He argued that the Camus system mi&ht not conform with the city's building 
codes: 'The. City Architect should have referred to the difficulties wLich 
must exist with modern methods of unit construction'. The HBC then Durr.-crtc-i 
two resolutions proposed by '.fatten. The first approved 'mechanised factory 
housing' for speedy inclusion in Eirminjiam's pro;;r;i:;r.e. Jhe sr-cc-nd rc--'.rded 
that they were 'impressed' by the Cnau?,system, but referred back the City 
Architects rev-ort for two nor.tlis c--lli:ig for additional material to be jrovicR 
on other syoteTas and on possible luildir;; rejiilaticn problems.
In March 1963 Sheppard Fidler 1 s second report claimed that there were r.o 
major problems with the building regulations (and certainly mentioned no 
structural problems), but this point was immediately dropped by the Committee.' 
Instead attention fastened on alternative systems suitable for building 9-20 
storey blocks. Sheppard Fidler reviewed only the Larsen-Nielson, Coiguet and
Reema systems, which he claimed were either not as fully industrialized as
OTP 
Camus or were unavailable. Committee members pointed out the omission of
Concrete Ltd.'s Bison system for which Birmingham had placed a pilot contract 
for a 34 flat 9 storey block in June 1962, with the local firm of Cc 3ryant ar.d. 
Son acting as general contractor. For site acquisition reasons work on this 
block had not yet begun. The Committee now took the view that they had 
resolved 'in the light of this experiment to consider whether or not to proceed 
with a programme of building by industrial methods', and since the contract had 
not yet been started they could not come to a decision. This view, apart frc:: 
contradicting the December 1962 decision in favour of industrialized building 
in principle, was completely new to Sheppard Fidler who saw the Bison block as 
relevant at best to a very small part of the housing programme.
The link which Sheppard Fidler made explicit between Camus and high rise 
building also attracted strong criticism on cost grounds:
If industrialized building systems were to be introduced the 
Committee would be thinking in terms of building up to 22 storeys, 
and we shall have to consider whether the expenditure involved 
could bo justified, not only from the viewpoint of the ratepayer, 
but also the taxpayer. Bearing in mind the amenities which would 
have to be provided, it is by no means cert: in that the saving of 
land involved in the erection of multi-storey buildings would be ^_ 
sufficient to justify their cost as against 3 or 4 storey blocks.
Information on how many units of accommodation would be lost by a completely 
low rri.se or housing estate development at Castle Bromwich was asked for, 
together with alternative costings.
Finally Sheppard Fidler's report was criticized because it 'did not deal 
fully with the possibility of utilizing the number of British systems new 
available', a patriotism that was clearly linked in discussion to Tna.ibr-rc 1 
desire to use firms already working in Birmingham rather than byin-in^ in
outsiders. The Committee minutes recorded a view not taken seriously in 
December, that traditional builders could redevelop Castle Broinwich in two 
years, and it was resolved that even if industrialized building was used the 
whole estate could not be given to one contractor. Eventually the meeting 
ended by calling for a new report to discuss these further issues, particular.! y
the houoin^ mix planned for the estate.
P^ 
Sheppard Fidler's final report on Camus was detailed and strongly worded."""
He dismissed the claims that traditional building could redevelop Castle 
Bromwich in two years: 'in my view it would be physically impossible vithin 
this period' 0 He emphasized that only half the housing would be industrialized, 
and the remainder could be distributed 'among a few of the larger contractors 
to develop either in traditional methods or in their own structural techniques. 
The fears expressed by some members that the larger firms would not have the 
opportunity of making their contribution at Castle Bromwich are, therefore, 
groundless 1 . On the Bison block he observed only: 'a clear directive on 
the methods of building to be employed must be given well in advance of the 
completion of this block 1 .
On high rise his report did mark a retreat. At 80 ppa with 30-4 Ofi; of 
accommodation in high rise, a contract of around 1,600 high flats would have 
to be brought up to 2,000 by building four storey blocks in Camus. He 
concluded:
I am convinced that the Camus system is the most 
comprehensive industrialized system available and 
should be adopted at Castle Bromwich. where the scale 
of buiJ ding will produce worthwhile economies together 
with speedier building.
On the housing mix for the estate, Sheppard Fidler set out five options,
87 (Table 806). Although houses were tenants' preferred form of accorjr.odatior.,
his report concluded that Option 1 was not feasible, and that of the other 
options number 5 provided the largest number of houses. The Housing Kr.nr.ger, 
KfcCfcy, stror.jly endorsed a high density solution to maximize housing gains: 
'any loss of housirr; at Castle Bromwich will have to be i^dc up conic../.ere else 1
and endorsed Option 5 on these grounds. Ee did note, however, that he found
it hard to see why 39^ of accommodation had to be in high rise at a density
of only 80 ppa.
Table 8.6; Planning Options at Castle Bromwich, April 1963.
Option Housing Mix Dwellings People Cost p'er; To 4" 5 "'
1
2
3
4
5
1 & 2 Sty
1,2 & 4 Sty
All 4 Sty
Ilixed Develop 
(1,2,4, high 
rise)
Total
2,712
2,892
3,732
meot
3,492
As (4) but a 4,260 
higher density
J2JL
12o
13.
17.
16.
19.
a_
5
4
2
2
7
Total
13
13
17
14
19
,908
,428
,076
,766
,280
p. a
64.4
62.1
79o2
680 4
80oO
person
£
619
674
724
774
835
dwelling 
£
3,177
3,132
3,315
3,275
3,388
Co
£
8
9
12
11
14
st
T* .
.62
.06
.37
.43
.43
The Committee decided the housing mix question first by discarding 
Options 1, 2 and 4 as unlikely to secure Ministry loan sanction. They settler. 
on Option 5 but demanded a lower density of 75 ppa tc reduce the proportion 
of high rise. 'Not only has the cost of multi-storey building now become 
excessive, but it is well known that tenants prefer normal houses to multi­ 
storey blocks'.
From this point onward Sheppard Fidler 1 s defeat was complete. With little 
further discussion the Committee finally rejected his proposal to employ the 
Camus system. Instead it was decided to call a conference of the r.iajor 
builders already working in the city to discuss alternative methods of developing 
the site. Watton remarked about this defeat:
As you probably know, anyone who doesn 1 t gat what they thirJc 
right .. particularly anyone in a rather senior position uhen 
uhat they think is a worderful idea gets turned down, he's apt 
to get a bit peeved about it. And when the City Architect 
lost this one, .. he was very concerned about it. As a matter 
of fact, a little time after that he gave us cur notice and left.
or.;
The long decision - making process over Camus had important ir.plications 
News of the rejection of industrialized building leaked out and t:>f. complete 
secrecy surrounding the decision attracted preso criticism. J PIurging on 
Castle Brohi.dch was severely delayed and the first turf at the site was on];;
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ceremonially cut in April 1964, a fact picked up by the QG for War wick shire 
at the later inquiry into Birmingham's claim for building land at Water Orton. 
He asked Watton:
•
£C: 'After four years of planning, through the initiative
of the Council a piece of grass has been cut? 1
Watton; 'I prefer to see it as a symbolic representation of the 
speed with which Birmingham has started on this Castle 
Bromwich project'.
0£: 'I could not put the words any better than you have, 
Mr Alderman 1 . 90
8.4; The Boom Years for High Rise.
BUYING BRITISH
In the light of the HBC's decision in April 1963 to reduce the proportion 
of high rise in the city's output at Castle Bromwich, it is surprising that 
over the next five years the same Committee approved some 15*000 high rise 
flats. Over two thirds of Birmingham's high rise dwellings date from this 
concentrated burst of building. The proportion of high rise in the housing 
programme in fact rose to a post-war peak of 60/£ in 1964- and dropped to only 
51$ in 1965 and 45$ in 1966. 91
The very large output of high rise dwellings in these years, (which 
reached a peak of nearly 4»500 approvals in 1965)? was partly a consequence of 
the overall expansion of Birmingham 1 s housebuilding, (Table #«2)« This 
expansion was itself due to sizeable increments to the land owned by the Council
for housingo The 350 acre Castle Bromwich site was supplemented in 1964 by ?.
92 smaller but still quite large site at Bromford Bridge Racecourse. And in
December 1964, the new Minister of Housing and Local Government, Richard Cross- 
man, made a personal decision to grant Birmingham's application to build on
over 1,500 acres of green belt land outside the city boundaries at "ater Ortcn,
93 a development which became known ns Chelmsley Wood. The high rise housing
boom thus exactly coincided with on unprecedented increase in the building land
_ _., _ i_i •i»^i^iJr/ *i—— • ——————"~~—^—— •
available to the Council. This accumulation of paradoxes is increased by 
the location of hig/i rise blociiy built in 1963-68. Of the 13,401 kno:rr. appr-r,-? l s , 
3£yi' were built on peripheral estates outside the city boundaries, ^
further 19/£ were built in the outer suburbs inside the city boundary but still 
up to four miles from the city centre, while another ]]fo were built in the
inner suburbs. Just over 4>200 flats (32?£) were built in the redevelopment
/ \ 94 areas, (Table 8.7).
Table 8 0 7; Location of Eigh Rise Flats Approvals, 1931-70. 
Year Location (where identified)
Redevelopment Inner 
Areas Suburbs
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1951-70
No 
90
135
198
584
453
490
300
578
34
276
942
884
986
1154
76
36
7216
29
18 
41
58
48
44
89
71
12
13
23
29
54
54
18
19
34
No
216 
180 
90 
192 
160 
192
257
270
—
36
—
34
386
350
602
60
-
354
149
3508
71 
100 
13 
25 
31 
40
25
28
—
11
-
12
19
9
20
3
—
82
81
16
Outer 
Suburbs
No 
180
Mb
584 
434 
364 
96
174
83
320
—
185
176
436
1134
914
—
—
—
-
5080
100
87 
57 
69 
19
17
9
28
—
23
63
21
28
30
_
—
—
—
24
Peripheral
Estates
No
-
144
355
..
46
36
986
1587
628
796
1000
—
~
5578
~
_
15
32
_
6
13
47
40
21
43
46
—
—
26
Total 
Identified
No
180 
306 
180
674 
761
524 
486
1015
950
1165
336
809
280
2084
4013
3028
1842
2154
430
185
21382
c 1
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
Ur, id en- 
tii"-' ed
i.'o 
24
_
193
68
—
—
383
335
474
378
89
«,
—
-
1950
One of the most interesting aspects of Birmingham 1 s return to high rise 
building despite the presence of countervailing forces in the 1958-63 period,
QC
is the very different contractual pattern which developed, (Table 808)."' 
During the 1950s Wimpey built just over a third of the city's high rise, and 
Laing, T.,rates and other national firms a further quarter. Four locc-.l firrr.s, 
S tubbings, Korriss and Jacombs, Bryant and G. VJhi.ttal accounted for a quarter 
of all high rise between them, although they did not win contracts with any 
great regularity.
After the hiatus in high rise approvals in 1961-3, the new burst of hi;;h 
flat bulling showed a completely different contractual pcttern. Over the 
five years 1964-8, Bryant leapt to prominence, being awr^oed 6C°/o of all ^ h
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(High flats Approvals)
Year Ration al ^irms
Vimpey V7ates L
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1951-60
1961-70
1 95JL-
1970:
%
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
196?.
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1951-61
1961-71
1951-71
180
90
180
366
416
96
138
316
—
382
-
-
-
208
626
806
348
192
354
— •
2224
2534
4758
of all
100
29
100
54
55
18
41
31
—
32
—
_
_
9
14
24
18
9
82
—
34
15
20
_ ,
—
fwt
308
._
108
96
~.
270
108
-
144
—
—
92
368
—
—
-
—
890
604
1494
High Ris
—
—
...., -
44
•M*
21
20
—
24
9
—
18
—
~
2
11
—
—
—
—
14
4
6
ain:-;
_
—
—
—
135
—
„
273
154
..
_
-
~
—
-
_
—
—
—
—
562
*•«
562
"Other
•~.
—
—
—
210
—
-
*M
—
-
-
372
-
—
120
—
—
~
—
—
210
492
702
.fi.i.rn.in--h
Bryant 3
„ ,
— .
x
_
—
— .
„
120
—
204
108
34
178
1734
2481
1814
1433
1832
76
185
324
9875
10199
"in j'irms
tubbirjrs
ti
_
~
«.
_.
160
160
—
270
110
—
46
~
276
126
168
~
—
—
—
700
616
1316
Lor:? is
_
~
_
•.
160
_
_
177
210
—
_
«
_
304
58
_
_
-.
—
547
362
909
Other
216
•*•
•ut
_ „
1 _ -
«-
36
179
60
—
_
_
144
~
_
—
—
— •
431
204
635
Dcrc
LaoQvr
•
^
BJ_
„
_
_
32
270
79
100
213
102
100
365
150
150
130
—
—
381
131 i
1692
v^ t
: Vnicier.-
u~
^__
p/1
•M
_
1ff,
m~r
"j O^
.,
66
_
•2 r- /;
102
225
42
_
„
~
•—
' 217
828
1 C< 5
e Approvals)
~
—
-
—
18
—
—
27
13
—
...
_
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
9
-
2
—
-
-
—
27
-
—
—
—
«
—
46
—
—
3
~
—
-
-
—
3
3
3
—
-
-
—
—
—
—
12
—
17
32
4
27
72
55
53
74
85
18
100
5
59
44
~
—
-
—
—
31
33
-
24
9
tea*
6
-
11
3
5
-
—
—
—
11
4
6
—
—
-
—
-
31
-
—
17
18
-
—
—
-
7
2
-
-
—
—
8
2
4
—
71
-
—
—
—
—
4
-
15
18
—
—
_
3
-
—
—
—
•~
7
1
3
—
—
-
_
~
—
7
27
i
—
30
26
15
4
8
£
8
6
—
~
6
8
7
—
—
-
3
-
—
—
«
•7
-
c. --'
-
5S
4
5
i
-
—
~
™™
t
'>
'3
(Korris refers to i-iorris and Jacombs Ltd)
flat approvals (9,300 dwellings). Wimpey gained only 14$ of these contracts, 
Wates won only a few hundred flats while Laing dropped out of hi.^h flat 
tendering altogether. No other local builder experienced such a massive 
upsurge in contracts. The 1964-8 increase in high rise building was thus 
almost entirely an increase in the work going to Bryant.. This in turn is 
explicable completely in terms of Bryant's adoption of the Bison method of 
industrialized building.
The Bison system was developed by Concrete Ltd. in 1962 out of their 
previous floor and column techniques, and produced pre-cast concrete flats on
Q£the lines of heavy prefabrication systems but with much smaller units." 
Concrete 1 s marketing problem was that they lacked main contracting resources 
and needed a general contractor to actually build the flats. In 1960 Stubbing
won a Birmingham contract for a traditional 16 storey block using Bison
97 elements with Concrete acting as major sub-contractor. Not until Bryant
took over as general contractor in the Midlands did Concrete achieve a major 
breakthrough, however.
Bryant originated as a private firm in the 1930s, and in the post-war 
period was run primarily by Mr A.C. (Chris) Bryant as a building and civil 
engineering contractor, carrying out road building, site works and private 
housing in the 1950s, but relatively little council housing. In 1959 a new
company, Bryant Holdings Ltd., was created to hold the capital of this firm
98 and in 1960 went public with an authorized capital of £1.25 million. A
period of rapid growth and diversification of subsidiaries followed, one of
which, Bryant Design and Construction Ltd., under the architect Hic-.l Rys Davies
99 designed the first complete Bison block in 1961. A year later Bryant won a
contract for a prototype Bison block in Birmingham and in 1963 decided to 
conmit themselves fully to marketing the system throughout the I-Iidlands. 
Bryant gave the n&Lie. Bryant Co-ordinated Construction to their strengthened 
involvement as main contractor and clinched the deal by winning two contracts a 4 
Rugby and Kidderminster.
Bryant were well placed to sell the Bison system to the mainly Labour 
controlled major housing authorities in the region. Their publicity in the
early 1960s was handled by the one man P.R. firm run by Dennis Hoi/ell, Labour
101 H.P. for Small Heath and an ex-city councillor. In 1963 he becaine a
Director, and made a speech at the Labour Party Conference opposing nationaliza­
tion of the building industry and advocating an industrialized building
102programme which capitalized on the success of large firms. At about the
same time local politicians including the HBC Chairman Ernest Bond were regular
visitors to Bryant social functions, and a senior figure in the Labour group
10*5 Alderman W.T. Bowen became a Bryant director. Bowen who had been displaced
from the Labour leadership in 1952 by Bradbeer, helped Vatton to vin the post 
in 1959 and was very close to him and a powerful member of the General Purposes 
Committee. Watton described his leadership of the Labour Group in these terns:
While I, all right, I was the Boss, they were a very 
qualified and talented Group, some of them. I mean 
you don't tell the Alderman Bowens of this world, people 
like that, what to dol 105
In October 1963, six months after the rejection of Camus and with the 
Castle Bromwich development still bogged down, Bowen arranged a trip by the
HBC (of which he was at no time a member) to see the first two completed Bison
1 ofi blocks at Kidderminster, which were the focus of an extensive Bryant publicity
A f\rj
drive (Figure 8.9). Although Birmingham's own Bison prototype was still
1 08 being built, the visit proved a turning point in Birmingham's use of hi.vh
rise. On*, i^trnrrvft^xfc described the visit in these terms:
Bowen persuaded Watton that the (House Building) Committee 
should go out and look at these flats when they were up, go 
out in a bus, a big party. And of course I was asked if 1 
wanted to come along and said ! O.K, I'll come 1 .. They were 
just ordinary, standard shape blocks - perfectly normal fla'-s 
with doors and windows and bathrooms and everything. You've 
got to remember at this time we were building a hundred to a 
hundred and. fifty schemes at a time, flats and all kinds . . .
Ar.yr.uy, we -went in a bus to the site. They had the bloc];." 
Iriu. out so (sketches) and the way to the blocks was throu :h 
this great marquee - which v:as [Loaded with drinks and, er, 
food.. So we stayed there quite a Ion0- time and then we went 
out and looked at the flats. Well by this time they could 
have been inlaid with ^oltfl In fact th<-;y looked pretty awful 
from the outside - they had this grey end white pan ?1 ling. 
Inside they were all right.
- 355 -
c- 8.9
n H T (•• \ "•'? Tfr 1/4 lib waa
, '-^.V" - * F135T BLOCK COMPLETED /SqTT
;V-V7 IN 29 WEEKS .^l^
••' '• I 'f:* " " u'"-"- -'-','..-
'••^l-r"^ -iir^;; r
; '•'• y^ •--''•'• *•* -» ""
'•: \- '•. r M -• ' — ' >•
BRYANT CO-ORDiNATED CONSTRUCTION 
provides a complete range of Technical 
Services for the comprehensive development 
of housing projects, ranging from Sits Investi­ 
gation, Foundation Engineering, Layout and 
Design., Computer Phnnir.Q and Program­ 
ming,to Construction — and guarantees econ­ 
omy of design and EARLY completion. All 
this means - economy (from sing'e blocks 
upwards); an early starting dat? (because 
estimating and design times arc reduced to 
the minimum); an early cor;ip!e:.on date (be­ 
cause unit-conctruction rr.cjns racid erec­ 
tion); comfortable 3ccomrnoa3ticn with 
privacy (the structure is sound-resistant and 
incorporates high tnermal i«si;htion); flexi­ 
bility in elevation treatment and layouts.
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We went round and at the end we went into the marquee 
again and had some more drinks. Somebody asked me vlr.it 
I thought of the flats, and I said (shrugs) 'They're 
perfectly normal average flats, like hundreds we've done'. 
Things went on and as we were leaving, at the exit, 
Harry Watton suddenly said, 'Right, we'll take five blocks'. 
Just as if he was buying bags of sweetsl Mte'll have five 
of them 1 , he said, 'and stick them on X 1 - some site he'd '
remembered we were just starting on.
«
Well I can tell you - I almost walked out on the spot. I 
mean, all Covnwatte,^ get this done to them from time to 
time, but this I . . That was Watton trying to please Bowen 
you see. 109
At a meeting on November 7th the HBC decided to follow up the visit by placing 
a negotiated contract for twelve standard plan 1 1 storey blocks with Bryant 
and Sheppard Fidler was instructed to find sites for them.
Interestingly enough, when contracts for the blocks came up for approval 
Councillor Matthews, the Conservative spokesman whose views played such a 
large part in securing the HBC rejection of Camus, declared an interest, and
continued to do this on a series of negotiated Bryant tenders over the next
1 1 1 three years. Since he ran a joinery business it seems reasonable to suppose
that his interest concerned the sub-contracting arrangements for these flats, 
He, of course, continued to play a part in all other EBC decisions over this 
period. In January 1964» f°r example, he drew the Committee's attention -to 
the partial collapse of a block of system built flats in Paris:
He thought this should be noted with a view to all 
concerned taking the greatest care in the erection 
of similar flats in Birr,.>in-;hcn. 112
From this point on Bryant/Concrete assumed a dominant position in 
Birmingham's high rise drive. When the prototype Bison block was at last 
finished late in May 1964? the Post reported enthusiastically:
Birmingham Corporation, members of which have been 
cautious in adopt in-; Continental methods of industrialized 
housingj, yesterday officially received its first block of 
flats built by, an all-British system. 1 '3
Bond spoke of the 'incredible efficiency* of the two contractors and pointe-1 
to the follow up order for twelve blocks as an indication of cor'j'idenco in the 
system. In characteristic style Chris Bryant used the occasion to i-.i-intain
pressure for system building by attacking Ministry obstruction, declaring
'the homeless of Britain cannot afford the luxury of "normal Whitehall sueed" '.
He went on to point out:
We are capable of higher production, but it is in the 
interests of both the city and the construction industry 
to have larger areas prepared for development.• It is 
obvious we can be most efficient when we are allowed to 
have continuous development. 114
THINKING BIG
In January 1964 Sheppard Fidler announced his intention to resign and go 
into private practice at the end of the municipal year. This decision was 
not provoked, as Sutcliffe and Smith suggest, by his failure to secure control
of planning for the architects' department, but by the decisions uiade on
115 industrialized building.
*
The new Chief Architect was Sheridan Sheddqn, who had been Sheppard Fidler 1 s 
deputy in charge of school building until 1961, when he took over as Chief
Officer in Leeds, then one of the foremost authorities using industrialized
11 fi 
building. Sheridan Sheddqn came back to Birmingham with Watton's strong
support as the man to get housing output moving again, but he was already a 
sick man. He held down the job with increasing difficulty through two long 
illnesses before resigning early in 1966. This development brought to the 
HBC's attention Alan Kaudsley, the newly appointed Deputy City Architect who 
got the job in April 1964 as 'the best of three poor candidates'. In deputis­ 
ing for Sheridan Sheddon he secured far more influence and contact with hor.sinr
117 matters than his control of school building would suggest.
In November 1964 Sheridan Sheddon carried out a complete reorganization 
of the housing division of his department designed to boost housing output. 
In place of the high quality design orientation introduced by Sheppard Fidler, 
he secured HBC approval of the following objectives for the Division:
1. Increase housing output to 4*000 dwellings s. year immediately, 
and more later.
2. Reduce the cost of dwellings.
3. Use industrialized forms of construction to st.ve labour.
4» Increase the labour force on existing contracts and 
ensure labour for future contracts by:
(a) providing; continuity of work for contractors 
by rational programmes, and
(b) attracting new national firms to work on 
Birmingham'.s housing. 118
The Division was divided into four sections. All design, research and 
standardization work was taken over by one section. Two more were concerned 
with landscape design, and with programming work, which was completely 
transferred to administrative staff. The last section dealt only with 
contracts and was in turn sub-divided into four units, each of which was given 
the specific objective of letting contracts for 1,000 dwellings a year in the 
first instance. These changes were certainly effective. Feverish letting 
of contracts in the last two months of 1964 boosted the city 1 s approvals by 
nearly 5Qr< to 4>077 dwellings by Lhe year end. And approvals then more than 
doubled to 8,741 in 1965, 7,559 in 1966, 9,000 in 1967 and 7,877 in 1968. 119
One of the most fascinating aspects of this change in contracting practice 
was an enormous expansion in the proportion of the city's housing drive 
included in contracts with a high rise component. Throughout the early ! 60s
this was around two fifths, but in 1964 it rose to over two thirds, and in
1 ?0 
1965 to nearly nine tenths of all approvals, (Table 8.9). In 1964 the-
rise reflected a simple re-expansion of high flat building, but the peak years 
of 1965-66 were also marked by the inclusion of very large numbers of low rise 
dwellings in integrated contracts with high flats for the first and only tir:o 
in Birmingham's history. Three quarters of all low rise dwellings included ir. 
high rise contracts over the post-war period were approved in these two yer,r: 7 
which also saw a rapid rise in average contract sizes.
The main beneficiary of this change was again Bryant. In late 1963 r.o::.be: 
of the HBC inspected a prototype Bryant industrialized house, for which the
4
company were building a factory in Handsworth, a ward with some of the city's 
most acute unemployment problem;:,. Bryant claimed major construction tir.e e,rA 
cost reductions could be made with the design and the HBC reaction was 
favourable. Bond told the local press:
Tr-ble _8«9t High Rise Contracts and Contract Sizes, 1951-69, 
(Approvals)
Year . High Rise Contracts Low Rise in High Average Contract
Rise Contracts Sizes
1951
1952
1955
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1951-69
No of
Contracts
1
2
1
6
5
4
4
12
8
9
5
7
9
15
27
23
8
8
2
156
No of c/o of all No of % of all
Dwellings Approvals Dwellings Approvals
180
306
180
934
761
524
508
1338
1143
1428
336
809
901
2744
7702
5473
1961
2450
430
30120
3.9
9.1
5.5
23o5
28o3
24.7
28o6
41.9
56.6
38.6
39.3
38,9
39«3
67.3
880 1
72o4
21.8
31.1
29o4
40o3
12
—
236
—
—
22
323
Mtf
235
—
-
233
324
3215
2067
30
269
—
6993
•
0.3
_
5.9
———
MS
1.3
10.1
-
6o4
-
«.
10.2
7 = 9
36.8
27.3
0.3
3.8
—
9.3
High
Rise
—
M
156
152
131
127
112
143
159
67
116
100
183
285
" 238
245
306
-
193
All
A -p^-rtx.T; r ~] « 
Jl k/ 0 .„ V.' » — —— U>
91
57
61
66
61
r » '""
/c
57
71
65
95
30
53
65
107
159
172
145
154
42
90
The whole party (of members) has been favourably impressed 
by what it has seen.. The important thing is that for two 
and three storey building this is a British system. ¥e have 
heard so much about Continental systems and at last we have a 
British system which seems to solve the problem of large 
housing authorities on speed and cost. 121
A new Bryant subsidiary was set up to market the system and in November 1964
Bryant won their first integrated contract for Bison high rise and Bryant
122 houses at Castle Bromwich. By 1965 Bryant low rise approvals reached
1,395 end a year later 1*863. A very large part of these approvals vac 
accounted for by integrated hi.g-h rise contracts for over 500 dwellings,
(Table 8 0 10) 0 These included the Druids Heath estate, proudly proclaimed
124 'the largest industrialized building project in Britain 1 . In 1967, hovcver,
the practice of integrated contracts came to an abrupt end, largely it Ece~.s 
because of the housih:',- cost yardsticks. To set round their restrictions, 
hi'jh rise flats v^cre let in laiv;o contracts with very high site densities and - 
no low ri^e, all the largest contracts going to Bryant. Over the period
between late 1964 and 1968, Bryant won £25,500,000 of business on high rise 
contracts over 500 dwellings (out of a total worth nearly £51 million and 
covering 8,700 dwellings). All of these contracts except Bryant?s first Icrge 
tender were negotiated. 
Table 8 0 10; Large High Rise Contracts, 1964-68.
Date
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1964-8
Tenders
Place
Castle Bromwich
Castle Bromwich
Druids Heath
Atholl House Farm
Bromford Bridge
Bells Lane
Chelmsley Wood
Eolloway Circus
Chelmsley Wood
Chelmsley Wood
Redevelopment Areas
Firm
Bryant
Bryant
Bryant
Direct
Labour
Wimpey
Bryant
Bryant
Bryant
Bryant
Bryant
Bryant
SC = Selective Competition N
Number of
jlwellrl.ngs
High Low
Rise Rise
736
900
450 582
250 31 3
580 403
350 569
216 669
488
796
748
752
6,166 2,538
= Negotiated
Tender
SC
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N '
N
N
Cost
£m
2e60
2o84
3.35
1.33
3.30
3.24
2. SB
1.59
2,96
2.92
2.69
30.65
The movement away from integrated contracts in 1967 did not harm Bryant
125
Low Rise, which was by then the most successful low rise only system in Britain. 
Instead approvals jumped to nearly 3,500 dwellings a year in 1967 and 1965. 
The low rise market in Birmingham remained much more diversified than that on 
high rise, v:ith Wimpey, Laing, Hates and local builders also important, and
entry by two large new firms, Mowlem and Reema in 1966. 127 But Bryant's
success did mean that Birmingham remained completely separate from the national
1 PR
trend in using Bison only for high rise. Repeated attempts by Concrete 
to market Bison Low Rise to the city failed in 1963-5. (Concrete quickly 
accepted this position, however. In September 1966 their Chairman, 
Kenneth Wood, argued that local authorities should move over to dealing vith 
two contractors:
One of these would be responsible for both the multi-storey 
blocks r-nd medium rise buildings. .. the ol.ier would be xhs 
' small house 1 specialist providing in large quantities u. range 
of system built 2 storey dwellings. 'Ore large contract, one 
main contractor 1 is a concept 30 inbuilt that it may take scr.e 
shiffcinj. But the use of two specialist contractors seems the 
logical approach and its ultimate acceptance is iMO 1 it^Dio. .) '29
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The concentration of work in large negotiated contracts and the success 
of Bryants in having these contracts aivarded to them aroused scarcely any 
attention in Council. In i-Iarch 1965, a Conservative councillor queried the
»
HBC's report over the suspension of Standing Orders on 14 contracts worth 
/;5,300 P 000 awarded to Bryant:
Bryants might be offering the best price. But how is 
this to be known unless the work was offered to contractors 
all over the country and they had the opportunity of 
tendering?
Bond replied;
Although on the surface (this was) a valid point, careful 
consideration shows that negotiation wa;-i necessary if the 
continuity and speed of the house building programme was 
to be held. 130
The Labour group proved keen to maintain contract relations established in 
1964-5» and in 1966 when Labour had lost control Bond opposed the awarding of 
a contract to Howlem:
Local builders had assured the Council that they had the 
spare capacity, and an outsider could not import more 
labour. 131
But the Conservatives also favoured contractual policies very favourable
to large firms. When the City Architect announced a 5<$> jump in output
early in 1965, the Post reported:
Councillor Matthews (the Conservative spokesman) attributed 
the boom to the adoption of a policy Conservatives had been 
advocating for years. This was that bigger contracts should 
be placed with individual contractors so that once they were 
on site continuity of work could be obtained. 
Once a contractor had secured a scheme in open competition, 
the local authority should be prepared to negotiate other 
contracts with him on the site for as long as five years. 
At this stage, work should go out to tender again to ensure 
the work was being done 'at the right price'. 132
(my italics)
This generous view exerted a major influence on contracting for the peripheral 
estates such as Chelmsley V.Tood, where continuity of work could plausibly co":r
i
many thousands of dwellings.
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THE COirmT OF DECISION I-lAKIivG, 1966-70
In 1966 there were a number of far reaching personnel and politic-! 
changes. Watton had to resign the Labour leadership and go into hospital 
after becoming seriously ill. and was succeeded by Alderman ?rani Price, the 
managing director of the highly successful Birmingham property developer
Murrayfield Real Estate Company and at the same time a prominent member of
133
the PWC. Shortly before the local elections a group of backbench Labour
rebels led by Stan Yapp staged a successful revolt against the roappointaer.t:
of certain Chairmen whose outside interests allegedly conflicted with their
134 positions. But in the event Labour lost control of the Council to the
Conservatives for the first time since 1962.
The Conservative leader Griffin did not appoint Matthews to chair the
*
HBC, despite his record as the Party's housing spokesman'. Instead he moved 
to the chair of the Estates Committee and the senior Conservative on the H3C,
the 76 year old Councillor Apps took over. He proved a very weak chairman,
135anxious not to 'sit on the officers laps', and he left the handling of press
1 "Z.f\
relations to Matthews who remained an HBC member.
At virtually the same time Sheridan Sheddon finally resigned and the
137 HBC decided to appoint Kaudsley to his post without advertising. In two
years Haudsley had moved from being third in line in the Lancashire architects 
department handling mainly school building to control of the largest public
housing programme in Britain outside the G.L.Co Apps gave him virtually
i "^R
carte blanche remarking: ! I knew he was the man for the job'o ^ His stsnii::- 1
rose dramatically with the city's soaring output and the award of six M"7^
139 Good Design in Houcinv awards between 19^7 and- 1973- In 1967 I-Iav.dsley
became architecture.! representative on the A.M.C.'s Housing Cor. n.ttee, in 
1968 he was appointed a member of CHAC, and in 1970 he was awarded a C.r.S.
Maudsley disposed of considerable patronage as Chief Architect ov>?v which
- 363 -
there was virtually no other control, particularly on the allocation of 
negotiated contracts and the employment of private architects. Between 
1966 iuid 1972 Maudsley entered into a corrupt relationship with a b-..-0-z.an 
architectural practice, Ebery and Sharp Ltd, uhich transformed their firia i-.to
' X -j
one of the largest practices in the country employing- nearly 50 staff. 
The firm were employed mainly on the post-contract phases of the Chelmsley
1/ood estate, checking that construction was properly carried out, and received
1 /' ^ 
£1 oj) million worth of work on Maudsley's recommendation. ' f ^
In 1974, Maudsley, Ebery and Sharp were arrested on conspiracy to corrupt
and fifteen other charges. Birmingham newspapers forecast a six week tr:.?l
143 and the calling of hundreds o.: witnesses, but as soon as the prosecution
Q.C. had finished his opening speech all three defendents changed their pica 
to guilty on the conspiracy to corrupt charge .'jnd the trial ended with the 
other charges left to lie on the table. However, on the last day of-the 
trial Sharp's Q.C. made a speech to the court claiming that the charges 
considered were 'only the tip of the iceberg 1 . Sharp, he said, now wanted 
to tell 'the unvarnished truth'. The Post report continued:
(The Q.C.) said that Birmingham's housebuilding boom had 
produced handsome profits and continued: 'The principal 
company was a public company called Bryants. In the years 
this court is concerned with, contracts worth £70 million 
were placed in the hands of Bryants'
.At this point the judge interrupted to prevent the Q.J 0 naming the conpany 
which featured in his allegations. The Q.C. then
claimed that before his relationship with Maudsley ber;::n,
Sharp had seen I-Iaudsley socializing with directors of
(the unnamed ccnpany)o One of the directors of the company
had handed Maudsley 'rolls of money 1 . The company had
approached Sharp in an attsrrct to use Ebery's Jersey bank acocvnt
as a clearing house for payments to Ilaudsley. One payment
involved a project of 1,253 homes for which I:;,udcley vos to be
paid £10 a house. By the end of 1966 when :.he present corrupt ion
had bo.--.iHi, Sharp had seen i-,iiat had ^one on» e
Muudsley's absolute pov/er helped to create the clinata for
corruption. 145
•
*
Sharp later gave a detailed account of his involvement ;;ith Maudsley to the
st^. He claimed he ingratiated hii^-.elf with Mauc-sley by plryin-
golf with him (badly) and drinking at their local Conservative club:
Just prior to Mr Kauclsley being appointed City Architect 
he told me, 'I am going to give you, Jim, the bluest job 
you ever had in your life'. He had Only been City Architect 
for a few days when he called me into his office. He had'a 
great sheet of paper on the floor covering areas 4 and 5 of 
Chelmsley Hood - virgin pieces of land. He gave me t^ose two 1 ,. 
jobs, and there was a quarter of a million pounds worth of v:or>. "'~
Once hooked Sharp and Ebery began to meet requests for gifts, loans ana none./, 
But according to Sharp two Bryant directors also financed and took part in 
trips and holidays with Haudsley - to London, Copenhagen, Tokyo and Ireland 
in 1966, 1967 and 1970 0 These formed part of what the Post, described as
'a sustained pro gramme of high style living paid for by Bryant directors and
\ 147 
James Sharp. These revelations produced a long police inquiry and in
mid 1977 four leading Bryant directors were arrested and charged on various 
corruption counts.
The close links between Haudsley and Bryant, however they may be 
characterized, seem to be directly relevant in understanding Kaudsley's 
consistent opposition to the increasing pressures against high rise buiidin:; 
after 1966*
PRESSURES AGAINST HIGH RISE
High rise approvals fell from 4,500 in 1965, their peak year, to 3,400 .ir, 
1966 and to 1,900 in 1967, when they accounted for barely a fifth of all 
approvals, the lowest proportion since 1954.
There were several reasons for the change. The Tories 1966 election 
manifesto included a commitment to building more council houses rather t'r.rr. 
flats, as well as building houses for sale. But this did not lead to tr.y 
policy chan~e since the Conservative group was anxious not to disrupt t/^ 
development of the housing drive. Far more serious was circular 3C/67, on 
which l Taudsley reported
The effect of the new cost l,...lta ia to force local 
authorities to abandon multi-storey construction except 
in those c-ir;c.^ uhere it is essential cc achieve the 
required density, ..... and to encourage hi-h acuity lov 
rise nchemet: with a reasonable proportion of u soiling::; in 
and 4 storey i'lats and maisonettes. 149
In fact Birmingham seemed to have little or no difficulty in securir*: loan 
sanction for high rise flats, which were now grouped into very large contracts 
with very high site densities (up to 300 ppa) which were used to justify lz:z. 
sanction approval. At the same time the location of these flats in estates
of houses was apparently used to convince the Ministry's* regional office that
1 50densities were below 120 ppa* J Not until 1969 did the Ministry office insist
on talcing the same density - the estate density for both purposes. ('I'his 
situation seems to have reflected the very close relationship between the city
and the KIILO Principal Regional Officer, who was an enthusiastic exponent of
151
industrialized building. Loan sanction on the city's schemes T.rao often
given at very early stages, often months before final approval of a negotiated
152
contract by the HBC, and unused allocations to other V.rect Midland authorities
were more than once redistributed to Birmingham in order to maintain its
153
hectic progress on housing contracts, The Regional Office never apparently
saw anything unusual or amiss in the city's contracting arrangements, 
principally because progress in some other areas seemed outstanding. Ifor 
example, the cost of three bedroom houses in the city rose by only 2C£o bet-.reen 
1962 and 1967, compared with a national increase of 50^ • And in 1969 a
National Building Agency report argued that productivity on the city's housing
\ 155 
developments was twice the national average).
A further reason for the fall in high rise approvals wis that by 1 2C8
156
the Housing Department was finding it difficult to let them. In faci, trie-
Housing Officer, Atkinson, called for an embargo on all further flat builcir^ 
in the north-east of the city where 5>000 high rise dwellings were completed ir. 
eighteen months at Castle Brcva-.ri.cn, Broraiord 3rid.;;e and Chelmsley Vood. .he
city hr.d reached 'saturation point' and was having to 'dig deep' into its
157 
itir.'-" list to find tenants, he claimed. Refusals were so common th-^t ^o_t
flat a otood e'r.pty for months. In the KfC backbench presyur-o arov.::c-o :.y the 
same dcvolop-orics succeeded in procuring a rccorr,,nendation by the City Jr^ir. j^r 
of a neu 100 poa coutral redevelopment density, with potentially Io-;er cler.sitios
366
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which already had over 30 high blocks}. :.
conference of the PtfC, 1IBG and Housing Management Committee at the end of Ke~ 
nearly produced a decisive shift away from high flats, but a rearguard. actici:
•
by Haudsley and some HBC members pinned the proportion of high rise in new 
development at 15).>. This^ defence primarily stressed the disadvantages of 
building lar :e numbers of low rise flats, although the architects der ardent 
had already moved over to building high density estates of houses.
Pressure against high rise continued to grow throughout 1968, however.
In May the Conservative leader Griffin pushed through an amalgamation of the
1 f:r 
HBC and Housing Management Committee against strong Labour opposition.
The displacement of a number of long standing HBC members and their rerlacer.er-t 
by people interested in housing management produced a new orientation towards 
the 'social 1 consequences of housing construction policy. Two developments 
reinforced this orientation. Firstly, the expansion of the city's housing 
output produced a growing dissatisfaction amongst tenants of older flats who
saw people from the waiting list being rehoused not in flats but in houses
1 f> 1 
after diminishing periods, often as little as two years. In contrast,
transfers from flats to the new houses was very rare and flat tenants saw this 
situation as acutely unfair. After a campaign on this issue was launched by
several backbench councillors, "the KG agreed to open a special transfer
>
1 K 1^
list to ive flat dwellers a chance to transfer to a house. 3y
1969, a few months after its opening, the list was so enormous that the 
initiative collapsed and the HC decided to consider only applications fro-. 
families with three or raore children,, let flat dwellers continued to 
hope for transfers. In 1972, by which time households with less than three 
children must have known that their chances of getting a house were e::tro::.5l 
slim, there were still 11,050 farllie.s on the list (about 27,500 people',. C 
these families 570 had three or more children, 2,000 were families with two 
children, and 2,500 families with one child: (so at least 18,4CO people ir. 
families with children wanted to transfer from flats). There wera also ^,2
childless couples and 2,750 single people on the list.
Secondly, this daunting evidence of the unpopularity of flats was 
supplemented by mounting criticism from tenants in the new industrialized 
estates of the accommodation provided. The most acute problem was that cf 
dampness. Complaints about damp first reached major proportions in -July 196? 
when tenants in the high flats at Druids Heath complained. For some 
months fe.udsley claimed to the Committee that everything was under control, 
although the press reported that a large party of workmen was kept continuously- 
employed on remedying defects including pervasive dampness and badly fitting 
doors and floors. Ti/hen complaints began to be heard from the high fiats at 
the Castle Bromwich estate, Bryant and Concrete met the HZC Chairr.an A?ps and 
'agreed to accept full responsibility and to carry out suitable preventitive
measures entirely at their own cost, indemnifying the Corporation for sixty
1^5 years against any possible loss due to the recurrence of this trouble'.
The dampness problem seemed to have receded as the first industrialized 
estates began to dry out but in 1968 the cold, wet winter produced a new and 
massive series of complaints from all the industrialized estates. In Karen
1969 Atkinson presented a report which for the first time set out the extent of
1C9Birmingham's problems from water penetration, rising damp and condensation.
Several thousand flats and houses were affected, some estates particularly 
badly; for example, at Druids Heath J2>j of the Bryant houses had condensation 
problems. Atkinson considered that many of the problems stemmed directly r'r-rr 
the speed with which the estates had been built. Concrete panels containing 
enonaous quantities of water had not been cured (left to dry out) for sufficient 
time but erected, trapping trie water in the dwellings of the unfortunate tenants 
Despite tue efforts of the Housing Department, the dampness problem rubbled en 
for years. In 1970-1 the Housing Committee set up a special Dampness I'ub- 
Coimuitcee which, in.addition to the thousands already spent, authorized 
expenditure of £50 to "JOO on nearly 2,000 dwellings with chronic danpnosc
1 VODrooler: 1;.
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CITY C3L1TRS HIGH RISE ^ID TKj-] PROPERTY XGIi
A final strand in the development of Biruiin-nani's high rise policy was 
the building- of tower blocks in the city centre, as well as in redevelopment 
areas and peripheral estates. This use of high flats was integrally bound v.p 
with the property boom. I'he trend originated in Frank Price's success in 
persuading the IfflC to 'buy the airspace' above Hurrayfield Real estate Co. f s 
Yardley development for two 12 storey blocks. 1 It was continued by the 
design by Sharp for the vanning Brytait - Samuel Properties tender for the
1 T"1
shopping centre at Chelmsley VJood which included several dramatic blocks.
In early 1964 Watton's enthusiasm for 'bringing life back to the city cer.trs*
produced an HBC decision to build a 20-storey block above the redeveloped
173New Street station, and in 1966 four 16 storey blocks were included in
the plans for the ill-fated Civic Centre site, (which had been under develops: 
since the
In 1965 the leading Birmingham office block architect James Roberts 
produced plans for a Property and General Investments Ltd. proposal for a 
site on an inner ring road roundabout, including a commercial development,
multi-storey car parks and two 33 storey blocks of Council flats, named 'lh.c
175 Sentinels 1 . After this plan lapsed discussions with various other firr.s
failed to find anyone to take on the whole development. Then Roberts 
suggested with P./C and architects department approval that the flats could ce 
built by themselves vrith the commercial development later. By this sta^e 
only Bryant and Bernard Sunley Ltd. (a London firm with no previous worl: for 
the City Co-uncil) were left in discussions and after considering prelir-i^r:.- 
costings for the blocks the architects department began final negotiations
with Bryant.
When the giant tower scheme was made public in Ilarch 1966 it attracted a 
good deal of unfavourable coment, thr: ypot. editorializing: ; I.t i r; rear;c:..ibl9
to wonder v/hen these grandiose ^choincs arc. conceived whether proper re.-^rd ir;
177 
paid to tho hum:..n and social needs of tenants'. In December t}\o .' ''J referred
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the preliminary tender to the Rousing Management Committee for consents, on
1 VRthe initiative of a Labour member Mrs Fisher. Shortly afterwards she 
attended the opening ceremony at the New Street block (built by Jryant. en a 
negotiated contract) at which the following incident took place: (as described 
in the HMC Minutes)
Mrs Fisher said that at the opening (of the New Street 
flats) she had been approached by the contractor concerned 
who had intimated that he understood she had been opposing 
the multi-storey blocks to be known as 'The Sentinels'. 
She retorted that this was not in fact so although she had 
been instrumental in arranging for the observations of the 
Housing Management Committee to be sought, bearing in mind 
passible management problems with a 32 storey scheme. She 
indicated that she felt it was most improper that an approach 
of this kind should have been made to her. 179
After the Conservative leader Griffin had 'expressed concern that the 
contractor should have directly approached and questioned Mrs Fisher about her 
objections to the scheme', the Housing Management Committee referred the
incident to the Town Clerk and advised the HiC to seek competitive tenders
180 
from a wider range of firms rather than negotiating with Bryant. Before
the next HBC meeting Maudsley wrote to the Town Clerk stressing that negotia­ 
tions had already gone on with a large number of firms (but not on the flats - 
only contract) and that Bryant had been given the contract,
on the grounds that they were already well aware of the 
city's standards and methods of working and it is therefore 
a comparatively easy exerciae to negotiate with them. If 
we now go forward in our negotiations with Bryants I a::i 
reasonably confident of obtaining a reduction on the first 
stage tender costs. If, on the other hand, there is ony 
suggestion of widening the scope of the firms tendering 
then there is little doubt that serious delay would rc:;ult 
and an increase in cost would be almost inevitable. 1£1
Maudsley, Atps and Matthews were consulted bv the Clerk, but since they ten-led 
to pooh-pooh the incident the natter was dropped and the K?,C approved 
negotiations with f>ryant.
•
Controversy over the city centre schemes continued in 13^7 when only ;.
quarter of the i.'evr Street flats could be let aiuer being offered to evor;..-c::e c:
182 the housing wcitirr; list at £5 a week. Eventually the remainder were lev.
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on the open market at 'economic rents'. V/hcn the final tender for the 
Sentinels project cane up the total cost of the 483 flats was nearly £2,CCO,CCC 
and the rents at £7.50 a week were unlikely to attract Council tenants. ^ ''' 
Despite opposition in the FtfC to housing 1,300 people in a tiny area in such a 
scheme, the project went through,although the battle carried into the Cour.c:!"1. 
Chamber after allegations that the contract was improperly approved before 
receiving planning permission from the PVJC.
A year after approval had eventually been given, Bryant submitted revised, 
plans for ths Sentinels commercial redevelopment on which Atkinson consented to 
the Housing Committee:
In housing management terms each scheme produced has 
worsened the position so far as the occupants of the 
flats are concerned. The parking spaces have been 
reduced, the prices increased and the building overlooking 
the north block increased in height. 185
A protracted battle between the Housing Department on one side and Ilaudsley, 
the Estates Officer, City Engineer and PWC on the other, resulted in permission 
being given to Bryant to build a 'purely commercial 1 scheme in which the city 
had to lease one floor of the car park at a high price. When the 
commercial development was finished in 1974 the Housing Chairman publicly 
described it as 'planning gone mad':
You only have? to look at it to see how ludicrous it is. 
It is going to cause hell for the residents. The car park 
is blocking out light on 6 or 8 floors.. I an ashamed of 
the planning decision that was taken here. 187
FINAL DECISIONS
In 1968, despite the pressures against high flats which we have detailed,
m
high rise; approvals rose to 21^ of the total and .were still at 2,150 d;;•-?!:.in-;-£,
188 
more than double the figure in any .year before 1964. The Ronan Point
collapse and Inquiry report, however, brought about a clear shift in 
Councillors' attitudes o-ainrst hi(;h rise. Although 1,600 Bison flats :rere
approved for 1969 aftor the Griffith report, Haudslcy assured the ::c iiv;t
189 
Concrete Ltd. would carry out any necessary strci^theiiinr on new blocks.
But in April 1969 following a consultant engineer's report Birmingham had to 
disconnect and replace all gas appliances at a cost of £400,000 in 86 system 
built- blocks, and bevin strengthening operations costing hundreds of- thousands 
of pounds more.
In April 1969 the Housing Manager Atkinson produced a report on the last 
large peripheral estate to be developed in Birmingham, T,/oodgate Valley. The 
report detailed the failure of 'Birmingham's existing peripheral estates 
arising from their remoteness from the city centre, the lack of employment 
opportunities for women, high transport costs involved in journeys to work 
and the comparative scarcity of social arid community facilities. "Jithin the 
constraints of finance Atkinson claimed that the only inducement the Corpora-tic 
could offer to people to move six miles out of the city centre to 'Joodgate
Valley was an improvement in their housing conditions, and he effectively
191 
argued that this entailed providing tenants with houses and not flats.
The HC decided to build 6,000 houses and no flats on the site, and the ^h.r.ii-.a
192 
told the press that Birmingham had turned its back on high rise.
The architects department still brought forward further proposals for 
high rise in redevelopment areas, although these were few and far betweer. 
Finally in March 1970 the Committee refused to negotiate two new contracts
with Brycnt after Griffin had 'recalled that this was the system which h?.d
194 
required strengthening 1 and instead called for competitive tenders. rJh
criticism of high flat schemes voiced at this meeting marked their final 
demise ir Birmingham.
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CHAPTER NINE 
Bristol
•
9..1: The Urban and Political Background^
* 
Unlike Birmingham or Newham^Bristol is a free-standing city. jj. though
it forms part of a standard metropolitan labour area of around 630,000 people,
encompassing Bath and Ueston-super-Hare, the city's population of 427,000
1 
people accounts for the vast bulk of this total. Covering some 26,000 acres
(about 41 square miles), Bristol is half the size of Birmingham but is still a
o 
very large authority encompassing large amounts of open space. Continuous
urban development has spilled over the city boundary at Filton to the north
•2
and at Magotsfield and Kingswood to the east, (Figure 9.1). To a greater 
extent than either Newham or Birmingham, Bristol nonetheless approximates the 
ideal of a 'whole city' authority.
HISTORY
Bristol of course has been an important port since mediaeval times and by
4 
the early eighteenth century was second only to London in its volume of trade.
During the industrial revolution the city slipped back and it was not until the 
construction of the river tiouth docks at Avonmouth and Portishead in the late 
nineteenth century that its economic base began to revive. Further ^vonncuth 
dock extensions in the 1900s and 1920s, combined with the growth of the aircraft 
industry at Filton to produce a steady population figure through to 1951, 
although extensions of the city boundaries in 1888, 191? and 1951 produced 
increases in the city-wide total, (Table 9-1)- 5 Since 1951 the city'?
population has been very slightly declining, by 1 »2>1 in the period 1951-61 and
6
2.6?o in the following decade.
THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND
Bristol's recent political history is not well documented althouch work by 
Clements and Miller does shed important light on some aspects of its develo^on;
L. JJLJ^^^
River 
Severn
j.iy Boundary
Open Space _ 
tiajor Kmployr'.ent Areas 
Redevelopment Are?<s
Coimcil IIoMsiiv; Estates: pre vrar 
•Council IJousinj -st'tes: post v.ti 
Other 3uJ.lt Up Area
Table 9*1; Bristol's Population and Area, 1801-1971.
Year Official City Area Estimated Population
Population (acres) of 1954 Area•^•MMMHIW
1801
1811
1821
1831
1841
1851
1861
1871
1881
1891
1901
1911
1921
1931
1951
1961
1971
43,306
49,493
52,889
59,074
78,443
137,328
154,093
182,552
206,874
221,578
339,042
357,059
377,018
397,012
442,994
437,043
426,657
17,460
17,460
19,669
19,669
26,350
26,350
26,350
68,088
82,277
98,445
119,783
142,825
159,128
179,063
219,610
260,259
300,624
Several points are worth mention. Firstly, the local Conservative party did 
not campaign as such in local elections until 1974. Instead a supposedly 
independent group of 'Citizen 1 councillors, deriving from a Conservative- 
Liberal anti-socialist alliance in the 1920s, represented Conservative views, 
the Liberals withdrawing from the arrangement in 1947. This largely spurious 
distinction did give a certain non-partisan character to aspects of Council 
politics.8 Secondly, Bristol politics has been characterized by a relatively 
bi-partisan attitude on some matters. Since the first Labour victory of 
1937 the majority group has taken all the Chairmanships, but aldermanic seats 
were allocated in proportion to party strength and a system of formal Corrdttee
leadership was established in which 'Shadow Chairmen' were consulted, served
9on official delegations etc.
Party control rested with the Labour party until 1960, (except for a roriod 
of equal representation in 1949-51, and of Citizen control in 195-2). L:.:.-.-v 
then lost control for three years, regained it for four years, lost it fro- 
1967 to 1972, and sii<ce regained control. In addition to these Labour-CJti^-r; 
fluctuations in office, the composition of the Council changed every year 
quite markedly.
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Clements has shown the close association between voting and the class 
composition of ward electorates between 19!54 and 1964, although specifically 
local campaigns by groups protesting against Council clearance activity lost 
Labour seats in traditional strongholds between 1959 and 1961. 10 Central and. 
eastern wards normally return Labour members, while wards north of the city 
centre return Citizens, (except along the Avonmouth council estates}. 11
HOUSIijG- IN BRISTOL
In 1971 49/o of the City's households were owner occupiers, 31/o rented from 
the Council and 20/0 from private landlords. Private rental accommodation is 
concentrated in the inner ring area surrounding the city centre, much of it in 
housing over a hundred years old and interspersed with lower quality owner 
occupied housing, some of which still lacks facilities such as an inside W.C. 
Newer owner occupied housing has been developed in successive periods outward
from, the inner ring. Council housing is concentrated around the peripheral
13 areas in large inter-war and post-war estates. Most post-war development
took place along the edge of the Avonmouth Industrial Estate and near the city's 
southernmost boundary with Somerset. A total of 66 Council estates with 
43,000 dwellings, covering about 1$$> of the City's land area are involved. 
There are also a number of small but very densely developed central clearance 
areas.
HIGH RISE IN BRISTOL
There are 5,434 high rise flats in Bristol in a total of 87 tall block:--. 
Information on the bedroom mix of the flats is unfortunately not available, but 
most of the accommodation has one or two bedrooms, with a small proportion of 
three bedroom flats, mainly in the earlier blocks. The blocks range in height 
only up'to 19 storeys, (Table 9.2). 14 In March 1972, by which time the V-j-;.lciir. 
of high rise had come, to an end, high fists accounted for H/-> of Bristol's 
accommodation built under the Housing Acts. This is considerably higher than 
the figures for other authorities in the area around Bristol, such as Bath ?;.-,
Table 9o2;_. High Rise Flats in Bristol, 1974.
Storey height
5-9
10-14
15-19
All storeys
Dwellings
No <v
1084
2991
1359
5434
19.9
55.0
25.1
100.0
Blocks 
No %
32
41
14
87
36.8
47.1
16.1
100.0
Weston-super-Mare jfo, Cardiff 3/^, Gloucester 2^ and Newport ifo. The two 
adjacent urban districts, Magotsfield and Kingswood, have no high flats. High 
rise is also a more important element in Bristol's purpose built housing stock 
than in some very large conurbation authorities, such as Manchester 11^ and 
Sheffield 1C$, and more important than in other large free-standing cities, 
such as Hull 1O^, Nottingham & and Leicester jfo. *
ORGANIZATION
Unlike Newham and Birmingham, the City Architect in Bristol played a 
straightforward technical service role and was not supervised by the Housing 
Committee. The co-ordination of construction policy, clearance and many
aspects of design control was vested in the Housing Manager as Secretary to the
1 f>Housing Committee. Finally density zoning and the granting of planning
permission was controlled by the City Engineer and Planning Officer. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This research was made possible by the kind decisions of the Chair'.: en of 
the Land and- Administration and Housing Committees of Bristol City Council to 
grant me complete access to the post-war Minutes arid papers of the Housing 
Committee and the Planning and Public Works Committee, and various other sourc 
I would like to thank them and the Bristol City Clerk, Mr J.A. Brown for this 
permission. The Housing Committee Minutes and papers were surveyed syste^a- 
ticslly from 1950 to 1972.
.A total of 11 'housing irdluentials 1 were identified for interview
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purposes in the manner described in Chapter 6, a comparatively low number 
because of a pattern of rapid circulation of members which seemed to characterize 
• a number of Bristol committees, and during the 1960s owed a good deal to'the 
regular ebb and flow of party fortunes in the annual elections. Of these 
members four had died and one could not be traced, while three members failed 
to reply to letters, (possibly because the interviewing period unfortunately 
coincided with the District elections). A total of only three Committee 
members were thus interviewed, and this combination of circumstances means that 
we have restricted the use of interview material to a background role. However, 
interviews were also carried out with three chief officers and another housing 
officer, bringing the total to seven. Interviewees were:
1) Councillor C.E. Merrett - Leader of the Labour Group since 1975, Vice- 
Chairman of the Housing Committee 1963-5, and member of the Committee 1957- 
60 and 1961-65.
2) Councillor Geoffrey Palmer - Chairman of the Housing Committee 1960-3 and 
1967-72, member 1950-76.
3) Councillor Mrs Bloom - member of the Housing Committee 1960-67.
4) J.B. Abbey - Housing Manager 1950-61.
5) H.C. Harris - Housing Manager 1961-67, Deputy Housing Manager 1950-61.
6) A.H. Clarke - City Architect 1957-74, Deputy City Architect 1954-57.
7) H.R. Hunt - Assistant Director of Housing 1974- , on the staff of Housing 
Management Department since 1953*
9.2; The Early Development of High Rise Policy.
EARLY PUBLIC HOUSING
Public housing in Bristol began in 1919 and during the inter-war years
the largely Citizen controlled Council built nearly 13,000 dwellings, four
17 fifths of then three-bedroom houses on suburban estates. Discussion aoout
the use of flats began in the mid 1920s as the Corporation turnea its attention 
to a number of small areas of acutely decayed city centre housing. A visit
- 38? -
from thy Minister of Health in 1934 during which he made a speech calling fcr 
more flat provision to provide slum clearance accommodation 'reasonably Z.QLT 
the centre of tenants'-work and interests' seems to have played a key part in 
the Citizens' general acceptance of flats. 9 Although opposed by some Labour 
councillors as 'warehousing the people, not rehousing them 1 , 20 several four- 
storey flats schemes went through with little controversy and were not affected 
by the Labour victory of 1937. The chair of the Housing Committee was taken 
by councillor Charles Gill, a right wing Labour member who ran the Committee in
markedly autocratic style until his death in 1957 and developed very close
21 relations vrLth Citizen housing spokesmen.
RECONSTRUCTION PLANNING
War damage in Bristol was not very serious in housing terms, with only
22 3,200 houses destroyed in small pockets near the docks and industrial areas.
The availability of bomb sites such as Redcliffe meant that there was initially
little attention paid to slum clearance, and policy on flats was slow to develop
•tt*
since the guidelines of the city's planning were set by^1930 Bristol and Bath
Regional Planning Scheme, drawn up by Abercrombie and Brueton, rather than by
?3 a war-time exercise.
The 1940s pattern of housing development continued on mainly pre-war lines,
24 supplemented by a large pre-fab and non-traditional housing commitDent. By
1948 Bristol had completed the largest number of post-war dwellings of any city 
outside London but it was clear that the pressure of demand on housing 
maintained by the city's buoyant economy necessitated a change of direction. 
The 1951 Development Plan envisaged an increase of 23,000 people in the city's 
population by 1970; and a need for 60,000 new dwellings plus overspill to us cart
/-> f
42,000 people. The local authority housing pro-regime vas seen as follows:" 0
Housing- estates • 13093 dwellings 4 9.2*
Bomb site areas 2837 10o7
Clearance areas 7350 2706
Infilling ]753 60^
Conversion of large houses 1600 6.0
Total 26622 .100.0
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The plan called for a programme of 19,000 dwellings by 1957, of which 10,000 
(52;!0 were to be in flats, with an annual public housing programme of 'a
minimum construction of 2,000 dwellings', supplemented by private housing of
27 1,000 dwellings a year.
The emphasis on flats was rather odd considering the quite low level of 
gross residential densities discovered in the Plan survey - between 30 and 
50 ppa - with only three small areas of net densities of 120 ppa or above. 
It was also surprising in view of Bristol's successful negotiation of a boundary 
extension into Somerset along its southern edge, in exchange for the ceding 
to the County of the detached Portishead dock area. 28 Bristol HC were able 
to plan four large estates on this area providing accommodation for 11,600 
families,(although Somerset's overspill obligations were also reduced to 
accepting qust over 1,000 Bristol households). Negotiations with Gloucester­ 
shire were a different matter, however, and although the County agreed to
accept 7,000 dwellings for Bristol overspill the City Council only built i,700
29 houses there in the 1952-60 period, after which out-County building ceased.
The Council and local press took a serious view of the difficulties of an 
overspill agreement, in July 1954 the Bristol Evening Post commented:
'Unless results are obtained in the near future, a 
"big stick" may have to be wielded in the form of 
Ministerial pressure.'
By the mid- 1 50s Bristol was sending delegations to meetings of major urban 
authorities protesting about their shortages of land and the HC considered:
'There is simply not enough room left within the city 
boundaries to build enough houses, Already the 
density of several Corporation estates has been 
increased so that more can live there, but the maximum 
has ncr.j been reached.' 30
The concern about land, together with the start of redevelopment on OOILD 
sites and in clearance areas, prompted" the City Architect, Nelson Meredith, to 
reorganize his department in 1952. The housing division was split into tvro 
sections, one concerned vith the design of the large, peripheral housing estates 
and the other to work solely on the production of schemes of muIti-;;L-oi-7
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flats. A year later designs for two five and eight storey blocks on bomb
sites were accepted by the HC. The designs were in a 'modern tenement' style
which remained characteristic of Bristol's designs until Nelson Meredith's
32retirement in 1957. During this time the use of high flats was somewhat
extended and a number of small four and five storey blocks were built on one 
of the peripheral housing estates.
The recasting of subsidies in 1956, particularly the abolition of the 
general housing subsidy, produced major developments in Bristol's housing 
policy. Approvals of new public housing fell by nearly half between 1954 and 
1956, and they continued to decline slowly for the rest of the ! 50s. At the 
same time the proportion of high flats in the city's approvals rose from 
around Q% in 1954 to nearly 30$ thres years later, and high flat approvals 
remained consistently above this level for the next ten years, (Table 9*3).^ 
Taking advantage of tha progressive storey height subsidy, the architects 
department brought forward plans for a fifteen storey block in the Barton Hill
redevelopment area in 1956, a scheme which was proudly described as the tallest
34 block yet built in any English city outside London. The general level of
storey heights also rose to 10-11 storeys and a consistent level of high flat 
approvals running at about 250 dwellings a year was established.
Over the 1950s as a whole, three fifths of all high flats were built Ln
35 redevelopment areas with the remainder on peripheral estates. In contract us..
terms, the largest builder of hir;h rise was Laing who dominated the city's 
non-traditional house building drive up to 1954 and then found themselves with 
a difficult market on houses. But local builders won most contracts and
•z/r
Laing's share was only a fifth of the tot'-al. Contract sixes were small 
because after the initial Barton Hill tall block the block designs were
conservative. In 1957 the new City Architect, A.H. Clarke, abolished the
37special multi-storey-housing section and tne high rise programme seemod to
have stabilized at a modest level around a third of the city's output. In 
fact the strains involved in the 1956 central government policy change quickly
390
produced a reversal of this situation.
Year
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
Total
Storey
110
193
-
~
110
24
119
108
_
25
10
-
113
—
—
«
24
836
height
10-14
~
70
-
-
151
266
152
129
249
532
581
616
371
—
«.
47
-
3164
15=13.
-
-
98
-
—
-
-
~
347
172
«
366
-
263
-
102
1348
—— — — .4_* •*- -*• |»J w ^  _X» f
-All High 
Flats
110
263
-
98
261
290
271
237
249
904
763
616
850
-
263
47
126
5348
All 
Approvals
2219
2034
1565
1104
903
824
801
535
352
913
1718
972
1186
238
349
689
130
16532
High Flats as >-> 
of All Approvals
5.0
12.9
—
8.9
28.9
35.2
33»8
44.3
70.7
99.1
44.4
63.4
71.7
-
75c4
6.8
96.9
32.3
9.3? The I960 Housing Crisis and the Citizen Intervention.
SLUM CLE/JL'u'ICr;, KINGSDOUI? AM) THE 1960 ELECTION
The major source of strain on the public housing programme after 1956 wa 
the slum clearance drive. Bristol's HG opposed the withdrawal of the genera 
housing subsidy which threatened their ability to complete their peripheral
estates and cut their housing output from a post-war peak of 2,200 in 1955 to
"3P 
800 dwellings by 1958. The only way this drop could be made up was by an
4
increase in clearance activity and the Labour ;=yroup seems to have been presL-v. 
izing the 1-Iedical Officer of Health to represent areas, adopting a policy of 
assuming thrvt any houre reaching 100 years of use would have to be de^ollshe!
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In 1958 the HC approved a twelve year clearance programme of 800 dwellings 
a year, and anticipated knocking down 24,500 dwellings by 2001.^
In practice clearance had oeen under way for some years before the 1956 
Act. Barton Hill was represented in the early 1950s despite the protests of 
a local Protection Society formed to fight redevelopment,' partly because of 
the character of the scheme proposed. Jennings' account of a 1953 public 
meeting in the area recorded:
The meeting was good-tempered .. (but) derisive laughter 
greeted attempts to prove that the majority would benefit 
from the scheme. Opposition to building in multi-storey 
flats was general; when one official, after expounding 
their convenience and the necessity for them, agreed that 
he himself lived, in a "nice little house", the whole audience 
chanted "That's what we want. A nice little house in a nice 
little garden, vith a nice little fence around it". Anxious 
mothers pictured themselves nine or more storeys up when 
their baby screamed or their toddler fell down in the promised 
communal playground; shift workers made searching inquiries 
about sound proofing.. let there was a reasonable hearing 
for officials when they claimed that the only alternative to 
building upwards was moving out to the overspill area 'f
(my emphasis)
The Housing Chairman Gill responded to residents' objections only by confessing 
'that he himself did not like flats - "But what can we do when land is short7""^ 
The Barton Hill residents failed to secure changes in Council policy despite 
their efforts, but as clearance rose after 1955 and began to affect areas of 
less acute housing stress so resistance to Council policy increased.
In the late '50s the Council announced plans to demolish half the houses 
in Easton ward, prompting the formation of the highly successful Easton Hone 
Defence Association, whose candidate in the 1959 election toppled one of the 
Labour ward councillors. 45 Early in 1960 in response to the threat of a 
similar success at the next election, the HC made property owners in Easton an
offer to renovate their homes with grant assistance, substantially reducing
44 the numbers of homes scheduled for demolition.
The Easton example prompted action >;y other neighbourhood groups including
one in Kingsdown, an area cf run down but pleasant housing on a steeply sloping
,• I 
site north of the city centre which was programed for clearance in 1957/'
• c
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Council redevelopment plans featuring 1? and 8 storey blocks produced strong 
opposition also from the influential Bristol Civic Society, since the site was 
one of major landscape importance. On the same grounds the Royal Fine Arts 
Commission demanded to be consulted in 1958. The Council's attitude to 
these interventions was hostile and nine months before the C.P.O. Inquiry a 
senior housing official told the Guardian; 'One thing is certain - those houses 
will have to come down.' Following the concessions in Easton ward, the 
Kingsdown Association renewed its attempt to procure a stay of execution even 
though the C.P.O. had gone through including 200 fit houses. In Hay 1960 the 
Citizen election manifesto came out against further clearance, and one of their 
spokesmen promised to review existing clearance schemes, including Kingsdown, 
if elected. The Kingsdown Association wrote to the city's three newspapers 
pointing out this pledge and contrasting it with the attitude of the new Labour 
HC Chairman, Councillor O'Neill, who they said 'completely evaded the issue 1 
when questioned at election meetings. The Association accused the Labour group 
of 'UNJUST discrimination towards the working class district of Kingsdown 1 and
asked 'all fair minded citizens to question Labour candidates at the election
48 about their destruction of 200 homes'.
PRIVATE HOUSING- AND COUNCIL LAND HOLDINGS
A second important housing issue at the 1960 election concerned Council 
land holdings, which the Citizens claimed were preventing private house buildin£ 
from contributing to the city's housing drive, which at between 250 and 350
dwellings a year (except in the immediate decontrol period) fell far short of
49 the Development Plan target of 1,000 new homes a year.
How far Corporation land holdings affected this is difficult to decide.
At the beginning of 1960 the HC held over 60 acres in the inner city, but ther,~
50 were hrrdly likely to be sites attractive to private housebuilders. In the
51 suburbs the Committee held very little land, but on the southern urban
52periphery the Corporation held GOO acres. Host of tr,is was an airfield site
which was suddenly closed in 1957, in the process freeing much nearby land 
from restrictions on building. Bristol immediately applied to revise its 
Development Plan to use the land for housing, permission for which ^as finally 
given by HIELG on December 18th 1959. 55 A further 3,540 dwellings were to be 
built on 226 acres of the site and the land problems which had so worried the 
Council in the mid-'50s seemed to have receded for good.^ It is unlikely 
that much progress on this development could have been made by May 1960 but 
the Citizens, particularly their 'shadow Chairman 1 Geoffrey Palmer, made an
attack on this landholding and plans to revitalize private housing central
55 elements in their campaign.
THE CITIZENS IN POWER
On gaining control of the Council, the Citizens quickly set about 
changing previous Labour policies. In his first HC meeting as Chairman, 
Palnor introduced motions to cancel three C*P,Os already submitted to the
Ministry for approval, and to ban any further building of Council houses on
56 housing estates or suburban sites. He also called on the Housing Manager,
Abbey, to submit reports on HC land which 'could be sold by negotiation with 
the Builders Association for development by private builders' and on derelict 
land holdings. In line with the ban on housebuilding he asked for a progress 
report on multi-storey building and prospects for its expansion. Combined 
with attacks on the Housing Department's staffing, a motion demanding a scheme 
for selling council houses to be prepared within four weeks, and another 
demanding details of all outstanding complaints and repairs, these blitzkreig 
tactics seem"to have demoralized the Housing Department and Abbey was unable
to stop the Citizens trying to implement their complete manifesto in the space
57 of about a month.
On June 13 the HC decided to stop all further house building, throwir<r
away a large part of an approved three year programme, some Citizen members
58 claiming that the back of the housing problem had been broken. Two wec::s
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later Abbey submitted a report on high rise building in which he had no option 
but to try and replace as much of the axed suburban programme as he could with 
high flats in the inner city redevelopment areas,' (although he also saved so^e 
old people's flats from the wreckage). He pointed out that the high rise 
programme could only respond slowly to these new demands and could only be 
expanded if the representation of clearance areas could be speeded up:
Much sterner measures must also be adopted with regard to 
the rehousing of families to be displaced from areas awaiting 
development, and the Committee must be prepared to take legal 
action to obtain possession of properties where a_ reasonable 
offer of other accommodation is refused. 59
(my emphasis) 
This passage of the report was accepted without comment by the Committee.
On the question of how high rise approvals could be increased to offset 
the axing of housing estate development Abbey noted that:
Unless the City Architect has or can obtain sufficient staff 
to tackle some of the outstanding schemes almost immediately, 
the Committee ci^y feel that consideration should be given \;o 
negotiating with some of the large firms of building contractors 
who have already prepared designs of hi^-h blocks of flats which 
could be amended to suit the requirements of the Committee , ° J
This suggestion was seized on by the Citizens as the only hopeful note in the 
report and approved in principle unanimously, despite the objections of Clarke 
the City Architect who seemed to doubt his department's ability to prepare 
contracts on a non-competitive basis.
In the ensuing weeks the Housing Department was approached by a large
f<~f 
number of contractors, and at Wimpey's expense the EC visited Binnir.gr.&n to
find out how their negotiated contract system operated. After this trip 
Clarke proposed that Bristol should straightforwardly duplicate Birmir^h^'s 
procedures, with the site layout and overall dwelling specification prepared 
by his department and the actual block design being carried out by the 
contractors' architects. 65 Early in September the HC agreed to negotiate fc-VT 
high rise contracts with Laing end Wimp— and to look at offers from other 
firms. 64 In fact, the two leading firms gained virtually complete control of 
Bristol's high rise prograjnme, building over four fifths of all the city's '60s
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high rise, (Table 9*4)<> Local firms were completely eliminated from hi^rr. 
rise contracts after 1960, and the only serious competition to the two fir-s 
thereafter was the London based Tersons firm who won four contracts'in 1962-3
•
but performed remarkably badly on completion times and won no more contracts. 
No other firm yon more than one contract.
(High rise contract approvals)
Year
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1953-60
1961-69
1953-69
£ of all
1953-60
1961-69
1 953-69
Number of
1953-60
1961-69
1 953-69
Average C
1953-60
1961-69
1953-69
Laing
~
70
~
-
«.
176
-
188
187
347
239
391
725
—
_
—
162
434
2051
2485
High Rise
26
52
44
contract
4
12
16
VTimpey
_
—
—
—
1 -
-
-
«.
62
316
327
89
116
—
233
—
-
-
1143
1143
Contract
0
29
20
<•* • o «.
-
9
9
Other non­
local firms
„
-.
—
98
-
-
100
=.
—
216
268
142
-
-
torn
68
-
198
694
892
Approvals:
12
18
16
2
7
9
Local
firms
110
264
—
—
252
152
219
49
—
25
-
-
-
-
—
-
—
1046
25
1071
62
1
19
15
1
16
All high rise
contracts
110
334
—
98
252
328
319
237
249
904
834
622
841
—
233
68
162
1678
3913
5591
100
100
100
21
29
50
(fo Of totfl
in high ri?ej
93
79
100
100
60
85
100
100
100
93
99
99
100
69
78
90
98
95
ontract Size:
109
171
155
M*
• 127
127
99
99
99
70
9
67
80
135
112
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CLEARANCE AJTO MINISTRY INTERVENTION
Had the Citizens carried out a revision of slum clearance programmes on 
the lines promised at the elections, these policy changes would not have beer- 
disastrous. In practice, however, the Citizen stance on slum clearance was 
reversed almost as soon as ^hey gained office at a meeting with the Minister 
of Housing and Local Government, Henry Brooke, in July 1960. The Bristol 
Clerk's record of this occasion is worth quoting at some length.
In response to Palmer's opening exposition of Bristol's view the Minister 
commented:
Slum clearance was a very human task and full consideration had to 
be given to the human side, but nevertheless, the work must go on. 
He repeated: "Je must continue the slum clearance drive".
Mr Palmer said people could be rehoused more quickly by individual 
action than by Clearance Area procedure. The Minister replied: 
"You certainly may be able to rehouse people living in that house 
more quickly if you are dealing with 'penny numbers'.". Mr Palnc-r 
said that individual action would also include efforts to purchase 
the houses involved. The Minister stated that he was sure owners 
should be given every consideration but sometimes elected representa­ 
tives had to do things citizens did not like.
The Minister then flatly refused to revoke the C.P.Os already confirmed at 
Kingsdown and elsewhere and elaborated on his powers to appoint an Inquiry and 
take over direct control of the city's housing programme if electors made " 
representation that the Council was not carrying out its duties under the 
1957 Housing Act. 'The Minister said this provision should be borne in mind'. 
Palmer and his Vice-Chairman attempted to argue their case in relation TO 
an individual fit house included in a C.P.O., but the Minister intervened to 
defend Bristol's Medical Officer of Health against criticism, commenting:
"One must pay very careful attention to the professional
experts".
Mr Palmer stated that under the 1957 Housing Act many houses 
could because of dampness, cracks etc. be classified as unfit, 
although in fact they were not unfit. The Minister replied 
that thin was not so. He said a house could be deemed to be 
u;,fit for human, habitation if and only if it was so far defective 
that it was not reasonably suitable for occupation in that condi-wicn. 
In answer to a question by the Medical Officer of Health the 
Minister said: "It would bo quite wrong to say that our Inspectors 
believe that Bristol has been employing hard or rigid standards. 
Broadly speaking my Inspectors have told me that they have not found 
Bristol out of line with other authorities" .
At the end of the meeting Brooke rammed home his message:
"I am extremely anxious that slum clearance should go on 
and go on fast. I should be anxious that large numbers of 
houses which are represented by the Medical Officer of •Health 
were being turned down by the City Council. I should be • 
beginning to wonder whether, in fact, slum clearance was going 
on as fast as it should be".
Mr O'heill said he felt that great attention should be paid to 
the representations of the I'edical Officer of Health. 
The Minister wished to have the Council's proposals for dealing- 
wit h the balance of the 10,000 unfit houses and said that he 
hoped there would not be any slowing down of the programme. 
He informed the deputation that the Prime Minister had charged 
him with responsibility for ensuring that the slum clearance 
programme was proceeded with.
When the Bristol delegation returned home they decided that they had r.o 
other option than to drop their plans to withdraw C.P.Os. Indeed Palmer
even "bowed to strong Ministry pressure to increase densities on the Kingsdo^ii
/TO
redevelopment as well as letting the C.P.O. go ahead. Eventually the 
future slum clearance programme was reviewed in November 1960, slightly scaled
down to include 5,000 unfit houses and modified to favour property owners'
6° 
interests with more rehabilitation and purchase by agreement provisions.
The meeting with MHLG also resulted in a modification of the Citizens'
70 plans to sell off Council land to private builders. Initially Palmer
envisaged negotiated sales operated via the local Housebuilders Association at 
initial cost to the Council plus development cost - in effect giving the 
builders involved a present of the rise in a site's land value since the Cour.c: 
acquired it. The justification for this was to avoid builders bidding pri-je:; 
up and to eliminate the scarcity element from the price. When this plan was 
explained at the meeting it received a cool reception:
The Minister said that the normal safeguard would be to sell 
by tender in the open market because that safeguards the Council 
against any suggestion that land is being sold to friends. He 
said that if a local authority consults the District Valuer and 
proceeds to sell at a price fixed by him, neither the Ministry 
nor any local ratepayer could effectively contest it. lie did 
think, however, that the Council would be putting themselves in
great danger by selling at cost price plus costs of developr.o::4u. . 1
t
The HC still decided to go ahead with negotiated sales but the scope of access 
was widened and the District Valuer given more freete to fix a 'iY.Lr' -orice
- 7,98 -
7? for land. ' The absence of a complete 'knockdown' price slowed up land
sales until 1961-2 when private housing demand picked up. But many local 
builders, plus to a great extent the estate development divisions of Wi'rpey
and Laing, purchased large areas of land at what were probably lower than
73market prices. «•
In their three years in office the Citizens sold off 250 acres of land 
(more than offsetting the 226 acres airfield housing site acquired in 1959).
private
A total of 3,900^houses was built at Stockton and Whitchurch at densities
74 of around 50 ppa. '^ But the vast bulk of these were completed in 1964-66,
75 four to six years after permission for local authority housing was given.
In the interim the Council housing programme was severely disrupted. 
CITIZEN POLICIES AND THB HOUSING CRISIS, 1959-63
The overall effect of the three Citizen decisions - to concentrate all 
public housing in high flats, to go ahead with clearance and to sell off 
Council land for private housing at reduced but not peppercorn prices - rroiucs-c. 
the worst deterioration in Bristol's housing situation in the post-war period.
In 1961 local authority completions were planned at 914 homes before the
76 Citizen policy switch - in the aftermath they collapsed to 387 dwellings.
Completions rose in 1962 to 818 but collapsed again in 1963 to the lowest total 
built since 1945. At the sams time clearance activity reached a post-war 
peak of 1,200 dwellings in 1962 and private housing rose only 25/<> above the lew
levels of the 1950s.
These violent changes in the City's housebuilding performance came on top 
of the effects of the Conservative's 1956 Act, which from 1958 on meant that
local authority housing was barely compensating for the reduction in housir.g
77 stocks produced by clearance, (Table 9.5). The Citizens' actions in contrast
i
produced a Council housing programme, which in 1961-2 built 1,300 fewer houses 
than it demolished, a disastrous period from which the city only began to 
recover in 1965, a year and a half after the Citizens left office. Kor v;as
399 -
the reduction in Council activity made up by private building. Tfic norral 
addition to overall housing stocks of one or two thousand homes a year fell to 
just 21 homes in 1961,'and in 1962 became an overall loss of 416 dwellings.
Year
1945
1946
1 947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
195t>
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
Public
Housing
(1)
7
277
1279
1S66
2170
1606
1655
1695
1480
2105
2242
1935
1413
769
635
936
387
818
274
1074
1482
1365
860
385
590
150
636
261
Private
Housing
(2)
_
_
—
117
96
213
387
242
289
244
1259
272 '
337
237
289
436
423
467
809
1605
1115
831
847
867
519
856
626
730
Slum
Clearance
13)
^
_
(Figures
131
150
257
671
714
891
789
1705
289
298
313
96
254
193
160
87
134
149
Net impact of Net impact of
(D - (3) (Oi
unavailable 1946-54)
2111
1785
1156
98
- 79
45
-402
-883
- 15
776
1169
1269
606
192
430
63
502
112
- (2) - (3)
3370
2057
1493
335
210
481
21
-416
794
2381
2284
2100
1453
1059
949
919
1128
842
The crisis produced a marked increase in the incidence of housing stress, 
again coining on top of the low performance of the late '50s. In the auturn 
of 1957 the Labour group closed the housing waiting list with 8,100 'live 1 
applications, 'owing to the effects of financial restrictions on the output of 
new dwellings'. Two years later the list was reopened and even after tho 
pent up flood of applications which followed, the 'live 1 total had fallen to 
5.700 households by March, I960, a reduction of nearly 3Q;o over the two an^ a 
half years. Under the Citizens the list increased consistently, despite a
- 400 -
weeding out of lapsed applications in 1962. In March 1964 there were 10,6C:,
families waiting for a Council home, an increase of nearly 90/1 on the figure
70 when the Citizens took office.
*
In addition to the worsening chances of obtaining a Council tenancy, the 
Citizen period was also marked by a decline in standard of Council 
housing provision. The level of high flat completions rose from 11^ of the 
city's output in 1959, to 28>£ in 1960, 45$ in 1961 and 92^ in 1962, 8°while 
high rise approvals doubled from 34)^ in 1959 to 71^ in 1961, reaching a figure 
of 99?* in 1962, ensuring that after construction lags high flats continued to 
account for 60-75/S of Bristol's housing output through 1964-66. 81
POLICY IN THE HIGH RISE BOOM
The total switch of the public housing programme into high rise encountered 
two kinds of limitations. The first was a lack of cleared inner city s:tes, 
which led the HC to devise plans for increasing densities on their last
op
peripheral estate at Hartcliffe. Initially the HC proposed a high rise 
development at densities of 180 ppa (in a zone of 50 ppa), but the city planners
cut this to 150 ppa and a scheme of five 11 storey blocks was approved^ despite
83 protests from the ward Labour party.
and 
Density increases also proceeded on inner city sites/although the planners
objected to two more 15 storey blocks at Barton Hill (which already had a
\ 84 planned 785 dwellings in twelve high blocks;, they allowed increases elsevrrore,
notably at Kingsdovm where the Ministry refused loan sanction without extra 
dwellings. The revised scheme of three linked 17 storey blocks produced 
strong opposition fron the Royal Fine Arts Commission who noted that Kincsicr,- 
was 'one of the most remarkable sites for housing they have seen for some t.irr.e, 
providing an opportunity for a scheme designed to take the fullest possible
iadvantages of its.unique position 1 and commented baldly, 'they were not 
satisfied that this opportunity had boon taken 1 . The public debate which 
followed was highly critical of Bristol Council's standards of design, 
particularly after Clarke defended the scheme as determined by the rood to
R7 
provide adequate car parking. Although the HC made a number of attempts
to 'bounce' the scheme through, and were extremely hostile to external
criticisms, the extra dwellings inserted by the Ministry vore finally deleted
PR 
at the Commission's insistence and the blocks reduced to 14 storeys. • The
scheme was finally completed in 1968, more than ten years after the original 
designs were made public.
The second and key limitation on housing completions was the extra 
construction time required for high flats compared with houses. The switch 
to negotiated tenders and contractor designed high rise was supposed to 
accelerate construction, and in November 1961, (before any of the new contracts
had been completed), the Housing Department claimed that these changes 'had
89 
cut nearly a year from the time taken to build some of the flats'. At the
same time the Labour spokesman O'Neill tried to persuade the EC to stem the 
increase in the Housing Waiting List by giving a contract for 500 houses 'to ce
built quickly. Although the Citizens had pledged in 1960 that any shortfall
90 
on high rise completions would be made up in this way, Palmer now refused to
alter their policy, commenting only:
Arrangements with several organizations large enough to 
cope with at least half the city's house building would 
result in a big improvement in the future. 91
In practice the architects department adapted very unsuccessfully to the new 
procedures. In January 1962 Clarke confessed that on three contracts
negotiations with Laing on architects department designs had produced 'tenders
92
far too high for me to recommend their acceptance'. As a result the three
schemes, which varied between 5 and 12 storeys were simply scrapped, and 
replaced by standard Laing 15 storey blocks which had already been successfuily 
negotiated. Laing also lost two contracts to Tersons after negotiations
93 failed.
The Citizen majority had meanwhile coined their own account of the f^i-u 
of their policy, expressed in an OcLober 1961 resolution con.rratul-iting jhe HC 
on its 'present policy to make every effort to ensure the erection of the
- 402 -
maximum number of dwellings during the next three years within the limits 
imposed by the availability of labour'. 94 In fact no one had ever sup-restei
•^ —j
that labour constraints were affecting Bristol before this date, but like the
7 •
bogus land shortage of the 1950s, the conventional wisdom had some effect on 
policy. As the industrialized building campaign got under way in 1962, and 
following a two day visit to Bristol by Dame Evelyn Sharp in April, Palmer ana.
Clarke inspected the Larsen Netson system in Copenhagen^ and a large HC
96 delegation visited Prance. Following this their report argued that labour
constraints would affect 'any acceleration or increase in the rate of production 
of new dwellings by traditional construction' and recommended approval in
C7
principle of a five year industrialized programme for 500 dwellings annually.'" 
This kind of cautious involvement was unlikely to attract the large firms by
this stage and Clarke held abortive talks first with Costains, Laing and
98 Taylor Woodrow Anglian, and later with Gloucester, Hewport and Cardiff about
99 a possible consortium to place a larger order.
Laing were the main contractors interested in Bristol and in November 1962 
the press commented on one of their tower block opening ceremonies under the 
headline, 'Battle of the Pre-fab Flats goes on'. Palmer told Laing's luncheon 
guests that 'Bristolians could look forward to seeing many flats similar to 
these built in the future 1 , but was lukewarm about industrialization. Laing's 
regional director stressed that they
were tremendously proud to be associated with another 
milestone in the development of Bristol. They were 
confident that they could double their existing Bristol 
program'.e of 600 homes a year.
Laing's technicians had spent five weeks on the 
Continent and. in Scandinavia studying pre-fab systems. 
The first obstacle to be overcome was that someone would 
have to build a factory for the purpose and this would tic 
very costly . ^00
101 
Laing's pressure for their Sectra system continued with visits by their
Chairman, Sir Maurice'Laing and ocher directors, and a notable celebration of
102 
their 10,COOth post-war dwelling for Lrirjtol. But they were haiastruru: :-..;.-
the relative difficulty of contract negotiations with the City Architects
- 403 -
department, and by the involvement of Wimpey in the housing programme,
who were of course the only major company not to move over to system buildi:-e-
during-the industrialization campaign.
9.4s Mie.. Policy Runs Dpwn._
POLICY UNDER LABOUR, 1963-7
In the 1963 elections Labour regained control of the Council. But 
although the change in control led to an abandonment of the most distinctive 
Citizen policies, including a diversification of housing output, there were 
many continuities in policy across the two periods. The primary reason for 
this was a marked right ward shift in the composition of the Labour group, nade 
clear in the election of Councillor Jenkins as leader in 1963. On the IIC, 
the new Chairman O'Neill was on good terms with Palmer and a fervent right
winger following his election to the Executive of the E.T.U. in the 1961 anti-
105 communist drive.
In June 1963 the Labour HC members decided on a substantial boost to the
housing programme, which was by then facing a shortfall of 1,000 homes in its
1 ofi 
output for the next year. Additional type block contracts were given to
Wimpey and Laing, and a contract for 500 houses to be built quickly on the icv 
areas of suburban land left by the Citizens was given to Laing after the Eousir.g 
Manager reported that 'this firm is anxious to resume work on the building of
1 Cf7houses for the Corporation'. (Laing's anxiety reflected their continuing
poor performance on negotiated tenders which led to one of their contracts
108 
being let on-the open market in September).
Between 1963 and 1965 overall approvals were higher than at any tine since 
1956, and high rise numbers (at 63$ of the total in 1964 and ?2><- in 1965) r: 
to 836 dwellings by 1965. 1 °9 After 1964 the policy of building hi.^b rise en 
peripheral estates ceased, and the emphasis moved to redevelopment areas, 
(Teble 9o6). 11 ° Overall, however, there vn.3 only a slight increase in tiio 
concentration of '60s high ri:;e in inner areas, largely because'of the
'densifying 1 blocks built on peripheral estates, but nearly two thirdr. of all 
high flats were nonetheless built in redevelopment areas. The decline in 
clearance activity under Labour, down to 300 houses a year in 1965, thus had 
clear implications for the future of high rise, Bristol's planners also 
seemed to be trying to lower densities in redevelopment areas at this tine, 
the City Engineer's plan for Be drains ter RA producing an angry reaction from
.* 4 *the HC demanding higher densities, more housing provision and higher blocks. ' ' ' 
Eventually the Planning and Public Uorks Committee permitted a 13^ increase in 
the housing provided but this was still much less than the EC had hoped. 11 ^ 
Table 9o6.; Location of High Rise Approvals. 1953-69*
Year
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1 953-60
1961-69
1953-69
cfo of all II
1953-60
1961-69
1953-69
Redevelopment Areas
48
135
—
98
110
266
100
188
•V*
589
335
290
826
_
263
-
126
945
2429
3374
igji Rise Approvals:
62
64
63
Inner
_
—
—
—
-
24
-
49
249
-
61
83
-
—
—
47
—
73
440
513
5
12
10
Suburbs
Outer
62
128
~
„
151
—
171
..
-
316
357
243
24
—
—
-
•M
512
950
1462
33
25
27
The declining prospects of a future, Iprge scale hich rise programs 
meant that Jristol failed to folio;: up its approval of industrialized build-­ 
in principle although visits to systous continued to bo raaJc in 19^3 (jc.otra)
1 "1 v
and 1964 (Reema and Coignet). -> But the Housing Manager reported that -he 
industrialized building label now covered their existing arrangement v/ith
Laing and Wimpey and the HC seemed to havo let the matter drop completely
114thereafter. The background to this lack of enthusiasm, which vns never
publicly stated, was that the Labour group under the right wir.^ leadership 
had decided by mid 1965 to run down public housing a^-ain and instead to 
encourage private development. This was the situation discovered by Crossr^an 
when he visited Bristol in November:
The Labour party is still in power on the city Council and 
wanted to discuss their large scale redevelopment. There 
are still huge areas in the centre which need redevelopment 
and I bad assumed they would ask for an enormous programme. 
So I told (a meeting of the Labour Council group) they could 
have a capacity pro^i-anno provided they would adopt system 
building, which they don't much like. They took it all quite 
quietly, but afterwards the leader of the Labour group and the 
chairman of the finance conmiittee took me aside and told me-; 
that their real trouble was very different. They just didn't . 
want to build anymore council houses because, even vrith ny nev: 
greatly improved subsidies, this would increase the debt on 
which interest payments were so overwhelming. They have over­ 
built and they have got too big a capital-investment programme. 
They would much prefer to sell the land for owner occupation. 
When I found that Bristol had already built 45,000 council Louses, 
I said "Of course you needn't build any more, this suits no 
perfectly", and told them to read my new I/hite Paper. They 
seemed very surprised . 115
In 1966 Bristol's approvals fell from a 1963-5 average of over 1,000 dwell.l.^s 
to less than 250 houses, (without any high rise), and the level remained at 
lens than 350 homes in 1967. Prom 1965 when completions were 1,500 d::ollJr.~s 
they fell to 150 dwellings by 1970, by which time Council building was havinr 
hardly any positive effect on local housing stocks, (Table 9.3). This re- 
orientation of public housing towards a minimal, background role meant that 
Bristol was quite separate from the national trend in not adopting industrif.l
building.
Two other ctrands of policy helped to produce a sharp bresk in hiy-h rir:e 
building in 1566. .Virstly, the decline in approvals and the difficulties cf 
negotiatirv; with CJ.arke's departi.-ient meant that Laing and Uimpey were no lc::.-«: 
prepared to Li-uintain .he close relations v/ith Briatol necessary for contract
- '+06 -
negotiation. In 1964 Wimpey negotiations failed for the first tice 116 and 
in October 1965 the HC decided to start offering contracts on the open irsr-et 
after a failure of several negotiations with Laing. 1 ' 7 This was averted only
when Laing offered to cut their previous tender prices by 15^, an offer the
11R 
HC accepted. Some months later Laing told the Housing Manager that thcy
would welcome the introduction of selective rather than negotiated tendering, 1 '" 
but in early 1966 the HC upset the duopolijtic U.inpey - Laing competition which
the Housing Department had planned on four out of six contracts, and demanded
1 ?0 the consideration of bids from six firms. In the event, Laing and Wimpey
•i p -i
won all the high flat contracts.
KINGSDOWN II
The second and crucial factor leading to a change of the city's hign. rise 
policy was the change in Ministry attitudes, which began to affect Bristol DUCJI 
earlier on because of its declining housing effort and failure to adopt systszi 
building. Clarke recalled that more than once in the 1960s he was ms.de rware 
that:
Bristol was quite exceptional in the percentage of housing 
in multi-storey.. This cropped up in Whitehall. Looking 
down the list we stood like a sore thumb nationally. ^-2
The occasion on which the change of Ministry attitudes became apparent
concerned the second stage of the ill fated Kingsdown scheme, which vas
123 designed by the architects department as four eight storey slab blocks.
In July 1966 the scheme was submitted to the MHLG South West regional office lor 
preliminary consents and produced a long letter in which the Regional ,.rc::i-.eo~ 
contrasted the economic mix of building foras for the density (140 ppa) - *,.v.ich 
was 40>^ high rise and 60^ low rise flats - with Bristol's proposal of 9V-: r'.^r 
rise and 9^ low rise flats. 124 In terms of capital costs this would cost an 
extra £40,000, and the additional subsid7 would cost i;.;LG £151,000.
w
Apart frcia the economics of tl.e- schore, the y^d«vt-i.?pr.iont shcvrn 
on tho layout ir: not the t.?pe best suited for the- area. It ir.s 
considered that the redevelopment should, be something en tho 
Ijj'os of the old London squares with bull din.r.-s not uoro th^n 4 
or 5 storeys in height. ^'hi- -ovld pr-oorve the j-.tLiofi'.-'.i-.^x- ol
the neighbourhood which once had considerable charm and 
could have again.
We note that the schono has been desired in line v/ith 
the Council's policy not to erect three and four storey 
flats unless they can be linked by direct access to multi­ 
storey flats in which lifts are available. However, in 
view of the comments given above, formal approval to the 
layout as submitted could be given only with considerable 
reluctance. The Council may therefore wish to review the 
matter and we should appreciate your further comments. 125
On the same day as the hinistry letter arrived, the Town Clerk received a 
letter of protest from the Bristol Civic Society about the secrecy surrounding
the plans, and the Royal Fine Arts Commission shortly afterwards insisted on
1 ?fi 
being consulted. The local press reported the EC's decision to press
ahead nonetheless, and criticized the weak Kinistry intervention:
This will be as good as a wink to Bristol to go ahead. There 
is no reason to believe, when so much that iu ugly has been 
erected already, that there will be any change of heart now - 
even at Vfnitehall's behest. 127
In fact MHLG shortly afterwards backed down in view of the Council's advanced
1 PRstate of negotiations with Uimpey on a contract.
The Civic Society submitted a detailed critique of the scheme during the
summer claiming that it was 'out of scale with the surrounding areas' and that
129 'the social quality of the layout leaves much to be desired 1 . HC reaction
was firmly resistant to any changes, the press describing their verdict as: 
'Objections to the rebuilding of Kings down with tall blocks of flats are
4 *7/~>
unreasonable and more than three years too late 1 ,'^ an ironic view since the 
HC had tried to insist on complete secrecy for the scheme until a contract h?.d
gone through.
The controversy rumbled on through the auturm but reached a decisive 
point ;:hen the Royal Fine Arts Commission wrote to the Council in December 
saying that the scheme seemed to have been designed with only three thin-u in 
mind - the EC's opposition to low rise flats without lifts, a calculation th^t 
lifts were only economic in fl£.t-3 of eight or more storeys, and 'a wi;;h to n^.; 
ui;e of a particular industrialised system for point blocks'.
The Commission believes that there are other equally import- LI 
considerations to which equal if not more weight should 'be ,-ivs:i 
before any final decision is taken on this scheme, including:
(a) The fact that the same density can .be achieved with- other 
forms of layout, not involving high buildings.
(b) The need for a layout v;hich will provide a really attractive 
environment for those who will live in the new buildings.
(c) The need for a standard of architectural design that will 
match the importance of the scheme, for the benefit both of those 
who live there and of the city as a whole .
The letter went on to observe:
The Commission much regrets that it was not consulted at a much 
earlier stage on this scheme, especially having regard to the 
discussion that took place in 1963 in connection with the first 
phase of the Kingsdown redevelopment . W
On the same day as this damning verdict arrived the MHLG Principal Regional 
Officer circulated all the HC members stating that in view of the Commission's
argument the Ministry could not give loan sanction to the scheme unless it was
132 redesigned.
The HC sent a delegation to discuss the new decision but eventually -.-.-ere
A «-» f"
forced to accept a scheme of 4 and 5 storey flats with lifts. "^ But at the
1967 elections the Citizens again won back control of the Council and threw out
134 the revised scheme still being prepared. Instead they decided to use tne
site for private housing and commissioned a leading firm of private architects
whose sophisticated lower density low rise scheme ' vras accepted without
136 criticism by the Bristol Civic Society and Royal hine Arts Commission.
FlilAL DECI3ICITS
The change of liHLG attitudes signalled by Kingsdown meant that the housir.^
pro-'-rraoiiie approved in hay 1967 mentioned no specific high rise projects, v-hile
'37 densities were said to be 'under continuous discussion with the Ministry 1 -
In September the Ilinistry cut Bristol's 1 967-8 programme from 580 to 1p8
138 dwellings, postponing tender approvals to the next year. - Shortly after the
HC discussed the future of a site at Rod-diffe adjoining an estate of 7^ lv>h 
flats in eleven t-11 blockn. Clarke proposed to build tvo 17 storey blocl.s 
there, but since the site WHS adjacent also to a major Bristol church and oince
the housing programme had been cut so badly that development would be delayed 
anyway, the Citizen majority threw the scheme out. 159 Following Palmer 'o 
lead they then decided not to use .the site for housing at all but to sell it 
for commercial development, although some members who had voted against 
Clarke's 'prison blocks' no 7 tried to retain it for housing. Palmer put a 
firm gloss on this decision in talking to the press, which reported:
Apart from a few projects in hand, Bristol will build no 
more multi-storey flats. There are now more than 50 tall 
blocks in the city and there is no need for any more, says 
Chairman of the City's Housing Committee, Alderman Geoffrey 
Palmer. He told me this after yesterday's Comittee meeting 
which wiped away any misapprehensions in councillors' minds 
about the future of a site at Redcliffe..
Some Labour members apparently thought that the Redcliffe housing 
scheme was merely postponed, but it is now clearly established 
that it is OUT. HO
The final seal on the high rise boom came in April 1968 when nogotir-.ticnc 
with Laing on the last 15 storey block planned for Barton Hill failed to .
produce a tender within the 10vu yardstick tolerance and consequently would no'.
H1 qualify for loan sanction at all. Laing wrote suggesting a lower density
development, which the HC accepted. The firm commented:
This situation is disappointing but, quite frankly, no longer 
surprising* Our experience leads us to the conclusion that 
the Ministry yardstick figures are not in any way compatible 
with the building costs of multi-storey flat projects such as 
the ooheme at Barton house. H2
A revised scheme including one six storey block also failed to qualify and
143 early in 1969 a completely low rise scheme was substituted. Later in 19^'
the HC approved one more high, block in a redevelopment area planned ceveral 
rti before. 1 ^ Uith this the building of high rise in Bristol ciine to cr.
end.
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CHAm-:?L TEN
the Explanat ion ,_of Local Politics
The preceding three chapters do not fit very veil .with existing accounts 
of urban politics in Britain, or with the theory of local democracy. Much 
of the analysis has concerned non-local and non-' political 1 influences, ar.d 
the role of electoral politics and elected representatives at times has 
seemed tangential to the explanation of policy change.
\7e argusd in Chapter Six that the relatively well developed literature 
on local government and local political input processes would enable us to
^\
focus more attention on less studied aspects of local policy making.^ In 
fact, the case studies have revealed that despite a very considerable-; liver..--. c: 
of research effort into an attempt to discover a conventionally 'politic?.! 1 
process on high rise, no such process could be uncovered. Contrary to -the 
expectations with which we approached the research, very little local dobst-v 
took place over high rise housing policy, and its development see*n« closely 
similar to the evolution of national policy.
Given that local decision makers are closer to the 'grass roots', rrnd 
in particular were clearly aware of tenant resistance to high rise, the- 
tmccntroversialiiy of the topic and the absence of any developed political 
activity around it pose a -prima facie problem which perplexed (znd. occasion- IT 
-depressed) me. From this perplexity came this brief attempt to onaly-o ths 
inapplicability of the existing literature and to put forward an altemati- e 
perspective on urban politics.
The first section of this chapter presents in a very condonscd for;:: the 
significant cordon elements in the case study narratives, and the second and 
third sections review them in relation to a variety of actor-orientated ,r:nd 
structural accounts .of urban politics, (which rr ; basically local or urban 
variants of the theories discussed in Chapter Five).
Vib ~
10o1: The LOC//1 Is.sue System.
The local issue system can be represented in terms which are apparently 
less complicated than those of the national issue system, (Figure 10..1}. 3v.-'; 
we have already noted in section 4.1 the channelling of multiple influx oes 
from the professional associations, the construction industry and other sources 
to local authorities via the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. ?hane 
pressures stand out from other influences on local policy in being largely 
unmediated by detailed perceptions of the local authority's own situation. 
Three other key influences on local policy formulation were mediated by these 
perceptions; construction industry pressure for high rise contracts, trends in 
the local government system as a whole in the use of high flats, and the 
housing preferences of tenants and potential tenants. The mediating 
perceptions themselves were focused on, firstly, an estimate of the housing 
problems faced by the local authority, and secondly, an estimate of the 
availability of land for public housing development. These perceptions wore 
collectively defined by actors in the local authority, usually without detailed 
analysis and without being subjected to public debate or scrutiny. They 
formed the basis on which housing management departments and individual 
councillors in all three authorities generally felt free to screen out of the 
policy process clear tenant pressures in opposition to high rise. They 
played a key role in ^hyping the attitudes of architect-planning and housing 
Ec'Tir gc-aont departments to trends in the nr.tional use of high, flats. And 
they served sr. the constant backdrop against which architects departments f.nd 
housing committees nude decisions about contractual policy in iespouse to 
construction industry pressure. Housing committee views in all three .--.re. .=?. 
drew principally on diffuse interpretations of the local authority's s: tu^tior. 
fovnuUited by council inonbors, interpretations which themselves to a great 
ex'jor.t reflected the inf orn-atj on passed'"en by chief officers.
Once the comM.ittees iLiirle the decision to build high rise, powor.Oal feed­ 
back processes v:cro set in train which broke down v«.::ticial coi.iiiiitt.ee resisv,.r.c
ffi/.'sre 10.1; The Local, Is?ue_j3vstern.
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to this form of rehousing, strengthened the t.rchitects departments' confidence 
in using the building form, and which in general seem to have stimulated 
further contractual pressure for high flat contracts. This direct feedback
*
to committees and architects departments was clearly unrelated to the. ori^insl 
mediating perceptions of tjie authority's housing problems and available .Und. 
Overt contractual pressure at later stages of the policy was still iilrely to 
be assessed in relation to these perceptions, but the feedback/routinization 
element was not similarly scrutinized. This was the situation from which 
the cumulative over-use of high flats during the later 1950s developed into 
the high rise boom of the 1960s in all the areas. Industrialized high rise 
can be understood, principally in terras of the sudden strengthening of 1'inistry 
and contractual pressure, a disjunctive development which firmly constituted 
the important influence paths shown in Figure 10.1 during the peak years of 
tiva boom, even in Bristol which did not actually adopt heavy prefabricateon 
systems,
To specify the role of each system element in relation to the inputs
received we return once again to the five system operations discussed by
3 Cortes, Frzeworski and Sprague and deployed in section 4-1. The perceptions
of individual councillors generally played an identification role. Housing 
committees initially resisted pressures for hi^h flat building somewhat, 
causing a slight cumulation of pressure in the early 1950s, except in 
Birmingham where committee resistance «at: evident only intermittently in ihe 
1958-61 period. Thereafter the co^rjitteeii exerted little distinctive Tr.;":.-.,er;-. 
on policy until the inputs favourable to high rise began to break down. 
Housing K/jn.-.-.ifTfc-'.c-nt departments generally exerted a conservative in:'luer.ce, 
delaying and reducing tenant opposition inputs and to a lesser extent injutc 
from national trends. Architect-planning departments proportionately 
transformed thc-ir input flows in oil cases but in differing; v:r.iyn: in 3ri.v';ol 
r-nd E.-:.st Ham thi". wsr, c conservative transformation; in iirrair^rm,, 'Tort H:-n 
and I7ewh:JTi it underscored thesa flovs.
The switch in policy away from high rise was not produced by snd d: d net- 
produce n,-jor changes in the contours of the icsue system. Ministry influence- 
remained strong, but the input sign changed from strongly pro- to strongly 
anti-high rice over the period from late 1965 to April 1967. Cone tract! on 
industry pressure continued to be exerted but the easing'of the contractual 
situation for local authorities which followed the public expenditure cuts f.rd 
the introduction of the housing cost yardsticks meant that the balance of 
influence swung back from the peak of industrial influence in 196? toward- the. 
local authority and smaller firms. At the same time the imitative-legiti­ 
mizing effect previously represented by national trends declined very rc.pidly, 
particularly after the Eonan Point disaster and the unfavourable media
coverage which began to be directed at high rise. New trends in high density
U*low rise designs and the abandonment ofidrive to produce 500,000 horses t. yc:r
by 1970, combined to lift some of tb<;- filters previously used'to screen but 
inputs from tenants and the local community from 1968 on. And of course, 
the feedback processes favourable to high rise began to dry up. The pat Ire.rn 
of inputs overall altered very little, however. Some of the signs changed 
from positive to negative; the screening out of some inputs was reduced, and 
others began to be modified whore previously they had been accepted without 
question.
1JX_2t_The System of Actors and Loc-il...Policy.
The variety and sophistication of actor-orientated accounts of local 
politic:;. n:-ke t'^epi difficult to assess adequately as a group. Here we c-;n 
only touch briefly on two key aspects of the case study materiel - concerning 
the range of actors and influences involved in housing con:-.true'lion Jecicicr.c, 
and the chu.r;-cter of politic:'! control of the policy - and t'jon cor^id^r- the 
success of four actor orientated expj (..nations in accounting for the dcvelcrr-ent 
of high ri.:;e policy.
THE RANGE 0? ACTORS INVOLVED
There were some marked differences in the- extent of involvement of 
actors in decision making; in the three areas.
As a preliminary point it is worth noting that, quite apart from' the 
doubt which surrounds the localness of any loct.1 election,^ it was not possible 
to see high rise policy as involved in electoral politics. So far as can 
be determined, it never featured in party election material (although more 
house building was advocated in the Birmingham Conservatives' 1966 manifesto) .
Newham clearly presented in the period of our study the limiting case of 
a closed and strong local authority, virtually never affected by genuine 
electoral competition, dominating and controlling an extremely weak interest 
group process and run for very long stretches of time by the same small group 
of Council leaders. Even favoured and integrated groups such as the local
i~y
Trades Council were rigorously excluded from 'political matters', although 
the Trades Council did call on Kewham in the summer of 1968 to stop building
o
high rise since it 'endangered family life 1 . Tenants associations were
9confined to non-political matters by their Council formulated constitutions.
All the constituency Labour parties were extensively manned by councillor:?,
1 C and Labour ward branches produced only one intervention on high rise.
Although Labour (and other) councillors interviewed quite clearly undertook c 
large amount of surgery vork, much of it on housing problems, this only 
intermittently seems to have influenced their views on Council policy. 
Council's handling of the Beckton protest seems to have reflected quite a 
strong hostility in the local authority and local Labour parties to zrrj 
genuinely independent groups. Finally Nevhsin Council had initially quite
«
close relations with, the local press, but in 1967-70 one of the paper's 
criticisms of hi-;h rise and other policies produced a marked worsening of 
relations, including an HC complaint to the Fre:?^ Council on ' 
reporting.
Birmingham's greater electoral competition and more vigorous loctl 
media broadened the r^nge of inputs into housing construction policy, despite 
the pronounced atrophying of Labour party interns! democracy and Trades Cour-2:'l 
influence under the Watton-ITa?.h regime, '" The Conservative party itself 
originated no known interventions in this area of policy, (although there v;--s 
some internal opposition to the continuation of the public housing drive when 
the Party gained control of the Council in 1966).15 The interest group process 
on housing is more difficult to characterize. Newton's evidence of extensive 
interest group contacts with the Council was certainly borne out in the 
multiplicity of contacts with housing associations, tenants associations 
and residents groups at the official level. But these contacts very rarely 
reached committee level. For example, the sporadic skirmishing in the 1950s 
with suburban residents associations and neighbouring local authorities on 
high block locations only once precipitated a/iHBC discussion, when the housirp- 
programme was disrupted by objections to a C.P.OJIheHBC Chairman told the
press on this occasion: ! 0ur job is to provide as many houses as possible
1 5 and we will not stand selfishness'. These attitudes changed quite markedly
during the 1960s, so that the campaign in 1969 on behalf of long term flat 
dwellers won a speedy, if almost completely symbolic response. And the
dampr.ess problem in high flats was successfully raised by backbench coirr.it :.ee
17 members fcllow5.ng isolated complaints voiced at public meetings. But basic
policy questions wore really only raised in public at tvio points - as a result
18of Eversley's 1957 attack, and in the aftermath of Ronan Point. Both + h-se
were occasipns when newspapers generated the controversy, although in ths 
lale 1960s their criticisms reflected the growth of (unorganized) tenant
resistance to high rise.
The corollary cf the relatively scarce and weak inputs from representative 
interest groups in Birmingham was the extensive informal influence of j.oc•: 1 
business interests (particularly in construction and property development) on 
council members arid officers, and indeed the direct involvement of many Lic^bers
19 with these interests. But while these close relations influenced the ior^
of housing construction policy after 1964 it is difficult to see thi.t different 
relations would have implied substantially different policies, (except.v;her2 
direct corruption occurred). In particular industrialized hi^h rise.on 
peripheral estates and city centre high rise would have been built even 
uithout Bryant's influence.
Urban politics in Bristol was much more open in many respects. Internal
Labour party politics was more democratic - at least by the late '60s - then
20 in either of the other areas. ' But a local Labour branch was only once
r) Jl
involved in the high rise issue (at Hartcliffe), and the Citizen group
remained largely cut off from direct contacts with local Conservative party
22 organizations. " The interest group process was vigorous, especially during
the opposition to clearance in 1956-65. The firm Council stance at Barton Hill 
was substantially modified by encounters at Easton and Kingsdown, and these 
conflicts did feed directly and successfully into the electoral process in
1959 and 1960, producing in turn the Citizen's attempt to reap electoral
23 benefits by capitalizing on opposition to clearance. But there were ot-.er
influences involved - notably the Bristol Property Owners' Federation - and
the actual development of policy under the Citizens was directed much more to
24 satisfying them than to the interests of tenants in clearance areas. UtV.or
interest group involvement was quasi-elite in character, notably the sx,cco3s 
of the Bristol Civic Society in securing attention on Kingsdown, altho^rh ever. 
here Council hostility to external r;roups was evident at many points and 
effective policy change came from 1-IHLG and Royal Fine Arts Commission 
objections rather than local pressure. Other groups involved in housir.r; 
issues had lens success. For example, in the winter of 1975-6 a thous-nd 
households in multi-storey flats were' sent surcharges averaging £~50 ec?h, ir. 
addition to payin- a standard basic heating charge of £120 a year, these 
cripplin-r bills boin:* the results of the Courcji.'s lor.g st;-••ndir.<: policy of 
buildin.r all-electric high blocks with extremely costly storage or underflcor
heating systems. Tenants' protests at their impossible situation secured 
no redress until two tenants associations paid outside heating consultants 
to report on alternative forms of heating provision. 25I?ir.all;; ,informs-.! ir.fiuer.ee 
from local business interests was quite important, and was certainly evioent 
in the Citizens' attempt to sell cut price land to local builders and in the 
development of the city's office and property development boom. 26
POLITICAL CONTROL
In the Newham study an attempt was made to develop Dahl's decisional
analysis to provide some quantitative index of the distribution of power on
27 the high rise issue within the local authority. To do this all high rise
contracts were taken as defining basic decision unite, and 'policy decisions' 
were identified as all decisions affecting more than one basic deciricnc 
For each policy decision three 'possible political acts' were identified •»
po
initiation, opposition and effective decision; (Dahl distinguished only 
initiation/opposition). A comparison of the actuali:, ion of these actn
i
shows that Newham had a markedly lower level of controversy over high rise 
than either of the two county boroughs, (Table 10.1). An index of the 
distribution of involvement in actual political acts was then computed, vhich 
showed that over 80% of actions on the high rise issue in all three authorities 
could be attributed to the housing and planning officers, chairmen and
Table 10,1; /.equalization of Possible,Political Acts, Newham Authorities, 
.1.949-^.72..
West Ham East Ham L^"!:!!
Policy decisions 12 7 19
Possible political acts % 21 57
Possible ^cts L.oove rninrunum (l) 24 14 53
Actual acts ,29 16 27
Actual acts above minimum (2) 17 9 3
(2) ao a proportion of (i) '/I/-- 64;; 2V
- A-26 -
committees, (Table 10o2). Committees retained a good deal of control in 
West Ham and in Newham after 1968, but at other times and in East Ham they 
lost power to the officers. Involvement in successful actions (ie actions
« m i i • ii .1 •.-..fc^^—.^M \
on the winning side) closely resembles that in Table 10.2, although officers h:d 
a slightly lower success rate than politicians (whose actions tended to be 
effective decisions - which are definitionally successful). All success 
rates were high, usually 80-10(# of actions being on the winning side, a 
product of the relatively low level of controversy, particularly in Ifewham
Table 10.2; Involvement in High Rine Policy Decisions, Newham Auth o r i ties,
29
1949-72.
(fo of actual political acts)
Architects department
Housing management department
Housing Committee chairman
Housing Committee
Planning Committee
Policy Committee
Other Committee
Other department
Council
Individual councillor
Number of political acts
West Ham
35
11
7
28
0
0
3
4
3
3
29
East Ham
( )
(47)
19
6
6
0
0
13
0
0
16
Newham
42
7 -
14
(
(20
15
4
0
0
0
27
This kind of analysis was not possible in Birmingham or Bristol owing to 
lack of research time, appropriate interviewee response rates and so^e
«
essential data. But both authorities' decision making showed clear 
similarities to the patterns in the Newham Councils. The Birmingham EfC,
because it focused its members 1 attention much more directly or. housing
influent 
construction policy, and because of the presence of Y/at ton and other Council /
ys members, was certainly much more influential than any committee in the 
Newham authorities. This was partly accomplished by a reduction in the ro.'.e
of the HBC chairman, however. In Bristol, committee initiatives were much 
more important than in Newham, although this difference would not be captured 
by these indices. Otherwise the niajor difference was the increased role of 
the housing department vis-a-vis the architects department. 50
These indices are useful in codifying general impressions, despite the 
inevitable quirks of measurement which they introduce in doing so. But they 
give only a formal picture of activity on the issue. They do not in themselves 
give any indication that the system of actors was an important source of 
influence on the development of policy, or that different patterns of influence 
and political treatment of the issue would have resulted in different outcomes. 
Nor do they provide more than the barest outline of the pattern of relations 
between actors themselves. We shall briefly sketch in a number of additional 
points about this aspect of the case study material.
Firstly, it is important to note that our analysis did not break through 
to the level of intra-departmental decision making. Actions are thus 
attributed in the narrative to chief officers which may have resulted from a
long and involved process reflecting quite other in-iuences, as in the case
31charted by Malpass. Actual design responsibility or design policy was
devolved down to the level of project architects and group leaders in V'est Han« 
As the Chief Architect explained:
I think the group leaders would get together 
occasionally - all of this was voluntary. I 
didn't decide -v.ny thing... I would express my 
viovra I suppose, but not in such a way that I 
*• damped their ardour. 32
Throughout the period, the simplification of dwelling types end the increase 
in contract sizes tended to push design issues higher up the departmental 
hierarchy, until with the adoption of system building the scope for individual
'X'X
design solutions was squeezed out alto^ether.^ A similar trend was evident
in' Bristol5 even thou-h the city did not adopt system building; ti o p.h.ift to
* 
contractor designed blocks went much fv.vther than the architect;- depart:^-r:t
intended because of the chronic negotiations difiicultito on thoir desire
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relative to the contractors' standard blocks. Finally, Birmingham carried
this process through earlier, (in the early ! 50s when large firms' type plan
35 • • 
designs were adopted), and further, (notably in the 1964 reorganization vnich
placed the professional staff in a thoroughly bureaucratized context dominated
•^ /• 
by pressure for greater outputs). In all these cases, decisions previously
internal to the architects department became increasingly bound up in its 
external relations, traditionally an area in which Chief Officers' and higher 
managements' work is concentrated. Chief Officers thus became increasingly 
involved in setting their departments' housing construction policy, but just 
how extensive or restricted their influence was remains uncertain.
Secondly, the indices considered above overestimate the role of corjiittees 
at the expense of chairmen, since we tended to assign doubtful oases cf 
'effective decision' to the Committee. Overwhelmingly the chief officer - 
chairman nexus dominated interviewees' accounts of decision-making, and back­ 
benchers seem to have accepted or occasionally criticized but rarely directly 
opposed their proposals. One Newham member described HC scrutiny in these
terms:
Well, the committee would be shown a sketch plan up on the 
wall and a financial estimate. Later you got this back with 
a detailed financial plan showing the expenditure heads, but 
you couldn't disagree really with what the officers said.
Backbenchers were also hampered not just by lack of expertise, but often by 
strong locality orientations. Another ITewham respondent observed:
There were a couple of times when members from areas I didn't 
know well, such as East Ham, asked me for my help on certain 
schemes. When this happened I made a point of going over 
there to see the area before I committed myself one way or 
another. But in the normal run of affairs, when my help hadn't 
been asked, my natural inclination was to hold to the officers' and 
chairman's judgement.
In all three authorities the extent cf the housing chairman's predominant
influence on the member side was acknowledged, although in Birmingham hi-
' 37 position could be turned by the Labour group leadership. Equally virtuely
all respondents saw his role as closely integrated into the administration and
as part of the overall leadership group on the Council . This was summed up 
by the i-iewham Labour leader:
The Chairman, as far as the Committee is concerned 
seems to be in a very similar position to the officers 
as far as the Council are concerned. They're what I 
call manaement .
Thirdly, the Committee influence on policy was reduced by a number of 
factors including the routinization of decision-making on high rise once the 
initial policy decisions in favour of its use had been made; the wide ga? 
between the incremental approvals of individual schemes and the actual 
transformation of large areas of the cities; the lack of any settled policy 
review procedures; the subordination of policy making to the tempo of contract 
design and letting; the relatively late stage at which concrete designs could 
be appreciated by members without technical expertise - all these meant that 
committee scrutiny of policy was never particularly effective. Interviews 
often suggested that members' grasp on their authority's policies was quite 
vague, even if they had been Chairman or Vice-chairman at so^e stage. 
Typical of such cases was an influential and very competent Birmingham member 
who declared at the start of our interview that high rise had been adopted 
'purely and simply to get land. You'll find that all our multi-storey blocks 
are near the city centre 1 . At a later stage of the interview the respondent 
was presented with a table showing the area distribution of Birmingham's high 
rise stock, from which it was clear that over 6($ of the city's high flats 
were located at the urban periphery and many indeed were outside the city 
boundary altogether. Asked to explain this, he was obviously at a lose to 
reconcile it 'with his earlier view:
Me might just have got ourselves into this stage of 
thinking that this was necessary for the housing programme... 
Perhaps we just uoke up one day and found we were surrounded 
by them. I mean, there was nobody watching the situation 
like you're doing with -your graphs. The architect certainly 
never caue to us and showed us a table like that.,. l : ni quite 
surprised s:c tho.oe figures. I don't know why we did that.
Because of this diffuse knowledge of the overall contours of Cc—ittee policy, 
we were ur^.ble to find any very significant differences in the level of Coi-.i.
scrutiny associated with the balance of member types (ie, influencial/
competent/loyalist/uninfluential member representation on the Committee) or
•zq 
the balance of political representation*
ACTOR ORIENTATED ACCOUNTS OP LOCAL POLICY
Four approaches to urban political analysis in terms of the system of 
actors involved have provided important explanations of the development of 
local policy. (i) The first mode of explanation, which is closest to the 
conventional view and to the ideology of local government itself, is the 
institutional o_r_public administration approach, which dominated academic 
discussion of British urban politics until the late 1960s. Parts of this 
literature treat local government solely as an administrative entity, and hence
tend to see local authorities as acting in a direct way as agents of the central
40 government. Those writers who ascribe an independent area of policy
formation to local government tend to emphasize a straightforward 'electoral
41 chain of command 1 model of influences on policy. Essentially the focus of
analysis is on institutions' formal or legal powers and on legitimate input 
processes in which 'public opinion 1 is seen as transmitted fairly directly to 
local decision makers, or policy change is ascribed to responsible non-locai 
public authorities. Little attention has been paid in these studies to the 
characteristics of individuals holding positions of authority, to informal 
processes of policy influence or to the mediation of input processes by political 
parties or interest groups.
Our local research has shown that public administration approaches were 
well supported by the distribution of involvement and influence on the high 
rise issue within the local authority, and surprisingly enough by the non- 
involvement of local parties or interest groups in policy formation. But the 
nature of the influence process within local government, in particular the 
informality of most influence exertion, the concentration of influence with a 
small number of 'housing influentials', the unresponsiveness of these decision-
makers to public opinion and the lack of public debate about high rise -
all these did not accord with the explanations suggested by public administration
approaches. Finally, the extensive influence of local and non-local business
and professional interests, and the informal character of Ministry con-trol and
advice, present very neriou;- obstacles to the acceptance of such an approach as
appropriate to the development of local policy on high rise.
(ii) Pluralist analysis basically develops a behavioural version of the
institutional view. The models of electoral influence offered are usually
cast in terms of responsible party government or a local variant of Schunpet-
44 erian theory. 'Public opinion 1 influences are seen as extensively mediated
by parties and local interest groups, with policy closely reflecting these
45 pressures and the views of local decision makers. A good deal of attention
is paid to the values, sources of information, role conceptions, socialization
and recruitment of local politicians, and to aspects of the political process
46 seen as acclimatizing them to the mores of local democracy. Much more
emphasis is also placed on informal influence processes (such as interest group 
bargaining) than in public administration approaches, and some decisional
ATJ
research has been conducted. Pluralist approaches place little stress on 
non-local influences of any type, although the importance of central govei-ninent 
policy changes is acknowledged. A leading pluralist textbook, Gyford's 
Local JPplJtics in Britain, makes no mention of the role of the national local 
government system, the professional associations, national pressure groups or
politicians, industrial and commercial interests or other non-local organiza-
48 tions as influences on local authority policies.
Pluralist analysis was less relevant to our case studies than the public 
administration approach, despite its more realistic approach to the exercise of 
power. The lack of party political or interest group involvement on the high 
vise Jssus, and the ability of local decision-makers to ignore or filter o\;t 
of the policy process the unorganised expressions of tenant resistance to high 
rise certainly projected the burdf-n of ensuring responsivenocis onto local
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leaderships. Their failure to exert effective control of policy or to 
protect tenants' interests cannot be explained in terms of deficiencies in 
their recruitment or socialization, however, even in Newham. Rather it is 
indicative of the limited extent to which the conventional political process 
affects local policy. The representation of high rise building as a technical 
solution to obvious problems depoliticized the issue, and meant that even 
local political leaderships had very little direct involvement in setting basic 
housing construction policy: their interventions undoubtedly affected the fora 
of policy, but within parameters overwhelmingly laid down in the national 
issue system or by the local bureaucracy.
(iii) Elite theory applications to urban politics have primarily been 
developed in the American community power literature, and apply most success­ 
fully to the weak political control/non partisan election systems of some U.S.
49 cities. The theory posits an effective influence or control of local"
political institutions by external 'community influentials', principally by
50 local social and economic elites. This approach has very rarely been
51 applied in Britain.
Our research, like most previous work, has found little support for the
52 simple elite control hypotheses put forward by Hunter and others. The
concentration of decision making on high rise in recognized channels in the 
local authority, and the lack of influence of a single, cohesive local elite 
in any of the three areas make elite approaches clearly inapplicable. The 
influence of local business interests in Binoingham provides almost the only 
evidence of the local elite affecting policy, and then within a nationally 
determined context of policy change.
(iv) Finally the neo-^elitist critique of pluralist community research argued 
for a shift in focus away from public activity in the 'decision making arena 1 
towards non-decision, making processes determining the issues reaching the 
community's agenda. B-chrach and Edratz posit the existence of a mobilization 
of bias to protect 'dominant interests' leadinr to the suppression of
grievances and the existence of latent issues. Again, however, dominant 
interests are seen as local elites and neo-elitist approaches focus on the
activities of particular decision-makers, maintaining a spatially defined
54 focus. Saunders' work is at present the only application of this literature
55 in Britain. „
This approach undoubtedly captures central aspects of the political process 
on high rise which are left unexplained by other actor orientated accounts. 
The routinization of the political process on high rise, the exclusion of 
housing construction issues from local political agenda, and the imbalance 
between local production interests and consumer interests in influencing 
council policies certainly constituted a 'mobilization of bias 1 on the issue. 
And the Beckton protest in Newham demonstrates the existence of suppressed
grievances on high rise which could only be articulated after an abrupt brea.:
5^ 
in the power relations between the local authority and public housing clients.
But the sources of this configuration of urban politics cannot be seen as local, 
nor can the dominant values structuring the political process be characterized 
in terms of community elites or interests. The decisional analysis in 
Chapters 7 to 9 was carried out with neo-elitist theory in mind, yet very 
little 'non-decision making' activity could be detected. Apart from the 
manipulation of the Beckton protest, local decision-makers were not involved 
in the overt suppression of grievances, for the basic structure of the public 
housing programme and the overall political and ideological patterning of the 
issue excluded the expression of public housing clients' views without 
recourse to non-decision making.
All four actor orientated accounts of urban politics have points applicable 
to our case study material, but none of them seems to represent a clearly 
adequate analysis. Essentially this,is because all these approaches treat 
the locality as the key locus of influence and decision making, and involve 
ascribing central importance to the local system of actors in expiating the 
development of high rise policy in the areas studied. We do not believe suv-h
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an argument can be sustained on the basis of the case studies. On the 
contrary, they seem to demonstrate that the system of actors responded to rather 
than encapsulated the fundamental determining forces of the high rise' .boom. 
Although at the level of observable activity many decisions influencing policy 
can be attributed to actors or organizations in the locality, at a more 
satisfactory explanatory level they can be understood as the working out of 
a fundamental logic of development, the determinants of which were non-local 
structural forces. Actors and organizations in many cases acted fairly 
consciously in response to such forces; their actions were not idiosyncratic 
or voluntary in the extended sense suggested by actor-orientated accounts of 
urban politics. Rather they represented the expression of more basically 
determined options and interests.
10.3? Structural Determination and Community Autonomy.
While the problem of distinguishing non-local from local political 
influences on urban policy has been recognized in some political science 
studies, the closely related distinction between actor influences and structural 
determination has been given little attention. In particular the epistemclo-
gical basis of a structural account is still undeveloped, and we must again
57 rely on some basic methodological advances made by Castells. His rough
sketch of influences on urban practices mediated by the system of actors vrill
serve as a
pro
basis for our brief analysis here, (Figure 10»2).';
STRUCTURAL IKFLLSNCD3: I PARAl-ISTERS
One basic form of structural determination evident in the case studies,
and rec-jgniaed by community output studies, concerns the socio-economic
59 backc-round of the local authority area. The ecological development of tha
thrca urban areas defined a physical bad:ground vhich either predisposed 
decision makers to Mass housirg solutions (as in Newham and Birmingham) or 
did 30 only for limited areas (as in Bristol). Mcoloric-l form nf.'ccled
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policy only via an interaction with the stratification and organisational 
systems which was not locally defined but applied throughout Britain. Its 
effects, such as the concentration of a relatively powerless public housing 
clientele in inner city areas, the exclusion of major redistributive options 
and the internalization of housing authorities' programmes within limited 
and arbitrary urban tracts, were evident in all three case studies.
The consequences of this interaction varied from the creation of acute 
land scarcity for public housing in Newham, to the favourable position in
f
Bristol following the Portishead deal with Somerset and the Whitchurch airfield 
purchase. Newham, unlike Bristol, was locked in from the outset to a 
vicious spiral of high density redevelopment to try to reduce its housing 
waiting list, and was never able to meet more than a fraction of its needs 
outside its area. Birmingham stood in between these positions. The 
concentration of boundary extension possibilities in semi-developed areas and
the stiff resistance of the city's neighbouring authorities to any expansion,
f\?
certainly increased the pressure on land within its boundaries. But again
land constraints on public housing were eased by 'windfall 1 purchases in the 
early 1960s even before extensions were granted.
*
These objective background influences fed into the policy process via 
a structure of nationally determined perceptions of local authority situations 
and appropriate public housing responses. Thus despite their favourable 
situation the Bristol Labour leadership convinced themselves that they faced a 
land shortage problem on a par with major conurbation authorities in the nid
and even reinterpreted the artificial scarcity of public housing sites 
created by Citizen policies in terms of their earlier convictions after 
regaining control in 1963. In a similar way Birmingham built i2c-.ny thousands 
of high flats at low densities around 80 ppa during the city's worsening lar-cL 
shortage of the 1950s, and continued the policy largely unchanged after J.ts 
large land acquisitions, almost entirely because of the acceptance of 
assumptions about the relationship of building form to density defined outride
65 the locality. ' This structuring of decision making was also evident in the
Ilewham authorities, despite their generally higher development densities.
Other mediating perceptions of the same type concerned tenant resistance to
t ' e6 
high rise (, which tended to be seen as ill informed or as genuine but parochial,.,
and the justification of high rise in terms of the ultimate view of city 
redevelopment embodied in urban planning orthodoxy - which often carried core 
weight with decision-makers than the actual changes being brought about in
rr-7
their areas. These general mediating perceptions, largely unrelated to 
local conditions, produced complex relationships between ecological development 
and Council's housing construction policies, relationships which in our view 
remove the basis of some voluntaristic accounts of local policy formation. 
Actors formulating policy did so within a context effectively pre-structured 
by the ideological positions adopted by the design professions, central 
government, the construction industry and the national local government system. 
(At the same time, of course, some of their decisions fed into the ideological 
currents in the national local government system, contributing towards the 
definition of other authorities' decision contexts and to the redefinition of
/TO
their own subsequent decision contexts). 
STRUCTURAL INFLUENCES: II INITIATIVES
The dynamic impact of developing structural pressures on the authorities 
is evident in two sources of local initiatives, central government intervention 
and movements of capital.
a) Central government intervention clearly influenced the development of the 
high rise housing boom in all three areas, by the subsidy change of 1956, by 
the pressure directed towards the adoption of industrialized building and the 
related expansion of contractual influence, and by the subsidy and yardstick
1
changes of 1965-7•
Early Ministry pressure for the initiation of high flat building was 
evident in the 1952 letter to West Ham and in the special arrangements dev:\i;ed 
for Birmingham's suburban high rise in 1953 - both of which had direct effects
on local policy. The 1956 subsidy change then made high flats a standard
<
element in housing policies in all the authorities covered. Only in 
Birmingham between 1958 and 1963 was this questioned, when the precariousness
of the Housing Revenue Accounts gave the extra costs of high rise acute
69 
salience. In Bristol, the worsening debt situation of the late '60s
did not lead to any reappraisal of high rise per se, although the .level of 
high building must have made a considerable difference to the debt total. 
In all three authorities, rent rebate schemes were accepted as an essential 
corollary of high flat building, although they were also pre-requisites of 
differential and 'realistic 1 rents to which Labour Councils were supposedly 
bitterly opposed.
In the early 1960s Ministry pressure in all three authorities increased 
the use of high rise. In Bristol this operated by preventing the revision 
of clearance plans, combined with an acceptance of exclusive high rise building 
by semi-industrialized methods. In Birmingham and V/est Ham pressure behind 
the industrialized building campaign produced the change. This support 
continued and increased through to 196? so that MBLG eventually adopted an 
explicit policy of withholding programming allocations unless system building
was employed.
Finally the Ministry change of heart over high rise in 1967 had an 
immediate influence on high flat approvals. In Bristol the Kingsdown II 
fiasco resulted in an extensive design rethink, although the architects 
department only finally abandoned high rise when its schemes started to fall 
outside the .1O/S tolerance limit altogether. In Birmingham Ministry influence 
-was equally strong, despite the idiosyncratic interpretation of site and 
estate densities allowed by the 1-IELG regional office until 1969. In Kcwhan 
the effect was straightforward after iiay 1968, although it became bound up 
with the post-EoDon Point reaction.
b ) Movements of_cap_ital exerted extensive influence on local authority policies 
because of their direct effects on the attainment of outputs and the implication:
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of this for future MKLG allocations. Because construction firms in the 
1950s and '60s could involve their resources in a variety of markets and in 
a large number of authorities in a period of high demand, their ;;i.lj ingness to
«a
tender for contracts was crucial for/Council's housing performance. In all 
three areas contractual pressure influenced the context of local authority 
relations, leading to the adoption of selective or negotiated tendering, 
and to system building or package deal construction. But the influence of 
the industry was not confined to such areas, but spilled over pervasively 
into the determination of housing construction policy.
Industrial influence powerfully defined the choices and trade-offs open 
to all the case study authorities, and the developing patterns of contractual 
involvement brought about fundamental changes in housing construction policy. 
In West Hain the association of high flats and selective tendering helped 
increase levels of high rise approvals in the 1950s, and the declining 
attractiveness of selective tendering more than any other factor then pushed 
the authority into the adoption of system building. The doubling of the 
planned Larsen-Nielson commitment to retain some design control, and the rapid 
enlargement of the system built programme by 1967 reflected the intensification 
of industrial pressure. The close collaboration between Newham Council and 
Taylor Woodrow-Anglian after Ronan Point, and the firm's success in safeguarding 
their interests despite the disaster, are indications of the extent of ITewhan's 
dependence on corporate involvement to maintain outputs.
In Birmingham the 1949 deal with the large housebuilding firms led 
directly to the inauguration of flat building and later high rise hour,!;,-, an 
area in which contractual influence on designs and policy change bec^e Jicst 
obvious in the 1950s. The weakening of this set of relations, and the fall 
in outputs which resulted, led directly to Sheppard Fidler's attest to radical; 
reconstitute it. The failure of his initiative was in part due to the lack 
of contractual pressure behind it. In contrast Bryant's vigorous market ir./ 
not only resulted in the growth of an extraordinary pattern of cor br,:etuol
relations and massive concessions on contract sizes, negotiated tenders and 
continuity of work, but also produced a complete reversal of the policy 
movement away from high rise made by Council members from 1958 to'1965. But 
unlike Newham, Birmingham was not dependent on a single firm. The scale of 
its programme would have attracted any large contractor, and several could 
easily have been accommodated in a competitive involvement. That this did
not happen was only a development and intensification of 'normal' relations,
72 however.
In Bristol contractual pressure behind high flat building had some 
influence on the expansion of high rise approvals following the end of the non- 
traditional housebuilding programme. But its major importance was in defining 
a key option in the Citizens 1 1960 policy change, and in then expanding the 
package deal commitment in ways which increased densities and storey heights. 
The reduction of the public housing drive and disengagement of the large 'firns 
which resulted also signalled the switch back to house building.
In all three areas then, contractual influence and pressure can be seen 
as constituting a central dynamic of the development of high rise policy.
10o4; Mass Housing and the Local Community.
The analysis of this chapter has demonstrated that local authority decision 
making on the high rise issue was more determined than determinant, and that 
explanations in terms of structural pressures and influences substantially 
account for the development of local policies.
It is worth re-emphasizing here the nature of the lack of 'community 
autonomy 1 on housing construction policy. The formal powers of local
authorities their ability to make decisions over a wide range of issues in
73a Li,iiir:<jr they chose, were not really involved. ilor was the IOSL of autonomy
due primarily to -inistry regulation of local policy, for until 196? there wos 
no such regulation of high rise housing policy. father local authorities 
lost po-.:er to non-urban elements in the social system and to forces outside 
the formal state apparatus - to the construction industry, to the design
professions, to the national local government system, and to the Ministry 
acting informally as the mediator of these and other social influences. In 
addition national level political-ideological structures decisively constrained 
local authorities on the nature of the redevelopment process, the levels of 
amenity provided in differant urban, areas, the form of coercive non-consul tar icr. 
of tenants employed to expedite development, perceptions of land availabilit;-, 
etc.
The development of local policies in the three areas studied showed a 
fairly clear trend for local autonomy to decrease over the period. Specific­ 
ally local influence on high rise policy continued in Birmingham until the late 
1940s, and in West Ham, East Ham and Bristol until the early '50s, Luring 
the period actors in the local authority still exerted a direct influence on 
policy. Once the initial adoption decision was made, however, the determina­ 
tion of policy moved progressively away from the local level. The distinctive­ 
ly local influences on high rise were primarily unfavourable to the policy; 
the decision to disregard them, particularly to effect reductions in public 
housing amenity against tenant opposition, was thus a threshold which, once 
crossed, opened the way to the cumulative over-use of high rise.
This interpretation was strongly supported by interviewees' explanations 
of local policy, which were overwhelmingly characterized by the lack of 
reference to specific local influences and the ascription of effective 
determining power to vaguely perceived national level pressures. At first 
these views seemed to me to be a rationalization of a now failed and unpopular 
policy, an attempt to shift the blame onto other actors and organizations. 
More basically there is a well known tendency for actors to give a situatior.Lj. 
explanation of their actions (i.e. one in terms of environmental influences/,
where observers would tend to give a dispositional explanation (i.e. one in
\ 74terms of actors' dispor:itional make-up). But the .Inescapable under-determina­ 
tion of any local level, actor-orientated account of policy develop..,--,t fair:.;..- 
quickly led to the revision of this initial impression and to the above attempt
to formulate a structural account. This account fits well with and gives 
additional meaning to the genuine perplexity of many interviewees trying to 
explain how, despite a sustained public authority effort, improvements in the 
standards of housing provision had fallen so far short of the post-^ar planr-i: 
ideals. As one Newham councillor observed:
This is the reason why we have areas such as this. 
I mean, we've been trying to rebuild this area 3ince 
1945J When you look at the area - it's over thirty 
years now isn't it? - the bloody Romans could have 
done the job quicker! It's not locally it's the 
problem, but nationally.
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AFTERWORD
Two Concluding Comments
We have already summarized our main findings in their appropriate
« 
theoretical contexts in Chapters Five and Ten, and it is unnecessary to
recapitulate them here* However, there are two rather disparate concluding 
comments that we would like to make, the first concerning an area of our 
argument which may require some clarification, the second concerning changes 
in housing policy in the period after that covered in this research.
I : THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
The necessary development of this study in two Parts with differing 
methodological approaches may have left an area of slight ambiguity in our 
accounts of national and local policy making where they concern the structure 
of governmental relations. It may therefore be useful to briefly review our 
findings on governmental relations in isolation from the details of the 
empirical analysis.
Essentially we have shown that there were five types of influence flows 
between central and local government on the high rise issue, which are repre­ 
sented in Figure A.1:
(1) Central government policy exerted a strong and direct influence on local 
authority decision making - (Main examples: the encouragement of flat 
building in the early 1950s, the 195& subsidy change, the industrialized 
building campaign, the 1965-7 changes),
(2) The detailed structure of relations between central government and local
authorities constrained central government's influence between rajor policy
4
cric-r.^es; the fact that local authorities retained direct control of the 
provision of housing restricted central government influence, r.nd created 
a certain dependence of central government on local authorities for 
outputs - (Main examples: the ability of local authorities to over- 
' build high rise, the weakness of Ministry cost controls).
Figure A.I:_The_Sti-uc!.ure of GovjTi»nt)cl::
0)
(3) Local authority outputs contributed to trends in the national IcrcJl
government syste
(5)
Trends in the national local government systea further constrained
central government f n detailed controls, strengthening tha procer_>so&
outlined in (2) above.
Trends in the national local government c-yetcra influenced individual
local authorities 1 clccir,lcn f-akin^.
In our view thi« }>iltem of poverr.r.i:-nt{\l relatieno applioi; cuiVo £.r;
to iosuoi'i in- \-i;ich both central avid local ^ovox'rnr.ent policies are invc. 
cx^inple e;;ic.tiri£ rcr-er.rch into t'K) politico of co^pro'noiudvc educo.tir-n
a closely i^alo^oua jxitttrn of influences ojfid con-s-traints.
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'tenement' estates reminiscent of flats of the 1940s. Even in the heart of 
the conurbations most new local authority building consists of houses or sr^ll 
blocks of low rice flats. Slum clearance policy has been almost completely 
revised over the last decade and (despite fluctuations in 197*t-?6) rehabilita­ 
tion is playing an increasingly important role in state policies. Political 
support for further council housing construction seems to have reached a post­ 
war low point, with the Labour government's 1977 Housing Policy Review antici­ 
pating a fall-back role only for state provision, and the Conservative Party 
committed to very extensive reductions in the size of the public housing 
sector. The construction industry is in the trough of a severe market slump, 
and the largest building firms and private design practices have substantially 
lost out on public housing work and channelled their resources abroad, 
particularly into the Middle East. In short the actors, organizations and 
policies with which we have been concerned have substantially altered.
Yet the high rise issue is not dead. Media coverage in the 1970s has 
remained higher than before 1968, and like 'new town blues' before it, the 
social malaise produced by high flat life has become one of the most familiar 
and exaggerated cliches of contemporary discussion on housing and planning 
issues.' This continuing topicality owes a great deal to the worsening problem 
of the high flat stock, with regular series of dramatic events thrusting the 
issue back into prominence. In 1977. for example, newspaper and T.V. coverage 
was precipitated by a fire in a 51 storey Glasgow block, the suicide of a 
young mother in Birmingham who jumped with her child from the balcony of her 
tower flat, and plans by Liverpool Council to demolish three unlettable high 
rise blocks. Other issues, such as the racial polarization of some high rise 
estates in Londun, and the effects of extensive sales of council houses on 
efforts to rehouse children from flats, seem certain to keep the problems o: 
hi~h rise in the news for some time to c^.e.
But the continuing relevance of this analysis is not confined to the 
physical legacies of the high rise housing boom and the lives of those people
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affected by them. For in many ways the most important consequence of this 
period of public housing policy has been its impact on contemporary debates 
and arguments about housing issues. The perceived failure of public housing 
represented by high rise has been used to support virtually all the policy 
changes of the last decade. Many commentators have seen in it the unrestrained 
working out of the design professions' 'arrogance 1 or 'rneglamania', and called 
for greater public participation in planning issues. High rise also played a 
central role in the extraordinary consensus of the early 1970s on the need :"or 
rehabilitation: to critics of public housing on both the right and left mass 
housing policies seemed to indicate the enormous problems of building low cost 
modern homes in inner urban areas and the comparative advantages of renovating 
older ones. The reaction after Ronan Point also crystallized the opposition 
of many inner urban residents to the sweeping clearance and redevelopment 
policies previously pursued, which in turn directed professional attention tc 
the social benefits of piecemeal or organic renewal. Finally, and most
*
significantly of all, the high rise housing boom cast a sizeable blight on the 
public irnr.ge of post-war Council housing. The policy lent itself to analysis 
in terms of the inherent inefficiency, bureaucratic indifference and 
unresponsiveness of state intervention compared with market provision. The 
orientation of public housing in the 1960s towards unpopular and high cost 
forms of accommodation seems to have slowly but quite decisively reduced the 
levels of public support for council housing, and to have strengthened supr.ort 
for private house ownership.
The balance sheet of the policy changes carried out in the 1970s hrs yet 
to be written. But when it is, these ideological effects may prove to have 
been some of the most important and enduring legacies of ths high rirWir:-ss 
housing era.
Housing Authorities, Construction Firms and Industrialized I-;i*h Ei
This appendix presents some further tables showing housing authorities', use 
of industrialized high rise and contractual aspects of this, relevant to the analysis 
of section 4-3.
Table 1:1 ; Housing Authorities Experienced in the Use of Industrialized Kirh Rise, 
1963-73
(Cumulative numbers)
Year London County Municipal Urban Others All
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
Boroughs
6
10
19
26
28
28
28
28
28
28
29
Boroughs
29
40
46
49
51
54
55
55
55
55
56
Boroughs
13
22
26
32
36
38
38
38
38
38
38
Districts
3
8
14
21
28
31
32
32
32
32
32
1
2
6
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
9
Authorities
52
82
111
136
151
159
161
161
161
161
164
Source; D.O.E. unpublished files on industrialized housing.
Table 1.2 l Housing Authorities Awarding Contracts in Industrial High Rise, 1963-72 
Year London County Lunicipal Urban Others All•• f ^J.-*.
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1963
1969
1970
1971
1972
Boroughs
4
9
15
22
16
10
14 -
4
2
2
Boroughs
27
26
23
17
21
17
8
5
2
3
j.
Boroughs
13
13
7
11
9
7
2
1
1
—
Districts
2
5
7
9
7
3
1
1
1
—
Authorities
1
2
5
3
1
1
—
—
—
—
47
55
57
62
54
38
25
11
6
5
Source: As Table 1.1.
Thble 1.3 .Average Contract Sizes on Industrialized High Rise by Housing Authe pity
Ye_ar
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
Tjpe
G L Co
195
240
140
261
162
225
523
584
72
722
-
, 1963-73
London
Boroughs
96
116
120
313
330
199
436
157
199
516
219
County
Boroughs
175
210
182
208
264
363
258
145
196
94
49
1-iunicipal
Boroughs
135
175
81
111
89
154
57
84
—
-
-
Urban
Districts
117
126
105
175
315
328
146
136
254
-
-
Other
57
127
87
63
156
619
-
-
-
—
31
• Euvnber cf
C-or:t:.-f--c;ts
72
c's
111
1C1
95
65
33
12
9
5
5
Sources D.O.E. unpublished files on industrialised housing.
Industrial!
Number of Authorities
de r 'lii"i'- u.ith:
VLu?-^ no- fines system)
Alone
Plus one other firm
Plus two other firms
Plus three other firms
Plus four or more firms
Total
COIIGIUTL! (Bison system)
Alone
Plus one other firm
Plus two other firms
Plus three other firms
Plus four or more firms
Total
LAIIiG (various systems)
Alone
Plus one other firm
Plus tv.c other firms
Plus three other firms
Plus four or no re firms
Total
WATjiS ('Jates system)
Alone
Plus one other firm
Plus two other firms
Plus three other firms
Plus four or more firms
Total
C M TJ'T 0' ^U'iUkj
Alone
Plus 0113 other lira
Plus t'.ro other firns
Plus three other fi 1:113
Plus four or more firms
Total
^ A YT n""5 ''"•f''}P Ty"'0" '— A''^^ Vi'J
Alone
Plus one other fir_i
Plus two other fi "•::£
J'luio three other firrap
Total
CJ:u.DJ.:3 (S!-irne cyst era)'
Alone
Plus ono other firm
P.lur, "C\M other fir^s
•V'.-x 'I- r-i T
sed Hir.h Ri
London
Boroughs
2
1
3
- «,
-
6
3
-
3
2
-
8
—
2
6
—
—
8
2
4
5
1
1
13
~
1
1
1
—
3
ce U9
Count
63-7?)
y I-Iunicipal
Borou.-hs Boroughs
17
9
4
5
3
38
6
5
4
4
3
22
1
3
3
3
1
11
~
5
—
—
—
5
—
—
—
—
2
2
17
3
—
—
-
20
9
2
—
—
-
11
2
—
—
—
—
2
—
1
-
—
-
1
—
—
—
—
—
—
Urban Other
Districts
14 3
_ _
— _.
— _
— —
14 3
5 1
— _
_ _
_. _
— —
5 1
2 1
1 1
— —
- -
— —
3 1
_ —
— —
_ „
- -
— —
- -
1 —
- -
_ —
— —
_ _
1
All
r— f-*
•13
7
5
3
81
2/-
7
7
6
3
47
6
6
G
3
"~s
25
2
10
5
1
1 •
19
1
1
1
1
2
6
(Larsen-l^ielson system)
1
1
1
-
3
—
1
-
1
—
-
1
1
2
—
-
2
2
-
—
_
—
4
——
——
——
——
_. _
1 —
— -
_ —
1
1
1
— _
2
1
2
2
i
•s
1
o
2
5
j ' y^ Housing Issue,
This section reports in full statistical terms a content analysis for four 
selected media sources of coverage of the high rise housing J.ssue, reported in 
general terms in section 4.5.
Sources surveyed were:
Z^J£LS££» surveyed 1950-70 using index under eight headings. 
llc-rfiam. Recorder . surveyed 1965-70 : (weekly local paper in JTewham).
Hunicipgl _ Journal t surveyed 1950-70 : (leading local government weekly, magazine,
founded 1393, particularly good coverage of built environment issues). 
Housing sjid Plca^in^^oviei7, surveyed 1950-70 ? (bi-monthly journal, of th-j Ilatlc
Housing and Town Planning Council, particularly good coverage of housing
construction) .
High-flat coverage was defined as all items about high rise housing (as as vesse 
by the reader) : plus passages of 90 words or more about high rise but in articles o 
other topics. Photographs etc. were included in coverage. Measurement of item 
length in column centimetres used following bases; 
Times, normal eight column page columns. 
Kewham Recorder, Minimum five column page col^iuis. 
Municipal Joui^ - 1 , nomal three column page columns.
:k:lLJ:--^J2Lr;v!ii:J.:rLJl2IJ-^' normal double column page columns. 
Size changes proved a probloui only for early 1950s llunici.y;:-.l arid tlie '
Recorder; different columns were adjusted to base to yield indications of pa:;o 
coverage. Page ,'J.se changed in the Housing and ?lr"^in : RoviGw in 1964 so pro- ar.d 
post-1964 data are not comparable, llo. comparisons of length across media are v:J.i:l.
(i) ^4-ii^I_j^.,J^C£tILi.S,
(?or thy billies and kunicipr-J. Journal see ilgure 4.2). Navfham Recorc'.o:' nee ?igure II. I.
- ;i Pu'iir; "-i"'''' see ^itsure II • 2.
Figure II. 1; Cover/vy? of ;j;\'l*L TJ:.dlJ>i 
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(ii) Attitudes of coverage
The following codes were used:
Pro: item directly advocates increased levels of high rise housing provision cr- 
reports such advocacy.
i; item directly advocates reduced levels of high rise 'housing provision or 
criticizes existing level, or reports such advocacy or criticism. 
Neutral: item is neither 'pro 1 nor anti 1 .
Table II.1; Newspaper high flat coverage, 1950-70: Attitudes
The Times Percentage of coverage Total Average item
Pro
• ' ——— III -II •!
1950-54
1955-59
1960-64
1965-67
1968
1969
1970
Newham Recorder
1965-67
1968
1969
1970
29
38
43
0
3
11
4
55
8
10
0
Neutral
57
56
33
51
60
59
69
17
53
46
34
Anti
14
6
24
49
37
30
27
28
39
44
66
Column cms
345
230
526
271
2 S 418
543
^23
906
4,224
2,304
1,027
Length (c.c::<s)
20
16
23
27
31
27
2.0
70
77
54
54
rJY.ble 11,2 : Local Government Press, High Flat Coverage 1950-70: Attitudes
Municipal Journal Percentage of coverage
Pro Neutral Anti
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1965
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
Housing and Planning Review
20
0
33
6
4
19
3
6
1
11
47
18
22
6
9
0
28
14
4
0
1
80
94
66* 93
96
80
97
93
99
87
53
73
74
94
91
100
70
85
84
82
98
0
6
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
2
0
9 
4 
o
0
0
2
1
12
18
1
Total 
Column cms
404
222
2,970
3,105
5,587
4,673
1,905
3,243
2,225
1,220
1,408
1,474
1,040
1,217
1,032
1,298
1,024
1,015
852
1,246
762
Average iter:: 
Length(c.c.^s)
25
25
149
148
224
187
136
147
111
32
40
48
27
36
37 42' 
-. 30
17
16
23
42 .
1950-55
1956-61
1962-70
89
69
37
11
31
46
0
0
17
962
1,171
1,718
93
90
143
(iii) Focus of coverage
Ten categories of the focus of high flat coverage were defined: 
(1) General; (2) Local; (3) Social; (4) Technical; (5) Personal; 
(6) International; (7) Layout; (8) Design; (9) Costs; and (10) Other.
The last four categories were not used in analysing newspaper 
coverage; items.in these categories did not occur. Industrial or contractual 
aspects are classed under the 'technical' heading.
Table II. 3 : Newspaper and Local Government JPrer.s Coverage of the High Rii-6 
Housing Issue, 1950-7'-': Focus. '
Year Percentage
Focus of Coverage
The Times
1950-5^ 
1955-59 
1960-64
1965-67 
1968
1969 
1970
—
11 
22 
28 
44 
21
33
12
—
78 
66 
28
53 
42 
44 
26
3_
0 
0
26
0 
0 
0 
41
7 
5 
12
3 
31 
23 
21
2—,
0 
0 
6 
0
6
0 
0
—
4 
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0
-£— — 2. —
/•/*"•""*
•^ /"* /~- 
\ *-_ *-/
ICO 
100 
100
Municipal Journal
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1950-70
Housing and
1950-55
1956-61
1962-70
( iv ) Ori^i
0
0
27
4
4
13
7
0
0
13
2
0
11
0
0
0
2
0
17
0
0
6
52
67
8
13
2
2
1
3
12
27
34
65
68
56
70
76
49
75
41
64
55
24
0
29
1
0
0
0
0
7
4
1
4
8
7
0
0
2
0
2
15
13
1
3
9
4
21
8
0
2
1
2
52
27
37
6
4
34
21
22
26
10
18
13
37
14
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
5
0
0
0
0
2
1
0
0
0
29
0
0
3
0
29
0
0
0
5
15
2'o
0
6
0
17
8
0
1
0
6
10
0
24
8
15
5
0
10
8
0
6
11
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
0
0
16
65
79
47
89
74
23
27
0
8
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
37
0
0
1
0
0
1
2
4
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
2
1
0
7
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
10
0
0
6
0
7
9
0
1
ICO
100
1CO
1CC
100
100
• I CO
100
ICC
100
100
ICO
100
100
ICC'
100
100
100
ICO
ICO
100
1CG
Planning Review
87
50
0
n of Coverage
0* 7
22
8
11
45
0
12
20
0
0
0
0
0
13
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
20
0
0
0
0
'CO
100
! '^'
Eleven categories of the origins of high flat coverage were defined: 
(1) Local authorities; (2) Central government and Parliament; (3) Other 
national bodies; (4) Construction and building materials firms; (5) A-.v.lt- 
(6) Other design professionals; (?) fusing managers; (8) Soci .1 welf.-re
organizations; (9) News; (10) Foreign; (ll) Other Media.
Attributed articles, discussions and letters were allocated by the 
authors 1 category; unattributed items were allocated by the likely source of 
coverage. In Newspapers category (9) was used for all doubtful cases. In the 
local government press where most unattributed coverage concerned local. sche:r.os, 
doubtful cases were allocate.';! to category (1).
Table II.4 ; Newspaper Coverage of the H:i rh rj.se Housing Issue, 1950-70; Origins
Year Percentage Percenters
Focus of Coverage:
Total
The Times
1950-4
1955-9 
1960-4
1965-7
1968
1969
1970
25
11
5
0
7
2k
28
0
16
6
0
16
16
9
4
11
19
36
12
18
44
0
2
11
0
6
0
7
0
21
14
0
2
0
0
4
.6
2
0
9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
60
15
37
50
38
25
13
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
17
7
13
12
17
0
1OO
100
100
100
100
100
100
Table II.5 • Local Government Press Coverage of the High Rise Housing Ic_sue_. 
	1950-70: Origins.
Municipal Journal
1950 41 4 4 o 13 5 0 0 o 33 0 100
1951 61 04 29 0000005 100
1952 41 120 57 oooooo 100
1953 57 0 3 13 23 0 0 0 0 3 1 100
195/f ' 83 0009006001 100
1955 35 382 48 000041 100
1956 23 1 0 0 68 1 0 0 0 0 2 100
1957 43 3 4 2 43 5 o o o o 1 100
1958 22 1 7 52 15 3 0 0 0 0 1 100
1959 51 1 2 26 1 14 0 0 050 100
1960 58 3 0 14 4 5 0 0 4 11 0 100
1961 72 2 3 13 0 2 0 7 0 2 0 100
1962 61 5 4 15 7 9 0 o o 0 o 100
1963 28 0 o 66 3 0 o o o 3 o loo
1Q£4 22 9 0 41 9 17 0 0 200 100
19^5 • . 71 50 19 0500000 100
-1966 53 0 2 14 0 0 8 0 0 23 0 100
1957 76 2 0 1O 1 4 0 0 080 100
-1968 52 2 8 22 15 1 0 0 0 0 0 100
1969 7/i o o o o 3 13 o 8 o 1 too
^970 59 5200 34 ooooo 100
Ho'. ::i.n r:
1950-55 5 0 23 0 27 45 0 0 0 0 0 100
^56-^1 o o i o 56 15 11 o 16 o o 100
1062-70 19 0 15 13 0 13 13 0 12 17 0 100
APPENDIX III 
Influences on the use of High Rise Housing in Nev/ha.n
Table III.1 presents the results of an analysis of ward data for the London 
Borough of Newhara, in which ojf\ attempt was made to assess .the influence of a 
number of variables on local authority housing, in terms of the propensity oi 
the local authority to opt for a particular kind of housing mix. The major 
results of this analysis can be summarized as follows:
1) The housing character of a ward is the best predictor of the local authority's 
housing mix in that ward. Partial correlations indicate that the residual 
influence of ward environmental character (i.e. the indices measuring the 
proportion of ward areas allocated to residential, industrial and vacant 
land uses), once housing character variables have been controlled is slight.
2) The influence of net residential densities at the ward level appears.to be 
markedly less than aggregate data for the London Boroughs would suggest 
(see section 2.2).
3) There is a high degree of co-variation of the houses and high rise indices, 
apparently reflecting the influence of the West Ham and Newham Council's 
policies of using these building forms in tandem.
k) The indices showing high rise housing as a percentage of all housing, and 
the proportion of ward populations living in high rise flats (i.e. the 
objective importance of high rise as a living environment in tVie wards), 
display a much more pronounced pattern of influences. The greater the role 
played by the local authority in providing housing in a ward, and the 
greater the net residential density, the larger the numbers of people who T,i
in hiyh rise. 
5) Variables measuring the wards' character in teras of land use should re
treated with caution at this level of analysis. For example, open -pace rr.a 
be included within one ward but mark the boundaries of several others. 
Similarly industrial are:?.s may affect wards other than their ov.-n. This 
having been said, the data does not suggest that high rise has eitr.-vbeen
used in areas with easy access to open space or has in any significant 
way helped to create open space. High rise is more common in areas of 
low amenity.
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